[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6P6BZF5MP55FMDVY8JWQFBQ":3,"skill-same:01M6P6BZF5MP55FMDVY8JWQFBQ":69},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":22,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":52,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":53,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":54,"install":55,"resources":68},"01M6P6BZF5MP55FMDVY8JWQFBQ","hunt-tls-network",null,"Hunt TLS\u002FSSL and DNS misconfigurations","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-tls-network\u002FSKILL.md",[],[18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"hunt tls network","network","tls","hunt","main","for","relevant","helper","offensive","org","scripts","scope","commands","testing","community","only","Tools","dns","license","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunt-tls-network\ndescription: Hunt TLS\u002FSSL and DNS misconfigurations\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nreport_count: 6\nsources: portswigger_research, ssl_labs_research, hstspreload_org\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-TLS-NETWORK — TLS\u002FSSL & DNS Security\n\n## Reality Check (Read First)\n\nMost findings in this class are **Info\u002FLow and routinely rejected** as \"best-practice\" \u002F \"missing-hardening\" by triage. This skill exists to stop you wasting a submission. Two questions before you report anything here:\n\n1. **Is there a real victim and a real action?** \"Missing HSTS\" is not a vulnerability — *demonstrated session-cookie capture from a victim you MitM'd* is. \"Missing CAA\" is never a vulnerability you can demonstrate.\n2. **Does the program accept it?** Many programs explicitly list missing SPF\u002FDMARC, missing security headers, weak ciphers without exploit, and CAA as **out of scope**. Read scope first; quote the in-scope line in your report.\n\n**What actually pays in this class (in order):**\n- **Dangling-CNAME \u002F dangling-A subdomain takeover** — you control content on `target.com` subdomain. Real impact, real bounty. (Owned in depth by `hunt-subdomain`; covered here for the TLS\u002FDNS recon angle.)\n- **Spoofable DMARC, proven by delivered-to-inbox email** — not \"p=none exists\" but an actual mail from `ceo@target.com` landing in a real inbox with a passing\u002Fnone DMARC verdict in the headers.\n- **DNS AXFR returning internal hosts** — full internal hostname\u002FIP map. Concrete recon value, often Medium.\n- **mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass on an internal service** — reaching authenticated-only functionality without the cert. Real auth bypass = High.\n- **Exploited TLS weakness with a working decrypt\u002FMitM PoC** — almost never achievable remotely in 2024-2026 against a patched stack; see Phase 1 caveats.\n\n**What does NOT pay (do not report standalone):** missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM PoC, missing security headers alone, weak-cipher *support* without an exploit, self-signed cert on a non-prod host, TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 *enabled* without a downgrade victim.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — TLS\u002FSSL Audit\n\n```bash\n# Quick TLS test with testssl.sh\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh --fast $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|OK|NOT\" | head -30\n\n# Or use sslyze (Python)\npip3 install sslyze\npython3 -m sslyze $TARGET --json_out \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i \"vulnerability\\|insecure\\|error\" | head -20\n\n# Check certificate expiry and chain\necho | openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -servername $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n  openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check for weak ciphers manually (a successful handshake = the cipher is OFFERED, not exploitable)\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher RC4-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher DES-CBC3-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\n\n# Protocol downgrade surface — TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 still negotiable?\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1   2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1_1 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\n```\n\n**Accuracy \u002F triage notes — do not over-claim TLS bugs:**\n\n- **Offered ≠ exploitable.** testssl\u002Fsslyze flagging RC4, 3DES, or TLS 1.0 means the server *negotiates* it. That is a hardening finding, **not** a demonstrated decrypt. Without a PoC it is Info\u002FLow and frequently OOS.\n- **SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183)** — 3DES birthday attack. Requires a long-lived TLS session, an on-path attacker, and ~hundreds of GB \u002F hours of same-key traffic. Realistically un-demonstrable in a bug bounty; report only the *support* of 3DES, expect Low\u002FInfo.\n- **POODLE (CVE-2014-3566)** — SSLv3 CBC padding oracle. Needs **SSLv3 actually enabled**; almost no modern stack offers it. Confirm with `testssl.sh --poodle` (or `nmap --script ssl-poodle`) — modern OpenSSL 3.x dropped the `-ssl3` flag. If SSLv3 won't negotiate, there is no POODLE.\n- **FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)** and **DROWN (CVE-2016-0800)** — require export-grade RSA \u002F a shared SSLv2 endpoint respectively. Both are pre-conditions you must *prove present*, not assume. DROWN needs SSLv2 reachable on *some* host sharing the cert\u002Fkey — scan for SSLv2 with `testssl.sh --drown` (or `nmap --script sslv2-drown`) across the cert's SAN list before claiming it; modern OpenSSL has no `-ssl2` flag.\n- **Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)** — if you genuinely find an unpatched OpenSSL 1.0.1 leaking memory, that *is* High\u002FCritical with a real PoC (dump containing keys\u002Fcookies). Verify with `testssl.sh --heartbleed` and capture leaked bytes; this is the rare TLS bug worth a full report.