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Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: public_research, community\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# WEB3 SMART CONTRACT AUDIT\n\n10 bug classes. Pre-dive kill signals. Foundry PoC template. Real paid examples.\n\n---\n\n## PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS (check BEFORE any code review)\n\n> ZKsync lesson: $322M TVL + OZ audit + 750K LOC + 5 sessions = 0 findings. Large well-audited bridges are extremely hard.\n\n1. **TVL \u003C $500K** → max payout capped too low for effort\n2. **2+ top-tier audits** (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OpenZeppelin) on simple protocol → bugs already found\n3. **Protocol \u003C 500 lines, single A→B→C flow** → minimal attack surface\n4. **Formula**: `max_realistic_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap)` — if \u003C $10K, skip\n\n**Soft kill:** OZ\u002FToB\u002FCyfrin audit on current version + codebase > 500K LOC → expect 40+ hours for maybe 1 finding. Only proceed if bounty floor > $50K AND you have protocol-specific expertise.\n\n**Target scoring (go if >= 6\u002F10):**\n- TVL > $10M: +2\n- Immunefi program with Critical >= $50K: +2\n- No top-tier audit on current version: +2\n- \u003C 30 days since deploy: +1\n- Protocol you've hunted before: +1\n- Source code + natspec comments: +1\n- Upgradeable proxies: +1\n\n---\n\n## THE ONE RULE\n\n> \"Read ALL sibling functions. If `vote()` has a modifier, check `poke()`, `reset()`, `harvest()`. The missing modifier on the sibling IS the bug.\"\n\nThis single rule explains 19% of all Critical findings.\n\n---\n\n## 1. ACCOUNTING STATE DESYNCHRONIZATION\n> #1 Critical bug class — 28% of all Criticals on Immunefi.\n\n### What It Is\nTwo state variables supposed to stay in sync. One code path updates A but forgets B. Later code reads both and makes decisions based on stale B.\n\n```\nReal Value = A - B\nIf A updated but B isn't → Real Value appears larger → phantom value\n```\n\n### Root Cause Patterns\n\n**Variant 1: Phantom Yield** (Yeet protocol — 35 duplicate reports)\n```solidity\nfunction startUnstake(uint256 amount) external {\n    totalSupply -= amount;  \u002F\u002F decremented BEFORE transfer\n    \u002F\u002F aToken.balanceOf(this) still reflects old value\n    \u002F\u002F yieldAmount = aToken.balanceOf - totalSupply = phantom yield\n}\n```\n\n**Variant 2: Fast Path Skips State Update** (Alchemix V3)\n```solidity\nfunction claimRedemption(uint256 tokenId) external {\n    if (transmuter.balance >= amount) {\n        transmuter.transfer(user, amount);\n        _burn(tokenId);\n        return;  \u002F\u002F EARLY RETURN — cumulativeEarmarked, _redemptionWeight, totalDebt never updated\n    }\n    \u002F\u002F Slow path: updates all state vars correctly\n    alchemist.redeem(...);\n}\n```\n\n**Variant 3: Update Happens in Wrong Order** (Alchemix)\n```solidity\nfunction deposit(uint256 amount) external {\n    _shares = (amount * totalShares) \u002F totalAssets;  \u002F\u002F calculated BEFORE deposit\n    totalAssets += amount;   \u002F\u002F assets added AFTER shares calculated → wrong rate\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Find all accounting variables\ngrep -rn \"totalSupply\\|totalShares\\|totalAssets\\|totalDebt\\|cumulativeReward\\|rewardPerShare\" contracts\u002F\n\n# Find all early returns in claim\u002Fredeem functions\ngrep -rn \"\\breturn\\b\" contracts\u002F -B3 | grep -B3 \"if\\b\"\n\n# For each early return: which state updates in normal path are skipped?\n```\n\n---\n\n## 2. ACCESS CONTROL\n> #2 Critical — 19% of Criticals. $953M lost in 2024 alone.\n\n### Variant 1: Missing Modifier on Sibling Function\n```solidity\nfunction vote(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) {  \u002F\u002F guarded\nfunction reset(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) { \u002F\u002F guarded\nfunction poke(uint256 tokenId) external {                         \u002F\u002F NO GUARD → infinite FLUX inflation\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 2: Wrong Check (Existence vs Ownership)\n```solidity\nfunction split(uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount) external {\n    _requireOwned(tokenId);  \u002F\u002F checks if token EXISTS, not if caller OWNS it\n    _burn(tokenId);\n    _mint(msg.sender, amount);  \u002F\u002F attacker steals tokens they don't own\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 3: Silent