[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6P5NY122C81Y2NP93ST0NNR":3,"skill-same:01M6P5NY122C81Y2NP93ST0NNR":69},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":21,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":52,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":53,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":54,"install":55,"resources":68},"01M6P5NY122C81Y2NP93ST0NNR","hunt-aspnet",null,"Hunt ASP.NET-specific surface","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-aspnet\u002FSKILL.md",[],[18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"hunt aspnet","hunt","aspnet","main","for","relevant","helper","offensive","scripts","scope","commands","testing","community","engagement","only","Tools","license","testing tools","security","github","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunt-aspnet\ndescription: Hunt ASP.NET-specific surface\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: github, authorized-engagement\nreport_count: 1\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nASP.NET deserialization bugs pay among the highest amounts in bug bounty when they reach RCE. Even when patched, the disclosure-tier findings (signed-only ViewState, dual-parser differential, request-validator quirks) reliably pay Low-Medium.\n\n**Highest-value targets:**\n\n- **SharePoint farms** (any version — 2013\u002F2016\u002F2019\u002FSE) — sign-only ViewState + permissive ToolPane.aspx + anonymous FormDigest creates the CVE-2025-53770 ToolShell precondition chain\n- **Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX** — `Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd` is a documented RCE sink when keys leak (CVE-2017-11317, CVE-2017-11357, CVE-2019-18935)\n- **Classic ASP.NET Webforms enterprise apps** — banking portals, dealer portals, HR systems left on .NET Framework 4.x\n- **WCF services** (`*.svc?WSDL`) — often forgotten admin endpoints with looser auth than the main app\n- **Sitecore CMS** — ViewState + Sitecore-specific deserialization chains (CVE-2021-42237)\n- **DotNetNuke (DNN)** — historic ViewState RCE chains\n- **Umbraco CMS** — ViewState + custom deserialization sinks\n\n**Asset types that pay most:** internet-reachable ASP.NET Webforms apps > WCF admin services > Telerik-integrated sites > Classic ASP.NET MVC with VSF (very rare)\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n**Response headers indicating ASP.NET:**\n```\nX-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319          (classic — disclosure on its own)\nX-Powered-By: ASP.NET\nX-AspNetMvc-Version: 5.2\nServer: Microsoft-IIS\u002F10.0\nSet-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...\nSet-Cookie: .ASPXAUTH=...            (Forms auth cookie)\nSet-Cookie: .ASPXFORMSAUTH=...\nSet-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...; SameSite=None  (suggests cross-origin embedding)\n```\n\n**Body signals (in form HTML):**\n```\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__VIEWSTATE\" id=\"__VIEWSTATE\" value=\"...\" \u002F>\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" id=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" value=\"...\" \u002F>\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED\" id=\"__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED\" value=\"\" \u002F>\n                                        ↑ EMPTY = signed-only, not encrypted = exploitable if key leaks\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__EVENTVALIDATION\" id=\"__EVENTVALIDATION\" value=\"...\" \u002F>\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__REQUESTDIGEST\" id=\"__REQUESTDIGEST\" value=\"0x...,...\">\n                                        ↑ SharePoint CSRF token; if anon-issued, see hunt-sharepoint\n```\n\n**URL patterns to probe:**\n```\n\u002Ftrace.axd                            (per-app trace viewer; sometimes anon-accessible)\n\u002Felmah.axd                            (ELMAH error log viewer)\n\u002Felmah.axd\u002F?id=...                    (ELMAH RCE \u002F stack-trace leak)\n\u002F*.svc                                (WCF services)\n\u002F*.svc?wsdl                           (WCF WSDL)\n\u002F*.svc\u002Fmex                            (Metadata Exchange)\n\u002F*.asmx                               (legacy SOAP)\n\u002F*.asmx?WSDL                          (legacy SOAP description)\n\u002F*.asmx?disco                         (legacy discovery)\n\u002FTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd       (Telerik AJAX components)\n\u002FChartImg.axd                         (DataVisualization controls; historic deserialization)\n\u002FScriptResource.axd                   (script resource handler; sometimes leaks paths)\n\u002FWebResource.axd                      (web resource handler)\n\u002F_vti_bin\u002F*                           (SharePoint Web Service Forwarder)\n\u002Fapi\u002F                                 (Web API 2.x is ASP.NET on classic framework)\n\u002Fsignin                               (often FedAuth \u002F WS-Federation)\n```\n\n**Tech-stack signals:**\n- `Server: Microsoft-IIS\u002F10.0` (or `\u002F8.5`, `\u002F7.5`) — confirmed Windows + IIS\n- `X-AspNet-Version` header — classic .NET Framework (4.x); .NET Core\u002F5+ does NOT emit this\n- Cookies with `ASP.NET_SessionId`, `.ASPXAUTH`, `FedAuth` — Forms or claims auth\n- `__VIEWSTATE` in form bodies — Webforms (NOT MVC, NOT Razor Pages, NOT Blazor)\n- `MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices` header (sometimes stripped by ELB but leaks in `start.aspx` body) — SharePoint\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n1. **Fingerprint the framework version.