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — HSTS Check\n\n```bash\n# Check HSTS header on main domain and all subdomains\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\"\n# Expected: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\n\n# Check critical subdomains (login, api, auth)\nfor sub in login auth api account pay www; do\n  HSTS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\")\n  if [ -z \"$HSTS\" ]; then\n    echo \"[!] MISSING HSTS: https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $sub.$TARGET: $HSTS\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Check HTTP (non-HTTPS) redirect\ncurl -sI \"http:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"location\"\n# Should redirect to HTTPS immediately\n\n# HSTS preload check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhstspreload.org\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fstatus?domain=$TARGET\" | python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR)\n\n```bash\n# Find nameservers\ndig NS $TARGET +short\n\n# Attempt zone transfer on each nameserver\nfor NS in $(dig NS $TARGET +short); do\n  echo \"=== Trying AXFR from $NS ===\"\n  dig AXFR $TARGET @$NS 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"^;\" | head -30\ndone\n\n# Zone transfer via alternative tools\nhost -t AXFR $TARGET $(dig NS $TARGET +short | head -1) 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\nnmap -sn --script dns-zone-transfer $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# If AXFR succeeds → full internal hostname map\n# Look for: internal IPs, staging servers, admin hostnames, CI\u002FCD servers\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Email Security (SPF\u002FDKIM\u002FDMARC)\n\n```bash\n# Check SPF record\ndig TXT $TARGET +short | grep \"v=spf1\"\n# Missing SPF → potential email spoofing\n\n# Check DMARC\ndig TXT _dmarc.$TARGET +short\n# Missing DMARC → attacker can send as @target.com with no enforcement\n\n# Check DKIM selectors (common: default, google, mail, k1)\nfor selector in default google mail k1 selector1 selector2 s1 s2 dkim; do\n  RESULT=$(dig TXT $selector._domainkey.$TARGET +short 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  [ -n \"$RESULT\" ] && echo \"DKIM selector found: $selector → $RESULT\"\ndone\n\n# --- Spoofability evaluation (heuristic only; PROOF is the swaks test below) ---\nSPF=$(dig +short TXT $TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=spf1\")\nDMARC=$(dig +short TXT _dmarc.$TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=DMARC1\")\n\n# SPF \"+all\" \u002F \"all\" with no qualifier = pass-everything = spoofable from any IP\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -Eq '[+ ]all($|[^-~?])' && echo \"[CRITICAL] SPF passes all senders (+all)\"\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -q \"~all\" && echo \"[INFO] SPF softfail (~all) — may still deliver to inbox\"\n[ -z \"$SPF\" ] && echo \"[INFO] No SPF record\"\n\n# Correct DMARC-absence check: test the variable for emptiness, do NOT pipe dig|wc -c\nif [ -z \"$DMARC\" ]; then\n  echo \"[INFO] No DMARC record (no published policy)\"\nelse\n  POLICY=$(echo \"$DMARC\" | grep -oiE 'p=[a-z]+' | head -1)\n  echo \"[INFO] DMARC present: $POLICY\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qi \"p=none\" && echo \"  -> p=none: monitors only, does NOT block spoofed mail\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qiE \"p=(quarantine|reject)\" && echo \"  -> enforcing policy: spoofing likely blocked at receiver\"\nfi\n```\n\n**Why the original `dig ... | wc -c | grep '^1$'` check was broken:** empty `dig +short` output is a zero-length string; piped through `wc -c` it usually yields `0`, and the surrounding newline handling is shell-dependent, so the `^1$` match misfires both ways. Always capture into a variable and test `[ -z \"$VAR\" ]`.\n\n### Spoofability is a RECEIVER decision, not a record-reading exercise\n\nDo not report \"missing DMARC = email spoofing\" from `dig` output alone. DMARC `p=none` (or absent) means the **sending domain published no enforcement** — but the **receiving** mail provider (Gmail, M365, the program's own MX) may still junk or reject your spoof based on SPF, its own heuristics, or ARC. The only proof that survives triage is a **message you delivered to a real inbox**.\n\n```bash\n# PROOF: send a spoofed mail and confirm INBOX delivery (use a tester account you own)\n# Use an account on the receiver the program actually uses (check their MX: dig MX $TARGET)\nswaks --to your-tester@gmail.com \\\n      --from \"CEO \u003Cceo@$TARGET>\" \\\n      --header \"Subject: [TEST] DMARC spoof PoC for $TARGET\" \\\n      --body \"Authorized bug-bounty test. Spoofed from-domain: $TARGET\" \\\n      --server \u003Can-smtp-relay-you-control-or-localhost>\n```\n\n**Confirmation gate — a spoof PoC is only valid if you can show:**\n1. The message landed in **Inbox** (not Spam\u002FJunk), screenshot the folder.\n2. The raw headers: `Authentication-Results:` showing `dmarc=none|fail` AND the mail was still **delivered** (not bounced). A bounce or a Spam-folder landing is NOT a finding — note it and move on.\n3. The visible `From:` shows `@$TARGET` to the recipient (header-from spoof, the one that matters for phishing), not just an `envelope-from` trick.\n\nSeverity is **Medium at best**, and only if delivered-to-inbox. Many programs mark email-auth findings OOS outright — check scope first.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Security Headers Audit\n\n```bash\n# Check all security headers\nHEADERS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\")\n\n# Check each critical header\nfor HEADER in \"Strict-Transport-Security\" \"Content-Security-Policy\" \"X-Frame-Options\" \\\n              \"X-Content-Type-Options\" \"Referrer-Policy\" \"Permissions-Policy\"; do\n  RESULT=$(echo \"$HEADERS\" | grep -i \"$HEADER\")\n  if [ -z \"$RESULT\" ]; then\n    echo \"[MISSING] $HEADER\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $HEADER: $RESULT\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Automated security headers check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fsecurityheaders.com\u002F?q=https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET&followRedirects=on\" | \\\n  grep -oP \"grade-\\K[A-F+]\" | head -3\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — Certificate Transparency (Subdomain Discovery)\n\n```bash\n# crt.sh — certificate transparency logs\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.