Modifier (if vs require)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — non-admin silently gets through:\nmodifier onlyAdmin() {\n    if (msg.sender == admin) {\n        _;  \u002F\u002F body only executes for admin, but non-admin doesn't revert\n    }\n}\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: require(msg.sender == admin, \"Not admin\"); _;\n```\n\n### Variant 4: Uninitialized Proxy\n```solidity\nfunction initialize(address _owner) public {  \u002F\u002F MISSING: initializer modifier\n    owner = _owner;  \u002F\u002F anyone can call → become owner\n}\n\u002F\u002F Fix: constructor() { _disableInitializers(); }\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Find sibling function families — do ALL have the same modifier set?\ngrep -rn \"function vote\\|function poke\\|function reset\\|function update\\|function claim\\|function harvest\" contracts\u002F -A2\n\n# Ownership check: existence vs ownership?\ngrep -rn \"_requireOwned\\|ownerOf\\|_isApprovedOrOwner\\|_checkAuthorized\" contracts\u002F -B5\n\n# Silent modifiers\ngrep -rn \"modifier\\b\" contracts\u002F -A8 | grep -B3 \"if (\" | grep -v \"require\\|revert\"\n\n# Uninitialized initializer\ngrep -rn \"function initialize\\b\" contracts\u002F -A3\ngrep -rn \"_disableInitializers()\" contracts\u002F\n```\n\n### Real Paid Examples\n\n| Protocol | Payout | Bug |\n|---|---|---|\n| Wormhole | $10M | Uninitialized UUPS proxy → anyone calls initialize() |\n| ZeroLend | n\u002Fa | split() uses existence check, not ownership check |\n| Alchemix | n\u002Fa | poke() missing onlyNewEpoch → infinite FLUX inflation |\n| Parity | $150M frozen | No access control on initWallet() in library |\n\n---\n\n## 3. INCOMPLETE CODE PATH\n> #3 Critical — 17% of Criticals.\n\n### The Function Family Comparison Test\n```\n1. List all state changes in function A (deposit\u002Fplace\u002Fcreate)\n2. List all state changes in function B (withdraw\u002Fupdate\u002Fcancel)\n3. For each state change in A: does B have the corresponding reverse?\n4. For each token transfer in A: does B have the corresponding refund?\nIf A does X but B doesn't do the reverse of X → BUG.\n```\n\n### Variant 1: Update Function Missing Refund (ThunderNFT)\n```solidity\nfunction place_order(OrderInput calldata order) external {\n    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), order.price);  \u002F\u002F takes tokens\n    orders[orderId] = order;\n}\nfunction update_order(OrderInput calldata updatedOrder) external {\n    \u002F\u002F BUG: NO REFUND for sell orders when price decreases → tokens permanently stuck\n    orders[orderId] = updatedOrder;\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 2: Partial Fill Token Stuck (Plume)\n```solidity\nfunction swapForETH(uint256 amountIn) external {\n    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amountIn);\n    uint256 filled = dex.swap(amountIn);  \u002F\u002F partial fill possible\n    _refundExcessEth(amountIn - filled);  \u002F\u002F BUG: refunds ETH only, not ERC20\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 3: mint() Bypasses Check That deposit() Has (MetaPool)\n```solidity\nfunction deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver) public override {\n    shares = _deposit(assets, receiver);  \u002F\u002F includes receipt validation\n}\nfunction mint(uint256 shares, address receiver) public override {\n    assets = convertToAssets(shares);\n    _mint(receiver, shares);  \u002F\u002F MISSING: _deposit() validation → mints without receiving assets\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"function place_\\|function create_\\|function add_\\|function open_\" contracts\u002F -A5\ngrep -rn \"function update_\\|function modify_\\|function cancel_\" contracts\u002F -A5\ngrep -rn \"safeApprove\\b\" contracts\u002F    # safeApprove without zero-reset before\ngrep -rn \"delete\\b\" contracts\u002F -B5 -A5  # delete before operation completes\ngrep -rn \"function deposit\\|function mint\\|function withdraw\\|function redeem\" contracts\u002F -A10\n```\n\n---\n\n## 4. OFF-BY-ONE & BOUNDARY CONDITIONS\n> #4 High — 22% of Highs. Single character change. Massive impact.\n\n### Root Cause\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VeChain Stargate — post-exit reward drain:\nfunction _claimableDelegationPeriods(address delegator) internal view returns (uint256) {\n    if (endPeriod > nextClaimablePeriod) {  \u002F\u002F BUG: should be >=\n        return 0;  \u002F\u002F exited users get nothing\n    }\n    return nextClaimablePeriod - lastClaimedPeriod;  \u002F\u002F rewards for period AFTER exit\n}\n```\n\n### Mental Test for Every Comparison\n> For every `if (A > B)`: \"What happens when A == B?