** Trigger any 500 error (stale ViewState POST is a reliable way) and look for `Version Information: Microsoft .NET Framework Version:X.X.XXXXX; ASP.NET Version:X.X.XXXX.X` in the error body. This banner discloses both the runtime and ASP.NET-version-specific patch level. .NET 4.0.30319 + ASP.NET 4.8.x is the most common modern combination.\n\n2. **Locate every form with `__VIEWSTATE`.** Spider the target and grep for `name=\"__VIEWSTATE\"`. Each is a candidate sink for deserialization attacks if MAC \u002F encryption is bypassable.\n\n3. **Check `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` value.** Empty (`value=\"\"`) means ViewState is signed-only via `\u003CmachineKey>` but NOT encrypted. Recovery of the validation key → arbitrary deserialization. Non-empty (`value=\"something\"`) means ViewState is BOTH signed and encrypted; both keys needed to forge.\n\n4. **Test the ViewState parser-error differential** (the dual-parser anti-pattern). Send 7+ ViewState shapes and classify responses:\n   - Trivial garbage (`AAAA`) → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - Real prefix from current page → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - Flipped-bit real ViewState → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - Oversize (`A * 100000`) → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - XML-shaped (`\u003Cxss\u002F>`) → **\"The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted\"** ← different parser path\n   - LosFormatter-style prefix (`\u002FwEPDwUKMTcxNzgyOTQwMmRkkz9p4lzA...`) → **\"The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted\"**\n\n   The differential proves there are **two distinct deserialization entry points**, one of which dispatches BEFORE the MAC check on some payload shapes. Historically this enables MAC-before-parse-bypass exploits.\n\n5. **Look for load-balanced cross-node ViewState MAC failures.** If POST gets a 500 with `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed. If this application is hosted by a Web Farm or cluster, ensure that \u003CmachineKey> configuration specifies the same validationKey...\"`, the farm has multiple WFEs WITHOUT machineKey sync, or without sticky-session affinity. Operationally this breaks legit users; security-wise it confirms farm topology.\n\n6. **Probe `trace.axd` and `elmah.axd`.** If either returns 200 anonymously, it's a Critical finding (trace leaks every request + headers + form data; ELMAH leaks every server error including stack traces).\n\n7. **Enumerate WCF services (`.svc`).** For each, fetch `?wsdl` and `?mex` (metadata exchange). MEX endpoints sometimes return full service contracts including admin operations.\n\n8. **Test request-validator bypass.** ASP.NET's request validator blocks `\u003C` in query strings by default. Bypass categories that may still get through:\n   - HTML-entity-encoded payloads (`&lt;script&gt;` — but these don't execute)\n   - Encoded inside JSON \u002F XML POST bodies (different content-type ≠ same validator)\n   - In path segments (not query) — validator scope depends on framework version\n   - In Cookie \u002F Referer headers (varies)\n   - Inside `\u003C%@ ... %>` ASP directives if reached via WebDAV PUT (rare)\n\n9. **Check `customErrors` mode.** If 500s expose full stack traces, framework versions, file paths, internal method names → `customErrors mode=\"Off\"` is set. Should be `RemoteOnly` for production.\n\n10. **Look for Telerik components.** `Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau` is the historic upload-to-RCE chain (CVE-2017-11317). The `dialogParametersHolder` parameter chain (CVE-2019-18935) requires the encryption key but is otherwise RCE.\n\n11. **SharePoint-specific deserialization paths** — see `hunt-sharepoint` skill for the ToolPane.aspx + anonymous FormDigest + unencrypted ViewState chain.\n\n12. **SafeControl enumeration via reflection.** SharePoint's `Picker.aspx?PickerDialogType=\u003CTypeName>` (and DNN-equivalent endpoints) accept class names and return DIFFERENT error messages for \"type exists but not whitelisted\" vs \"type does not exist.\" Feed a wordlist of `Microsoft.SharePoint.*.WebControls.*` types to enumerate the SafeControl list — useful for CVE-2019-0604-family hunting.\n\n---\n\n## Payload & Detection Patterns\n\n**Stack-trace fingerprint (trigger via stale ViewState POST):**\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Fpage.aspx\" \\\n  --data \"__VIEWSTATE=AAAA&__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR=AAAA\"\n# Inspect body for:\n#  - \"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\" → confirms signed ViewState\n#  - \"The state information is invalid for this page\" → confirms ALTERNATE parser path\n#  - \"Version Information: Microsoft .NET Framework Version:X.X.XXXXX\" → exact patch level\n#  - \"Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.ServerStub...