[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71H9GF6N2VNV5E35MCPV77Q":3,"skill-same:01M71H9GF6N2VNV5E35MCPV77Q":99},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":72,"commitSha":73,"skillDirectory":74,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":75,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":76,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M71H9GF6N2VNV5E35MCPV77Q","logging-sysmon-detect",null,"Detect malicious scheduled task creation and modification using Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create for schtasks.exe), 11 (File Create for task XML), and Windows Security Event 4698\u002F4702. The analyst correlates task creation with suspicious parent processes, public directory paths, and encoded command arguments to identify persistence and lateral movement via scheduled tasks. Activates for requests involving scheduled task detection, Sysmon persistence hunting, or T1053.005 Scheduled Task\u002FJob analysis.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Flogging\u002Fsysmon\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"logging sysmon detect","logging","detect","sysmon","command","de","hunting","suspicious","create","malicious","monitoring","tasks","windows-security","analysis","Bash","scheduled","cybersecurity","cm","creation","ids","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: logging-sysmon-detect\ndescription: Detect malicious scheduled task creation and modification using Sysmon Event IDs 1 (Process Create for schtasks.exe), 11 (File Create for task XML), and Windows Security Event 4698\u002F4702. The analyst correlates task creation with suspicious parent processes, public directory paths, and encoded command arguments to identify persistence and lateral movement via scheduled tasks. Activates for requests involving scheduled task detection, Sysmon persistence hunting, or T1053.005 Scheduled Task\u002FJob analysis.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- sysmon\n- scheduled-tasks\n- persistence\n- detection\n- threat-hunting\n- windows-security\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Execution Isolation\n- Process Termination\n- Hardware-based Process Isolation\n- Platform Monitoring\n- Process Suspension\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1021\n- T1059\n- T1547\n- T1562.001\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Detecting Malicious Scheduled Tasks with Sysmon\n\n## Overview\n\nAdversaries abuse Windows Task Scheduler (schtasks.exe, at.exe) for persistence (T1053.005)\nand lateral movement. Sysmon Event ID 1 captures schtasks.exe process creation with full\ncommand-line arguments, while Event ID 11 captures task XML files written to\nC:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\. Windows Security Event 4698 logs task registration details.\nThis skill covers building detection rules that correlate these events to identify\nmalicious scheduled tasks created from suspicious paths, with encoded payloads, or\ntargeting remote systems.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting malicious scheduled tasks with sysmon\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon installed with a detection-focused configuration (e.g., SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong)\n- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Elastic, or Sentinel)\n- PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging enabled (Event 4104)\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Configure Sysmon to log Event IDs 1, 11, 12, 13 with task-related filters\n2. Build detection rules for schtasks.exe \u002Fcreate with suspicious arguments\n3. Correlate Event 4698 (task registered) with Sysmon Event 1 (process create)\n4. Hunt for tasks executing from public directories or with encoded commands\n5. Alert on remote task creation (schtasks \u002Fs) for lateral movement detection\n\n## Expected Output\n\n```\n[CRITICAL] Suspicious Scheduled Task Detected\n  Task: \\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateCheck\n  Command: powershell.exe -enc SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAGUAYgBSAGU...\n  Created By: DOMAIN\\compromised_user\n  Parent Process: cmd.exe (PID 4532)\n  Source: \\\\192.168.1.50 (remote creation)\n  MITRE: T1053.005 - Scheduled Task\u002FJob\n```\n","# Detecting Malicious Scheduled Tasks with Sysmon\n\n## Overview\n\nAdversaries abuse Windows Task Scheduler (schtasks.exe, at.exe) for persistence (T1053.005)\nand lateral movement. Sysmon Event ID 1 captures schtasks.exe process creation with full\ncommand-line arguments, while Event ID 11 captures task XML files written to\nC:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\. Windows Security Event 4698 logs task registration details.\nThis skill covers building detection rules that correlate these events to identify\nmalicious scheduled tasks created from suspicious paths, with encoded payloads, or\ntargeting remote systems.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting malicious scheduled tasks with sysmon\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon installed with a detection-focused configuration (e.g., SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong)\n- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Elastic, or Sentinel)\n- PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging enabled (Event 4104)\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Configure Sysmon to log Event IDs 1, 11, 12, 13 with task-related filters\n2. Build detection rules for schtasks.exe \u002Fcreate with suspicious arguments\n3. Correlate Event 4698 (task registered) with Sysmon Event 1 (process create)\n4. Hunt for tasks executing from public directories or with encoded commands\n5. Alert on remote task creation (schtasks \u002Fs) for lateral movement detection\n\n## Expected Output\n\n```\n[CRITICAL] Suspicious Scheduled Task Detected\n  Task: \\Microsoft\\Windows\\UpdateCheck\n  Command: powershell.exe -enc SQBuAHYAbwBrAGUALQBXAGUAYgBSAGU...\n  Created By: DOMAIN\\compromised_user\n  Parent Process: cmd.exe (PID 4532)\n  Source: \\\\192.168.1.50 (remote creation)\n  MITRE: T1053.005 - Scheduled Task\u002FJob\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":44,"capec":49,"model":50,"tools":51,"domain":35,"maxTurns":55,"nist_csf":56,"subdomain":48,"description":7,"mitre_attack":61,"d3fend_techniques":66},[22,45,46,47,48,31],"scheduled-tasks","persistence","detection","threat-hunting",[],"sonnet",[52,33,53,54],"Read","Glob","Grep",20,[57,58,59,60],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[62,63,64,65],"T1021","T1059","T1547","T1562.001",[67,68,69,70,71],"Execution Isolation","Process Termination","Hardware-based Process Isolation","Platform Monitoring","Process Suspension","main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fwindows\u002Flogging\u002Fsysmon\u002Fdetect","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill logging-sysmon-detect",{"tool":85,"command":86},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill logging-sysmon-detect",{"tool":88,"command":89},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill logging-sysmon-detect","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Flogging\u002Fsysmon\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",true,[93],{"path":94,"resourceType":95,"resourceTypeDesc":96,"sizeBytes":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",678,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Flogging\u002Fsysmon\u002Fdetect\u002Findex.json",[100,121,141,162,184,200],{"skillNo":101,"name":102,"nameZh":6,"description":103,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":104,"categories":105,"keywords":106,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[107,21,108,109,46,24,36,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,35,120],"services","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":122,"name":123,"nameZh":6,"description":124,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":125,"categories":126,"keywords":127,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[128,107,129,109,130,131,132,35,33,32,133,134,135,136,24,23,137,138,139,140],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","team","across","crackmapexec","native","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":147,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[148,149,150,151,152,153,35,33,154,32,155,156,24,138,157,158,159,160,161,50],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper",{"skillNo":163,"name":164,"nameZh":6,"description":165,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":166,"categories":167,"keywords":168,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[21,169,170,171,172,173,174,36,175,35,120,176,177,178,179,180,181,182,183,24],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":185,"name":186,"nameZh":6,"description":187,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":188,"categories":189,"keywords":190,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[191,192,21,193,171,173,194,36,195,175,35,120,32,196,197,198,199,183,24,110],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":201,"name":202,"nameZh":6,"description":203,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":204,"categories":205,"keywords":206,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[207,21,171,208,194,36,209,210,35,120,211,212,213,214,215,216,24,110,217,218],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]