\" Is that correct?\n\n### 6 Boundary Locations to Check\n1. Period\u002FEpoch boundaries: `>` vs `>=` at period end\n2. Time-based locks: does `block.timestamp == deadline` lock or unlock?\n3. Loop break conditions: `break` with `>` vs `>=`\n4. Array index boundaries: `i \u003C= array.length` (should be `i \u003C array.length`)\n5. Amount\u002Fbalance boundaries: `>= amount` allows exact full withdrawal?\n6. Rounding\u002Fprecision: can any input produce 0 output that should be non-zero?\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Boundaries in comparisons\ngrep -rn \"Period\\|Epoch\\|Round\\|Deadline\\|period\\|epoch\\|deadline\" contracts\u002F -A3 | grep \"[\u003C>][^=]\"\n\n# Loop breaks\ngrep -rn \"\\bbreak\\b\" contracts\u002F -B10\n\n# Off-by-one in array access\ngrep -rn \"\\.length\\s*-\\s*1\\|i\\s*\u003C=\\s*.*\\.length\\b\" contracts\u002F\n```\n\n---\n\n## 5. ORACLE \u002F PRICE MANIPULATION\n> 12% of all reports. Largest individual payouts. $117M Mango, $70M Curve.\n\n### Bug A: Missing Staleness Check (most common)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE:\n(, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\nreturn uint256(price);  \u002F\u002F If Chainlink node goes down, stale price returned indefinitely\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT:\n(, int256 price,, uint256 updatedAt,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\nrequire(block.timestamp - updatedAt \u003C= MAX_PRICE_AGE, \"Stale price\");\nrequire(price > 0, \"Invalid price\");\n```\n\n### Bug B: Missing Confidence Interval (Pyth)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE:\nPythStructs.Price memory p = pyth.getPriceUnsafe(priceFeed);\nreturn p.price;  \u002F\u002F ignores p.conf (confidence interval)\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT:\nrequire(p.conf * 10 \u003C= uint64(p.price), \"Price too uncertain\");\n\u002F\u002F conf > 10% of price = untrustworthy\n```\n\n### Bug C: TWAP Too Short (flash loan manipulatable)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: 60-second TWAP\nuint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[] (2);\nsecondsAgos[0] = 60; secondsAgos[1] = 0;\n\u002F\u002F Flash loan can shift price for entire 60s window\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: 1800s minimum TWAP (30 min)\n```\n\n### Bug D: Single-Source Oracle\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: only Uniswap spot price\nuint price = getUniswapSpotPrice(token);  \u002F\u002F flash loan manipulatable\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: Chainlink primary, Uniswap TWAP as fallback, require close agreement\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Missing staleness check\ngrep -rn \"latestRoundData\" contracts\u002F -A5 | grep -v \"updatedAt\\|timestamp\"\n\n# Pyth price usage — confidence interval checked?\ngrep -rn \"getPriceUnsafe\\|getPrice\\b\" contracts\u002F -A8 | grep -v \"conf\\|confidence\"\n\n# TWAP windows — short TWAP flag\ngrep -rn \"secondsAgo\\|TWAP\\|cardinality\" contracts\u002F -A5\n```\n\n---\n\n## 6. ERC4626 VAULT ATTACKS\n\n### Exchange Rate Manipulation (near-empty vault)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — first depositor attack:\n\u002F\u002F 1. Attacker deposits 1 wei → gets 1 share\n\u002F\u002F 2. Attacker donates large amount directly (transfer, not deposit)\n\u002F\u002F 3. Exchange rate: 1 share = (1 + donation) assets\n\u002F\u002F 4. Victim deposits → rounds down to 0 shares → free donation to attacker\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: virtual shares (OpenZeppelin v4.9+)\nfunction _decimalsOffset() internal view virtual override returns (uint8) {\n    return 9;  \u002F\u002F add 1e9 virtual shares + assets to prevent manipulation\n}\n```\n\n### ERC4626 Transfer (moves shares but not stake\u002Flock records)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: shares transferred, but lock records stay with original owner\n\u002F\u002F → shares stuck, can't redeem → permanent freeze (Belong pattern)\nfunction transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external override {\n    _transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);  \u002F\u002F moves shares\n    \u002F\u002F MISSING: transfer lock record from msg.sender to `to`\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"function transfer\\|function transferFrom\" contracts\u002F -A15\ngrep -rn \"function deposit\\|function mint\\|function withdraw\\|function redeem\" contracts\u002F -A10\n```\n\n---\n\n## 7. REENTRANCY\n> 2016–present. CEI pattern prevents it. Still found in DeFi.