\" → SharePoint farm\n```\n\n**ViewState parser-error differential probe (Python):**\n```python\nimport requests, re, json\nS = requests.Session(); S.verify = False\n# Get fresh form\nr = S.get(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Fpath\u002Fpage.aspx\")\nreal_vs = re.search(r'__VIEWSTATE\" id=\"__VIEWSTATE\" value=\"([^\"]+)', r.text).group(1)\nreal_vsg = re.search(r'__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" id=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" value=\"([^\"]+)', r.text).group(1)\n\n# Test 7 payload shapes\nfor label, vs in [\n    (\"trivial\",      \"AAAA\"),\n    (\"real\",         real_vs),\n    (\"flipped-bit\",  real_vs[:50] + \"X\" + real_vs[51:]),\n    (\"oversize\",     \"A\" * 100000),\n    (\"base64\",       \"VGVzdE1hcmtlcjY3OFhZWg==\"),\n    (\"xml-shaped\",   \"\u003Cxss\u002F>\"),\n    (\"losformatter\", \"\u002FwEPDwUKMTcxNzgyOTQwMmRkkz9p4lzA\" + \"A\"*50),\n]:\n    r = S.post(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Fpath\u002Fpage.aspx\",\n               data={\"__VIEWSTATE\": vs, \"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\": real_vsg})\n    title = re.search(r'\u003Ctitle>([^\u003C]+)\u003C\u002Ftitle>', r.text)\n    title = title.group(1)[:100] if title else \"—\"\n    print(f\"  [{label:14s}] {r.status_code}  {title}\")\n```\n\n**`trace.axd` anonymous check:**\n```bash\ncurl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Ftrace.axd\"\n# 200 = full trace dump exposed → Critical\n# 403 = mod set to localhost-only → check via X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\n```\n\n**WCF service enumeration:**\n```bash\n# Find all .svc files\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002F\" -o body.html\ngrep -oE '\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9\u002F_-]+\\.svc' body.html | sort -u\n# For each found:\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002FService.svc?wsdl\" | xmllint --format - | head -60\n```\n\n**Request-validator bypass categories:**\n```\n# Default: \u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript> in ?q= → \"Potentially dangerous Request.QueryString value detected\"\n# Bypasses that sometimes work:\n?q=%3cscript%3e            (URL-encoded — depends on validator config)\n?q=\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=alert(1)>  (depends on validator version)\n?q=\u003C%00script>             (NUL-byte; older validators)\n?q=javascript:alert(1)     (no \u003C at all — passes validator)\nCookie: foo=\u003Cscript>       (cookie body not validated by default)\nReferer: http:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002F\u003Cscript>  (referer not validated in classic ASP.NET)\n```\n\n**Telerik exploit gate (CVE-2019-18935 — requires encryption keys):**\n```bash\n# Fingerprint Telerik\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002FTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau\" -X POST\n# If response is RadAsyncUploadHandler-style → Telerik present; try keys\n# Public exploits require leaked machineKey AND telerikEncryptionKey\n```\n\n---\n\n## Common Root Causes\n\n1. **`viewStateEncryption=\"Auto\"` defaults to signed-only on pages without sensitive ViewState data.** Many SharePoint pages are configured this way. When `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` is empty, ViewState is signed-only — recovery of `validationKey` alone enables forgery.\n\n2. **`\u003CmachineKey>` AutoGenerate in a Web Farm.** Each WFE generates a different key on first boot; ViewState issued by one WFE fails MAC validation on another. Operationally produces 500s; security-wise broadcasts the topology (the error message names the cluster).\n\n3. **`\u003CcustomErrors mode=\"Off\">` left from development.** Stack traces with full method names, file paths, version banners exposed to anonymous internet users.\n\n4. **`trace.axd` \u002F `elmah.axd` left enabled in production.** Often forgotten in `\u003Csystem.web>\u003Ctrace enabled=\"true\">` blocks.\n\n5. **Forgotten WCF `.svc` admin endpoints.** Built for internal admin tooling, never disabled when the main app went to internet exposure.\n\n6. **Dual-parser anti-pattern: `ObjectStateFormatter` (legacy) vs `LosFormatter` (modern) deserialize in different orders relative to MAC validation.** Some payload shapes hit the legacy parser BEFORE MAC check.\n\n7. **Request validator only applies to URL-encoded body and querystring.** Headers, cookies, XML\u002FJSON bodies, and multipart fields are NOT validated by default. Developers assume validator is universal; it is not.\n\n8. **`\u003CmachineKey>` checked into source repos.** Configuration check-ins to GitHub frequently leak validation\u002Fdecryption keys. Combine with `hunt-misc` source-recon for Telerik \u002F SharePoint \u002F DNN keys.\n\n9. **`SafeControls` web.config entries trusted to gate deserialization.** SharePoint's `\u003CSafeControl>` list determines which classes Picker.aspx can instantiate. Bypasses exist when the inheritance check is the only gate (CVE-2019-0604 family).\n\n---\n\n## Bypass Techniques\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` non-empty (encrypted) | Recover both decryption + validation keys from any source-code leak \u002F config-disclosure \u002F VS forge primitive; without keys, deserialization cannot be triggered |\n| Request validator blocks `\u003C` in querystring | Move payload to Cookie \u002F Referer \u002F JSON body \u002F multipart filename — validator doesn't reach those contexts in classic ASP.NET |\n| `EnableViewStateMac=\"true\"` enforced | Recover `validationKey` from web.config disclosure or `\u003CmachineKey>` AutoGenerate fingerprinting (ysoserial.net `--minify --islegacy` mode generates ViewState that passes some MAC-validation gaps) |\n| `trace.axd` localhost-only | Set `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` if the trace mode is `localOnly` and the validation uses Request.UserHostAddress (some apps