$TARGET&output=json\" | \\\n  python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"name_value\" | \\\n  grep -oP '\"name_value\": \"\\K[^\"]+' | \\\n  sed 's\u002F\\*\\.\u002F\u002Fg' | sort -u > recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt\n\necho \"[+] CT subdomains found: $(wc -l \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt)\"\n\n# Compare with existing subdomain list\ncomm -23 \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt) \\\n         \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fsubdomains.txt 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull) | head -20\n# New entries = recently issued certs = new services to investigate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6.5 — Dangling Records → Subdomain Takeover (the finding that actually pays)\n\nThis is the highest-impact item in the whole skill. A CNAME\u002FA record pointing at a deprovisioned third-party resource (S3 bucket, Azure CDN\u002FApp Service, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Fastly, etc.) lets you claim that resource and serve content from `*.target.com`. Full depth lives in `hunt-subdomain`; here is the TLS\u002FDNS-recon entry point.\n\n```bash\n# For each subdomain from CT logs, resolve the CNAME chain and check for a live origin\nwhile read sub; do\n  CNAME=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -1)\n  [ -z \"$CNAME\" ] && continue\n  CODE=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" --max-time 8 \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  echo \"$sub -> $CNAME  [http $CODE]\"\ndone \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt | tee recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fcname-map.txt\n\n# Flag CNAMEs that point at known takeoverable providers, then confirm the\n# fingerprint string in the body (e.g. \"NoSuchBucket\", \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here\",\n# \"Fastly error: unknown domain\", \"The specified bucket does not exist\", Azure \"Web App - Unavailable\").\n```\n\n**Validation gate — a takeover claim requires you to actually claim it:**\n1. Confirm the dangling target is **unregistered\u002Fclaimable** (the S3 bucket name is free, the Heroku app does not exist, etc.) — the provider error fingerprint alone is necessary but NOT sufficient.\n2. **Register the resource yourself** and serve a unique canary file, e.g. `https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\u003Crandom>.txt` returning a string only you know. Screenshot it served over the victim subdomain with valid TLS.\n3. Tear it down immediately after PoC; never leave attacker-controlled content live on the target's domain.\n\nImpact: cookie scope theft (cookies set for `.target.com`), OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FCORS-trust abuse, phishing on a trusted origin. Typically **High** (Critical if it sits at an OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shares session cookies).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — CAA Records (recon signal only — NOT a reportable finding)\n\n```bash\n# CAA records DECLARE which CAs the domain owner permits to issue certs.\ndig CAA $TARGET +short\ndig CAA \"*.$TARGET\" +short\n```\n\n**Do NOT report \"missing CAA\" as a vulnerability.** This is the most common false positive in this class. Correct framing:\n\n- A **missing CAA record does not let any attacker obtain a certificate.** It only means the owner has not *opted into* restricting which CAs may issue. With or without CAA, an attacker still needs to pass Domain Control Validation (HTTP-01 \u002F DNS-01 \u002F email) — which requires already controlling the domain, DNS, or web root.\n- The \"fraudulent issuance\" scenario requires **CA compromise or social-engineering a CA** into mis-issuing. That is out of scope for essentially every bug-bounty program and is not something you can demonstrate. CAA enforcement is a CA-side control, not an attacker-facing surface.\n- CAA is **Info-tier hardening at most**, and routinely closed as Won't-Fix \u002F OOS. Mention it in a recon notes appendix if at all; never file it standalone.\n\n**Where CAA recon IS useful (no finding, just intel):** the `issue`\u002F`issuewild` values tell you which CA the org uses (e.g. `letsencrypt.org`, `digicert.com`, `amazon.com`). That hints at automation (ACME) and at where a *real* takeover (Phase 6.5 dangling records) could let you mint a valid cert via DCV because you'd control the host.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 8 — mTLS Bypass Attempts\n\n```bash\n# Check if endpoint requires client certificate\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002F\" 2>&1 | grep -i \"ssl\\|certificate\\|403\\|401\"\n\n# Try without client cert (should fail)\ncurl -sk --cert \"\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" | head -5\n\n# Try common bypass paths (some apps skip mTLS on health checks)\nfor path in \u002Fhealth \u002Fping \u002Fstatus \u002Fmetrics \u002Fapi\u002Fhealth; do\n  STATUS=$(curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET$path\")\n  echo \"$path: $STATUS\"\ndone\n\n# Header-injection bypass — nginx\u002FHAProxy\u002FEnvoy commonly terminate mTLS at the edge and\n# forward the verdict as a request header the backend trusts. If the edge does NOT strip\n# client-supplied copies of that header, you spoof a verified client. Try the real header\n# names used by each proxy:\nfor combo in \\\n  \"X-SSL-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-SSL-Client-S-DN: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"ssl-client-verify: SUCCESS|ssl-client-subject-dn: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"X-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-Client-DN: CN=admin,O=target\" \\\n  \"X-Forwarded-Client-Cert: By=spiffe:\u002F\u002Fx;Hash=0;Subject=\\\"CN=admin\\\"\"; do\n  H1=\"${combo%%|*}\"; H2=\"${combo##*|}\"\n  echo \"== $H1 \u002F $H2 ==\"\n  curl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" -H \"$H1\" -H \"$H2\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n**mTLS-bypass validation — this is a real auth bypass, so prove access, not just a status code:**\n- A `200` could be a generic page. Confirm you reached **authenticated-only functionality**: show data\u002Fan action that is impossible without the client cert (e.g. an admin-only object, an internal-only response body).