\n\n### Variants\n- **Single-function**: attacker re-enters same function before state updated\n- **Cross-function**: re-enters a sibling function with stale state\n- **Cross-contract**: re-enters via a callback to another protocol\n- **Read-only**: re-enters a view function that returns stale data used by attacker\n\n### Root Cause Pattern\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE (effects after interaction):\nfunction withdraw(uint256 amount) external {\n    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);\n    (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(\"\");  \u002F\u002F INTERACTION first\n    require(success);\n    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;  \u002F\u002F EFFECT after → reentrancy window\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT (CEI — Checks, Effects, Interactions):\nfunction withdraw(uint256 amount) external {\n    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);  \u002F\u002F CHECK\n    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;            \u002F\u002F EFFECT\n    (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(\"\");  \u002F\u002F INTERACTION last\n    require(success);\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# External calls before state updates\ngrep -rn \"\\.call{value\\|safeTransfer\\|transfer(\" contracts\u002F -B10 | grep -v \"require\\|revert\"\n\n# Missing nonReentrant modifier on critical functions\ngrep -rn \"function withdraw\\|function redeem\\|function claim\" contracts\u002F -A2 | grep -v \"nonReentrant\"\n\n# Storage slot for reentrancy guard\ngrep -rn \"nonReentrant\\|ReentrancyGuard\\|_notEntered\" contracts\u002F\n```\n\n---\n\n\n## Contents\n\n- [8. FLASH LOAN ATTACKS](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [9. SIGNATURE REPLAY](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [10. PROXY \u002F UPGRADE ISSUES](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [FOUNDRY POC TEMPLATE](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Related Skills & Chains](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# WEB3 SMART CONTRACT AUDIT\n\n10 bug classes. Pre-dive kill signals. Foundry PoC template. Real paid examples.\n\n---\n\n## PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS (check BEFORE any code review)\n\n> ZKsync lesson: $322M TVL + OZ audit + 750K LOC + 5 sessions = 0 findings. Large well-audited bridges are extremely hard.\n\n1. **TVL \u003C $500K** → max payout capped too low for effort\n2. **2+ top-tier audits** (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OpenZeppelin) on simple protocol → bugs already found\n3. **Protocol \u003C 500 lines, single A→B→C flow** → minimal attack surface\n4. **Formula**: `max_realistic_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap)` — if \u003C $10K, skip\n\n**Soft kill:** OZ\u002FToB\u002FCyfrin audit on current version + codebase > 500K LOC → expect 40+ hours for maybe 1 finding. Only proceed if bounty floor > $50K AND you have protocol-specific expertise.\n\n**Target scoring (go if >= 6\u002F10):**\n- TVL > $10M: +2\n- Immunefi program with Critical >= $50K: +2\n- No top-tier audit on current version: +2\n- \u003C 30 days since deploy: +1\n- Protocol you've hunted before: +1\n- Source code + natspec comments: +1\n- Upgradeable proxies: +1\n\n---\n\n## THE ONE RULE\n\n> \"Read ALL sibling functions. If `vote()` has a modifier, check `poke()`, `reset()`, `harvest()`. The missing modifier on the sibling IS the bug.\"\n\nThis single rule explains 19% of all Critical findings.\n\n---\n\n## 1. ACCOUNTING STATE DESYNCHRONIZATION\n> #1 Critical bug class — 28% of all Criticals on Immunefi.\n\n### What It Is\nTwo state variables supposed to stay in sync. One code path updates A but forgets B. Later code reads both and makes decisions based on stale B.