[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6NSQPAFJM8BQ186F2VRX7TG":3,"skill-same:01M6NSQPAFJM8BQ186F2VRX7TG":71},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":22,"commitSha":52,"skillDirectory":53,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":54,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":55,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":56,"install":57,"resources":70},"01M6NSQPAFJM8BQ186F2VRX7TG","hunt-business-logic",null,"Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities.","duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","duc-duy-1612","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F192231384?v=4","01M6NSDKQQDKVTHZ8DZMZ1VYY6","01M6NSDKW8DDVTQHBT1HBDDJPT",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fhunt-business-logic\u002FSKILL.md",[],[18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"hunt business logic","business","hunt","logic","main","for","hunting","relevant","helper","scripts","scope","commands","testing","community","only","https","license","testing tools","vulnerabilities","github","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunt-business-logic\ndescription: Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities.\ncategory: security\nrisk: offensive\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_repo: elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\nsource_type: community\ndate_added: '2026-09-20'\nlicense: MIT\nlicense_source: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE\ncompatibility: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the\n  relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands\n  not bundled.\nsources: hackerone_public, github\nreport_count: 25\n---\n> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nBusiness logic vulnerabilities pay highest in platforms where financial transactions, identity verification, and access controls intersect with real-world consequences. The richest targets are:\n\n- **E-commerce & payment platforms** (Valve\u002FSteam, Shopify) — payment flow manipulation, free goods, price tampering\n- **Marketplace & gig economy apps** (Airbnb, Uber) — identity\u002Fverification bypass enabling fraud or unsafe interactions\n- **SaaS with tiered access** (Mozilla Monitor) — bypassing verification to unlock monitoring features without entitlement\n- **High-traffic consumer apps** (Snapchat, Yelp) — rate-limit bypass enabling spam, enumeration, or abuse at scale\n\nAsset types that pay: checkout flows, subscription endpoints, callback\u002Fverification systems, webhook handlers, employee\u002Finternal portals exposed to the internet, and any endpoint that trusts client-supplied data to make authorization decisions.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n**URL patterns to watch:**\n- `\u002Fcheckout`, `\u002Forder`, `\u002Fsubscribe`, `\u002Fpayment`, `\u002Fverify`, `\u002Fconfirm`, `\u002Fcallback`\n- `\u002Finternal`, `\u002Femployee`, `\u002Fsummit`, `\u002Fstaff`, `\u002Fadmin` — internal pages accidentally public\n- `\u002Fapi\u002Fv*\u002Fpayment`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fv*\u002Fnotify`, `\u002Fwebhook` — payment provider callbacks\n- Endpoints accepting `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP` headers\n\n**Response\u002Fheader signals:**\n- `Set-Cookie` with unvalidated session state tied to cart or order data\n- Payment provider names in responses: `Smart2Pay`, `Stripe`, `PayPal`, `Braintree`\n- Redirect chains through third-party payment pages (in-flight data opportunity)\n- `200 OK` on subscription\u002Fverification endpoints with no CAPTCHA or token\n\n**JS patterns:**\n- Hardcoded internal URLs in frontend bundles (`\u002Femployee\u002F`, `\u002Fstaff\u002F`, `\u002Finternal\u002F`)\n- Client-side price calculation before server submission\n- Verification logic that only checks on the frontend (`if (verified) { ... }`)\n- `fetch('\u002Fapi\u002Fsubscribe', { method: 'POST', body: ... })` with no anti-CSRF token or rate-limit token\n\n**Tech stack signals:**\n- Shopify storefronts with draft\u002Funpublished channel pages\n- Apps using IP-based rate limiting without session\u002Faccount binding\n- Payment webhooks with no HMAC signature validation\n- SMS\u002Fphone callback flows that don't verify ownership before enabling features\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n1. **Map all authentication boundaries.** Spider the target. Identify pages\u002Fendpoints that serve authenticated content (employee portals, premium features, order pages) and test each unauthenticated. Look for internal pages indexed in JS bundles or linked from robots.txt\u002Fsitemap.xml.\n\n2. **Identify every verification flow.** Enumerate: email verification, phone\u002FSMS verification, payment verification, CAPTCHA, age gates. For each, test: what happens if you skip the verification step entirely? What happens if you replay a valid token on a different account?\n\n3. **Test rate-limiting controls on every form.** For every POST endpoint (subscribe, login, OTP, search), send 50+ rapid requests. Vary: remove cookies, rotate `X-Forwarded-For` \u002F `X-Real-IP` headers, change `User-Agent`. Check if the server uses IP from headers rather than connection IP.\n\n4. **Intercept and tamper with payment flows.** Use Burp Suite to intercept every request between your browser, the application, and the payment provider. Identify where price, currency, order ID, or status fields are set. Attempt to modify amounts to $0.01 or currency to a low-value currency. Look for POST-back\u002Fwebhook endpoints that accept payment confirmation — test if they validate HMAC\u002Fsignature.\n\n5. **Test phone\u002Fcallback number verification.