\n- Distinguish *server policy* from *server state*: a `403` flipping to `200` with the spoofed header is meaningful; a `200` for both with and without the header means the path was never protected (no finding).\n- For the bypass-path angle (`\u002Fhealth`, `\u002Fmetrics`): only a finding if that endpoint exposes **sensitive data** (internal IPs, build secrets, Prometheus metrics revealing internal topology) — an empty `200 OK` health probe is not.\n- Capture the request\u002Fresponse pair in Burp Repeater so the spoofed header → privileged response is unambiguous.\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\nSeverities below are calibrated to what triage actually accepts. They are deliberately conservative; do not inflate them in a report.\n\n| TLS\u002FDNS finding | Realistic standalone severity | Notes \u002F what raises it |\n|----------------|------|------|\n| Dangling-CNAME subdomain takeover (claimed + canary served) | **High** | Critical if at OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FSSO or sharing `.target.com` session cookies |\n| mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass reaching authed functionality | **High** | Must show privileged data\u002Faction, not just a 200 |\n| AXFR returning internal hosts\u002FIPs | **Medium** | Recon value; pairs with internal-service findings |\n| Spoofable DMARC, **delivered to a real inbox** (PoC headers) | **Medium** | Often OOS — check scope; Inbox (not Spam) + delivered required. *Reading `p=none` from `dig` alone = Info, do not file* |\n| Heartbleed \u002F live memory leak with captured secrets | **High–Critical** | Only with an actual dump containing keys\u002Fcookies |\n| Missing HSTS on auth subdomain | **Low \u002F Info** | NOT High — exploitation needs an active MitM position you cannot demonstrate remotely; report only with a working downgrade-capture PoC |\n| Weak cipher *support* (RC4\u002F3DES\u002FSWEET32) with no decrypt PoC | **Info \u002F Low** | Hardening only; frequently OOS |\n| Missing CAA | **Info (do not file)** | Absence does not enable issuance; not attacker-demonstrable |\n\n---\n\n## Tools\n\n```bash\n# testssl.sh — comprehensive TLS audit\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh $TARGET\n\n# sslyze — Python TLS scanner\npip3 install sslyze\n\n# MXToolbox for email security\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fmxtoolbox.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002FLookup\u002Fspf?argument=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# dmarc-inspector\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fdmarcian.com\u002Fdmarc-inspector\u002F?domain=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\nEach finding ships only with the proof listed — never the `dig`\u002Fheader output alone.\n\n- **Subdomain takeover:** you registered the dangling resource and served a unique canary over `https:\u002F\u002Fsub.target.com\u002F` with valid TLS. Screenshot + canary string. (Tear down after.)\n- **mTLS bypass:** spoofed client-verify header returns *privileged* data\u002Faction that the cert-required path otherwise denies. Burp request\u002Fresponse pair.\n- **AXFR:** zone transfer returns internal hostnames\u002FIPs from an authoritative NS. Full transcript.\n- **DMARC spoof:** swaks-sent mail with `From: @target.com` **delivered to a real Inbox** (not Spam), raw `Authentication-Results` headers attached. A bounce or Spam landing = no finding.\n- **HSTS missing:** only reportable with a working downgrade PoC capturing a victim cookie over plaintext — otherwise it is best-practice noise.\n\n**Severity (conservative — matches the Chain Table):**\n- Subdomain takeover (claimed): High (Critical at OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shared session cookie)\n- mTLS bypass to authed functionality: High\n- AXFR returning internal hosts: Medium\n- DMARC spoof delivered-to-inbox: Medium (often OOS — verify scope)\n- HSTS missing on auth (with downgrade PoC): Low–Medium; without PoC: Info\n- Weak cipher support without decrypt PoC: Info–Low\n- Missing security headers \u002F missing CAA only: Info (usually do not file)\n\n**Pre-submission scope gate:** before filing ANY item here, confirm the program does not list it as out of scope (email-auth, missing-headers, weak-TLS-without-exploit, and CAA are commonly OOS). Quote the in-scope line in your report.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-TLS-NETWORK — TLS\u002FSSL & DNS Security\n\n## Reality Check (Read First)\n\nMost findings in this class are **Info\u002FLow and routinely rejected** as \"best-practice\" \u002F \"missing-hardening\" by triage. This skill exists to stop you wasting a submission. Two questions before you report anything here:\n\n1. **Is there a real victim and a real action?** \"Missing HSTS\" is not a vulnerability — *demonstrated session-cookie capture from a victim you MitM'd* is. \"Missing CAA\" is never a vulnerability you can demonstrate.\n2. **Does the program accept it?** Many programs explicitly list missing SPF\u002FDMARC, missing security headers, weak ciphers without exploit, and CAA as **out of scope**. Read scope first; quote the in-scope line in your report.\n\n**What actually pays in this class (in order):**\n- **Dangling-CNAME \u002F dangling-A subdomain takeover** — you control content on `target.com` subdomain. Real impact, real bounty. (Owned in depth by `hunt-subdomain`; covered here for the TLS\u002FDNS recon angle.)\n- **Spoofable DMARC, proven by delivered-to-inbox email** — not \"p=none exists\" but an actual mail from `ceo@target.com` landing in a real inbox with a passing\u002Fnone DMARC verdict in the headers.\n- **DNS AXFR returning internal hosts** — full internal hostname\u002FIP map. Concrete recon value, often Medium.