\n\n```\nReal Value = A - B\nIf A updated but B isn't → Real Value appears larger → phantom value\n```\n\n### Root Cause Patterns\n\n**Variant 1: Phantom Yield** (Yeet protocol — 35 duplicate reports)\n```solidity\nfunction startUnstake(uint256 amount) external {\n    totalSupply -= amount;  \u002F\u002F decremented BEFORE transfer\n    \u002F\u002F aToken.balanceOf(this) still reflects old value\n    \u002F\u002F yieldAmount = aToken.balanceOf - totalSupply = phantom yield\n}\n```\n\n**Variant 2: Fast Path Skips State Update** (Alchemix V3)\n```solidity\nfunction claimRedemption(uint256 tokenId) external {\n    if (transmuter.balance >= amount) {\n        transmuter.transfer(user, amount);\n        _burn(tokenId);\n        return;  \u002F\u002F EARLY RETURN — cumulativeEarmarked, _redemptionWeight, totalDebt never updated\n    }\n    \u002F\u002F Slow path: updates all state vars correctly\n    alchemist.redeem(...);\n}\n```\n\n**Variant 3: Update Happens in Wrong Order** (Alchemix)\n```solidity\nfunction deposit(uint256 amount) external {\n    _shares = (amount * totalShares) \u002F totalAssets;  \u002F\u002F calculated BEFORE deposit\n    totalAssets += amount;   \u002F\u002F assets added AFTER shares calculated → wrong rate\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Find all accounting variables\ngrep -rn \"totalSupply\\|totalShares\\|totalAssets\\|totalDebt\\|cumulativeReward\\|rewardPerShare\" contracts\u002F\n\n# Find all early returns in claim\u002Fredeem functions\ngrep -rn \"\\breturn\\b\" contracts\u002F -B3 | grep -B3 \"if\\b\"\n\n# For each early return: which state updates in normal path are skipped?\n```\n\n---\n\n## 2. ACCESS CONTROL\n> #2 Critical — 19% of Criticals. $953M lost in 2024 alone.\n\n### Variant 1: Missing Modifier on Sibling Function\n```solidity\nfunction vote(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) {  \u002F\u002F guarded\nfunction reset(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) { \u002F\u002F guarded\nfunction poke(uint256 tokenId) external {                         \u002F\u002F NO GUARD → infinite FLUX inflation\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 2: Wrong Check (Existence vs Ownership)\n```solidity\nfunction split(uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount) external {\n    _requireOwned(tokenId);  \u002F\u002F checks if token EXISTS, not if caller OWNS it\n    _burn(tokenId);\n    _mint(msg.sender, amount);  \u002F\u002F attacker steals tokens they don't own\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 3: Silent Modifier (if vs require)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — non-admin silently gets through:\nmodifier onlyAdmin() {\n    if (msg.sender == admin) {\n        _;  \u002F\u002F body only executes for admin, but non-admin doesn't revert\n    }\n}\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: require(msg.sender == admin, \"Not admin\"); _;\n```\n\n### Variant 4: Uninitialized Proxy\n```solidity\nfunction initialize(address _owner) public {  \u002F\u002F MISSING: initializer modifier\n    owner = _owner;  \u002F\u002F anyone can call → become owner\n}\n\u002F\u002F Fix: constructor() { _disableInitializers(); }\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Find sibling function families — do ALL have the same modifier set?\ngrep -rn \"function vote\\|function poke\\|function reset\\|function update\\|function claim\\|function harvest\" contracts\u002F -A2\n\n# Ownership check: existence vs ownership?\ngrep -rn \"_requireOwned\\|ownerOf\\|_isApprovedOrOwner\\|_checkAuthorized\" contracts\u002F -B5\n\n# Silent modifiers\ngrep -rn \"modifier\\b\" contracts\u002F -A8 | grep -B3 \"if (\" | grep -v \"require\\|revert\"\n\n# Uninitialized initializer\ngrep -rn \"function initialize\\b\" contracts\u002F -A3\ngrep -rn \"_disableInitializers()\" contracts\u002F\n```\n\n### Real Paid Examples\n\n| Protocol | Payout | Bug |\n|---|---|---|\n| Wormhole | $10M | Uninitialized UUPS proxy → anyone calls initialize() |\n| ZeroLend | n\u002Fa | split() uses existence check, not ownership check |\n| Alchemix | n\u002Fa | poke() missing onlyNewEpoch → infinite FLUX inflation |\n| Parity | $150M frozen | No access control on initWallet() in library |\n\n---\n\n## 3. INCOMPLETE CODE PATH\n> #3 Critical — 17% of Criticals.\n\n### The Function Family Comparison Test\n```\n1. List all state changes in function A (deposit\u002Fplace\u002Fcreate)\n2. List all state changes in function B (withdraw\u002Fupdate\u002Fcancel)\n3. For each state change in A: does B have the corresponding reverse?\n4. For each token transfer in A: does B have the corresponding refund?\nIf A does X but B doesn't do the reverse of X → BUG.