[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M77W5ZVS5EG07M2GYAX365MG":3,"skill-same:01M77W5ZVS5EG07M2GYAX365MG":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":30,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M77W5ZVS5EG07M2GYAX365MG","secrets-in-git-history",null,"Mine GitHub, GitLab and git history for identities, infrastructure and leaked credentials using commit author emails, GitHub code search, the commit .patch endpoint, trufflehog, gitleaks, git log pickaxe and full-ref history scans. Use when investigating a developer or organisation on GitHub, finding leaked API keys, AWS keys or tokens in code, enumerating org members and their personal repos, or recovering secrets deleted from HEAD but still present in history or forks. Applies to software supply-chain risk, credential exposure response, M&A technical diligence, and insider-threat investigation. Reference at useosint.com\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history.","Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent","Reihantt6","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F219822095?v=4","01M77KK94PV8B7C2D9XWXNS8DJ","Mohamad Reihan tegar prasetya","01M77KK958QFMTHYXGXFV7KZ79",2,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\ndescription: \"Mine GitHub, GitLab and git history for identities, infrastructure and leaked credentials using commit author emails, GitHub code search, the commit .patch endpoint, trufflehog, gitleaks, git log pickaxe and full-ref history scans. Use when investigating a developer or organisation on GitHub, finding leaked API keys, AWS keys or tokens in code, enumerating org members and their personal repos, or recovering secrets deleted from HEAD but still present in history or forks. Applies to software supply-chain risk, credential exposure response, M&A technical diligence, and insider-threat investigation. Reference at useosint.com\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history.\"\n---\n# Secrets in git history\n\nA repository is three intelligence products: a list of humans with real email\naddresses, a map of the organisation's infrastructure, and a credential store\nnobody meant to publish. The costly mistake is scanning the working tree.\nSecrets deleted from HEAD stay in history forever, and commits deleted from a\nbranch stay reachable through the fork network — scan only what is checked out\nand you are searching the one place the secret was definitely removed from.\n\n## What you're holding, and where to start\n\n| You have | Start with | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| An organisation name | Public org members, then their personal repos | Corporate repos are reviewed; personal ones are not |\n| A developer's name or handle | Commit emails across their repos | Yields an email nothing else gives you |\n| A commit email | Reverse-search across hosts; resolve any noreply ID | Links accounts across orgs and platforms |\n| A suspected credential leak | Both scanners over a mirror clone, all refs | HEAD-only scanning misses the point entirely |\n| A specific string — hostname, key prefix | `git log -S` pickaxe across all refs | Tells you when it entered and when it left |\n| A live domain | Check for an exposed `.git` — see the legal note | Full history from a web server, if authorized |\n| Nothing but a company website | Code search the org's internal domain names | Finds repos with no obvious link to the org |\n\n## The commit email leak\n\nGit records an author identity on every commit, self-asserted rather than\nverified. That cuts both ways: emails are trivially forged, and they are also\nthe most reliable public link between a code-host identity and a real mailbox.\n\n```bash\ngit clone --mirror https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fexample-org\u002Fexample-repo.git repo.git\ngit --git-dir=repo.git log --all --format='%an \u003C%ae>' | sort -u\n```\n\nGitHub's web UI does not display commit emails, which leads people to assume\nthey are hidden. They are not. Append `.patch` to any commit URL for a\nmail-format patch whose `From:` header carries the author name and email; the\nAPI returns the same under `commit.author.email`.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fexample-org\u002Fexample-repo\u002Fcommit\u002F\u003Csha>.patch | head -5\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002Fexample-org\u002Fexample-repo\u002Fcommits\u002F\u003Csha> | jq .commit.author\n```\n\n**The noreply pattern is the part worth understanding properly.