forge-verify-incoming
Blocking receiver integrity gate for inbound ECL hand-offs to FORGE (ECL §6.2.2). Use automatically when reading any upstream artefact that carries a sibling `.envelope.json` — verifies `verify_pass` trace event keyed by `message_id` before processing the payload. Refuses and returns control to the orchestrator on integrity mismatch, missing event, schema violation, or undeclared edge. Do not use for artefacts without a sibling envelope.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 所属仓库
- Rynaro/magicite
- 最近更新
- 2026-10-14
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- ★ 2
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- forge-verify-incoming
- metadata
- { "phase": "F", "methodology": "FORGE" }
- description
- Blocking receiver integrity gate for inbound ECL hand-offs to FORGE (ECL §6.2.2). Use automatically when reading any upstream artefact that carries a sibling `.envelope.json` — verifies `verify_pass` trace event keyed by `message_id` before processing the payload. Refuses and returns control to the orchestrator on integrity mismatch, missing event, schema violation, or undeclared edge. Do not use for artefacts without a sibling envelope.
03 SKILL.md 正文
Verify-Incoming Skill — FORGE (blocking, symmetric)
Loaded when reading any upstream artefact handed off to FORGE that carries a sibling .envelope.json. Blocking receiver integrity gate (ECL §6.2.2).
When to use
Load this skill automatically when the Reasoner reads any upstream artefact at path P AND a sibling ${P%.*}.envelope.json exists. The skill enforces the blocking integrity gate: a verify_pass trace event keyed by message_id MUST be on record before processing begins. On any integrity or contract failure, the skill REFUSES and returns control to the orchestrator. If no .envelope.json sibling exists, skip silently.
Receiver-side integrity gate for inbound ECL hand-offs. When an upstream
artefact arrives with a sibling .envelope.json, FORGE MUST NOT process the
payload unless its SHA-256 integrity has been verified and passed. This is
the blocking posture mandated by ECL §6.2.2 ("a receiver SHALL NOT process a
payload whose integrity tag does not match"). It is symmetric: every Eidolon
in the roster ships this same gate, so no hand-off edge can silently skip it.
Posture change (vs. earlier opt-in warn-only): previous versions logged a warning and processed the payload anyway. That is now superseded. On an unverified or failed envelope this skill refuses and hands back to the orchestrator. Provenance is only a differentiator if receivers actually reject tampered payloads — end to end, not just at the orchestrator.
Where the cryptographic check runs (and why the receiver only reads)
FORGE's tool surface cannot run the SHA-256 gate itself (receiver Eidolons have restricted or no Bash). The mechanical check therefore runs at the orchestrator, once, before FORGE is dispatched:
# Orchestrator pre-step (host LLM, full Bash) — already shipped in the nexus CLI:
eidolons verify-envelope <artefact>.envelope.json --block # exit 3 ⇒ tamper/mismatch
# …or, when routing through the kernel:
eidolons run --verify <artefact>.envelope.json --verify-block # gates the route
The gate writes a verify_pass (or verify_fail) trace event keyed by
message_id. FORGE then enforces the result using only Read — no Bash
required:
- Read
.eidolons/.trace/<thread_id>.jsonl(thethread_idisenvelope.thread_id). - Find the event whose
message_idmatchesenvelope.message_id. verify_passwithintegrity_method: "sha256"→ integrity confirmed, proceed to contract conformance below.verify_fail, or no matching event → integrity unconfirmed → REFUSE (see Failure Mode). Do not process the payload.
Defense-in-depth (optional): if FORGE's host happens to grant Bash with
eidolons on PATH, it MAY independently re-run eidolons verify-envelope <env> --block and abort on a non-zero exit. The orchestrator pre-verify is the
contract; self-verification is an additional guard, never a replacement.