\n```\n\n### Variant 1: Update Function Missing Refund (ThunderNFT)\n```solidity\nfunction place_order(OrderInput calldata order) external {\n    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), order.price);  \u002F\u002F takes tokens\n    orders[orderId] = order;\n}\nfunction update_order(OrderInput calldata updatedOrder) external {\n    \u002F\u002F BUG: NO REFUND for sell orders when price decreases → tokens permanently stuck\n    orders[orderId] = updatedOrder;\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 2: Partial Fill Token Stuck (Plume)\n```solidity\nfunction swapForETH(uint256 amountIn) external {\n    token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amountIn);\n    uint256 filled = dex.swap(amountIn);  \u002F\u002F partial fill possible\n    _refundExcessEth(amountIn - filled);  \u002F\u002F BUG: refunds ETH only, not ERC20\n}\n```\n\n### Variant 3: mint() Bypasses Check That deposit() Has (MetaPool)\n```solidity\nfunction deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver) public override {\n    shares = _deposit(assets, receiver);  \u002F\u002F includes receipt validation\n}\nfunction mint(uint256 shares, address receiver) public override {\n    assets = convertToAssets(shares);\n    _mint(receiver, shares);  \u002F\u002F MISSING: _deposit() validation → mints without receiving assets\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"function place_\\|function create_\\|function add_\\|function open_\" contracts\u002F -A5\ngrep -rn \"function update_\\|function modify_\\|function cancel_\" contracts\u002F -A5\ngrep -rn \"safeApprove\\b\" contracts\u002F    # safeApprove without zero-reset before\ngrep -rn \"delete\\b\" contracts\u002F -B5 -A5  # delete before operation completes\ngrep -rn \"function deposit\\|function mint\\|function withdraw\\|function redeem\" contracts\u002F -A10\n```\n\n---\n\n## 4. OFF-BY-ONE & BOUNDARY CONDITIONS\n> #4 High — 22% of Highs. Single character change. Massive impact.\n\n### Root Cause\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VeChain Stargate — post-exit reward drain:\nfunction _claimableDelegationPeriods(address delegator) internal view returns (uint256) {\n    if (endPeriod > nextClaimablePeriod) {  \u002F\u002F BUG: should be >=\n        return 0;  \u002F\u002F exited users get nothing\n    }\n    return nextClaimablePeriod - lastClaimedPeriod;  \u002F\u002F rewards for period AFTER exit\n}\n```\n\n### Mental Test for Every Comparison\n> For every `if (A > B)`: \"What happens when A == B?\" Is that correct?\n\n### 6 Boundary Locations to Check\n1. Period\u002FEpoch boundaries: `>` vs `>=` at period end\n2. Time-based locks: does `block.timestamp == deadline` lock or unlock?\n3. Loop break conditions: `break` with `>` vs `>=`\n4. Array index boundaries: `i \u003C= array.length` (should be `i \u003C array.length`)\n5. Amount\u002Fbalance boundaries: `>= amount` allows exact full withdrawal?\n6. Rounding\u002Fprecision: can any input produce 0 output that should be non-zero?\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Boundaries in comparisons\ngrep -rn \"Period\\|Epoch\\|Round\\|Deadline\\|period\\|epoch\\|deadline\" contracts\u002F -A3 | grep \"[\u003C>][^=]\"\n\n# Loop breaks\ngrep -rn \"\\bbreak\\b\" contracts\u002F -B10\n\n# Off-by-one in array access\ngrep -rn \"\\.length\\s*-\\s*1\\|i\\s*\u003C=\\s*.*\\.length\\b\" contracts\u002F\n```\n\n---\n\n## 5. ORACLE \u002F PRICE MANIPULATION\n> 12% of all reports. Largest individual payouts. $117M Mango, $70M Curve.\n\n### Bug A: Missing Staleness Check (most common)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE:\n(, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\nreturn uint256(price);  \u002F\u002F If Chainlink node goes down, stale price returned indefinitely\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT:\n(, int256 price,, uint256 updatedAt,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\nrequire(block.timestamp - updatedAt \u003C= MAX_PRICE_AGE, \"Stale price\");\nrequire(price > 0, \"Invalid price\");\n```\n\n### Bug B: Missing Confidence Interval (Pyth)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE:\nPythStructs.Price memory p = pyth.getPriceUnsafe(priceFeed);\nreturn p.price;  \u002F\u002F ignores p.conf (confidence interval)\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT:\nrequire(p.conf * 10 \u003C= uint64(p.price), \"Price too uncertain\");\n\u002F\u002F conf > 10% of price = untrustworthy\n```\n\n### Bug C: TWAP Too Short (flash loan manipulatable)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: 