[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M70P0BFWX7RMTQNS3CXFV638":3,"skill-same:01M70P0BFWX7RMTQNS3CXFV638":75},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":28,"publishedAt":45,"linkOnly":46,"markdownContent":47,"markdownBody":48,"frontMatter":49,"refName":51,"commitSha":52,"skillDirectory":53,"forksCount":54,"repositoryHtmlUrl":55,"repositoryHomepageUrl":56,"ownerHtmlUrl":57,"ownerBlogUrl":58,"ownerDescription":59,"updatedAt":60,"install":61,"resources":74},"01M70P0BFWX7RMTQNS3CXFV638","security",null,"Security pattern database for Claude Code plugin audits. Covers execution surfaces, supply chain, data exfiltration, and prompt injection.","shengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills","shengdabai","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F116417419?v=4","01M70F6D2WY5PQV5A92BKYJQEW","Tony Sheng","01M70F6D3GAAAYZ5H4CC1G8VXM",3,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxiaolai\u002Fnlpm\u002Fskills\u002Fnlpm\u002Fsecurity\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":26,"taxonomyTypeDesc":27},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[5,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44],"code","injection","data","pattern","surfaces","supply chain","claude code plugin","plugin","exfiltration","database","prompt","prompt injection","execution","for","chain","supply","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: security\ndescription: Security pattern database for Claude Code plugin audits. Covers execution surfaces, supply chain, data exfiltration, and prompt injection.\nversion: 0.1.0\n---\n\n# Security Scan Patterns for Claude Code Plugins\n\n## Execution Surfaces\n\nClaude Code plugins have five execution surfaces that must be scanned:\n\n| Surface | Files | Risk Level | Why |\n|---------|-------|------------|-----|\n| Hooks | `hooks\u002Fhooks.json`, referenced scripts | Critical | Runs on EVERY tool call automatically |\n| Scripts | `scripts\u002F*.sh`, `*.py`, `*.js` | High | Executed by commands\u002Fagents |\n| MCP Servers | `.mcp.json` | High | Network access, data flow |\n| Bash in commands | `commands\u002F*.md` with Bash tool | Medium | Shell execution via Claude |\n| Install scripts | `package.json` postinstall, setup scripts | Medium | Runs on install |\n\n## Dangerous Shell Patterns\n\n### Critical (immediate risk)\n\n| Pattern | Regex | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Pipe to shell | `curl.*\\|.*sh`, `wget.*\\|.*bash` | Remote code execution |\n| Eval with variables | `eval\\s+[\"']?\\$` | Arbitrary code execution |\n| Reverse shell | `bash\\s+-i\\s+>&`, `\u002Fdev\u002Ftcp\u002F` | Backdoor |\n| Base64 decode and exec | `base64.*\\|.*sh`, `base64.*\\|.*python` | Obfuscated execution |\n| SSH key exfiltration | `cat.*\\.ssh\u002F`, `scp.*\\.ssh\u002F` | Key theft |\n| Token exfiltration | Secrets like GITHUB_TOKEN or API keys sent to curl\u002Fwget | Credential theft |\n\n### High (likely dangerous)\n\n| Pattern | Regex | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Subprocess with shell=True | `subprocess\\.(call\\|run\\|Popen).*shell\\s*=\\s*True` | Python shell injection |\n| OS system calls | `os\\.system\\(` | Python shell execution |\n| Dynamic require\u002Fimport | `require\\(\\s*\\$`, `import\\(\\s*\\$` | Dynamic code loading |\n| File write outside repo | `> ~\u002F`, `> \u002Fetc\u002F`, `> \u002Ftmp\u002F.*\\.sh` | System modification |\n| Sudo usage | `sudo\\s+` | Privilege escalation |\n| PATH modification | Appending to bashrc, zshrc, or profile | Persistent system modification |\n\n### Medium (context-dependent)\n\n| Pattern | Regex | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Network calls | `curl\\s+`, `wget\\s+`, `fetch\\(`, `requests\\.(get\\|post)` | Data exfiltration potential |\n| Environment access | `process\\.env`, `os\\.environ`, shell variable expansion | Sensitive data access |\n| File reads outside repo | Reading from home directory or system paths | Data access |\n| Runtime package install | `npm install`, `pip install`, `gem install` | Supply chain risk |\n| Shell exec functions | Functions that execute strings as shell commands | Shell execution |\n\n## MCP Configuration Risks\n\nScan `.mcp.json` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Remote servers | `url` field pointing to non-localhost | High |\n| Unknown domains | Domain not in known-safe list | High |\n| Broad permissions | `permissions` with wildcard or extensive list | Medium |\n| File system access | Server with `fs` or `filesystem` capability | Medium |\n| Shell access | Server with `shell` or execution capability | Critical |\n| Missing auth | Remote