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Docs-only; helper scripts and templates not bundled.\nmetadata:\n  author: devops-skills\n  version: '1.0'\n---\n\n# SaaS Security Posture Management for Startups\n\nSecure every SaaS tool your company relies on with practical, command-driven hardening.\n\n## When to Use This Skill\n\n- **SOC 2 preparation** — auditors need evidence of MFA, access controls, and OAuth governance.\n- **Suspicious OAuth app** — an employee authorized a third-party app with broad scopes.\n- **SaaS sprawl** — teams sign up for tools with company email and nobody tracks them.\n- **Post-incident hardening** — after phishing or credential leaks, tighten every surface.\n\n## 2. SaaS Inventory Audit\n\n### Google Workspace — OAuth Grants\n\n```bash\ngam all users show tokens > oauth_tokens_audit.csv\n```\n\n### GitHub — Installed Apps\n\n```bash\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Finstallations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.installations[] | {app: .app_slug, permissions: .permissions, created: .created_at}'\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fcredential-authorizations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, credential_type: .credential_type}'\n```\n\n### Slack — Approved and Pending Apps\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.approved.list\" | jq '.approved_apps[] | {name: .app.name, id: .app.id}'\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.requests.list\" | jq '.app_requests[]'\n```\n\n### AWS — IAM Credential Report\n\n```bash\naws iam generate-credential-report\naws iam get-credential-report --output text --query 'Content' | base64 -d > iam_credential_report.csv\n```\n\n### Master Inventory Template\n\n```yaml\ntools:\n  - name: Google Workspace\n    owner: it@company.com\n    sso: true\n    mfa: enforced\n  - name: GitHub Enterprise\n    owner: engineering@company.com\n    sso: true\n    mfa: enforced\n  - name: Slack Business+\n    owner: it@company.com\n    sso: true\n    app_approval: required\n  - name: AWS Organizations\n    owner: platform@company.com\n    sso: true\n    scp_enforced: true\n```\n\n---\n\n## 3. GitHub Security Hardening\n\n```bash\n# Enforce 2FA and find non-compliant members\ngh api -X PATCH \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG} -f two_factor_requirement_enabled=true\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fmembers?filter=2fa_disabled --paginate --jq '.[].login'\n\n# Verify SAML SSO identities\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fcredential-authorizations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, saml_name_id: .saml_name_id}'\n\n# Add IP allow list entry\ngh api -X POST \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fip-allow-list \\\n  -f allow_list_value=\"203.0.113.0\u002F24\" -f name=\"Office VPN\" -F is_active=true\n\n# Branch protection on main\ngh api -X PUT \u002Frepos\u002F{ORG}\u002F{REPO}\u002Fbranches\u002Fmain\u002Fprotection \\\n  -H \"Accept: application\u002Fvnd.github+json\" --input - \u003C\u003C'EOF'\n{\n  \"required_status_checks\": {\"strict\": true, \"contexts\": [\"ci\u002Fbuild\",\"ci\u002Ftest\"]},\n  \"enforce_admins\": true,\n  \"required_pull_request_reviews\": {\n    \"required_approving_review_count\": 2,\n    \"dismiss_stale_reviews\": true,\n    \"require_code_owner_reviews\": true\n  },\n  \"restrictions\": null,\n  \"allow_force_pushes\": false,\n  \"allow_deletions\": false\n}\nEOF\n\n# Audit PATs and revoke stale tokens\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fpersonal-access-tokens --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {owner: .owner.login, name: .token_name, expires: .token_expires_at}'\ngh api -X DELETE \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fpersonal-access-tokens\u002F{PAT_ID}\n\n# Audit deploy keys and webhooks\nfor repo in $(gh repo list {ORG} --limit 500 --json name -q '.[].name'); do\n  gh api \u002Frepos\u002F{ORG}\u002F${repo}\u002Fkeys --jq '.[] | {title: .title, read_only: .read_only}'\ndone\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fhooks --jq '.