use Forwarded-For instead) |\n| WCF `.svc` 401 on anonymous | Try `?wsdl` and `?mex` first; metadata is sometimes anonymously enumerable even when service ops require auth |\n| Telerik upload patched | Check the Telerik version: anything pre-2017Q1 (build 2017.1.118 or earlier) is the original RAU RCE. Check 2017Q3 - 2019Q3 for CVE-2019-18935 |\n| `SafeControl` whitelist enforced | Inheritance gate (`instanceof PickerDialog`) IS the gate on patched SP — bypass requires finding a SafeControl subclass with a deserialization sink; enumerate via Picker.aspx |\n| `customErrors mode=\"On\"` (no stack traces) | Force a different error path: invalid Content-Length, malformed ViewState that triggers a parser-level exception below the customErrors handler |\n\n---\n\n## Gate 0 Validation\n\nBefore writing the report, confirm:\n\n1. **What can the attacker DO right now with the disclosed information?**\n   - `trace.axd` 200 with full request dump → **Critical** (PII \u002F session cookies \u002F Authorization headers exposed)\n   - `elmah.axd` 200 with error log → **High** (stack traces + internal paths + sometimes credentials)\n   - `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` empty + recoverable machineKey via separate finding → **Critical chain to RCE**\n   - `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` empty without key recovery → **Low-Medium** (primitive present, not exploitable on its own)\n   - Stack traces in 500s → **Low** unless they include credentials \u002F connection strings\n\n2. **Have you reproduced the full chain to attacker-attainable impact, or only the primitive?**\n   - Cross-reference `triage-validation` Pre-Severity Gate. \"Primitive confirmed\" is not Critical until the chain ends in impact.\n\n3. **Can a triager reproduce in \u003C10 min from your report?**\n   - Each step copy-pasteable curl \u002F Python.\n   - For RCE chains: link the public exploit tool (ysoserial.net, viewgen, telerik-revda) and the specific gadget chain.\n\n---\n\n## Real Impact Examples\n\n### Scenario A — Signed-only ViewState + permissive ToolPane on EoL SharePoint 2013\n\n`https:\u002F\u002Ftarget-portal.example\u002F_layouts\u002F15\u002FToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit` returns 200 anonymously. The form contains `__VIEWSTATE` (signed only — `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=\"\"`), and `__REQUESTDIGEST` is anonymously issued via `_api\u002Fcontextinfo`. Combined with SP2013 being end-of-life (no patch will ever ship), this is the canonical CVE-2025-53770 \"ToolShell\" precondition chain on a permanently-unpatched code path. Reported severity: **Critical**. The dual-parser test (Section 4 of Methodology) confirmed that XML-shaped payloads reach the legacy `ObjectStateFormatter` BEFORE MAC validation — additional evidence that the chain is reachable even without full machineKey recovery (though full RCE requires both).\n\n### Scenario B — Telerik RadAsyncUploadHandler exposed on legacy bank portal\n\n`\u002FTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau` returns the Telerik upload handler. Telerik version (visible in JS bundle metadata) is 2016.3.1027. CVE-2017-11317 applies — keys are baked into the public Telerik DLL of that version. Upload → write `aspx` to `\u002Fapp_data\u002F` → request → RCE. Reported severity: **Critical**.\n\n### Scenario C — trace.axd + elmah.axd both exposed on enterprise HR portal\n\n`trace.axd` 200 returns 50 most recent requests, including `Authorization: Bearer eyJ...` headers on API requests. `elmah.axd` 200 returns full error log with database connection-string in one of the exceptions. Reported severity: **Critical** (credentials in plaintext to anonymous internet).\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-rce`** — ViewState deserialization is the headline ASP.NET RCE path; signed-only ViewState + leaked machineKey = RCE every time. Chain primitive: ASP.NET ViewState dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern detected (signed but not encrypted, `\u003C%@ Page enableViewStateMac=\"true\" viewStateEncryptionMode=\"Never\" %>`) + machineKey recovered (from web.config disclosure, `elmah.axd`, source leak, or GitHub) → `hunt-rce` ysoserial.net `TypeConfuseDelegate` gadget → arbitrary command in `w3wp.exe` worker-process identity.\n- **`hunt-sharepoint`** — SharePoint farms inherit every ASP.NET anti-pattern plus their own surface. Chain primitive: ASP.NET fingerprint reveals SharePoint (X-SharePoint headers + `\u002F_layouts\u002F` reachable) → pivot to `hunt-sharepoint` for SP-specific RCE paths (ToolShell, SafeControl reflection) before generic ViewState attack.\n- **`hunt-ntlm-info`** — IIS sites that advertise NTLM\u002FNegotiate anonymously leak AD topology. Chain primitive: ASP.NET app behind IIS with `WWW-Authenticate: NTLM` → `hunt-ntlm-info` Type-2 challenge capture → internal forest name → cross-reference Entra tenant via `m365-entra-attack` discovery.\n- **`hunt-file-upload`** — Telerik RadAsyncUpload, Kentico, Umbraco, and DotNetNuke all have historical upload-handler RCE. Chain primitive: ASP.NET CMS fingerprinted → `hunt-file-upload` bypass matrix against the CMS upload handler → `.aspx` written into web-accessible path → request → RCE under app-pool identity.\n- **`triage-validation`** — `trace.axd`\u002F`elmah.axd` disclosure is only Critical when it actually leaks live credentials\u002Ftokens; pure stack traces are usually Low. Chain primitive: pull every reported finding through `triage-validation` 7-Question Gate before submission — distinguish \"verbose error\" (informational) from \"live bearer token in error log\" (Critical) before writing the report (`redteam-report-template`).