\n- **mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass on an internal service** — reaching authenticated-only functionality without the cert. Real auth bypass = High.\n- **Exploited TLS weakness with a working decrypt\u002FMitM PoC** — almost never achievable remotely in 2024-2026 against a patched stack; see Phase 1 caveats.\n\n**What does NOT pay (do not report standalone):** missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM PoC, missing security headers alone, weak-cipher *support* without an exploit, self-signed cert on a non-prod host, TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 *enabled* without a downgrade victim.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — TLS\u002FSSL Audit\n\n```bash\n# Quick TLS test with testssl.sh\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh --fast $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|OK|NOT\" | head -30\n\n# Or use sslyze (Python)\npip3 install sslyze\npython3 -m sslyze $TARGET --json_out \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \u002Ftmp\u002Fsslyze_$TARGET.json | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i \"vulnerability\\|insecure\\|error\" | head -20\n\n# Check certificate expiry and chain\necho | openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -servername $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n  openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check for weak ciphers manually (a successful handshake = the cipher is OFFERED, not exploitable)\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher RC4-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher DES-CBC3-SHA 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"cipher\\|handshake\"\n\n# Protocol downgrade surface — TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 still negotiable?\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1   2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\nopenssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1_1 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E \"Protocol|Cipher\"\n```\n\n**Accuracy \u002F triage notes — do not over-claim TLS bugs:**\n\n- **Offered ≠ exploitable.** testssl\u002Fsslyze flagging RC4, 3DES, or TLS 1.0 means the server *negotiates* it. That is a hardening finding, **not** a demonstrated decrypt. Without a PoC it is Info\u002FLow and frequently OOS.\n- **SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183)** — 3DES birthday attack. Requires a long-lived TLS session, an on-path attacker, and ~hundreds of GB \u002F hours of same-key traffic. Realistically un-demonstrable in a bug bounty; report only the *support* of 3DES, expect Low\u002FInfo.\n- **POODLE (CVE-2014-3566)** — SSLv3 CBC padding oracle. Needs **SSLv3 actually enabled**; almost no modern stack offers it. Confirm with `testssl.sh --poodle` (or `nmap --script ssl-poodle`) — modern OpenSSL 3.x dropped the `-ssl3` flag. If SSLv3 won't negotiate, there is no POODLE.\n- **FREAK (CVE-2015-0204)** and **DROWN (CVE-2016-0800)** — require export-grade RSA \u002F a shared SSLv2 endpoint respectively. Both are pre-conditions you must *prove present*, not assume. DROWN needs SSLv2 reachable on *some* host sharing the cert\u002Fkey — scan for SSLv2 with `testssl.sh --drown` (or `nmap --script sslv2-drown`) across the cert's SAN list before claiming it; modern OpenSSL has no `-ssl2` flag.\n- **Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)** — if you genuinely find an unpatched OpenSSL 1.0.1 leaking memory, that *is* High\u002FCritical with a real PoC (dump containing keys\u002Fcookies). Verify with `testssl.sh --heartbleed` and capture leaked bytes; this is the rare TLS bug worth a full report.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — HSTS Check\n\n```bash\n# Check HSTS header on main domain and all subdomains\ncurl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\"\n# Expected: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\n\n# Check critical subdomains (login, api, auth)\nfor sub in login auth api account pay www; do\n  HSTS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -i \"strict-transport-security\")\n  if [ -z \"$HSTS\" ]; then\n    echo \"[!] MISSING HSTS: https:\u002F\u002F$sub.$TARGET\u002F\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $sub.$TARGET: $HSTS\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Check HTTP (non-HTTPS) redirect\ncurl -sI \"http:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"location\"\n# Should redirect to HTTPS immediately\n\n# HSTS preload check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fhstspreload.org\u002Fapi\u002Fv2\u002Fstatus?domain=$TARGET\" | python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — DNS Zone Transfer (AXFR)\n\n```bash\n# Find nameservers\ndig NS $TARGET +short\n\n# Attempt zone transfer on each nameserver\nfor NS in $(dig NS $TARGET +short); do\n  echo \"=== Trying AXFR from $NS ===\"\n  dig AXFR $TARGET @$NS 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"^;\" | head -30\ndone\n\n# Zone transfer via alternative tools\nhost -t AXFR $TARGET $(dig NS $TARGET +short | head -1) 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\nnmap -sn --script dns-zone-transfer $TARGET 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# If AXFR succeeds → full internal hostname map\n# Look for: internal IPs, staging servers, admin hostnames, CI\u002FCD servers\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Email Security (SPF\u002FDKIM\u002FDMARC)\n\n```bash\n# Check SPF record\ndig TXT $TARGET +short | grep \"v=spf1\"\n# Missing SPF → potential email spoofing\n\n# Check DMARC\ndig TXT _dmarc.$TARGET +short\n# Missing DMARC → attacker can send as @target.com with no enforcement\n\n# Check DKIM selectors (common: default, google, mail, k1)\nfor selector in default google mail k1 selector1 selector2 s1 s2 dkim; do\n  RESULT=$(dig TXT $selector._domainkey.$TARGET +short 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  [ -n \"$RESULT\" ] && echo \"DKIM selector found: $selector → $RESULT\"\ndone\n\n# --- Spoofability evaluation (heuristic only; PROOF is the swaks test below) ---\nSPF=$(dig +short TXT $TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=spf1\")\nDMARC=$(dig +short TXT _dmarc.