[] | {url: .config.url, events: .events, active: .active}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## 4. Slack Security\n\n```bash\n# Require app approval\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.config.set\" -d '{\"app_approval_enabled\": true}'\n\n# Set workspace to invite-only\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setDiscoverability\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"discoverability\": \"invite_only\"}'\n\n# Force re-authentication every 24 hours\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setSessionDuration\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"session_duration\": 86400}'\n\n# Set message retention to 1 year\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setRetentionPolicy\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"retention_type\": \"all\", \"retention_duration\": 365}'\n\n# Audit Slack Connect shared channels\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.conversations.search?search_channel_types=connect\" \\\n  | jq '.conversations[] | {name: .name, is_ext_shared: .is_ext_shared}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## 5. Google Workspace Hardening\n\n```bash\n# Enforce 2-Step Verification and strong passwords\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings 2sv enforced\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings password_length 14\n\n# Block all third-party OAuth apps, then whitelist specific ones\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings oauth_access block_all\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings oauth_access whitelist client_id:APP_CLIENT_ID_1\n\n# Disable external Drive sharing and file transfers\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive sharing_outside_domain off\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive transfer_to_personal off\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings groups external_members off\n\n# Verify email authentication records\ndig TXT company.com | grep \"v=spf1\"\ndig TXT google._domainkey.company.com\ndig TXT _dmarc.company.com\n# Expected: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@company.com; pct=100\n\n# Mobile device management\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings mobile management advanced\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings mobile screen_lock required\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings mobile encryption required\ngam update mobile ${DEVICE_ID} action wipe   # compromised device\n```\n\n---\n\n## 6. AWS Account Security\n\n```bash\n# Root account lockdown — verify MFA, remove access keys\naws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'\naws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountAccessKeysPresent'\n\n# SSO permission set with least privilege\naws sso-admin create-permission-set --instance-arn \"${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}\" \\\n  --name \"DeveloperAccess\" --session-duration \"PT8H\"\naws sso-admin attach-managed-policy-to-permission-set \\\n  --instance-arn \"${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}\" --permission-set-arn \"${PERMISSION_SET_ARN}\" \\\n  --managed-policy-arn \"arn:aws:iam::aws:policy\u002FReadOnlyAccess\"\n```\n\n### Service Control Policies\n\n```json\n{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\"Sid\": \"DenyRootActions\", \"Effect\": \"Deny\", \"Action\": \"*\", \"Resource\": \"*\",\n     \"Condition\": {\"StringLike\": {\"aws:PrincipalArn\": \"arn:aws:iam::*:root\"}}},\n    {\"Sid\": \"DenyLeaveOrg\", \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n     \"Action\": \"organizations:LeaveOrganization\", \"Resource\": \"*\"}\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n```bash\naws organizations create-policy --name \"DenyRootActions\" \\\n  --type SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY --content file:\u002F\u002Fdeny-root-actions.json\naws organizations attach-policy --policy-id \"${POLICY_ID}\" --target-id \"${ORG_ROOT_ID}\"\n\n# Organization-wide CloudTrail\naws cloudtrail create-trail --name org-security-trail \\\n  --s3-bucket-name company-cloudtrail-logs \\\n  --is-multi-region-trail --is-organization-trail --enable-log-file-validation\naws cloudtrail start-logging --name org-security-trail\n```\n\n---\n\n## 7. OAuth App Review\n\n### Identify High-Risk Grants\n\n```bash\n# Google — find apps with dangerous scopes\ngam all users show tokens | grep -E \"(drive|gmail|admin)\" > high_risk_oauth.txt\n\n# GitHub — find apps with write access\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Finstallations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.installations[] | select(.permissions.contents == \"write\") | {app: .app_slug}'\n```\n\n### Revoke Dangerous Grants\n\n```bash\ngam user compromised@company.com delete token clientid APP_CLIENT_ID  # single app\ngam user compromised@company.com delete tokens                        # all apps\ngh