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nASP.NET deserialization bugs pay among the highest amounts in bug bounty when they reach RCE. Even when patched, the disclosure-tier findings (signed-only ViewState, dual-parser differential, request-validator quirks) reliably pay Low-Medium.\n\n**Highest-value targets:**\n\n- **SharePoint farms** (any version — 2013\u002F2016\u002F2019\u002FSE) — sign-only ViewState + permissive ToolPane.aspx + anonymous FormDigest creates the CVE-2025-53770 ToolShell precondition chain\n- **Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX** — `Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd` is a documented RCE sink when keys leak (CVE-2017-11317, CVE-2017-11357, CVE-2019-18935)\n- **Classic ASP.NET Webforms enterprise apps** — banking portals, dealer portals, HR systems left on .NET Framework 4.x\n- **WCF services** (`*.svc?WSDL`) — often forgotten admin endpoints with looser auth than the main app\n- **Sitecore CMS** — ViewState + Sitecore-specific deserialization chains (CVE-2021-42237)\n- **DotNetNuke (DNN)** — historic ViewState RCE chains\n- **Umbraco CMS** — ViewState + custom deserialization sinks\n\n**Asset types that pay most:** internet-reachable ASP.NET Webforms apps > WCF admin services > Telerik-integrated sites > Classic ASP.NET MVC with VSF (very rare)\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n**Response headers indicating ASP.NET:**\n```\nX-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319          (classic — disclosure on its own)\nX-Powered-By: ASP.NET\nX-AspNetMvc-Version: 5.2\nServer: Microsoft-IIS\u002F10.0\nSet-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...\nSet-Cookie: .ASPXAUTH=...            (Forms auth cookie)\nSet-Cookie: .ASPXFORMSAUTH=...\nSet-Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=...; SameSite=None  (suggests cross-origin embedding)\n```\n\n**Body signals (in form HTML):**\n```\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__VIEWSTATE\" id=\"__VIEWSTATE\" value=\"...\" \u002F>\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" id=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" value=\"...\" \u002F>\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED\" id=\"__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED\" value=\"\" \u002F>\n                                        ↑ EMPTY = signed-only, not encrypted = exploitable if key leaks\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__EVENTVALIDATION\" id=\"__EVENTVALIDATION\" value=\"...\" \u002F>\n\u003Cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"__REQUESTDIGEST\" id=\"__REQUESTDIGEST\" value=\"0x...,...\">\n                                        ↑ SharePoint CSRF token; if anon-issued, see hunt-sharepoint\n```\n\n**URL patterns to probe:**\n```\n\u002Ftrace.axd                            (per-app trace viewer; sometimes anon-accessible)\n\u002Felmah.axd                            (ELMAH error log viewer)\n\u002Felmah.axd\u002F?id=...                    (ELMAH RCE \u002F stack-trace leak)\n\u002F*.svc                                (WCF services)\n\u002F*.svc?wsdl                           (WCF WSDL)\n\u002F*.svc\u002Fmex                            (Metadata Exchange)\n\u002F*.asmx                               (legacy SOAP)\n\u002F*.asmx?WSDL                          (legacy SOAP description)\n\u002F*.asmx?disco                         (legacy discovery)\n\u002FTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd       (Telerik AJAX components)\n\u002FChartImg.axd                         (DataVisualization controls; historic deserialization)\n\u002FScriptResource.axd                   (script resource handler; sometimes leaks paths)\n\u002FWebResource.axd                      (web resource handler)\n\u002F_vti_bin\u002F*                           (SharePoint Web Service Forwarder)\n\u002Fapi\u002F                                 (Web API 2.x is ASP.NET on classic framework)\n\u002Fsignin                               (often FedAuth \u002F WS-Federation)\n```\n\n**Tech-stack signals:**\n- `Server: Microsoft-IIS\u002F10.0` (or `\u002F8.5`, `\u002F7.5`) — confirmed Windows + IIS\n- `X-AspNet-Version` header — classic .NET Framework (4.x); .NET Core\u002F5+ does NOT emit this\n- Cookies with `ASP.NET_SessionId`, `.ASPXAUTH`, `FedAuth` — Forms or claims auth\n- `__VIEWSTATE` in form bodies — Webforms (NOT MVC, NOT Razor Pages, NOT Blazor)\n- `MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices` header (sometimes stripped by ELB but leaks in `start.aspx` body) — SharePoint\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n1. **Fingerprint the framework version.** Trigger any 500 error (stale ViewState POST is a reliable way) and look for `Version Information: Microsoft .NET Framework Version:X.X.XXXXX; ASP.NET Version:X.X.XXXX.X` in the error body. This banner discloses both the runtime and ASP.NET-version-specific patch level. .NET 4.0.30319 + ASP.NET 4.8.x is the most common modern combination.\n\n2. **Locate every form with `__VIEWSTATE`.** Spider the target and grep for `name=\"__VIEWSTATE\"`. Each is a candidate sink for deserialization attacks if MAC \u002F encryption is bypassable.\n\n3. **Check `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` value.