$TARGET | tr -d '\"' | grep -i \"v=DMARC1\")\n\n# SPF \"+all\" \u002F \"all\" with no qualifier = pass-everything = spoofable from any IP\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -Eq '[+ ]all($|[^-~?])' && echo \"[CRITICAL] SPF passes all senders (+all)\"\necho \"$SPF\" | grep -q \"~all\" && echo \"[INFO] SPF softfail (~all) — may still deliver to inbox\"\n[ -z \"$SPF\" ] && echo \"[INFO] No SPF record\"\n\n# Correct DMARC-absence check: test the variable for emptiness, do NOT pipe dig|wc -c\nif [ -z \"$DMARC\" ]; then\n  echo \"[INFO] No DMARC record (no published policy)\"\nelse\n  POLICY=$(echo \"$DMARC\" | grep -oiE 'p=[a-z]+' | head -1)\n  echo \"[INFO] DMARC present: $POLICY\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qi \"p=none\" && echo \"  -> p=none: monitors only, does NOT block spoofed mail\"\n  echo \"$POLICY\" | grep -qiE \"p=(quarantine|reject)\" && echo \"  -> enforcing policy: spoofing likely blocked at receiver\"\nfi\n```\n\n**Why the original `dig ... | wc -c | grep '^1$'` check was broken:** empty `dig +short` output is a zero-length string; piped through `wc -c` it usually yields `0`, and the surrounding newline handling is shell-dependent, so the `^1$` match misfires both ways. Always capture into a variable and test `[ -z \"$VAR\" ]`.\n\n### Spoofability is a RECEIVER decision, not a record-reading exercise\n\nDo not report \"missing DMARC = email spoofing\" from `dig` output alone. DMARC `p=none` (or absent) means the **sending domain published no enforcement** — but the **receiving** mail provider (Gmail, M365, the program's own MX) may still junk or reject your spoof based on SPF, its own heuristics, or ARC. The only proof that survives triage is a **message you delivered to a real inbox**.\n\n```bash\n# PROOF: send a spoofed mail and confirm INBOX delivery (use a tester account you own)\n# Use an account on the receiver the program actually uses (check their MX: dig MX $TARGET)\nswaks --to your-tester@gmail.com \\\n      --from \"CEO \u003Cceo@$TARGET>\" \\\n      --header \"Subject: [TEST] DMARC spoof PoC for $TARGET\" \\\n      --body \"Authorized bug-bounty test. Spoofed from-domain: $TARGET\" \\\n      --server \u003Can-smtp-relay-you-control-or-localhost>\n```\n\n**Confirmation gate — a spoof PoC is only valid if you can show:**\n1. The message landed in **Inbox** (not Spam\u002FJunk), screenshot the folder.\n2. The raw headers: `Authentication-Results:` showing `dmarc=none|fail` AND the mail was still **delivered** (not bounced). A bounce or a Spam-folder landing is NOT a finding — note it and move on.\n3. The visible `From:` shows `@$TARGET` to the recipient (header-from spoof, the one that matters for phishing), not just an `envelope-from` trick.\n\nSeverity is **Medium at best**, and only if delivered-to-inbox. Many programs mark email-auth findings OOS outright — check scope first.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Security Headers Audit\n\n```bash\n# Check all security headers\nHEADERS=$(curl -sI \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F\")\n\n# Check each critical header\nfor HEADER in \"Strict-Transport-Security\" \"Content-Security-Policy\" \"X-Frame-Options\" \\\n              \"X-Content-Type-Options\" \"Referrer-Policy\" \"Permissions-Policy\"; do\n  RESULT=$(echo \"$HEADERS\" | grep -i \"$HEADER\")\n  if [ -z \"$RESULT\" ]; then\n    echo \"[MISSING] $HEADER\"\n  else\n    echo \"[OK] $HEADER: $RESULT\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Automated security headers check\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fsecurityheaders.com\u002F?q=https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET&followRedirects=on\" | \\\n  grep -oP \"grade-\\K[A-F+]\" | head -3\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — Certificate Transparency (Subdomain Discovery)\n\n```bash\n# crt.sh — certificate transparency logs\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%25.$TARGET&output=json\" | \\\n  python3 -m json.tool 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep \"name_value\" | \\\n  grep -oP '\"name_value\": \"\\K[^\"]+' | \\\n  sed 's\u002F\\*\\.\u002F\u002Fg' | sort -u > recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt\n\necho \"[+] CT subdomains found: $(wc -l \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt)\"\n\n# Compare with existing subdomain list\ncomm -23 \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt) \\\n         \u003C(sort recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fsubdomains.txt 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull) | head -20\n# New entries = recently issued certs = new services to investigate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6.5 — Dangling Records → Subdomain Takeover (the finding that actually pays)\n\nThis is the highest-impact item in the whole skill. A CNAME\u002FA record pointing at a deprovisioned third-party resource (S3 bucket, Azure CDN\u002FApp Service, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Fastly, etc.) lets you claim that resource and serve content from `*.target.com`. Full depth lives in `hunt-subdomain`; here is the TLS\u002FDNS-recon entry point.\n\n```bash\n# For each subdomain from CT logs, resolve the CNAME chain and check for a live origin\nwhile read sub; do\n  CNAME=$(dig +short CNAME \"$sub\" | head -1)\n  [ -z \"$CNAME\" ] && continue\n  CODE=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" --max-time 8 \"https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  echo \"$sub -> $CNAME  [http $CODE]\"\ndone \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fct-subdomains.txt | tee recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fcname-map.txt\n\n# Flag CNAMEs that point at known takeoverable providers, then confirm the\n# fingerprint string in the body (e.g. \"NoSuchBucket\", \"There isn't a GitHub Pages site here\",\n# \"Fastly error: unknown domain\", \"The specified bucket does not exist\", Azure \"Web App - Unavailable\").\n```\n\n**Validation gate — a takeover claim requires you to actually claim it:**\n1. Confirm the dangling target is **unregistered\u002Fclaimable** (the S3 bucket name is free, the Heroku app does not exist, etc.) — the provider error fingerprint alone is necessary but NOT sufficient.