** Users with\nemail privacy enabled commit as `username@users.noreply.github.com`, or in the\nnewer form `12345678+username@users.noreply.github.com`. That second form leaks\nthe account's **numeric user ID**, which is immutable and survives every rename\nthe account ever makes, so an old commit resolves to whoever holds it today:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Fuser\u002F12345678 | jq '.login, .created_at'\n```\n\nThat defeats a rename: an old commit under a long-abandoned handle points at the\nperson's current identity. The complementary failure on the subject's side is\nenabling email privacy *after* years of committing — every commit before that\ndate carries the real address, so pull the author list across all history.\n\n## Enumerating an organisation as a social graph\n\nCorporate repositories are reviewed. Personal ones are not, and developers put\nthe same infrastructure in both. The pivot is org to human to personal account.\n\nPublic org membership is opt-in and therefore incomplete, so triangulate:\n`https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Forgs\u002F\u003Corg>\u002Fpublic_members` gives the members who chose\nto be visible, while the author list across every org repository gives everyone\nwho actually committed, including those who never went public and those who left.\n\nFrom each human, pull repos, gists, followers, following, starred and watched\nrepositories. Stars and follows are the underused ones: nobody curates them for\nprivacy, and they map interests, employers, side projects and professional\nrelationships more honestly than any profile field. A cluster of developers all\nstarring the same obscure internal-looking tool are colleagues.\n\nPublic activity events cover a short recent window, but the public event stream\nis also published as a historical archive dataset, extending the analysis back\nyears. Commit timestamps in aggregate give working hours and a timezone.\n\n## Code search and its real limits\n\nHost code search finds strings across public repositories. Search what only this\norganisation would write: internal hostnames, private package names, cloud\naccount IDs, the email domain. The company name finds marketing copy; the\ninternal domain finds infrastructure.\n\nThe limits matter more than the syntax, because each is a silent gap. Code\nsearch covers **the default branch only** — no history, no other branches — so\nthe deleted secret is invisible to it by construction. **Not every repository is\nindexed**: very large ones, and forks with no independent activity, are commonly\nexcluded. Authentication is generally required and rate limits are tight. And\nmatching is token-based, so a substring inside a longer token may not match the\nway you expect.\n\nTreat code search as a discovery tool that tells you *which repositories* to\nclone. The actual work happens locally.\n\n## Everything that survives deletion\n\n- **Secrets removed from HEAD remain in history.** Deleting a file is a commit,\n  not an erasure; rewriting history does not reach clones, forks or caches; and\n  almost nobody rotates afterwards, because deleting felt like fixing.\n- **Commits in a fork network stay reachable by SHA**, even after a branch is\n  deleted, a PR is closed unmerged, or the fork is removed. Making a repository\n  private does not retract what reached forks, and force-pushed commits are\n  dangling rather than gone.\n- **Gists are unlisted, not private** — anyone with the URL reads a \"secret\"\n  gist, and URLs leak into logs, chats and tickets.\n- **CI logs are public on public repositories.** Masking of known secret values\n  fails whenever a value is base64-encoded, concatenated, URL-encoded, or\n  printed by a subprocess. Issue and PR attachments are likewise served by\n  opaque URL and stay retrievable after the issue or repository is gone.\n\n## Scanning properly\n\nMirror-clone, then run both scanners — their detector sets and false-positive\nprofiles differ and neither is a superset. Then pickaxe the strings they have no\ndetector for: internal domains, cloud account IDs, hostnames from config files.\n\n```bash\ntrufflehog git file:\u002F\u002F.\u002Frepo.git\ngitleaks detect --source=. -v\ngit log --all --source -S'internal.example.com' --oneline\ngit log --all --diff-filter=D --name-only --format='%H %aI %an'\n```\n\n**One warning about verification.** TruffleHog can confirm a candidate is live\nby calling the provider's API with it. That is an interaction with a third party\nusing someone else's credential, and it writes to their logs. Inside an\nauthorized assessment it is normally expected. Outside one, do not.\n\nCommands in [reference\u002Fgit-archaeology.md](reference\u002Fgit-archaeology.md); what\nto grep for and how to triage a hit in\n[reference\u002Fhigh-signal-indicators.md](reference\u002Fhigh-signal-indicators.md).