** Empty (`value=\"\"`) means ViewState is signed-only via `\u003CmachineKey>` but NOT encrypted. Recovery of the validation key → arbitrary deserialization. Non-empty (`value=\"something\"`) means ViewState is BOTH signed and encrypted; both keys needed to forge.\n\n4. **Test the ViewState parser-error differential** (the dual-parser anti-pattern). Send 7+ ViewState shapes and classify responses:\n   - Trivial garbage (`AAAA`) → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - Real prefix from current page → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - Flipped-bit real ViewState → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - Oversize (`A * 100000`) → `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\"`\n   - XML-shaped (`\u003Cxss\u002F>`) → **\"The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted\"** ← different parser path\n   - LosFormatter-style prefix (`\u002FwEPDwUKMTcxNzgyOTQwMmRkkz9p4lzA...`) → **\"The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted\"**\n\n   The differential proves there are **two distinct deserialization entry points**, one of which dispatches BEFORE the MAC check on some payload shapes. Historically this enables MAC-before-parse-bypass exploits.\n\n5. **Look for load-balanced cross-node ViewState MAC failures.** If POST gets a 500 with `\"Validation of viewstate MAC failed. If this application is hosted by a Web Farm or cluster, ensure that \u003CmachineKey> configuration specifies the same validationKey...\"`, the farm has multiple WFEs WITHOUT machineKey sync, or without sticky-session affinity. Operationally this breaks legit users; security-wise it confirms farm topology.\n\n6. **Probe `trace.axd` and `elmah.axd`.** If either returns 200 anonymously, it's a Critical finding (trace leaks every request + headers + form data; ELMAH leaks every server error including stack traces).\n\n7. **Enumerate WCF services (`.svc`).** For each, fetch `?wsdl` and `?mex` (metadata exchange). MEX endpoints sometimes return full service contracts including admin operations.\n\n8. **Test request-validator bypass.** ASP.NET's request validator blocks `\u003C` in query strings by default. Bypass categories that may still get through:\n   - HTML-entity-encoded payloads (`&lt;script&gt;` — but these don't execute)\n   - Encoded inside JSON \u002F XML POST bodies (different content-type ≠ same validator)\n   - In path segments (not query) — validator scope depends on framework version\n   - In Cookie \u002F Referer headers (varies)\n   - Inside `\u003C%@ ... %>` ASP directives if reached via WebDAV PUT (rare)\n\n9. **Check `customErrors` mode.** If 500s expose full stack traces, framework versions, file paths, internal method names → `customErrors mode=\"Off\"` is set. Should be `RemoteOnly` for production.\n\n10. **Look for Telerik components.** `Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau` is the historic upload-to-RCE chain (CVE-2017-11317). The `dialogParametersHolder` parameter chain (CVE-2019-18935) requires the encryption key but is otherwise RCE.\n\n11. **SharePoint-specific deserialization paths** — see `hunt-sharepoint` skill for the ToolPane.aspx + anonymous FormDigest + unencrypted ViewState chain.\n\n12. **SafeControl enumeration via reflection.** SharePoint's `Picker.aspx?PickerDialogType=\u003CTypeName>` (and DNN-equivalent endpoints) accept class names and return DIFFERENT error messages for \"type exists but not whitelisted\" vs \"type does not exist.\" Feed a wordlist of `Microsoft.SharePoint.*.WebControls.*` types to enumerate the SafeControl list — useful for CVE-2019-0604-family hunting.\n\n---\n\n## Payload & Detection Patterns\n\n**Stack-trace fingerprint (trigger via stale ViewState POST):**\n```bash\ncurl -sk -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Fpage.aspx\" \\\n  --data \"__VIEWSTATE=AAAA&__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR=AAAA\"\n# Inspect body for:\n#  - \"Validation of viewstate MAC failed\" → confirms signed ViewState\n#  - \"The state information is invalid for this page\" → confirms ALTERNATE parser path\n#  - \"Version Information: Microsoft .NET Framework Version:X.X.XXXXX\" → exact patch level\n#  - \"Microsoft.SharePoint.Client.ServerStub...\" → SharePoint farm\n```\n\n**ViewState parser-error differential probe (Python):**\n```python\nimport requests, re, json\nS = requests.Session(); S.verify = False\n# Get fresh form\nr = S.get(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Fpath\u002Fpage.aspx\")\nreal_vs = re.search(r'__VIEWSTATE\" id=\"__VIEWSTATE\" value=\"([^\"]+)', r.text).group(1)\nreal_vsg = re.search(r'__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" id=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\" value=\"([^\"]+)', r.text).group(1)\n\n# Test 7 payload shapes\nfor label, vs in [\n    (\"trivial\",      \"AAAA\"),\n    (\"real\",         real_vs),\n    (\"flipped-bit\",  real_vs[:50] + \"X\" + real_vs[51:]),\n    (\"oversize\",     \"A\" * 100000),\n    (\"base64\",       \"VGVzdE1hcmtlcjY3OFhZWg==\"),\n    (\"xml-shaped\",   \"\u003Cxss\u002F>\"),\n    (\"losformatter\", \"\u002FwEPDwUKMTcxNzgyOTQwMmRkkz9p4lzA\" + \"A\"*50),\n]:\n    r = S.post(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Fpath\u002Fpage.aspx\",\n               data={\"__VIEWSTATE\": vs, \"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\": real_vsg})\n    title = re.search(r'\u003Ctitle>([^\u003C]+)\u003C\u002Ftitle>', r.text)\n    title = title.group(1)[:100] if title else \"—\"\n    