api -X DELETE \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Finstallations\u002F{INSTALLATION_ID}           # GitHub app\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.uninstall\" -d '{\"app_id\": \"A0XXXXXXX\"}'\n```\n\n### Scope Risk Classification\n\n```\nCRITICAL — revoke unless justified:\n  Google: mail.google.com, admin.directory.user | GitHub: admin:org, repo | Slack: admin\nHIGH — review carefully:\n  Google: googleapis.com\u002Fauth\u002Fdrive | GitHub: contents:write | Slack: channels:read\nLOW — generally safe:\n  Google: userinfo.email | GitHub: read:org | Slack: identity.basic\n```\n\n---\n\n## 8. Admin Account Protection\n\n```bash\n# Dedicated admin account in Google Workspace\ngam create user admin-jdoe@company.com firstname \"John (Admin)\" lastname \"Doe\" \\\n  password \"$(openssl rand -base64 32)\" org \"\u002FAdmins\"\ngam update user admin-jdoe@company.com admin on\n\n# Require hardware security keys for the Admins OU\ngam update org \"\u002FAdmins\" settings 2sv security_key_only\n\n# AWS MFA enforcement policy\ncat \u003C\u003C'EOF' > enforce-mfa-policy.json\n{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": [{\n    \"Sid\": \"DenyUnlessMFA\", \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n    \"NotAction\": [\"iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice\",\"iam:EnableMFADevice\",\n                  \"iam:GetUser\",\"iam:ListMFADevices\",\"sts:GetSessionToken\"],\n    \"Resource\": \"*\",\n    \"Condition\": {\"BoolIfExists\": {\"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"false\"}}\n  }]\n}\nEOF\naws iam create-policy --policy-name EnforceMFA --policy-document file:\u002F\u002Fenforce-mfa-policy.json\n\n# Break-glass account for SSO outages\nBREAK_GLASS_PW=$(openssl rand -base64 48)\ngam create user breakglass@company.com firstname \"Break\" lastname \"Glass\" \\\n  password \"${BREAK_GLASS_PW}\" org \"\u002FAdmins\" admin on\n# Store password in a sealed envelope in a physical safe\n# After every use: rotate password, re-seal, log the incident\n```\n\n---\n\n## 9. Data Loss Prevention\n\n```bash\n# Google Drive — block external sharing and restrict viewers\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive sharing_outside_domain off\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive disable_download_print_copy_for_viewers on\n\n# GitHub — enable secret scanning and push protection org-wide\ngh api -X PATCH \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG} -f security_product=secret_scanning -f enablement=enable_all\ngh api -X PATCH \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG} -f security_product=secret_scanning_push_protection -f enablement=enable_all\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fsecret-scanning\u002Falerts --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {repo: .repository.name, secret_type: .secret_type, state: .state}'\n\n# Slack — restrict data export to org admins\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setExportRestrictions\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"export_type\": \"org_admins_only\"}'\n\n# AWS — block all public S3 access at account level\naws s3control put-public-access-block --account-id \"${AWS_ACCOUNT_ID}\" \\\n  --public-access-block-configuration \\\n  \"BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## 10. Shadow IT Detection\n\n### DNS-Based Discovery\n\n```bash\nSHADOW_IT_DOMAINS=(\"airtable.com\" \"notion.so\" \"trello.com\" \"asana.com\"\n  \"monday.com\" \"clickup.com\" \"figma.com\" \"canva.com\" \"miro.com\"\n  \"zapier.com\" \"dropbox.com\" \"box.com\" \"wetransfer.com\")\nfor domain in \"${SHADOW_IT_DOMAINS[@]}\"; do\n  count=$(grep -c \"${domain}\" \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fdns\u002Fquery.log 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo \"0\")\n  [ \"${count}\" -gt 0 ] && echo \"DETECTED: ${domain} — ${count} queries\"\ndone\n```\n\n### Google Workspace Login Audit\n\n```bash\ngam report login parameters app_name \\\n  start_time \"2026-03-01T00:00:00Z\" end_time \"2026-03-24T23:59:59Z\" > login_audit.csv\ngam report token > token_usage_report.csv\n```\n\n### Proxy Log Analysis\n\n```bash\nawk '{print $7}' \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fsquid\u002Faccess.log | sed 's|https\\?:\u002F\u002F||;s|\u002F.