\n\n## Exposed .git directories\n\nA deployment that copies a working tree to a web root publishes `.git` with it,\nand from `.git\u002Fconfig`, `.git\u002FHEAD` and the object store the entire history is\nreconstructible — source, credentials, author identities, everything.\n\nObserving that such a path exists, through a search index or an existing scan\nresult, is passive. **Retrieving it is not.** Downloading a `.git` directory is\naccessing a system and taking data from it, and no misconfiguration constitutes\npermission. Only inside a written authorization; otherwise, report it.\n\n## Where this goes wrong\n\n- **Author identity is self-asserted.** Anyone can commit as anyone; an email in\n  a commit is a claim, not proof of authorship. Signed commits are the exception\n  and the signature is what you verify, not the string.\n- **Bots dominate commit counts.** CI, dependency bots and merge automation\n  produce huge volumes of commits under synthetic identities. Filter them before\n  concluding anything about people.\n- **Rebases and squash merges rewrite authorship.** The committer becomes\n  whoever performed the merge, and squashing collapses many authors into one.\n  Absence from the log is not absence from the project.\n- **Timezone inference is soft.** Laptops travel, offsets get set by hand, CI\n  commits at UTC. Corroboration only.\n- **Test fixtures and documentation examples look exactly like credentials**,\n  and provider examples propagate into thousands of repos. Search first.\n- **Public-by-design keys are not leaks.** Publishable and referrer-locked\n  browser keys are meant to ship; reporting one as a breach costs you\n  credibility on the findings that are real.\n- **A namesake org or typosquat is not your target**, and a history-only finding\n  is often more live than a current one, because removal without rotation is the\n  norm.\n\n## Confidence grading\n\n- **Confirmed** — an identity link where a noreply numeric ID resolves to the\n  account, or the same commit email appears under multiple accounts already tied\n  to the person. A credential exposure whose format is valid, whose scope the\n  surrounding context establishes, with a commit SHA and date.\n- **Probable** — a distinctive email or handle recurring across repositories\n  with consistent commit timing, or a credential-shaped string in a real config\n  file outside a test path.\n- **Unconfirmed** — a single unsigned commit's author string; a common handle; a\n  scanner hit in a fixture or documentation example; a credential of unknown\n  scope.\n- **Rejected** — a documented placeholder, a publishable key, or an expired\n  temporary credential presented as a live exposure.\n\nRecord repository, commit SHA, date and file path for every finding. A SHA is an\nimmutable citation; a line number is not.\n\n## Worked example\n\nObjective: map the engineering team of a company whose site names only\nexecutives.\n\nCode search on the internal domain `svc.example-corp.net` returns three\nrepositories, none carrying the company's name. Mirror-cloning them gives\nfourteen distinct author emails, eleven corporate and three personal.\n\nOne author commits as `48211903+dhaverford@users.noreply.github.com`. Resolving\nthe numeric ID returns a *different* current username — the account was renamed,\nand the old handle links to conference talks and a personal blog the current one\ndoes not.\n\nThe dead end: gitleaks flags an AWS-shaped key in a test fixture, and searching\nthe string finds it verbatim in AWS's own documentation. Discarded, and recorded\nas discarded so nobody re-raises it.\n\nThe real finding is a `terraform.tfstate` added and deleted in the same week two\nyears ago, recovered from history. No live credential, but four internal\nhostnames and a cloud account ID — infrastructure for `find-hidden-subdomains`.\n\nGrade: team roster **probable**, since commit authorship is self-asserted and\nuncorroborated. The rename link **confirmed** — the numeric ID is immutable.\n\n## Pivots\n\n| New selector | Goes to |\n|---|---|\n| Commit author emails | `what-an-email-reveals`, `what-leaked-about-you` |\n| Handles, renamed accounts, numeric IDs | `hunt-a-handle` |\n| Real names from commits and CODEOWNERS | `find-anyone` |\n| Internal hostnames from config | `find-hidden-subdomains`, `who-owns-this-domain` |\n| Cloud account IDs, buckets, IPs | `find-exposed-servers`, `google-like-a-spy` |\n| Committed documents and images | `secrets-in-file-metadata` |\n| Org structure and vendor stack | `x-ray-a-company` |\n| Deleted repos and removed pages | `read-deleted-pages` |\n| Credential appearing in a public dump | `find-leaks-in-the-wild` |\n| The contributor network | `graph-the-network` |\n\n## Legal, disclosure, and the one hard rule\n\n**Never authenticate with a credential you find.