\n2. **Register the resource yourself** and serve a unique canary file, e.g. `https:\u002F\u002F$sub\u002F\u003Crandom>.txt` returning a string only you know. Screenshot it served over the victim subdomain with valid TLS.\n3. Tear it down immediately after PoC; never leave attacker-controlled content live on the target's domain.\n\nImpact: cookie scope theft (cookies set for `.target.com`), OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FCORS-trust abuse, phishing on a trusted origin. Typically **High** (Critical if it sits at an OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shares session cookies).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — CAA Records (recon signal only — NOT a reportable finding)\n\n```bash\n# CAA records DECLARE which CAs the domain owner permits to issue certs.\ndig CAA $TARGET +short\ndig CAA \"*.$TARGET\" +short\n```\n\n**Do NOT report \"missing CAA\" as a vulnerability.** This is the most common false positive in this class. Correct framing:\n\n- A **missing CAA record does not let any attacker obtain a certificate.** It only means the owner has not *opted into* restricting which CAs may issue. With or without CAA, an attacker still needs to pass Domain Control Validation (HTTP-01 \u002F DNS-01 \u002F email) — which requires already controlling the domain, DNS, or web root.\n- The \"fraudulent issuance\" scenario requires **CA compromise or social-engineering a CA** into mis-issuing. That is out of scope for essentially every bug-bounty program and is not something you can demonstrate. CAA enforcement is a CA-side control, not an attacker-facing surface.\n- CAA is **Info-tier hardening at most**, and routinely closed as Won't-Fix \u002F OOS. Mention it in a recon notes appendix if at all; never file it standalone.\n\n**Where CAA recon IS useful (no finding, just intel):** the `issue`\u002F`issuewild` values tell you which CA the org uses (e.g. `letsencrypt.org`, `digicert.com`, `amazon.com`). That hints at automation (ACME) and at where a *real* takeover (Phase 6.5 dangling records) could let you mint a valid cert via DCV because you'd control the host.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 8 — mTLS Bypass Attempts\n\n```bash\n# Check if endpoint requires client certificate\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002F\" 2>&1 | grep -i \"ssl\\|certificate\\|403\\|401\"\n\n# Try without client cert (should fail)\ncurl -sk --cert \"\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" | head -5\n\n# Try common bypass paths (some apps skip mTLS on health checks)\nfor path in \u002Fhealth \u002Fping \u002Fstatus \u002Fmetrics \u002Fapi\u002Fhealth; do\n  STATUS=$(curl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET$path\")\n  echo \"$path: $STATUS\"\ndone\n\n# Header-injection bypass — nginx\u002FHAProxy\u002FEnvoy commonly terminate mTLS at the edge and\n# forward the verdict as a request header the backend trusts. If the edge does NOT strip\n# client-supplied copies of that header, you spoof a verified client. Try the real header\n# names used by each proxy:\nfor combo in \\\n  \"X-SSL-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-SSL-Client-S-DN: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"ssl-client-verify: SUCCESS|ssl-client-subject-dn: CN=admin\" \\\n  \"X-Client-Verify: SUCCESS|X-Client-DN: CN=admin,O=target\" \\\n  \"X-Forwarded-Client-Cert: By=spiffe:\u002F\u002Fx;Hash=0;Subject=\\\"CN=admin\\\"\"; do\n  H1=\"${combo%%|*}\"; H2=\"${combo##*|}\"\n  echo \"== $H1 \u002F $H2 ==\"\n  curl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Finternal\u002Fapi\" -H \"$H1\" -H \"$H2\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n**mTLS-bypass validation — this is a real auth bypass, so prove access, not just a status code:**\n- A `200` could be a generic page. Confirm you reached **authenticated-only functionality**: show data\u002Fan action that is impossible without the client cert (e.g. an admin-only object, an internal-only response body).\n- Distinguish *server policy* from *server state*: a `403` flipping to `200` with the spoofed header is meaningful; a `200` for both with and without the header means the path was never protected (no finding).\n- For the bypass-path angle (`\u002Fhealth`, `\u002Fmetrics`): only a finding if that endpoint exposes **sensitive data** (internal IPs, build secrets, Prometheus metrics revealing internal topology) — an empty `200 OK` health probe is not.\n- Capture the request\u002Fresponse pair in Burp Repeater so the spoofed header → privileged response is unambiguous.\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\nSeverities below are calibrated to what triage actually accepts. They are deliberately conservative; do not inflate them in a report.\n\n| TLS\u002FDNS finding | Realistic standalone severity | Notes \u002F what raises it |\n|----------------|------|------|\n| Dangling-CNAME subdomain takeover (claimed + canary served) | **High** | Critical if at OAuth `redirect_uri`\u002FSSO or sharing `.target.com` session cookies |\n| mTLS \u002F client-cert bypass reaching authed functionality | **High** | Must show privileged data\u002Faction, not just a 200 |\n| AXFR returning internal hosts\u002FIPs | **Medium** | Recon value; pairs with internal-service findings |\n| Spoofable DMARC, **delivered to a real inbox** (PoC headers) | **Medium** | Often OOS — check scope; Inbox (not Spam) + delivered required. *Reading `p=none` from `dig` alone = Info, do not file* |\n| Heartbleed \u002F live memory leak with captured secrets | **High–Critical** | Only with an actual dump containing keys\u002Fcookies |\n| Missing HSTS on auth subdomain | **Low \u002F Info** | NOT High — exploitation needs an active MitM position you cannot demonstrate remotely; report only with a working downgrade-capture PoC |\n| Weak cipher *support* (RC4\u002F3DES\u002FSWEET32) with no decrypt PoC | **Info \u002F Low** | Hardening only; frequently OOS |\n| Missing CAA | **Info (do not file)** | Absence does not enable issuance; not attacker-demonstrable |\n\n---\n\n## Tools\n\n```bash\n# testssl.sh — comprehensive TLS audit\nbrew install testssl\ntestssl.sh $TARGET\n\n# sslyze — Python TLS scanner\npip3 install sslyze\n\n# MXToolbox for email security\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fmxtoolbox.