*||' \\\n  | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -50 > top_domains.txt\ncomm -23 \u003C(awk '{print $2}' top_domains.txt | sort) \\\n  \u003C(yq '.tools[].domains[]' saas-inventory.yaml | sort) > unapproved.txt\n```\n\n### Automated Alerting\n\n```bash\ncat \u003C\u003C'SCRIPT' > \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Fshadow-it-check.sh\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv bash\nset -euo pipefail\nAPPROVED=\"\u002Fetc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fapproved-saas-domains.txt\"\nYESTERDAY=$(date -d \"yesterday\" +%d-%b-%Y)\ngrep \"${YESTERDAY}\" \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fdns\u002Fquery.log | awk '{print $4}' | sort -u > \u002Ftmp\u002Ftoday.txt\nNEW=$(comm -23 \u002Ftmp\u002Ftoday.txt \u003C(sort \"${APPROVED}\"))\n[ -n \"${NEW}\" ] && mail -s \"[ALERT] Shadow IT\" security@company.com \u003C\u003C\u003C \"${NEW}\"\nSCRIPT\nchmod +x \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Fshadow-it-check.sh\necho \"0 8 * * * root \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Fshadow-it-check.sh\" >> \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\u002Fshadow-it-check\n```\n\n---\n\n## Quick Reference — Top 10 Priority Actions\n\n| # | Action | Scope |\n|---|--------|-------|\n| 1 | Enforce MFA\u002F2FA everywhere | Google, GitHub, AWS, Slack |\n| 2 | Enable SSO with your IdP | All tools |\n| 3 | Audit and revoke OAuth grants | Google, GitHub |\n| 4 | Require Slack app approval | Slack |\n| 5 | Branch protection on main | GitHub |\n| 6 | Secret scanning + push protection | GitHub |\n| 7 | Block public S3 buckets | AWS |\n| 8 | Enable org-wide CloudTrail | AWS |\n| 9 | Disable external Drive sharing | Google |\n| 10 | Create break-glass admin accounts | Google, AWS |\n\n## Maintenance Cadence\n\n**Weekly:** Review OAuth grants, secret scanning alerts, Slack app queue.\n**Monthly:** AWS IAM report, rotate service keys, admin account review, shadow IT scan.\n**Quarterly:** Full SaaS inventory refresh, OAuth pruning, break-glass test, SCP updates.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Infrastructure commands can disrupt services: confirm target host\u002Fscope and have backups\u002Fsnapshots before mutating state.\n- Docs-only import: upstream scripts and templates not bundled.\n\n","# SaaS Security Posture Management for Startups\n\nSecure every SaaS tool your company relies on with practical, command-driven hardening.\n\n## When to Use This Skill\n\n- **SOC 2 preparation** — auditors need evidence of MFA, access controls, and OAuth governance.\n- **Suspicious OAuth app** — an employee authorized a third-party app with broad scopes.\n- **SaaS sprawl** — teams sign up for tools with company email and nobody tracks them.\n- **Post-incident hardening** — after phishing or credential leaks, tighten every surface.\n\n## 2. SaaS Inventory Audit\n\n### Google Workspace — OAuth Grants\n\n```bash\ngam all users show tokens > oauth_tokens_audit.csv\n```\n\n### GitHub — Installed Apps\n\n```bash\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Finstallations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.installations[] | {app: .app_slug, permissions: .permissions, created: .created_at}'\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fcredential-authorizations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, credential_type: .credential_type}'\n```\n\n### Slack — Approved and Pending Apps\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.approved.list\" | jq '.approved_apps[] | {name: .app.name, id: .app.id}'\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.requests.list\" | jq '.app_requests[]'\n```\n\n### AWS — IAM Credential Report\n\n```bash\naws iam generate-credential-report\naws iam get-credential-report --output text --query 'Content' | base64 -d > iam_credential_report.csv\n```\n\n### Master Inventory Template\n\n```yaml\ntools:\n  - name: Google Workspace\n    owner: it@company.com\n    sso: true\n    mfa: enforced\n  - name: GitHub Enterprise\n    owner: engineering@company.com\n    sso: true\n    mfa: enforced\n  - name: Slack Business+\n    owner: it@company.com\n    sso: true\n    app_approval: required\n  - name: AWS Organizations\n    owner: platform@company.com\n    sso: true\n    scp_enforced: true\n```\n\n---\n\n## 3. GitHub Security Hardening\n\n```bash\n# Enforce 2FA and find non-compliant members\ngh api -X PATCH \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG} -f two_factor_requirement_enabled=true\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fmembers?filter=2fa_disabled --paginate --jq '.