** Whenever a platform accepts a callback number, test: can you set it to a number you don't own? Does the platform call\u002Ftext that number and grant trust based solely on submission? Try setting it to a victim's number.\n\n6. **Check for unprotected employee\u002Finternal surfaces.** Search Shodan, GitHub, JS bundles, and Wayback Machine for internal subdomain\u002Fpath references. Test access without authentication. Check if these surfaces allow order placement, data access, or privilege escalation.\n\n7. **Validate business impact.** For each finding, determine: does this result in financial loss, unauthorized access, or data exposure? Document the end-to-end chain.\n\n---\n\n## Payload & Detection Patterns\n\n**Rate limit bypass via header rotation:**\n```bash\n# Rotate X-Forwarded-For to bypass IP rate limiting\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n  curl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fapi\u002Fsubscribe \\\n    -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$i\" \\\n    -H \"X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.$i\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d '{\"email\":\"victim+'\"$i\"'@example.com\"}' \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n**Payment tampering — modify in-flight price:**\n```http\nPOST \u002Fpayment\u002Finitiate HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: target.com\n\namount=0.01&currency=USD&order_id=12345&product_id=99\n```\n```bash\n# Look for unvalidated webhook endpoints\ncurl -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fpayment\u002Fcallback \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"status\":\"success\",\"amount\":\"0.01\",\"order_id\":\"12345\",\"transaction_id\":\"fake-txn\"}'\n```\n\n**Unauthenticated internal page discovery:**\n```bash\n# Check robots.txt and sitemap for internal paths\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Frobots.txt | grep -iE \"(disallow|allow)\" \ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fsitemap.xml | grep -iE \"(employee|internal|staff|summit|admin)\"\n\n# Grep JS bundles for internal paths\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fassets\u002Fapp.js | grep -oE '\"\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9\u002F_-]{3,50}\"' | sort -u\n```\n\n**Email verification bypass:**\n```bash\n# Skip the verification step: hit the post-verification API endpoint directly\n# with an unverified session. If it succeeds, the gate is UI-only.\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002Fmonitor.target.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmonitoring\u002Fenable \\\n  -H \"Cookie: session=\u003Cyour_unverified_session>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"victim@example.com\"}'\n\n# Replay verification token on different account\ncurl -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fverify \\\n  -d 'token=VALID_TOKEN_FROM_ACCOUNT_A&email=account_b@example.com'\n```\n\n**Grep patterns for client-side logic issues:**\n```bash\n# Find price calculations in JS\ngrep -iE \"(price|amount|total|cost)\\s*[=*+]\" app.js\n\n# Find internal URLs in JS bundles\ngrep -oE '\"\u002F(employee|internal|staff|admin|summit)[^\"]*\"' *.js\n\n# Find unvalidated IP header usage in server code\ngrep -iE \"x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|cf-connecting-ip\" src\u002F -r\n```\n\n---\n\n## Common Root Causes\n\n1. **Server trusts client-supplied data for financial decisions.** Developers offload price calculation to the frontend or pass amount fields through forms\u002FURLs without re-validating on the server against a canonical source (the product database).\n\n2. **Verification is enforced only in the UI, not the API.** Frontend hides features behind a verification gate, but the backend API endpoints are fully functional without a verified status — any authenticated request succeeds.\n\n3. **IP-based rate limiting reads from spoofable headers.** Developers implement rate limits using `request.headers['X-Forwarded-For']` instead of the actual connection IP, allowing trivial bypass by header manipulation.\n\n4. **Payment webhooks lack signature validation.** Developers implement \"success\" webhooks without verifying the HMAC signature provided by the payment provider, allowing anyone to POST a fake success notification.\n\n5. **Internal\u002Femployee pages aren't access-controlled.** Internal tools are deployed to production domains without authentication middleware, either because developers assume obscurity (unlisted URL) or forgot to apply auth to a new route.\n\n6. **Phone\u002Fcallback verification is advisory, not enforced.** Systems accept a phone number and grant trust to whoever submitted it, without confirming the submitter owns or controls that number.\n\n7. **Draft\u002Fchannel-specific storefronts inherit full order functionality.** Platforms like Shopify allow creating storefronts for specific channels (employee events) that are unlisted but still fully functional for order placement if the URL is known.\n\n---\n\n## Bypass Techniques\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| IP-based rate limiting | Rotate `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP` headers per request |\n| CAPTCHA on subscription forms | Use header-based bypass first; if CAPTCHA is only on the web form, call the underlying API endpoint directly |\n| Email verification gate | Access the post-verification API endpoint directly; replay valid tokens; check if `verified=true` is a client-set cookie\u002Fparam |\n| Payment amount server validation | Modify currency to a lower-value currency; test with $0.00 or negative amounts; manipulate order IDs to reference different products |\n| Webhook HMAC validation | Test with no\u002Fempty signature header (is validation enforced at all — a modified payload only \"passes\" if it isn't); replay an UNMODIFIED captured webhook to test missing idempotency\u002Fanti-replay |\n| Auth on internal pages | Try unauthenticated; try with a low-privilege account; try path traversal variants (`\u002Femployee\u002F..