** Not to check whether it\nworks, not read-only, not once. It is unauthorized access under computer-misuse\nlaw in most jurisdictions, and publication does not confer permission. Establish\nvalidity from format, context and metadata and nothing else. See\n[..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md](..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md).\n\nA live-looking credential creates an obligation to disclose. Report promptly\nthrough a security contact, a `security.txt` route, or the host's vulnerability\nchannel; give the repository, commit SHA and file path; state explicitly that\nhistory rewriting is not sufficient and the credential must be **rotated**; keep\nonly a redacted reference; publish nothing. Hosts running automated\nsecret-scanning partnerships may have revoked the token already, which does not\nremove the obligation to tell someone.\n\nCloning public repositories is normal use; bulk cloning and high-rate API\nquerying are rate-limited and can breach terms. Commit emails are personal data\nunder GDPR and equivalent regimes whatever the repository's status — collect the\nminimum and set a retention period.\n","# Secrets in git history\n\nA repository is three intelligence products: a list of humans with real email\naddresses, a map of the organisation's infrastructure, and a credential store\nnobody meant to publish. The costly mistake is scanning the working tree.\nSecrets deleted from HEAD stay in history forever, and commits deleted from a\nbranch stay reachable through the fork network — scan only what is checked out\nand you are searching the one place the secret was definitely removed from.\n\n## What you're holding, and where to start\n\n| You have | Start with | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| An organisation name | Public org members, then their personal repos | Corporate repos are reviewed; personal ones are not |\n| A developer's name or handle | Commit emails across their repos | Yields an email nothing else gives you |\n| A commit email | Reverse-search across hosts; resolve any noreply ID | Links accounts across orgs and platforms |\n| A suspected credential leak | Both scanners over a mirror clone, all refs | HEAD-only scanning misses the point entirely |\n| A specific string — hostname, key prefix | `git log -S` pickaxe across all refs | Tells you when it entered and when it left |\n| A live domain | Check for an exposed `.git` — see the legal note | Full history from a web server, if authorized |\n| Nothing but a company website | Code search the org's internal domain names | Finds repos with no obvious link to the org |\n\n## The commit email leak\n\nGit records an author identity on every commit, self-asserted rather than\nverified. That cuts both ways: emails are trivially forged, and they are also\nthe most reliable public link between a code-host identity and a real mailbox.\n\n```bash\ngit clone --mirror https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fexample-org\u002Fexample-repo.git repo.git\ngit --git-dir=repo.git log --all --format='%an \u003C%ae>' | sort -u\n```\n\nGitHub's web UI does not display commit emails, which leads people to assume\nthey are hidden. They are not. Append `.patch` to any commit URL for a\nmail-format patch whose `From:` header carries the author name and email; the\nAPI returns the same under `commit.author.email`.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fexample-org\u002Fexample-repo\u002Fcommit\u002F\u003Csha>.patch | head -5\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002Fexample-org\u002Fexample-repo\u002Fcommits\u002F\u003Csha> | jq .commit.author\n```\n\n**The noreply pattern is the part worth understanding properly.** Users with\nemail privacy enabled commit as `username@users.noreply.github.com`, or in the\nnewer form `12345678+username@users.noreply.github.com`. That second form leaks\nthe account's **numeric user ID**, which is immutable and survives every rename\nthe account ever makes, so an old commit resolves to whoever holds it today:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Fuser\u002F12345678 | jq '.login, .created_at'\n```\n\nThat defeats a rename: an old commit under a long-abandoned handle points at the\nperson's current identity. The complementary failure on the subject's side is\nenabling email privacy *after* years of committing — every commit before that\ndate carries the real address, so pull the author list across all history.\n\n## Enumerating an organisation as a social graph\n\nCorporate repositories are reviewed. Personal ones are not, and developers put\nthe same infrastructure in both. The pivot is org to human to personal account.