Memory: Recall + Ingest (CRYSTALIUM)
On an inbound hand-off, first recall related prior context (if CRYSTALIUM available):
mcp__crystalium__recall(
scope = { project: <cwd-project>, agent_class_visibility: "forge" },
query = <artefact GOAL + from.eidolon + artifact.kind>,
k = 5,
layers = ["semantic", "episodic", "procedural"]
)
Only after the integrity gate passes (verify_pass) ingest the received
envelope to record the inbound edge:
mcp__crystalium__ingest(
envelope = <received .envelope.json contents>,
payload = <artefact payload contents>
)
Never ingest an envelope that failed or skipped verification. Graceful skip:
if mcp__crystalium__* tools are unavailable, skip both calls silently.
Trigger
Load this skill automatically when:
- Reading an upstream artefact at path
P, and - A sibling file
${P%.*}.envelope.jsonexists in the same directory.
Detection rule (POSIX sh compatible):
envelope_path="${artefact_path%.*}.envelope.json"
[ -f "$envelope_path" ] && load_skill "verify-incoming"
If no .envelope.json sibling exists, this is a non-ECL artefact — skip the gate
silently and process normally.
Inbound edges FORGE accepts
to.eidolon MUST equal forge. from.eidolon MUST be a declared upstream
sender. Performative and artifact.kind are validated against the ECL inbound
contract contracts/<from>-to-forge.yaml (source of truth); the table below
is the convenience summary:
| from | performative(s) | artifact.kind |
|---|---|---|
atlas, spectra, apivr, idg |
PROPOSE, INFORM | consultation-request |
vigil |
PROPOSE, CRITIQUE, INFORM | root-cause-report |
A hand-off whose from.eidolon is not listed, or whose performative /
artifact.kind is not allowed for that edge, is an UNDECLARED_EDGE /
PERFORMATIVE_NOT_ALLOWED / ARTIFACT_KIND_NOT_ALLOWED violation → REFUSE.
Failure Mode (BLOCKING — refuse, do not process)
On any integrity or contract failure:
- Append a
verify_failevent to.eidolons/.trace/<thread_id>.jsonl. - Print to stderr:
[forge-verify-incoming] REFUSE: <FAILURE_CODE> from <from.eidolon>. - Do not process the payload. Hand control back to the orchestrator with a refusal. The orchestrator routes the failure to VIGIL (integrity / tamper investigation) or to the human — never a silent retry, never a silent process-anyway.
Failure codes: INTEGRITY_MISMATCH, UNVERIFIED (no verify_pass on record),
SCHEMA_INVALID, UNDECLARED_EDGE, PERFORMATIVE_NOT_ALLOWED,
ARTIFACT_KIND_NOT_ALLOWED.
On success: append verify_pass, then proceed with the payload.
Trace Events
Append one JSONL line per verification to .eidolons/.trace/<thread_id>.jsonl
(create if absent). The thread_id comes from envelope.thread_id; if the
envelope is unparseable, use unknown.
verify_pass:
{"ts":"<RFC3339>","event":"verify_pass","message_id":"<uuid>","thread_id":"<uuid>","from":"<eidolon>@<version>","to":"forge@<version>","performative":"<performative>","integrity_method":"sha256"}
verify_fail:
{"ts":"<RFC3339>","event":"verify_fail","message_id":"<uuid>","thread_id":"<uuid>","from":"<eidolon>@<version>","to":"forge@<version>","integrity_method":"sha256","verify_failure_code":"<CODE>","decision":"refused"}
Notes
- Blocking, not warn-only. Refusal is the whole point: a receiver that processes a tamper-flagged payload defeats the provenance guarantee.
- Symmetric. All six Eidolons ship this gate with identical semantics; the only per-Eidolon variation is the inbound-edge table above.
- Mechanical gate, single source of truth. The SHA-256 comparison is the
nexus
eidolons verify-envelopeverb (ECL §6.2.2) — never re-implemented or LLM-estimated in this skill. - Read-only enforcement. The receiver needs only
Readto consult the trace; this is why the gate is symmetric across tool-less Eidolons.
Reasoner — Verify-Incoming Skill (blocking, symmetric, ECL §6.2.2)
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