\u002Femployee\u002F`) |\n| Phone verification (OTP sent) | Submit someone else's number without OTP validation; check if the system grants trust on submission vs. OTP confirmation |\n\n---\n\n## Gate 0 Validation\n\nBefore writing any report, answer all three:\n\n1. **What can the attacker DO right now?**\n   Be specific: \"An unauthenticated user can place an order for physical goods at $0 cost\" or \"An attacker can bypass email verification and monitor any email address without owning it\" or \"An attacker can send unlimited subscription emails to any address.\" Vague impact = reject.\n\n2. **What does the victim LOSE?**\n   Identify a concrete, attributable loss: financial loss (free goods, fraudulent payments), privacy loss (phone number spoofed, unauthorized monitoring), service abuse (spam campaigns via rate-limit bypass), or security degradation (unverified identity trusted for sensitive actions). If the loss is purely theoretical, re-evaluate severity.\n\n3. **Can it be reproduced in 10 minutes from scratch?**\n   Create a fresh account (or use no account). Follow your documented steps. Achieve the impact. If you can't reliably reproduce it end-to-end in under 10 minutes with the steps you've written, your methodology is incomplete — refine before submitting.\n\n---\n\n## Real Impact Examples\n\n**Scenario 1 — Free Physical Goods via Exposed Internal Storefront (Shopify-style)**\nAn employee summit page was deployed to a public Shopify storefront as a private channel for distributing free books to staff. The URL was discoverable via JS bundle analysis or link sharing. An anonymous user who navigated to the URL could browse and complete a checkout with no authentication required, receiving physical merchandise shipped at the company's expense. Impact: direct financial loss per order, potential for bulk ordering if not caught quickly.\n\n**Scenario 2 — Payment Manipulation via In-Flight Tampering (Valve\u002FSteam-style)**\nA payment flow passed order amount and currency through client-controlled parameters before redirecting to a third-party payment provider (Smart2Pay). By intercepting the redirect with Burp Suite and modifying the amount field, an attacker could complete a real payment for $0.01 while the application's webhook — lacking HMAC validation — accepted the provider's confirmation and credited the full item\u002Fservice to the account. Impact: critical financial loss; attacker receives full value goods\u002Fservices for near-zero cost, infinitely repeatable.\n\n**Scenario 3 — Email Verification Bypass for Unauthorized Monitoring (Mozilla-style)**\nA breach-monitoring service required email verification before enabling monitoring alerts for an address. The verification check was enforced in the UI flow but the underlying API accepted monitoring setup requests for any address using a valid session — skipping the verification step entirely. An attacker could set up monitoring for email addresses they don't own, receiving breach notification data (potentially including credential exposure status) for victim accounts. Impact: privacy violation; attacker gains intelligence on whether a target's email was in a breach without the target's knowledge or consent.\n\n---\n\n## Disclosed Report Citations (Backfill +5 — 2016-2023)\n\nThe following real, verified bug-bounty \u002F coordinated-disclosure cases extend this skill. All five share a measurable financial-impact angle (actual $ loss demonstrated or quantifiable platform-wide exposure).\n\n8. **Stripe — Fee discount race redemption** ([H1 #1849626](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F1849626))\n    - Subclass: coupon\u002Fdiscount race-multi-redemption + financial primitive\n    - Payload: Stripe Support applied a one-time $20,000 fee-credit. Researcher captured the \"accept-discount\" POST and replayed it 30× in parallel via Burp Turbo Intruder, each acceptance crediting the account anew\n    - Root cause: idempotency missing on discount-acceptance endpoint; no unique constraint on (account_id, discount_id)\n    - Year: 2023 — **$5,000**, $600,000 of fee-free transactions accrued before fix (~$18,000 real Stripe loss at 3% take rate)\n\n9. **Reverb.com — Gift-card race multi-redemption** ([H1 #759247](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F759247))\n    - Subclass: gift-card \u002F store-credit race-redemption\n    - Payload: single valid gift card, parallel-POST to `\u002Fredeem` from 10 sockets via Turbo Intruder. Balance credits N× the face value\n    - Root cause: no row-level lock on gift_card table; balance debit and credit live in separate transactions\n    - Year: 2019 — **$1,500**\n\n10. **Upserve \u002F OLO — Negative-quantity price manipulation** ([H1 #364843](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F364843))\n    - Subclass: negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering\n    - Payload: `POST \u002Fapi\u002Forder {\"items\":[{\"id\":1,\"qty\":1,\"price\":50},{\"id\":2,\"qty\":-3,\"price\":50}]}` — order total computes to `-$100`, floors to ~$0 at payment capture, food still fulfills\n    - Root cause: server multiplies `qty * price` with no `qty >= 1` guard\n    - Year: 2018 — textbook citation for the subclass (acknowledged-only program)\n\n11. **Krisp — Pay-less-per-seat via PUT tampering** ([H1 #1446090](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F1446090))\n    - Subclass: price-per-unit mass-assignment \u002F quantity-discount manipulation\n    - Payload: `PUT \u002Fv2\u002Fseats` body includes a server-trusted `price` field. Set `price=1` instead of $60. Subscription updates, billing engine charges $1\u002Fseat for 100 seats\n    - Root cause: server reads price from request body instead of looking it up by plan_id; classic mass-assignment\n    - Year: 2021 — Stripe-billed SaaS pricing exposure\n\n12. **Stripe — Pay using archived price via mid-flow swap** ([H1 #1328278](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F1328278))\n    - Subclass: cart-state TOCTOU \u002F cancel-then-deliver (price-version race at checkout)\n    - Payload: merchant archives an old price (e.g., $5 instead of new $50). Buyer starts checkout via the new payment-link, then mid-flow swaps `price_id` back to the archived one. Stripe charges $5; subscription provisions at the new tier\n    - Root cause: payment-link validates \"is active\", price object validates \"exists\" — but the join \"price.active AND price ∈ link.allowed_prices\" is missing\n    - Year: 2021 — Stripe Medium (per-subscription recurring loss)\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-race-condition`** — Every uniqueness\u002Fquota check in a logic flow is a race candidate. Chain primitive: Business logic (coupon\u002Fcredit\u002Fpromotion) + race condition → coupon redeemed N times in a single TCP packet via Turbo Intruder.\n- **`hunt-idor`** — Logic flows that trust a client-supplied identifier (order_id, tenant_id, beneficiary_id) overlap directly with IDOR. Chain primitive: business-logic step-skip + IDOR on beneficiary_id → transfer funds from victim account.\n- **`hunt-api-misconfig`** — Step-skip and verification-bypass often live next to mass-assignment fields. Chain primitive: business-logic email-verify skip + API mass assignment (`verified:true, role:admin`) → ATO without email control.\n- **`hunt-ato`** — Logic bugs in password reset, email change, and recovery flows are core ATO paths. Chain primitive: business logic (email change accepts without re-auth) + `hunt-ato` Path 2 → silent victim email swap → password reset to attacker mailbox.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the Business-Logic Probe Checklist (negative quantity, decimal overflow, currency swap, step-skip via direct URL nav, state-machine reverse) and the Always-Rejected list to avoid filing self-inflicted bugs.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the 7-Question Gate (especially Q4 \"Is this exploitable by an outside attacker without unrealistic preconditions?\"): logic bugs need a concrete dollar\u002FPII\u002Fstate impact, not just \"the flow looks weird\".\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n","> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**\n> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.\n> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.\n> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.\n\n> **Mandatory confirmation gate**\n> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:\n> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.\n> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.\n> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.\n> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.\n>\n> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n## Crown Jewel Targets\n\nBusiness logic vulnerabilities pay highest in platforms where financial transactions, identity verification, and access controls intersect with real-world consequences. The richest targets are:\n\n- **E-commerce & payment platforms** (Valve\u002FSteam, Shopify) — payment flow manipulation, free goods, price tampering\n- **Marketplace & gig economy apps** (Airbnb, Uber) — identity\u002Fverification bypass enabling fraud or unsafe interactions\n- **SaaS with tiered access** (Mozilla Monitor) — bypassing verification to unlock monitoring features without entitlement\n- **High-traffic consumer apps** (Snapchat, Yelp) — rate-limit bypass enabling spam, enumeration, or abuse at scale\n\nAsset types that pay: checkout flows, subscription endpoints, callback\u002Fverification systems, webhook handlers, employee\u002Finternal portals exposed to the internet, and any endpoint that trusts client-supplied data to make authorization decisions.\n\n---\n\n## Attack Surface Signals\n\n**URL patterns to watch:**\n- `\u002Fcheckout`, `\u002Forder`, `\u002Fsubscribe`, `\u002Fpayment`, `\u002Fverify`, `\u002Fconfirm`, `\u002Fcallback`\n- `\u002Finternal`, `\u002Femployee`, `\u002Fsummit`, `\u002Fstaff`, `\u002Fadmin` — internal pages accidentally public\n- `\u002Fapi\u002Fv*\u002Fpayment`, `\u002Fapi\u002Fv*\u002Fnotify`, `\u002Fwebhook` — payment provider callbacks\n- Endpoints accepting `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP` headers\n\n**Response\u002Fheader signals:**\n- `Set-Cookie` with unvalidated session state tied to cart or order data\n- Payment provider names in responses: `Smart2Pay`, `Stripe`, `PayPal`, `Braintree`\n- Redirect chains through third-party payment pages (in-flight data opportunity)\n- `200 OK` on subscription\u002Fverification endpoints with no CAPTCHA or token\n\n**JS patterns:**\n- Hardcoded internal URLs in frontend bundles (`\u002Femployee\u002F`, `\u002Fstaff\u002F`, `\u002Finternal\u002F`)\n- Client-side price calculation before server submission\n- Verification logic that only checks on the frontend (`if (verified) { ... }`)\n- `fetch('\u002Fapi\u002Fsubscribe', { method: 'POST', body: ... })` with no anti-CSRF token or rate-limit token\n\n**Tech stack signals:**\n- Shopify storefronts with draft\u002Funpublished channel pages\n- Apps using IP-based rate limiting without session\u002Faccount binding\n- Payment webhooks with no HMAC signature validation\n- SMS\u002Fphone callback flows that don't verify ownership before enabling features\n\n---\n\n## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology\n\n1. **Map all authentication boundaries.