print(f\"  [{label:14s}] {r.status_code}  {title}\")\n```\n\n**`trace.axd` anonymous check:**\n```bash\ncurl -sk -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002Ftrace.axd\"\n# 200 = full trace dump exposed → Critical\n# 403 = mod set to localhost-only → check via X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\n```\n\n**WCF service enumeration:**\n```bash\n# Find all .svc files\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002F\" -o body.html\ngrep -oE '\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9\u002F_-]+\\.svc' body.html | sort -u\n# For each found:\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002FService.svc?wsdl\" | xmllint --format - | head -60\n```\n\n**Request-validator bypass categories:**\n```\n# Default: \u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript> in ?q= → \"Potentially dangerous Request.QueryString value detected\"\n# Bypasses that sometimes work:\n?q=%3cscript%3e            (URL-encoded — depends on validator config)\n?q=\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=alert(1)>  (depends on validator version)\n?q=\u003C%00script>             (NUL-byte; older validators)\n?q=javascript:alert(1)     (no \u003C at all — passes validator)\nCookie: foo=\u003Cscript>       (cookie body not validated by default)\nReferer: http:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002F\u003Cscript>  (referer not validated in classic ASP.NET)\n```\n\n**Telerik exploit gate (CVE-2019-18935 — requires encryption keys):**\n```bash\n# Fingerprint Telerik\ncurl -sk \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example\u002FTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau\" -X POST\n# If response is RadAsyncUploadHandler-style → Telerik present; try keys\n# Public exploits require leaked machineKey AND telerikEncryptionKey\n```\n\n---\n\n## Common Root Causes\n\n1. **`viewStateEncryption=\"Auto\"` defaults to signed-only on pages without sensitive ViewState data.** Many SharePoint pages are configured this way. When `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` is empty, ViewState is signed-only — recovery of `validationKey` alone enables forgery.\n\n2. **`\u003CmachineKey>` AutoGenerate in a Web Farm.** Each WFE generates a different key on first boot; ViewState issued by one WFE fails MAC validation on another. Operationally produces 500s; security-wise broadcasts the topology (the error message names the cluster).\n\n3. **`\u003CcustomErrors mode=\"Off\">` left from development.** Stack traces with full method names, file paths, version banners exposed to anonymous internet users.\n\n4. **`trace.axd` \u002F `elmah.axd` left enabled in production.** Often forgotten in `\u003Csystem.web>\u003Ctrace enabled=\"true\">` blocks.\n\n5. **Forgotten WCF `.svc` admin endpoints.** Built for internal admin tooling, never disabled when the main app went to internet exposure.\n\n6. **Dual-parser anti-pattern: `ObjectStateFormatter` (legacy) vs `LosFormatter` (modern) deserialize in different orders relative to MAC validation.** Some payload shapes hit the legacy parser BEFORE MAC check.\n\n7. **Request validator only applies to URL-encoded body and querystring.** Headers, cookies, XML\u002FJSON bodies, and multipart fields are NOT validated by default. Developers assume validator is universal; it is not.\n\n8. **`\u003CmachineKey>` checked into source repos.** Configuration check-ins to GitHub frequently leak validation\u002Fdecryption keys. Combine with `hunt-misc` source-recon for Telerik \u002F SharePoint \u002F DNN keys.\n\n9. **`SafeControls` web.config entries trusted to gate deserialization.** SharePoint's `\u003CSafeControl>` list determines which classes Picker.aspx can instantiate. Bypasses exist when the inheritance check is the only gate (CVE-2019-0604 family).\n\n---\n\n## Bypass Techniques\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` non-empty (encrypted) | Recover both decryption + validation keys from any source-code leak \u002F config-disclosure \u002F VS forge primitive; without keys, deserialization cannot be triggered |\n| Request validator blocks `\u003C` in querystring | Move payload to Cookie \u002F Referer \u002F JSON body \u002F multipart filename — validator doesn't reach those contexts in classic ASP.NET |\n| `EnableViewStateMac=\"true\"` enforced | Recover `validationKey` from web.config disclosure or `\u003CmachineKey>` AutoGenerate fingerprinting (ysoserial.net `--minify --islegacy` mode generates ViewState that passes some MAC-validation gaps) |\n| `trace.axd` localhost-only | Set `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` if the trace mode is `localOnly` and the validation uses Request.UserHostAddress (some apps use Forwarded-For instead) |\n| WCF `.svc` 401 on anonymous | Try `?wsdl` and `?mex` first; metadata is sometimes anonymously enumerable even when service ops require auth |\n| Telerik upload patched | Check the Telerik version: anything pre-2017Q1 (build 2017.1.118 or earlier) is the original RAU RCE. Check 2017Q3 - 2019Q3 for CVE-2019-18935 |\n| `SafeControl` whitelist enforced | Inheritance gate (`instanceof PickerDialog`) IS the gate on patched SP — bypass requires finding a SafeControl subclass with a deserialization sink; enumerate via Picker.aspx |\n| `customErrors mode=\"On\"` (no stack traces) | Force a different error path: invalid Content-Length, malformed ViewState that triggers a parser-level exception below the customErrors handler |\n\n---\n\n## Gate 0 Validation\n\nBefore writing the report, confirm:\n\n1. **What can the attacker DO right now with the disclosed information?