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002FLookup\u002Fspf?argument=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# dmarc-inspector\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fdmarcian.com\u002Fdmarc-inspector\u002F?domain=$TARGET\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\nEach finding ships only with the proof listed — never the `dig`\u002Fheader output alone.\n\n- **Subdomain takeover:** you registered the dangling resource and served a unique canary over `https:\u002F\u002Fsub.target.com\u002F` with valid TLS. Screenshot + canary string. (Tear down after.)\n- **mTLS bypass:** spoofed client-verify header returns *privileged* data\u002Faction that the cert-required path otherwise denies. Burp request\u002Fresponse pair.\n- **AXFR:** zone transfer returns internal hostnames\u002FIPs from an authoritative NS. Full transcript.\n- **DMARC spoof:** swaks-sent mail with `From: @target.com` **delivered to a real Inbox** (not Spam), raw `Authentication-Results` headers attached. A bounce or Spam landing = no finding.\n- **HSTS missing:** only reportable with a working downgrade PoC capturing a victim cookie over plaintext — otherwise it is best-practice noise.\n\n**Severity (conservative — matches the Chain Table):**\n- Subdomain takeover (claimed): High (Critical at OAuth\u002FSSO redirect or shared session cookie)\n- mTLS bypass to authed functionality: High\n- AXFR returning internal hosts: Medium\n- DMARC spoof delivered-to-inbox: Medium (often OOS — verify scope)\n- HSTS missing on auth (with downgrade PoC): Low–Medium; without PoC: Info\n- Weak cipher support without decrypt PoC: Info–Low\n- Missing security headers \u002F missing CAA only: Info (usually do not file)\n\n**Pre-submission scope gate:** before filing ANY item here, confirm the program does not list it as out of scope (email-auth, missing-headers, weak-TLS-without-exploit, and CAA are commonly OOS). Quote the in-scope line in your report.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":26,"source":43,"license":14,"sources":44,"category":37,"date_added":45,"description":7,"source_repo":46,"source_type":32,"report_count":47,"compatibility":48,"license_source":49},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","portswigger_research, ssl_labs_research, hstspreload_org","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter",6,"Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-tls-network","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":56,"prompt":66,"zipAvailable":67},[57,60,63],{"tool":58,"command":59},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-tls-network",{"tool":61,"command":62},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-tls-network",{"tool":64,"command":65},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-tls-network","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-tls-network\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[70,95,119,143,171,195],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[76],{"categoryNo":77,"categoryName":78,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[82,83,84,85,86,87,72,88,89,90,91,33,32,22,92,93,29,28,24,94],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,33,115,32,116,117,93,118],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","node","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[126,127,128,129,130,131,132,36,133,134,135,136,137,32,22,138,139,140,141,142],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","github","codex","research","https","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":144,"name":145,"nameZh":6,"description":146,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":147,"categories":148,"keywords":160,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - free tier, no card required.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[149,152,155],{"categoryNo":150,"categoryName":151,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":153,"categoryName":154,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":156,"categoryName":157,"taxonomyType":158,"taxonomyTypeDesc":159},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[126,127,128,161,129,162,130,131,36,163,164,165,166,135,167,32,22,168,169,170],"youtube transcript skills","gemini","search","api","Video","browse","api-integration","free","card","channels",{"skillNo":172,"name":173,"nameZh":6,"description":174,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":175,"categories":176,"keywords":181,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EAB96PX83W5PTE8A0R8D","youtube-notetaker","Turn YouTube talks into local study notes with slides, transcripts, editable annotations, and a markdown-backed viewer.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-notetaker\u002FSKILL.md",[177,180],{"categoryNo":178,"categoryName":179,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000003","演示文稿",{"categoryNo":153,"categoryName":154,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},[128,182,183,106,129,184,185,186,187,36,165,188,189,190,191,22,192,138,193,194],"youtube notetaker","notetaker","workflow","official","notes","code","markdown","slides","annotations","README","study","dair-academy","viewer",{"skillNo":196,"name":197,"nameZh":6,"description":198,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":199,"categories":200,"keywords":202,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0E55F0GW5MX48V8HXS8B5","youtube-full","Fetch YouTube transcripts, search videos, browse channels, and extract playlists via TranscriptAPI — no yt-dlp, no Google API key, works from any cloud server.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-full\u002FSKILL.md",[201],{"categoryNo":150,"categoryName":151,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},[203,128,204,205,129,162,163,206,207,164,165,166,135,208,167,32,22,168,209,141],"youtube full","full","google","server","dlp","credits","automatic"]