** Spider the target. Identify pages\u002Fendpoints that serve authenticated content (employee portals, premium features, order pages) and test each unauthenticated. Look for internal pages indexed in JS bundles or linked from robots.txt\u002Fsitemap.xml.\n\n2. **Identify every verification flow.** Enumerate: email verification, phone\u002FSMS verification, payment verification, CAPTCHA, age gates. For each, test: what happens if you skip the verification step entirely? What happens if you replay a valid token on a different account?\n\n3. **Test rate-limiting controls on every form.** For every POST endpoint (subscribe, login, OTP, search), send 50+ rapid requests. Vary: remove cookies, rotate `X-Forwarded-For` \u002F `X-Real-IP` headers, change `User-Agent`. Check if the server uses IP from headers rather than connection IP.\n\n4. **Intercept and tamper with payment flows.** Use Burp Suite to intercept every request between your browser, the application, and the payment provider. Identify where price, currency, order ID, or status fields are set. Attempt to modify amounts to $0.01 or currency to a low-value currency. Look for POST-back\u002Fwebhook endpoints that accept payment confirmation — test if they validate HMAC\u002Fsignature.\n\n5. **Test phone\u002Fcallback number verification.** Whenever a platform accepts a callback number, test: can you set it to a number you don't own? Does the platform call\u002Ftext that number and grant trust based solely on submission? Try setting it to a victim's number.\n\n6. **Check for unprotected employee\u002Finternal surfaces.** Search Shodan, GitHub, JS bundles, and Wayback Machine for internal subdomain\u002Fpath references. Test access without authentication. Check if these surfaces allow order placement, data access, or privilege escalation.\n\n7. **Validate business impact.** For each finding, determine: does this result in financial loss, unauthorized access, or data exposure? Document the end-to-end chain.\n\n---\n\n## Payload & Detection Patterns\n\n**Rate limit bypass via header rotation:**\n```bash\n# Rotate X-Forwarded-For to bypass IP rate limiting\nfor i in $(seq 1 100); do\n  curl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fapi\u002Fsubscribe \\\n    -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$i\" \\\n    -H \"X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.$i\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n    -d '{\"email\":\"victim+'\"$i\"'@example.com\"}' \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\"\ndone\n```\n\n**Payment tampering — modify in-flight price:**\n```http\nPOST \u002Fpayment\u002Finitiate HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: target.com\n\namount=0.01&currency=USD&order_id=12345&product_id=99\n```\n```bash\n# Look for unvalidated webhook endpoints\ncurl -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fpayment\u002Fcallback \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"status\":\"success\",\"amount\":\"0.01\",\"order_id\":\"12345\",\"transaction_id\":\"fake-txn\"}'\n```\n\n**Unauthenticated internal page discovery:**\n```bash\n# Check robots.txt and sitemap for internal paths\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Frobots.txt | grep -iE \"(disallow|allow)\" \ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fsitemap.xml | grep -iE \"(employee|internal|staff|summit|admin)\"\n\n# Grep JS bundles for internal paths\ncurl -s https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fassets\u002Fapp.js | grep -oE '\"\u002F[a-zA-Z0-9\u002F_-]{3,50}\"' | sort -u\n```\n\n**Email verification bypass:**\n```bash\n# Skip the verification step: hit the post-verification API endpoint directly\n# with an unverified session. If it succeeds, the gate is UI-only.\ncurl -s -X POST https:\u002F\u002Fmonitor.target.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmonitoring\u002Fenable \\\n  -H \"Cookie: session=\u003Cyour_unverified_session>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"email\":\"victim@example.com\"}'\n\n# Replay verification token on different account\ncurl -X POST https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fverify \\\n  -d 'token=VALID_TOKEN_FROM_ACCOUNT_A&email=account_b@example.com'\n```\n\n**Grep patterns for client-side logic issues:**\n```bash\n# Find price calculations in JS\ngrep -iE \"(price|amount|total|cost)\\s*[=*+]\" app.js\n\n# Find internal URLs in JS bundles\ngrep -oE '\"\u002F(employee|internal|staff|admin|summit)[^\"]*\"' *.js\n\n# Find unvalidated IP header usage in server code\ngrep -iE \"x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|cf-connecting-ip\" src\u002F -r\n```\n\n---\n\n## Common Root Causes\n\n1. **Server trusts client-supplied data for financial decisions.** Developers offload price calculation to the frontend or pass amount fields through forms\u002FURLs without re-validating on the server against a canonical source (the product database).\n\n2. **Verification is enforced only in the UI, not the API.** Frontend hides features behind a verification gate, but the backend API endpoints are fully functional without a verified status — any authenticated request succeeds.\n\n3. **IP-based rate limiting reads from spoofable headers.** Developers implement rate limits using `request.headers['X-Forwarded-For']` instead of the actual connection IP, allowing trivial bypass by header manipulation.