server without `auth` field | High |\n\nKnown-safe MCP domains: `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `modelcontextprotocol.io`, `github.com`, `api.anthropic.com`\n\n## Hook Safety Rules\n\nScan `hooks\u002Fhooks.json` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Hook runs shell script | `command` field references `.sh`, `.py`, `.js` | Medium (must scan the script) |\n| Hook uses user input | Script receives prompt or input variables without sanitization | High |\n| Hook on every event | Triggers on PreToolUse or PostToolUse without tool filter | Medium |\n| Hook modifies files | Script writes to disk on every tool call | Medium |\n| Hook makes network calls | Script contains network request commands | High |\n\n## Dependency Supply Chain\n\nScan `package.json` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| postinstall scripts | `scripts.postinstall` exists | High |\n| preinstall scripts | `scripts.preinstall` exists | High |\n| Git URL dependencies | Deps pointing to git URLs | Medium |\n| Unpinned versions | Wildcard or \"latest\" version | Medium |\n\nScan `requirements.txt` \u002F `pyproject.toml` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Git URL deps | git+https or git+ssh URLs | Medium |\n| Unpinned | No version pin | Low |\n| Direct URL | HTTP download URLs | High |\n\n## Prompt Injection Surfaces\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Untrusted file content in prompts | Agent reads arbitrary file then uses content in Bash | High |\n| User input passed to shell | Command takes arguments and passes to Bash without sanitization | Critical |\n| Template expansion | Variable expansion in hook scripts with user-controlled values | High |\n\n## Severity Definitions\n\n| Severity | Meaning | Action |\n|----------|---------|--------|\n| Critical | Immediate exploitation risk: RCE, credential theft, backdoor | Block contribution, file security issue |\n| High | Likely dangerous: shell injection, data exfil, privilege escalation | Block contribution, report in audit |\n| Medium | Context-dependent: network calls, env access, runtime installs | Report in audit, flag for review |\n| Low | Minor concern: unpinned deps, broad permissions | Report as informational |\n\n## Report Format\n\nThe security scan section in an audit report follows this structure:\n\n```\n## Security Scan\n\n| Severity | Count |\n|----------|-------|\n| Critical | N |\n| High | N |\n| Medium | N |\n| Low | N |\n\n### Findings\n\n| # | Severity | File | Line | Pattern | Description |\n|---|----------|------|------|---------|-------------|\n```\n\n## Risk Gate\n\nIf any Critical or High findings exist, the `contribute-approved` label must NOT be applied. The audit report must include a prominent warning and the tracking issue must link to the security findings.\n","# Security Scan Patterns for Claude Code Plugins\n\n## Execution Surfaces\n\nClaude Code plugins have five execution surfaces that must be scanned:\n\n| Surface | Files | Risk Level | Why |\n|---------|-------|------------|-----|\n| Hooks | `hooks\u002Fhooks.json`, referenced scripts | Critical | Runs on EVERY tool call automatically |\n| Scripts | `scripts\u002F*.sh`, `*.py`, `*.js` | High | Executed by commands\u002Fagents |\n| MCP Servers | `.mcp.json` | High | Network access, data flow |\n| Bash in commands | `commands\u002F*.md` with Bash tool | Medium | Shell execution via Claude |\n| Install scripts | `package.json` postinstall, setup scripts | Medium | Runs on install |\n\n## Dangerous Shell Patterns\n\n### Critical (immediate risk)\n\n| Pattern | Regex | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Pipe to shell | `curl.*\\|.*sh`, `wget.*\\|.*bash` | Remote code execution |\n| Eval with variables | `eval\\s+[\"']?\\$` | Arbitrary code execution |\n| Reverse shell | `bash\\s+-i\\s+>&`, `\u002Fdev\u002Ftcp\u002F` | Backdoor |\n| Base64 decode and exec | `base64.*\\|.*sh`, `base64.*\\|.*python` | Obfuscated execution |\n| SSH key exfiltration | `cat.*\\.ssh\u002F`, `scp.*\\.ssh\u002F` | Key theft |\n| Token exfiltration | Secrets like GITHUB_TOKEN or API keys sent to curl\u002Fwget | Credential theft |\n\n### High (likely dangerous)\n\n| Pattern | Regex | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Subprocess with shell=True | `subprocess\\.(call\\|run\\|Popen).*shell\\s*=\\s*True` | Python shell injection |\n| OS system calls | `os\\.system\\(` | Python shell execution |\n| Dynamic require\u002Fimport | `require\\(\\s*\\$`, `import\\(\\s*\\$` | Dynamic code loading |\n| File write outside repo | `> ~\u002F`, `> \u002Fetc\u002F`, `> \u002Ftmp\u002F.