\n\nPublic org membership is opt-in and therefore incomplete, so triangulate:\n`https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Forgs\u002F\u003Corg>\u002Fpublic_members` gives the members who chose\nto be visible, while the author list across every org repository gives everyone\nwho actually committed, including those who never went public and those who left.\n\nFrom each human, pull repos, gists, followers, following, starred and watched\nrepositories. Stars and follows are the underused ones: nobody curates them for\nprivacy, and they map interests, employers, side projects and professional\nrelationships more honestly than any profile field. A cluster of developers all\nstarring the same obscure internal-looking tool are colleagues.\n\nPublic activity events cover a short recent window, but the public event stream\nis also published as a historical archive dataset, extending the analysis back\nyears. Commit timestamps in aggregate give working hours and a timezone.\n\n## Code search and its real limits\n\nHost code search finds strings across public repositories. Search what only this\norganisation would write: internal hostnames, private package names, cloud\naccount IDs, the email domain. The company name finds marketing copy; the\ninternal domain finds infrastructure.\n\nThe limits matter more than the syntax, because each is a silent gap. Code\nsearch covers **the default branch only** — no history, no other branches — so\nthe deleted secret is invisible to it by construction. **Not every repository is\nindexed**: very large ones, and forks with no independent activity, are commonly\nexcluded. Authentication is generally required and rate limits are tight. And\nmatching is token-based, so a substring inside a longer token may not match the\nway you expect.\n\nTreat code search as a discovery tool that tells you *which repositories* to\nclone. The actual work happens locally.\n\n## Everything that survives deletion\n\n- **Secrets removed from HEAD remain in history.** Deleting a file is a commit,\n  not an erasure; rewriting history does not reach clones, forks or caches; and\n  almost nobody rotates afterwards, because deleting felt like fixing.\n- **Commits in a fork network stay reachable by SHA**, even after a branch is\n  deleted, a PR is closed unmerged, or the fork is removed. Making a repository\n  private does not retract what reached forks, and force-pushed commits are\n  dangling rather than gone.\n- **Gists are unlisted, not private** — anyone with the URL reads a \"secret\"\n  gist, and URLs leak into logs, chats and tickets.\n- **CI logs are public on public repositories.** Masking of known secret values\n  fails whenever a value is base64-encoded, concatenated, URL-encoded, or\n  printed by a subprocess. Issue and PR attachments are likewise served by\n  opaque URL and stay retrievable after the issue or repository is gone.\n\n## Scanning properly\n\nMirror-clone, then run both scanners — their detector sets and false-positive\nprofiles differ and neither is a superset. Then pickaxe the strings they have no\ndetector for: internal domains, cloud account IDs, hostnames from config files.\n\n```bash\ntrufflehog git file:\u002F\u002F.\u002Frepo.git\ngitleaks detect --source=. -v\ngit log --all --source -S'internal.example.com' --oneline\ngit log --all --diff-filter=D --name-only --format='%H %aI %an'\n```\n\n**One warning about verification.** TruffleHog can confirm a candidate is live\nby calling the provider's API with it. That is an interaction with a third party\nusing someone else's credential, and it writes to their logs. Inside an\nauthorized assessment it is normally expected. Outside one, do not.\n\nCommands in [reference\u002Fgit-archaeology.md](reference\u002Fgit-archaeology.md); what\nto grep for and how to triage a hit in\n[reference\u002Fhigh-signal-indicators.md](reference\u002Fhigh-signal-indicators.md).\n\n## Exposed .git directories\n\nA deployment that copies a working tree to a web root publishes `.git` with it,\nand from `.git\u002Fconfig`, `.git\u002FHEAD` and the object store the entire history is\nreconstructible — source, credentials, author identities, everything.\n\nObserving that such a path exists, through a search index or an existing scan\nresult, is passive. **Retrieving it is not.** Downloading a `.git` directory is\naccessing a system and taking data from it, and no misconfiguration constitutes\npermission. Only inside a written authorization; otherwise, report it.\n\n## Where this goes wrong\n\n- **Author identity is self-asserted.** Anyone can commit as anyone; an email in\n  a commit is a claim, not proof of authorship. Signed commits are the exception\n  and the signature is what you verify, not the string.\n- **Bots dominate commit counts.