\n\n4. **Payment webhooks lack signature validation.** Developers implement \"success\" webhooks without verifying the HMAC signature provided by the payment provider, allowing anyone to POST a fake success notification.\n\n5. **Internal\u002Femployee pages aren't access-controlled.** Internal tools are deployed to production domains without authentication middleware, either because developers assume obscurity (unlisted URL) or forgot to apply auth to a new route.\n\n6. **Phone\u002Fcallback verification is advisory, not enforced.** Systems accept a phone number and grant trust to whoever submitted it, without confirming the submitter owns or controls that number.\n\n7. **Draft\u002Fchannel-specific storefronts inherit full order functionality.** Platforms like Shopify allow creating storefronts for specific channels (employee events) that are unlisted but still fully functional for order placement if the URL is known.\n\n---\n\n## Bypass Techniques\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| IP-based rate limiting | Rotate `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`, `True-Client-IP`, `CF-Connecting-IP` headers per request |\n| CAPTCHA on subscription forms | Use header-based bypass first; if CAPTCHA is only on the web form, call the underlying API endpoint directly |\n| Email verification gate | Access the post-verification API endpoint directly; replay valid tokens; check if `verified=true` is a client-set cookie\u002Fparam |\n| Payment amount server validation | Modify currency to a lower-value currency; test with $0.00 or negative amounts; manipulate order IDs to reference different products |\n| Webhook HMAC validation | Test with no\u002Fempty signature header (is validation enforced at all — a modified payload only \"passes\" if it isn't); replay an UNMODIFIED captured webhook to test missing idempotency\u002Fanti-replay |\n| Auth on internal pages | Try unauthenticated; try with a low-privilege account; try path traversal variants (`\u002Femployee\u002F..\u002Femployee\u002F`) |\n| Phone verification (OTP sent) | Submit someone else's number without OTP validation; check if the system grants trust on submission vs. OTP confirmation |\n\n---\n\n## Gate 0 Validation\n\nBefore writing any report, answer all three:\n\n1. **What can the attacker DO right now?**\n   Be specific: \"An unauthenticated user can place an order for physical goods at $0 cost\" or \"An attacker can bypass email verification and monitor any email address without owning it\" or \"An attacker can send unlimited subscription emails to any address.\" Vague impact = reject.\n\n2. **What does the victim LOSE?**\n   Identify a concrete, attributable loss: financial loss (free goods, fraudulent payments), privacy loss (phone number spoofed, unauthorized monitoring), service abuse (spam campaigns via rate-limit bypass), or security degradation (unverified identity trusted for sensitive actions). If the loss is purely theoretical, re-evaluate severity.\n\n3. **Can it be reproduced in 10 minutes from scratch?**\n   Create a fresh account (or use no account). Follow your documented steps. Achieve the impact. If you can't reliably reproduce it end-to-end in under 10 minutes with the steps you've written, your methodology is incomplete — refine before submitting.\n\n---\n\n## Real Impact Examples\n\n**Scenario 1 — Free Physical Goods via Exposed Internal Storefront (Shopify-style)**\nAn employee summit page was deployed to a public Shopify storefront as a private channel for distributing free books to staff. The URL was discoverable via JS bundle analysis or link sharing. An anonymous user who navigated to the URL could browse and complete a checkout with no authentication required, receiving physical merchandise shipped at the company's expense. Impact: direct financial loss per order, potential for bulk ordering if not caught quickly.\n\n**Scenario 2 — Payment Manipulation via In-Flight Tampering (Valve\u002FSteam-style)**\nA payment flow passed order amount and currency through client-controlled parameters before redirecting to a third-party payment provider (Smart2Pay). By intercepting the redirect with Burp Suite and modifying the amount field, an attacker could complete a real payment for $0.01 while the application's webhook — lacking HMAC validation — accepted the provider's confirmation and credited the full item\u002Fservice to the account. Impact: critical financial loss; attacker receives full value goods\u002Fservices for near-zero cost, infinitely repeatable.\n\n**Scenario 3 — Email Verification Bypass for Unauthorized Monitoring (Mozilla-style)**\nA breach-monitoring service required email verification before enabling monitoring alerts for an address. The verification check was enforced in the UI flow but the underlying API accepted monitoring setup requests for any address using a valid session — skipping the verification step entirely. An attacker could set up monitoring for email addresses they don't own, receiving breach notification data (potentially including credential exposure status) for victim accounts. Impact: privacy violation; attacker gains intelligence on whether a target's email was in a breach without the target's knowledge or consent.\n\n---\n\n## Disclosed Report Citations (Backfill +5 — 2016-2023)\n\nThe following real, verified bug-bounty \u002F coordinated-disclosure cases extend this skill. All five share a measurable financial-impact angle (actual $ loss demonstrated or quantifiable platform-wide exposure).