**\n   - `trace.axd` 200 with full request dump → **Critical** (PII \u002F session cookies \u002F Authorization headers exposed)\n   - `elmah.axd` 200 with error log → **High** (stack traces + internal paths + sometimes credentials)\n   - `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` empty + recoverable machineKey via separate finding → **Critical chain to RCE**\n   - `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` empty without key recovery → **Low-Medium** (primitive present, not exploitable on its own)\n   - Stack traces in 500s → **Low** unless they include credentials \u002F connection strings\n\n2. **Have you reproduced the full chain to attacker-attainable impact, or only the primitive?**\n   - Cross-reference `triage-validation` Pre-Severity Gate. \"Primitive confirmed\" is not Critical until the chain ends in impact.\n\n3. **Can a triager reproduce in \u003C10 min from your report?**\n   - Each step copy-pasteable curl \u002F Python.\n   - For RCE chains: link the public exploit tool (ysoserial.net, viewgen, telerik-revda) and the specific gadget chain.\n\n---\n\n## Real Impact Examples\n\n### Scenario A — Signed-only ViewState + permissive ToolPane on EoL SharePoint 2013\n\n`https:\u002F\u002Ftarget-portal.example\u002F_layouts\u002F15\u002FToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit` returns 200 anonymously. The form contains `__VIEWSTATE` (signed only — `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=\"\"`), and `__REQUESTDIGEST` is anonymously issued via `_api\u002Fcontextinfo`. Combined with SP2013 being end-of-life (no patch will ever ship), this is the canonical CVE-2025-53770 \"ToolShell\" precondition chain on a permanently-unpatched code path. Reported severity: **Critical**. The dual-parser test (Section 4 of Methodology) confirmed that XML-shaped payloads reach the legacy `ObjectStateFormatter` BEFORE MAC validation — additional evidence that the chain is reachable even without full machineKey recovery (though full RCE requires both).\n\n### Scenario B — Telerik RadAsyncUploadHandler exposed on legacy bank portal\n\n`\u002FTelerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau` returns the Telerik upload handler. Telerik version (visible in JS bundle metadata) is 2016.3.1027. CVE-2017-11317 applies — keys are baked into the public Telerik DLL of that version. Upload → write `aspx` to `\u002Fapp_data\u002F` → request → RCE. Reported severity: **Critical**.\n\n### Scenario C — trace.axd + elmah.axd both exposed on enterprise HR portal\n\n`trace.axd` 200 returns 50 most recent requests, including `Authorization: Bearer eyJ...` headers on API requests. `elmah.axd` 200 returns full error log with database connection-string in one of the exceptions. Reported severity: **Critical** (credentials in plaintext to anonymous internet).\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-rce`** — ViewState deserialization is the headline ASP.NET RCE path; signed-only ViewState + leaked machineKey = RCE every time. Chain primitive: ASP.NET ViewState dual-parser MAC-bypass anti-pattern detected (signed but not encrypted, `\u003C%@ Page enableViewStateMac=\"true\" viewStateEncryptionMode=\"Never\" %>`) + machineKey recovered (from web.config disclosure, `elmah.axd`, source leak, or GitHub) → `hunt-rce` ysoserial.net `TypeConfuseDelegate` gadget → arbitrary command in `w3wp.exe` worker-process identity.\n- **`hunt-sharepoint`** — SharePoint farms inherit every ASP.NET anti-pattern plus their own surface. Chain primitive: ASP.NET fingerprint reveals SharePoint (X-SharePoint headers + `\u002F_layouts\u002F` reachable) → pivot to `hunt-sharepoint` for SP-specific RCE paths (ToolShell, SafeControl reflection) before generic ViewState attack.\n- **`hunt-ntlm-info`** — IIS sites that advertise NTLM\u002FNegotiate anonymously leak AD topology. Chain primitive: ASP.NET app behind IIS with `WWW-Authenticate: NTLM` → `hunt-ntlm-info` Type-2 challenge capture → internal forest name → cross-reference Entra tenant via `m365-entra-attack` discovery.\n- **`hunt-file-upload`** — Telerik RadAsyncUpload, Kentico, Umbraco, and DotNetNuke all have historical upload-handler RCE. Chain primitive: ASP.NET CMS fingerprinted → `hunt-file-upload` bypass matrix against the CMS upload handler → `.aspx` written into web-accessible path → request → RCE under app-pool identity.\n- **`triage-validation`** — `trace.axd`\u002F`elmah.axd` disclosure is only Critical when it actually leaks live credentials\u002Ftokens; pure stack traces are usually Low. Chain primitive: pull every reported finding through `triage-validation` 7-Question Gate before submission — distinguish \"verbose error\" (informational) from \"live bearer token in error log\" (Critical) before writing the report (`redteam-report-template`).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":25,"source":43,"license":14,"sources":44,"category":36,"date_added":45,"description":7,"source_repo":46,"source_type":30,"report_count":47,"compatibility":48,"license_source":49},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","github, authorized-engagement","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter",1,"Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. 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Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. 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