*\\.sh` | System modification |\n| Sudo usage | `sudo\\s+` | Privilege escalation |\n| PATH modification | Appending to bashrc, zshrc, or profile | Persistent system modification |\n\n### Medium (context-dependent)\n\n| Pattern | Regex | Why |\n|---------|-------|-----|\n| Network calls | `curl\\s+`, `wget\\s+`, `fetch\\(`, `requests\\.(get\\|post)` | Data exfiltration potential |\n| Environment access | `process\\.env`, `os\\.environ`, shell variable expansion | Sensitive data access |\n| File reads outside repo | Reading from home directory or system paths | Data access |\n| Runtime package install | `npm install`, `pip install`, `gem install` | Supply chain risk |\n| Shell exec functions | Functions that execute strings as shell commands | Shell execution |\n\n## MCP Configuration Risks\n\nScan `.mcp.json` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Remote servers | `url` field pointing to non-localhost | High |\n| Unknown domains | Domain not in known-safe list | High |\n| Broad permissions | `permissions` with wildcard or extensive list | Medium |\n| File system access | Server with `fs` or `filesystem` capability | Medium |\n| Shell access | Server with `shell` or execution capability | Critical |\n| Missing auth | Remote server without `auth` field | High |\n\nKnown-safe MCP domains: `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `modelcontextprotocol.io`, `github.com`, `api.anthropic.com`\n\n## Hook Safety Rules\n\nScan `hooks\u002Fhooks.json` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Hook runs shell script | `command` field references `.sh`, `.py`, `.js` | Medium (must scan the script) |\n| Hook uses user input | Script receives prompt or input variables without sanitization | High |\n| Hook on every event | Triggers on PreToolUse or PostToolUse without tool filter | Medium |\n| Hook modifies files | Script writes to disk on every tool call | Medium |\n| Hook makes network calls | Script contains network request commands | High |\n\n## Dependency Supply Chain\n\nScan `package.json` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| postinstall scripts | `scripts.postinstall` exists | High |\n| preinstall scripts | `scripts.preinstall` exists | High |\n| Git URL dependencies | Deps pointing to git URLs | Medium |\n| Unpinned versions | Wildcard or \"latest\" version | Medium |\n\nScan `requirements.txt` \u002F `pyproject.toml` for:\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Git URL deps | git+https or git+ssh URLs | Medium |\n| Unpinned | No version pin | Low |\n| Direct URL | HTTP download URLs | High |\n\n## Prompt Injection Surfaces\n\n| Risk | Check | Severity |\n|------|-------|----------|\n| Untrusted file content in prompts | Agent reads arbitrary file then uses content in Bash | High |\n| User input passed to shell | Command takes arguments and passes to Bash without sanitization | Critical |\n| Template expansion | Variable expansion in hook scripts with user-controlled values | High |\n\n## Severity Definitions\n\n| Severity | Meaning | Action |\n|----------|---------|--------|\n| Critical | Immediate exploitation risk: RCE, credential theft, backdoor | Block contribution, file security issue |\n| High | Likely dangerous: shell injection, data exfil, privilege escalation | Block contribution, report in audit |\n| Medium | Context-dependent: network calls, env access, runtime installs | Report in audit, flag for review |\n| Low | Minor concern: unpinned deps, broad permissions | Report as informational |\n\n## Report Format\n\nThe security scan section in an audit report follows this structure:\n\n```\n## Security Scan\n\n| Severity | Count |\n|----------|-------|\n| Critical | N |\n| High | N |\n| Medium | N |\n| Low | N |\n\n### Findings\n\n| # | Severity | File | Line | Pattern | Description |\n|---|----------|------|------|---------|-------------|\n```\n\n## Risk Gate\n\nIf any Critical or High findings exist, the `contribute-approved` label must NOT be applied. The audit report must include a prominent warning and the tracking issue must link to the security findings.