\n\n8. **Stripe — Fee discount race redemption** ([H1 #1849626](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F1849626))\n    - Subclass: coupon\u002Fdiscount race-multi-redemption + financial primitive\n    - Payload: Stripe Support applied a one-time $20,000 fee-credit. Researcher captured the \"accept-discount\" POST and replayed it 30× in parallel via Burp Turbo Intruder, each acceptance crediting the account anew\n    - Root cause: idempotency missing on discount-acceptance endpoint; no unique constraint on (account_id, discount_id)\n    - Year: 2023 — **$5,000**, $600,000 of fee-free transactions accrued before fix (~$18,000 real Stripe loss at 3% take rate)\n\n9. **Reverb.com — Gift-card race multi-redemption** ([H1 #759247](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F759247))\n    - Subclass: gift-card \u002F store-credit race-redemption\n    - Payload: single valid gift card, parallel-POST to `\u002Fredeem` from 10 sockets via Turbo Intruder. Balance credits N× the face value\n    - Root cause: no row-level lock on gift_card table; balance debit and credit live in separate transactions\n    - Year: 2019 — **$1,500**\n\n10. **Upserve \u002F OLO — Negative-quantity price manipulation** ([H1 #364843](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F364843))\n    - Subclass: negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering\n    - Payload: `POST \u002Fapi\u002Forder {\"items\":[{\"id\":1,\"qty\":1,\"price\":50},{\"id\":2,\"qty\":-3,\"price\":50}]}` — order total computes to `-$100`, floors to ~$0 at payment capture, food still fulfills\n    - Root cause: server multiplies `qty * price` with no `qty >= 1` guard\n    - Year: 2018 — textbook citation for the subclass (acknowledged-only program)\n\n11. **Krisp — Pay-less-per-seat via PUT tampering** ([H1 #1446090](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F1446090))\n    - Subclass: price-per-unit mass-assignment \u002F quantity-discount manipulation\n    - Payload: `PUT \u002Fv2\u002Fseats` body includes a server-trusted `price` field. Set `price=1` instead of $60. Subscription updates, billing engine charges $1\u002Fseat for 100 seats\n    - Root cause: server reads price from request body instead of looking it up by plan_id; classic mass-assignment\n    - Year: 2021 — Stripe-billed SaaS pricing exposure\n\n12. **Stripe — Pay using archived price via mid-flow swap** ([H1 #1328278](https:\u002F\u002Fhackerone.com\u002Freports\u002F1328278))\n    - Subclass: cart-state TOCTOU \u002F cancel-then-deliver (price-version race at checkout)\n    - Payload: merchant archives an old price (e.g., $5 instead of new $50). Buyer starts checkout via the new payment-link, then mid-flow swaps `price_id` back to the archived one. Stripe charges $5; subscription provisions at the new tier\n    - Root cause: payment-link validates \"is active\", price object validates \"exists\" — but the join \"price.active AND price ∈ link.allowed_prices\" is missing\n    - Year: 2021 — Stripe Medium (per-subscription recurring loss)\n\n---\n\n## Related Skills & Chains\n\n- **`hunt-race-condition`** — Every uniqueness\u002Fquota check in a logic flow is a race candidate. Chain primitive: Business logic (coupon\u002Fcredit\u002Fpromotion) + race condition → coupon redeemed N times in a single TCP packet via Turbo Intruder.\n- **`hunt-idor`** — Logic flows that trust a client-supplied identifier (order_id, tenant_id, beneficiary_id) overlap directly with IDOR. Chain primitive: business-logic step-skip + IDOR on beneficiary_id → transfer funds from victim account.\n- **`hunt-api-misconfig`** — Step-skip and verification-bypass often live next to mass-assignment fields. Chain primitive: business-logic email-verify skip + API mass assignment (`verified:true, role:admin`) → ATO without email control.\n- **`hunt-ato`** — Logic bugs in password reset, email change, and recovery flows are core ATO paths. Chain primitive: business logic (email change accepts without re-auth) + `hunt-ato` Path 2 → silent victim email swap → password reset to attacker mailbox.\n- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the Business-Logic Probe Checklist (negative quantity, decimal overflow, currency swap, step-skip via direct URL nav, state-machine reverse) and the Always-Rejected list to avoid filing self-inflicted bugs.\n- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the 7-Question Gate (especially Q4 \"Is this exploitable by an outside attacker without unrealistic preconditions?\"): logic bugs need a concrete dollar\u002FPII\u002Fstate impact, not just \"the flow looks weird\".\n\n## When to Use\n\n- You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.\n- You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.\n\n## Limitations\n\n- Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.\n- Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.\n- Validate every finding (see `triage-validation`) before reporting; report via `report-writing`. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.\n\n### Example\n\n```bash\n# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.\ncat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief\n```\n\n> Adapted from [elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter) (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use\u002FLimitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.