[].login'\n\n# Verify SAML SSO identities\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fcredential-authorizations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, saml_name_id: .saml_name_id}'\n\n# Add IP allow list entry\ngh api -X POST \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fip-allow-list \\\n  -f allow_list_value=\"203.0.113.0\u002F24\" -f name=\"Office VPN\" -F is_active=true\n\n# Branch protection on main\ngh api -X PUT \u002Frepos\u002F{ORG}\u002F{REPO}\u002Fbranches\u002Fmain\u002Fprotection \\\n  -H \"Accept: application\u002Fvnd.github+json\" --input - \u003C\u003C'EOF'\n{\n  \"required_status_checks\": {\"strict\": true, \"contexts\": [\"ci\u002Fbuild\",\"ci\u002Ftest\"]},\n  \"enforce_admins\": true,\n  \"required_pull_request_reviews\": {\n    \"required_approving_review_count\": 2,\n    \"dismiss_stale_reviews\": true,\n    \"require_code_owner_reviews\": true\n  },\n  \"restrictions\": null,\n  \"allow_force_pushes\": false,\n  \"allow_deletions\": false\n}\nEOF\n\n# Audit PATs and revoke stale tokens\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fpersonal-access-tokens --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {owner: .owner.login, name: .token_name, expires: .token_expires_at}'\ngh api -X DELETE \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fpersonal-access-tokens\u002F{PAT_ID}\n\n# Audit deploy keys and webhooks\nfor repo in $(gh repo list {ORG} --limit 500 --json name -q '.[].name'); do\n  gh api \u002Frepos\u002F{ORG}\u002F${repo}\u002Fkeys --jq '.[] | {title: .title, read_only: .read_only}'\ndone\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fhooks --jq '.[] | {url: .config.url, events: .events, active: .active}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## 4. Slack Security\n\n```bash\n# Require app approval\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.config.set\" -d '{\"app_approval_enabled\": true}'\n\n# Set workspace to invite-only\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setDiscoverability\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"discoverability\": \"invite_only\"}'\n\n# Force re-authentication every 24 hours\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setSessionDuration\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"session_duration\": 86400}'\n\n# Set message retention to 1 year\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setRetentionPolicy\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"retention_type\": \"all\", \"retention_duration\": 365}'\n\n# Audit Slack Connect shared channels\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.conversations.search?search_channel_types=connect\" \\\n  | jq '.conversations[] | {name: .name, is_ext_shared: .is_ext_shared}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## 5. Google Workspace Hardening\n\n```bash\n# Enforce 2-Step Verification and strong passwords\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings 2sv enforced\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings password_length 14\n\n# Block all third-party OAuth apps, then whitelist specific ones\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings oauth_access block_all\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings oauth_access whitelist client_id:APP_CLIENT_ID_1\n\n# Disable external Drive sharing and file transfers\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive sharing_outside_domain off\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive transfer_to_personal off\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings groups external_members off\n\n# Verify email authentication records\ndig TXT company.com | grep \"v=spf1\"\ndig TXT google._domainkey.company.com\ndig TXT _dmarc.company.com\n# Expected: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@company.com; pct=100\n\n# Mobile device management\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings mobile management advanced\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings mobile screen_lock required\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings mobile encryption required\ngam update mobile ${DEVICE_ID} action wipe   # compromised device\n```\n\n---\n\n## 6. AWS Account Security\n\n```bash\n# Root account lockdown — verify MFA, remove access keys\naws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'\naws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountAccessKeysPresent'\n\n# SSO permission set with least privilege\naws sso-admin create-permission-set --instance-arn \"${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}\" \\\n  --name \"DeveloperAccess\" --session-duration \"PT8H\"\naws sso-admin