\n",{"name":5,"version":50,"description":7},"0.1.0","main","7850740bd837adb32f0a109ab2af82482196c6f2","skills\u002Fxiaolai\u002Fnlpm\u002Fskills\u002Fnlpm\u002Fsecurity",1,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fzturnsgo.com","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai","https:\u002F\u002Fzturnsgo.com\u002F","AI × education creator — producer, not consumer. Taught 6,000+ learners; shipping learning tools & daily essays with Claude Code, practicing @xiaolai's way 🥋","2026-11-01 21:28:23",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":62,"prompt":72,"zipAvailable":73},[63,66,69],{"tool":64,"command":65},"npx","npx skills add shengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills --skill security",{"tool":67,"command":68},"bunx","bunx skills add shengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills --skill security",{"tool":70,"command":71},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add shengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills --skill security","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxiaolai\u002Fnlpm\u002Fskills\u002Fnlpm\u002Fsecurity\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[76,85,93,101,109,117],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":80,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":84},"01M73H7XKBHE1ETQDZT94MF9HH","seedance-prompt-en","Write effective prompts for Jimeng Seedance 2.0 multimodal AI video generation. Use when users want to create video prompts using text, images, videos, and audio inputs with the @ reference system. Covers camera movements, effects replication, video extension, editing, music beat-matching, e-commerce ads, short dramas, and educational content.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fseedance-prompt-en\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fseedance-prompt-en\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":84},"01M73GRE9998Q1DZWC71N41JWG","onepage-pdf","Convert an HTML page into a single continuous-page PDF (one tall page, no pagination breaks), preserving desktop layout, backgrounds and selectable text. Use when the user asks to turn an HTML file\u002Freport\u002Fproposal into a \"single-page PDF\", \"long PDF\", \"不分页 PDF\", \"单页 PDF\", \"长图式 PDF\", or complains that an HTML-to-PDF export breaks into pages or cuts content. Supports optional string redaction with leak verification.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fonepage-pdf\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fonepage-pdf\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":94,"name":95,"nameZh":6,"description":96,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":84},"01M73GQG1KZDADVPV3MHAT1J5A","native-feel-cross-platform-desktop","Use when the user is designing, prototyping, or rewriting a desktop app that must run on multiple OSes (macOS + Windows, optionally Linux) AND feel indistinguishable from a native app to its users — fast launch, native windowing, native input handling, native materials. Trigger words include \"cross-platform desktop\", \"Electron alternative\", \"Tauri vs native\", \"WebView wrapper\", \"near-native performance\", \"Raycast architecture\", \"WebKit\u002FWebView2 quirks\", \"WKWebView\", \"system tray app\", \"global hotkey app\", \"launcher app\". Do NOT trigger this skill for pure web apps, pure mobile apps, or for greenfield projects that have no native-feel requirement.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnative-feel-cross-platform-desktop\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnative-feel-cross-platform-desktop\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106,"categories":107,"keywords":108,"publishedAt":84},"01M73G87PDNSMKG2FHWCYER6N8","gstack","Router for the gstack skill suite. (gstack)","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgstack\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgstack\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":110,"name":111,"nameZh":6,"description":112,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":113,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":84},"01M73G3EAQWKCM8DB8D0N0QSVG","fireworks-tech-graph","Use when the user wants to create any technical diagram - architecture, data flow, flowchart, sequence, agent\u002Fmemory, or concept map - and export as SVG+PNG. Trigger on: \"画图\" \"帮我画\" \"生成图\" \"做个图\" \"架构图\" \"流程图\" \"可视化一下\" \"出图\" \"generate diagram\" \"draw diagram\" \"visualize\" or any system\u002Fflow description the user wants illustrated.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ffireworks-tech-graph\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ffireworks-tech-graph\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":118,"name":119,"nameZh":6,"description":120,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":121,"categories":122,"keywords":123,"publishedAt":84},"01M73G086AXAH9DW1H5G5N3CPB","dbs-video-extract","接收抖音、小红书、微信视频号等短视频链接或分享文案，查询作品／账号数据并提取语音文字稿，按作者和标题归档为 Markdown。用户希望完整解析短视频、取得数据或文字稿时使用；运行前检查 TikHub 与轻抖使用凭证，缺少时用新手能理解的方式引导购买和安全配置。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fshengdabai\u002FTony-Claude-Code-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdbs-video-extract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]