\n",{"name":5,"risk":43,"source":44,"license":14,"sources":45,"category":46,"date_added":47,"description":7,"source_repo":48,"source_type":31,"report_count":49,"compatibility":50,"license_source":51},"offensive","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter","hackerone_public, github","security","2026-09-20","elementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter",25,"Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Felementalsouls\u002FClaude-BugHunter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FLICENSE","f3312ba749561b6159f477dbfc9313c875d40a56",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fhunt-business-logic","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612","2026-10-25 23:50:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":58,"prompt":68,"zipAvailable":69},[59,62,65],{"tool":60,"command":61},"npx","npx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-business-logic",{"tool":63,"command":64},"bunx","bunx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-business-logic",{"tool":66,"command":67},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add duc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web --skill hunt-business-logic","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fhunt-business-logic\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[72,97,121,143,171,195],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0FA5FZ410Z33Z3TFQ4DBA","zero-trust","Implement zero-trust network architecture. Configure identity-based access, micro-segmentation, and continuous verification. Use when implementing modern security architectures.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzero-trust\u002FSKILL.md",[78],{"categoryNo":79,"categoryName":80,"taxonomyType":81,"taxonomyTypeDesc":82},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[84,85,86,87,88,89,74,90,91,92,93,32,31,22,94,95,28,27,25,96],"ZeRO","trust","zero trust","architecture","assessment","verification","segmentation","devops-security","access","configure","active","critical","implementing",{"skillNo":98,"name":99,"nameZh":6,"description":100,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":101,"categories":102,"keywords":103,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0F1YZJW3KX5FBKEVZ8CV4","zcode-delegate","Delegate coding tasks to the Z.AI ZCode CLI only when the user explicitly requests it, while the orchestrator retains review and landing responsibility.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fzcode-delegate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,32,117,31,118,119,95,120],"delegate","zcode","zcode delegate","review","cli","orchestration","tasks","run","Bash","model","node","read","orchestrator","files","desktop app","app","agent-orchestration",{"skillNo":122,"name":123,"nameZh":6,"description":124,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":125,"categories":126,"keywords":127,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0ETK41VGNMYEXW0T00AJN","youtube-transcript","Fetch YouTube transcripts through DeepAPI or local fallback tooling and save clean text output.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript\u002FSKILL.md",[],[128,129,130,131,37,132,133,34,33,134,135,136,137,31,22,138,139,140,141,142],"transcript","youtube transcript","youtube","safe","codex","research","text","fetch","tooling","clean","local","output","deepapi","youtube transcripts","blob",{"skillNo":144,"name":145,"nameZh":6,"description":146,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":147,"categories":148,"keywords":160,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EPPH2PVMDW40017F8WX0","youtube-transcript-skills","Fetch YouTube video transcripts, search videos\u002Fchannels, browse channels, and extract playlists via the getyoutubetranscript.com API - free tier, no card required.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-transcript-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[149,152,155],{"categoryNo":150,"categoryName":151,"taxonomyType":81,"taxonomyTypeDesc":82},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":153,"categoryName":154,"taxonomyType":81,"taxonomyTypeDesc":82},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":156,"categoryName":157,"taxonomyType":158,"taxonomyTypeDesc":159},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[128,129,130,161,131,162,37,132,34,163,164,165,166,135,167,31,22,168,169,170],"youtube transcript skills","gemini","search","api","Video","browse","api-integration","free","card","channels",{"skillNo":172,"name":173,"nameZh":6,"description":174,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":175,"categories":176,"keywords":181,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0EAB96PX83W5PTE8A0R8D","youtube-notetaker","Turn YouTube talks into local study notes with slides, transcripts, editable annotations, and a markdown-backed viewer.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-notetaker\u002FSKILL.md",[177,180],{"categoryNo":178,"categoryName":179,"taxonomyType":81,"taxonomyTypeDesc":82},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000003","演示文稿",{"categoryNo":153,"categoryName":154,"taxonomyType":81,"taxonomyTypeDesc":82},[130,182,183,108,131,184,185,186,187,34,165,188,189,190,191,22,192,138,193,194],"youtube notetaker","notetaker","workflow","official","notes","code","markdown","slides","annotations","README","study","dair-academy","viewer",{"skillNo":196,"name":197,"nameZh":6,"description":198,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":199,"categories":200,"keywords":202,"publishedAt":38},"01M6Q0E55F0GW5MX48V8HXS8B5","youtube-full","Fetch YouTube transcripts, search videos, browse channels, and extract playlists via TranscriptAPI — no yt-dlp, no Google API key, works from any cloud server.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fduc-duy-1612\u002FOnline-Delivery-Systems-Web\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills_archive\u002Fyoutube-full\u002FSKILL.md",[201],{"categoryNo":150,"categoryName":151,"taxonomyType":81,"taxonomyTypeDesc":82},[203,130,204,205,131,162,163,206,207,164,165,166,135,208,167,31,22,168,209,141],"youtube full","full","google","server","dlp","credits","automatic"]