60-second TWAP\nuint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[] (2);\nsecondsAgos[0] = 60; secondsAgos[1] = 0;\n\u002F\u002F Flash loan can shift price for entire 60s window\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: 1800s minimum TWAP (30 min)\n```\n\n### Bug D: Single-Source Oracle\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: only Uniswap spot price\nuint price = getUniswapSpotPrice(token);  \u002F\u002F flash loan manipulatable\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: Chainlink primary, Uniswap TWAP as fallback, require close agreement\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# Missing staleness check\ngrep -rn \"latestRoundData\" contracts\u002F -A5 | grep -v \"updatedAt\\|timestamp\"\n\n# Pyth price usage — confidence interval checked?\ngrep -rn \"getPriceUnsafe\\|getPrice\\b\" contracts\u002F -A8 | grep -v \"conf\\|confidence\"\n\n# TWAP windows — short TWAP flag\ngrep -rn \"secondsAgo\\|TWAP\\|cardinality\" contracts\u002F -A5\n```\n\n---\n\n## 6. ERC4626 VAULT ATTACKS\n\n### Exchange Rate Manipulation (near-empty vault)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — first depositor attack:\n\u002F\u002F 1. Attacker deposits 1 wei → gets 1 share\n\u002F\u002F 2. Attacker donates large amount directly (transfer, not deposit)\n\u002F\u002F 3. Exchange rate: 1 share = (1 + donation) assets\n\u002F\u002F 4. Victim deposits → rounds down to 0 shares → free donation to attacker\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT: virtual shares (OpenZeppelin v4.9+)\nfunction _decimalsOffset() internal view virtual override returns (uint8) {\n    return 9;  \u002F\u002F add 1e9 virtual shares + assets to prevent manipulation\n}\n```\n\n### ERC4626 Transfer (moves shares but not stake\u002Flock records)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE: shares transferred, but lock records stay with original owner\n\u002F\u002F → shares stuck, can't redeem → permanent freeze (Belong pattern)\nfunction transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external override {\n    _transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);  \u002F\u002F moves shares\n    \u002F\u002F MISSING: transfer lock record from msg.sender to `to`\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\ngrep -rn \"function transfer\\|function transferFrom\" contracts\u002F -A15\ngrep -rn \"function deposit\\|function mint\\|function withdraw\\|function redeem\" contracts\u002F -A10\n```\n\n---\n\n## 7. REENTRANCY\n> 2016–present. CEI pattern prevents it. Still found in DeFi.\n\n### Variants\n- **Single-function**: attacker re-enters same function before state updated\n- **Cross-function**: re-enters a sibling function with stale state\n- **Cross-contract**: re-enters via a callback to another protocol\n- **Read-only**: re-enters a view function that returns stale data used by attacker\n\n### Root Cause Pattern\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE (effects after interaction):\nfunction withdraw(uint256 amount) external {\n    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);\n    (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(\"\");  \u002F\u002F INTERACTION first\n    require(success);\n    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;  \u002F\u002F EFFECT after → reentrancy window\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F CORRECT (CEI — Checks, Effects, Interactions):\nfunction withdraw(uint256 amount) external {\n    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);  \u002F\u002F CHECK\n    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;            \u002F\u002F EFFECT\n    (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(\"\");  \u002F\u002F INTERACTION last\n    require(success);\n}\n```\n\n### Grep Patterns\n```bash\n# External calls before state updates\ngrep -rn \"\\.call{value\\|safeTransfer\\|transfer(\" contracts\u002F -B10 | grep -v \"require\\|revert\"\n\n# Missing nonReentrant modifier on critical functions\ngrep -rn \"function withdraw\\|function redeem\\|function claim\" contracts\u002F -A2 | grep -v \"nonReentrant\"\n\n# Storage slot for reentrancy guard\ngrep -rn \"nonReentrant\\|ReentrancyGuard\\|_notEntered\" contracts\u002F\n```\n\n---\n\n\n## Contents\n\n- [8. FLASH LOAN ATTACKS](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [9. SIGNATURE REPLAY](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [10. PROXY \u002F UPGRADE