** CI, dependency bots and merge automation\n  produce huge volumes of commits under synthetic identities. Filter them before\n  concluding anything about people.\n- **Rebases and squash merges rewrite authorship.** The committer becomes\n  whoever performed the merge, and squashing collapses many authors into one.\n  Absence from the log is not absence from the project.\n- **Timezone inference is soft.** Laptops travel, offsets get set by hand, CI\n  commits at UTC. Corroboration only.\n- **Test fixtures and documentation examples look exactly like credentials**,\n  and provider examples propagate into thousands of repos. Search first.\n- **Public-by-design keys are not leaks.** Publishable and referrer-locked\n  browser keys are meant to ship; reporting one as a breach costs you\n  credibility on the findings that are real.\n- **A namesake org or typosquat is not your target**, and a history-only finding\n  is often more live than a current one, because removal without rotation is the\n  norm.\n\n## Confidence grading\n\n- **Confirmed** — an identity link where a noreply numeric ID resolves to the\n  account, or the same commit email appears under multiple accounts already tied\n  to the person. A credential exposure whose format is valid, whose scope the\n  surrounding context establishes, with a commit SHA and date.\n- **Probable** — a distinctive email or handle recurring across repositories\n  with consistent commit timing, or a credential-shaped string in a real config\n  file outside a test path.\n- **Unconfirmed** — a single unsigned commit's author string; a common handle; a\n  scanner hit in a fixture or documentation example; a credential of unknown\n  scope.\n- **Rejected** — a documented placeholder, a publishable key, or an expired\n  temporary credential presented as a live exposure.\n\nRecord repository, commit SHA, date and file path for every finding. A SHA is an\nimmutable citation; a line number is not.\n\n## Worked example\n\nObjective: map the engineering team of a company whose site names only\nexecutives.\n\nCode search on the internal domain `svc.example-corp.net` returns three\nrepositories, none carrying the company's name. Mirror-cloning them gives\nfourteen distinct author emails, eleven corporate and three personal.\n\nOne author commits as `48211903+dhaverford@users.noreply.github.com`. Resolving\nthe numeric ID returns a *different* current username — the account was renamed,\nand the old handle links to conference talks and a personal blog the current one\ndoes not.\n\nThe dead end: gitleaks flags an AWS-shaped key in a test fixture, and searching\nthe string finds it verbatim in AWS's own documentation. Discarded, and recorded\nas discarded so nobody re-raises it.\n\nThe real finding is a `terraform.tfstate` added and deleted in the same week two\nyears ago, recovered from history. No live credential, but four internal\nhostnames and a cloud account ID — infrastructure for `find-hidden-subdomains`.\n\nGrade: team roster **probable**, since commit authorship is self-asserted and\nuncorroborated. The rename link **confirmed** — the numeric ID is immutable.\n\n## Pivots\n\n| New selector | Goes to |\n|---|---|\n| Commit author emails | `what-an-email-reveals`, `what-leaked-about-you` |\n| Handles, renamed accounts, numeric IDs | `hunt-a-handle` |\n| Real names from commits and CODEOWNERS | `find-anyone` |\n| Internal hostnames from config | `find-hidden-subdomains`, `who-owns-this-domain` |\n| Cloud account IDs, buckets, IPs | `find-exposed-servers`, `google-like-a-spy` |\n| Committed documents and images | `secrets-in-file-metadata` |\n| Org structure and vendor stack | `x-ray-a-company` |\n| Deleted repos and removed pages | `read-deleted-pages` |\n| Credential appearing in a public dump | `find-leaks-in-the-wild` |\n| The contributor network | `graph-the-network` |\n\n## Legal, disclosure, and the one hard rule\n\n**Never authenticate with a credential you find.** Not to check whether it\nworks, not read-only, not once. It is unauthorized access under computer-misuse\nlaw in most jurisdictions, and publication does not confer permission. Establish\nvalidity from format, context and metadata and nothing else. See\n[..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md](..\u002F..\u002FETHICS.md).\n\nA live-looking credential creates an obligation to disclose. Report promptly\nthrough a security contact, a `security.txt` route, or the host's vulnerability\nchannel; give the repository, commit SHA and file path; state explicitly that\nhistory rewriting is not sufficient and the credential must be **rotated**; keep\nonly a redacted reference; publish nothing. Hosts running automated\nsecret-scanning partnerships may have revoked the token already, which does not\nremove the obligation to tell someone.