attach-managed-policy-to-permission-set \\\n  --instance-arn \"${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}\" --permission-set-arn \"${PERMISSION_SET_ARN}\" \\\n  --managed-policy-arn \"arn:aws:iam::aws:policy\u002FReadOnlyAccess\"\n```\n\n### Service Control Policies\n\n```json\n{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\"Sid\": \"DenyRootActions\", \"Effect\": \"Deny\", \"Action\": \"*\", \"Resource\": \"*\",\n     \"Condition\": {\"StringLike\": {\"aws:PrincipalArn\": \"arn:aws:iam::*:root\"}}},\n    {\"Sid\": \"DenyLeaveOrg\", \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n     \"Action\": \"organizations:LeaveOrganization\", \"Resource\": \"*\"}\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n```bash\naws organizations create-policy --name \"DenyRootActions\" \\\n  --type SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY --content file:\u002F\u002Fdeny-root-actions.json\naws organizations attach-policy --policy-id \"${POLICY_ID}\" --target-id \"${ORG_ROOT_ID}\"\n\n# Organization-wide CloudTrail\naws cloudtrail create-trail --name org-security-trail \\\n  --s3-bucket-name company-cloudtrail-logs \\\n  --is-multi-region-trail --is-organization-trail --enable-log-file-validation\naws cloudtrail start-logging --name org-security-trail\n```\n\n---\n\n## 7. OAuth App Review\n\n### Identify High-Risk Grants\n\n```bash\n# Google — find apps with dangerous scopes\ngam all users show tokens | grep -E \"(drive|gmail|admin)\" > high_risk_oauth.txt\n\n# GitHub — find apps with write access\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Finstallations --paginate \\\n  --jq '.installations[] | select(.permissions.contents == \"write\") | {app: .app_slug}'\n```\n\n### Revoke Dangerous Grants\n\n```bash\ngam user compromised@company.com delete token clientid APP_CLIENT_ID  # single app\ngam user compromised@company.com delete tokens                        # all apps\ngh api -X DELETE \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Finstallations\u002F{INSTALLATION_ID}           # GitHub app\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.apps.uninstall\" -d '{\"app_id\": \"A0XXXXXXX\"}'\n```\n\n### Scope Risk Classification\n\n```\nCRITICAL — revoke unless justified:\n  Google: mail.google.com, admin.directory.user | GitHub: admin:org, repo | Slack: admin\nHIGH — review carefully:\n  Google: googleapis.com\u002Fauth\u002Fdrive | GitHub: contents:write | Slack: channels:read\nLOW — generally safe:\n  Google: userinfo.email | GitHub: read:org | Slack: identity.basic\n```\n\n---\n\n## 8. Admin Account Protection\n\n```bash\n# Dedicated admin account in Google Workspace\ngam create user admin-jdoe@company.com firstname \"John (Admin)\" lastname \"Doe\" \\\n  password \"$(openssl rand -base64 32)\" org \"\u002FAdmins\"\ngam update user admin-jdoe@company.com admin on\n\n# Require hardware security keys for the Admins OU\ngam update org \"\u002FAdmins\" settings 2sv security_key_only\n\n# AWS MFA enforcement policy\ncat \u003C\u003C'EOF' > enforce-mfa-policy.json\n{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": [{\n    \"Sid\": \"DenyUnlessMFA\", \"Effect\": \"Deny\",\n    \"NotAction\": [\"iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice\",\"iam:EnableMFADevice\",\n                  \"iam:GetUser\",\"iam:ListMFADevices\",\"sts:GetSessionToken\"],\n    \"Resource\": \"*\",\n    \"Condition\": {\"BoolIfExists\": {\"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent\": \"false\"}}\n  }]\n}\nEOF\naws iam create-policy --policy-name EnforceMFA --policy-document file:\u002F\u002Fenforce-mfa-policy.json\n\n# Break-glass account for SSO outages\nBREAK_GLASS_PW=$(openssl rand -base64 48)\ngam create user breakglass@company.com firstname \"Break\" lastname \"Glass\" \\\n  password \"${BREAK_GLASS_PW}\" org \"\u002FAdmins\" admin on\n# Store password in a sealed envelope in a physical safe\n# After every use: rotate password, re-seal, log the incident\n```\n\n---\n\n## 9. Data Loss Prevention\n\n```bash\n# Google Drive — block external sharing and restrict viewers\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive sharing_outside_domain off\ngam update org \"\u002F\" settings drive disable_download_print_copy_for_viewers on\n\n# GitHub — enable secret scanning and push protection org-wide\ngh api -X PATCH \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG} -f security_product=secret_scanning -f enablement=enable_all\ngh api -X PATCH \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG} -f security_product=secret_scanning_push_protection -f enablement=enable_all\ngh api \u002Forgs\u002F{ORG}\u002Fsecret-scanning\u002Falerts --paginate \\\n  --jq '.