ISSUES](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [FOUNDRY POC TEMPLATE](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Related Skills & Chains](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":36,"source":53,"license":14,"sources":54,"category":47,"date_added":55,"description":7,"source_repo":56,"source_type":42,"compatibility":57,"license_source":58},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","public_research, community","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fweb3-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":65,"prompt":75,"zipAvailable":76},[66,69,72],{"tool":67,"command":68},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill web3-audit",{"tool":70,"command":71},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill web3-audit",{"tool":73,"command":74},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill web3-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fweb3-audit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[78],{"path":79,"resourceType":80,"resourceTypeDesc":81,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"references\u002Fdetails.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",10518,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fweb3-audit\u002Freferences\u002Fdetails.md",[85,108,132,156,182,206],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[91],{"categoryNo":92,"categoryName":93,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署",[95,96,97,98,99,100,87,101,102,103,104,43,42,41,105,106,38,37,34,107],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,43,128,42,129,130,106,131],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","node","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":133,"name":134,"nameZh":6,"description":135,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":136,"categories":137,"keywords":138,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[139,140,141,142,143,144,145,46,146,147,148,149,150,42,41,151,152,153,154,155],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","github","codex","research","https","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":157,"name":158,"nameZh":6,"description":159,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":160,"categories":161,"keywords":171,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - free tier, no card required.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[162,165,168],{"categoryNo":163,"categoryName":164,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":166,"categoryName":167,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":169,"categoryName":170,"taxonomyType":25,"taxonomyTypeDesc":26},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师",[139,140,141,172,142,173,143,144,46,174,175,176,177,148,178,42,41,179,180,181],"youtube transcript skills","gemini","search","api","Video","browse","api-integration","free","card","channels",{"skillNo":183,"name":184,"nameZh":6,"description":185,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":186,"categories":187,"keywords":192,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0EAB96PX83W5PTE8A0R8D","youtube-notetaker","Turn YouTube talks into local study notes with slides, transcripts, editable annotations, and a markdown-backed viewer.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-notetaker\u002FSKILL.md",[188,191],{"categoryNo":189,"categoryName":190,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000003","演示文稿",{"categoryNo":166,"categoryName":167,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},[141,193,194,119,142,195,196,197,198,46,176,199,200,201,202,41,203,151,204,205],"youtube notetaker","notetaker","workflow","official","notes","code","markdown","slides","annotations","README","study","dair-academy","viewer",{"skillNo":207,"name":208,"nameZh":6,"description":209,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":210,"categories":211,"keywords":213,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0E55F0GW5MX48V8HXS8B5","youtube-full","Fetch YouTube transcripts, search videos, browse channels, and extract playlists via TranscriptAPI — no yt-dlp, no Google API key, works from any cloud server.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-full\u002FSKILL.md",[212],{"categoryNo":163,"categoryName":164,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},[214,141,215,216,142,173,174,217,218,175,176,177,148,219,178,42,41,179,220,154],"youtube full","full","google","server","dlp","credits","automatic"]