\n\nCloning public repositories is normal use; bulk cloning and high-rate API\nquerying are rate-limited and can breach terms. Commit emails are personal data\nunder GDPR and equivalent regimes whatever the repository's status — collect the\nminimum and set a retention period.\n",{"description":7},"main","58843b159d7a4050d6b785a98b908cce505c0b92","agent\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6","reihsns.web.id","2026-08-19 20:08:18",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent --skill secrets-in-git-history",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent --skill secrets-in-git-history",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Reihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent --skill secrets-in-git-history","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history\u002FSKILL.md",true,[46,52],{"path":47,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":50,"sourceHtmlUrl":51},"reference\u002Fgit-archaeology.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",9022,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history\u002Freference\u002Fgit-archaeology.md",{"path":53,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"reference\u002Fhigh-signal-indicators.md",9045,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fsecrets-in-git-history\u002Freference\u002Fhigh-signal-indicators.md",[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XDCYZ407XYMF2T4P6F7VT","youtube-transcript","Extract transcripts from YouTube videos. Use when the user asks for a transcript, subtitles, or captions of a YouTube video and provides a YouTube URL (youtube.com\u002Fwatch?v=, youtu.be\u002F, or similar). Supports output with or without timestamps.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XD7PBC98J6MXGJJ2TJ8DX","youtube-thumbnail-design","YouTube thumbnail design with specific dimensions, contrast rules, and mobile preview optimization. Covers safe zones, text placement, face expression psychology, and A\u002FB testing. Use for: YouTube thumbnails, video cover images, click-through optimization. Triggers: youtube thumbnail, thumbnail design, video thumbnail, click through rate, ctr optimization, youtube cover, video cover image, thumbnail maker, thumbnail tips, youtube design, video preview image","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fyoutube-thumbnail-design\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XD2541C8HXJ6RHYZP4NGJ","youtube-short-maker","Make YouTube Shorts that hold attention with Pexo — vertical 9:16, fast-paced, hook in the first 3 seconds. Describe your topic and Pexo writes the script, generates the shots, picks the models, and assembles a finished Short with music and captions. Use for YouTube Shorts: \"youtube short\", \"make a youtube short\", \"shorts video\", \"short-form video\". NOT for long-form or landscape video.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fyoutube-short-maker\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XCXKVSYK7KTZ3PQBVVGFD","xcode-project-setup","Safely modifies Xcode projects (.pbxproj) to add Swift Packages and link files. Use this skill whenever an iOS project needs dependencies installed (e.g. Firebase, Alamofire).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fxcode-project-setup\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XCR1DV8ZQK2NHWKVY4EWX","x402","Set up Browser Use Cloud payments with x402 — pay per request from a crypto wallet (USDC on Base mainnet), no signup or API key. Two setups it works out up front — \"just use it\" (set up a wallet so you or Claude Code can run cloud browser tasks paid from the wallet — Claude writes and runs throwaway scripts, nothing touches your codebase) or \"build it in\" (install the SDK and write the key + code into your project). Walks through wallet setup, funding, .env, and a ~$1 test run. Use when the user asks about x402, pay-per-use, USDC payments, or wants Browser Use Cloud without an API key. For the free-tier signup (reverse-CAPTCHA → API key), use `browser-use cloud signup` or the `cloud` skill instead.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fx402\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":19},"01M77XCMD3R3ZBZQQSW6E0793B","x-twitter-scraper","Build GitHub Copilot workflows with Xquik X API SDKs, REST endpoints, hosted Apify Actor runs, MCP tools, TweetClaw OpenClaw plugin installs, signed webhooks, tweet search, user lookup, follower exports, media actions, and agent automation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FReihantt6\u002Fsns-myagent\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagent\u002Fskills\u002Fx-twitter-scraper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]