[] | {repo: .repository.name, secret_type: .secret_type, state: .state}'\n\n# Slack — restrict data export to org admins\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fslack.com\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin.teams.settings.setExportRestrictions\" \\\n  -d '{\"team_id\": \"T0XXXXXXX\", \"export_type\": \"org_admins_only\"}'\n\n# AWS — block all public S3 access at account level\naws s3control put-public-access-block --account-id \"${AWS_ACCOUNT_ID}\" \\\n  --public-access-block-configuration \\\n  \"BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## 10. Shadow IT Detection\n\n### DNS-Based Discovery\n\n```bash\nSHADOW_IT_DOMAINS=(\"airtable.com\" \"notion.so\" \"trello.com\" \"asana.com\"\n  \"monday.com\" \"clickup.com\" \"figma.com\" \"canva.com\" \"miro.com\"\n  \"zapier.com\" \"dropbox.com\" \"box.com\" \"wetransfer.com\")\nfor domain in \"${SHADOW_IT_DOMAINS[@]}\"; do\n  count=$(grep -c \"${domain}\" \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fdns\u002Fquery.log 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo \"0\")\n  [ \"${count}\" -gt 0 ] && echo \"DETECTED: ${domain} — ${count} queries\"\ndone\n```\n\n### Google Workspace Login Audit\n\n```bash\ngam report login parameters app_name \\\n  start_time \"2026-03-01T00:00:00Z\" end_time \"2026-03-24T23:59:59Z\" > login_audit.csv\ngam report token > token_usage_report.csv\n```\n\n### Proxy Log Analysis\n\n```bash\nawk '{print $7}' \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fsquid\u002Faccess.log | sed 's|https\\?:\u002F\u002F||;s|\u002F.*||' \\\n  | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -50 > top_domains.txt\ncomm -23 \u003C(awk '{print $2}' top_domains.txt | sort) \\\n  \u003C(yq '.tools[].domains[]' saas-inventory.yaml | sort) > unapproved.txt\n```\n\n### Automated Alerting\n\n```bash\ncat \u003C\u003C'SCRIPT' > \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Fshadow-it-check.sh\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv bash\nset -euo pipefail\nAPPROVED=\"\u002Fetc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fapproved-saas-domains.txt\"\nYESTERDAY=$(date -d \"yesterday\" +%d-%b-%Y)\ngrep \"${YESTERDAY}\" \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fdns\u002Fquery.log | awk '{print $4}' | sort -u > \u002Ftmp\u002Ftoday.txt\nNEW=$(comm -23 \u002Ftmp\u002Ftoday.txt \u003C(sort \"${APPROVED}\"))\n[ -n \"${NEW}\" ] && mail -s \"[ALERT] Shadow IT\" security@company.com \u003C\u003C\u003C \"${NEW}\"\nSCRIPT\nchmod +x \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Fshadow-it-check.sh\necho \"0 8 * * * root \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Fshadow-it-check.sh\" >> \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\u002Fshadow-it-check\n```\n\n---\n\n## Quick Reference — Top 10 Priority Actions\n\n| # | Action | Scope |\n|---|--------|-------|\n| 1 | Enforce MFA\u002F2FA everywhere | Google, GitHub, AWS, Slack |\n| 2 | Enable SSO with your IdP | All tools |\n| 3 | Audit and revoke OAuth grants | Google, GitHub |\n| 4 | Require Slack app approval | Slack |\n| 5 | Branch protection on main | GitHub |\n| 6 | Secret scanning + push protection | GitHub |\n| 7 | Block public S3 buckets | AWS |\n| 8 | Enable org-wide CloudTrail | AWS |\n| 9 | Disable external Drive sharing | Google |\n| 10 | Create break-glass admin accounts | Google, AWS |\n\n## Maintenance Cadence\n\n**Weekly:** Review OAuth grants, secret scanning alerts, Slack app queue.\n**Monthly:** AWS IAM report, rotate service keys, admin account review, shadow IT scan.\n**Quarterly:** Full SaaS inventory refresh, OAuth pruning, break-glass test, SCP updates.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Infrastructure commands can disrupt services: confirm target host\u002Fscope and have backups\u002Fsnapshots before mutating state.\n- Docs-only import: upstream scripts and templates not bundled.\n\n",{"name":5,"risk":26,"source":43,"license":14,"category":44,"metadata":45,"date_added":48,"description":7,"source_repo":49,"source_type":22,"compatibility":50,"license_source":51},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBagelHole\u002FDevOps-Security-Agent-Skills","devops",{"author":46,"version":47},"devops-skills","1.0","2026-09-20","BagelHole\u002FDevOps-Security-Agent-Skills","Requires the relevant OS\u002Fplatform tooling and privileged access where noted. 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