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Use when rotating or automating rotation of service account passwords, API keys, or secrets stored in a vault.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23,26],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",{"categoryNo":27,"categoryName":28,"taxonomyType":29,"taxonomyTypeDesc":30},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50],"performing service account credential rotation","risk","secrets","api","vault","credential-rotation","secrets-management","PAM","t1098","initial-access","directory","t1078","t1003","service-accounts","cloud","pr","identity","automation","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: performing-service-account-credential-rotation\ndescription: Automates credential rotation for service accounts across Active Directory,\n  cloud platforms, and application databases to eliminate stale secrets and reduce\n  compromise risk. Use when rotating or automating rotation of service account passwords,\n  API keys, or secrets stored in a vault.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: identity-access-management\ntags:\n- service-accounts\n- credential-rotation\n- secrets-management\n- pam\n- automation\n- vault\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.AA-01\n- PR.AA-02\n- PR.AA-05\n- PR.AA-06\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078\n- T1110\n- T1556\n- T1098\n- T1003\nmitre_f3:\n  version: '1.1'\n  tactics:\n  - initial-access\n  - positioning\n  - stealth\n  techniques:\n  - id: F1006.001\n    name: 'Account Takeover: Exposed API Key'\n    tactic: initial-access\n    source: f3\n  - id: F1006.002\n    name: 'Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential'\n    tactic: initial-access\n    source: f3\n  - id: T1110\n    name: Brute Force\n    tactic: initial-access\n    source: attack\n  - id: F1005\n    name: Account Manipulation\n    tactic: positioning\n    source: f3\n  - id: F1023\n    name: Device Fingerprint Spoofing\n    tactic: stealth\n    source: f3\n---\n\n# Performing Service Account Credential Rotation\n\n## Overview\n\nService accounts are non-human identities used by applications, daemons, CI\u002FCD pipelines, and automated processes to authenticate to systems and APIs. These accounts often have elevated privileges and their credentials (passwords, API keys, certificates, tokens) are frequently long-lived and shared across teams, making them prime targets for attackers. Credential rotation is the systematic process of replacing these secrets on a scheduled basis, propagating new credentials to all dependent systems, and verifying service continuity after rotation.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve performing service account credential rotation\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Inventory of all service accounts across AD, cloud, and applications\n- Secrets management platform (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or CyberArk)\n- Service dependency mapping (which services use which credentials)\n- Change management process for rotation windows\n- Monitoring for service health post-rotation\n\n## Core Concepts\n\n### Service Account Types\n\n| Type | Platform | Credential | Rotation Method |\n|------|----------|-----------|-----------------|\n| Active Directory Service Account | Windows\u002FAD | Password | gMSA (automatic) or PAM-managed |\n| AWS IAM User | AWS | Access Key\u002FSecret Key | AWS Secrets Manager rotation Lambda |\n| GCP Service Account | GCP | JSON key file | Key rotation via IAM API |\n| Azure Service Principal | Azure | Client secret\u002Fcertificate | Key Vault + rotation policy |\n| Database Service Account | SQL\u002FOracle\u002FPostgres | Password | Vault dynamic secrets |\n| API Key | SaaS applications | API token | Application-specific API |\n\n### Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)\n\nWindows gMSAs provide automatic password management by Active Directory:\n- AD automatically rotates the password every 30 days\n- Password is 240 bytes, cryptographically random\n- Multiple servers can use the same gMSA simultaneously\n- No administrator knows or manages the password\n- Eliminates manual rotation for Windows services\n\n### Rotation Architecture\n\n```\nSecrets Manager \u002F Vault\n        │\n        ├── Rotation Trigger (schedule or on-demand)\n        │\n        ├── Generate new credential\n        │\n        ├── Update credential at source (AD, cloud IAM, database)\n        │\n        ├── Update credential in all consumers:\n        │   ├── Application configuration\n        │   ├── CI\u002FCD pipeline secrets\n        │   ├── Kubernetes secrets\n        │   └── Other dependent services\n        │\n        ├── Verify service health\n        │   ├── Health check endpoints\n        │   ├── Authentication test\n        │   └── Functional smoke test\n        │\n        └── Revoke old credential (after grace period)\n```\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Discover and Inventory Service Accounts\n\nEnumerate all service accounts and their dependencies:\n\n```powershell\n# Active Directory: Find all service accounts\nGet-ADServiceAccount -Filter * -Properties *\nGet-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne \"$null\"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName,PasswordLastSet,LastLogonDate\n\n# Find accounts with passwords older than 90 days\n$threshold = (Get-Date).AddDays(-90)\nGet-ADUser -Filter {PasswordLastSet -lt $threshold -and Enabled -eq $true} -Properties PasswordLastSet,ServicePrincipalName |\n    Where-Object {$_.ServicePrincipalName} |\n    Select-Object Name, PasswordLastSet, ServicePrincipalName\n```\n\n### Step 2: Implement gMSA for Windows Services\n\n```powershell\n# Create KDS Root Key (one-time, domain-wide)\nAdd-KdsRootKey -EffectiveImmediately\n\n# Create the gMSA account\nNew-ADServiceAccount -Name \"svc-webapp-gmsa\" `\n    -DNSHostName \"svc-webapp-gmsa.corp.example.com\" `\n    -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword \"WebServerGroup\" `\n    -KerberosEncryptionType AES128,AES256\n\n# Install on target server\nInstall-ADServiceAccount -Identity \"svc-webapp-gmsa\"\n\n# Test the account\nTest-ADServiceAccount -Identity \"svc-webapp-gmsa\"\n\n# Configure IIS Application Pool to use gMSA\n# Set identity to: CORP\\svc-webapp-gmsa$\n```\n\n### Step 3: AWS Access Key Rotation with Secrets Manager\n\n```python\nimport boto3\nimport json\n\ndef rotate_iam_access_key(secret_arn, iam_username):\n    \"\"\"Rotate an IAM user's access key via Secrets Manager.\"\"\"\n    iam = boto3.client(\"iam\")\n    sm = boto3.client(\"secretsmanager\")\n\n    # Create new access key\n    new_key = iam.create_access_key(UserName=iam_username)\n    new_access_key = new_key[\"AccessKey\"][\"AccessKeyId\"]\n    new_secret_key = new_key[\"AccessKey\"][\"SecretAccessKey\"]\n\n    # Store new credentials in Secrets Manager\n    sm.put_secret_value(\n        SecretId=secret_arn,\n        SecretString=json.dumps({\n            \"accessKeyId\": new_access_key,\n            \"secretAccessKey\": new_secret_key,\n            \"username\": iam_username,\n        })\n    )\n\n    # List old access keys and deactivate them\n    keys = iam.list_access_keys(UserName=iam_username)\n    for key in keys[\"AccessKeyMetadata\"]:\n        if key[\"AccessKeyId\"] != new_access_key and key[\"Status\"] == \"Active\":\n            iam.update_access_key(\n                UserName=iam_username,\n                AccessKeyId=key[\"AccessKeyId\"],\n                Status=\"Inactive\"\n            )\n\n    return {\"new_key_id\": new_access_key, \"old_keys_deactivated\": True}\n```\n\n### Step 4: Database Credential Rotation with Vault\n\n```python\nimport hvac\n\ndef configure_vault_database_rotation(vault_url, vault_token, db_config):\n    \"\"\"Configure HashiCorp Vault for automatic database credential rotation.\"\"\"\n    client = hvac.Client(url=vault_url, token=vault_token)\n\n    # Enable database secrets engine\n    client.sys.enable_secrets_engine(\n        backend_type=\"database\",\n        path=\"database\"\n    )\n\n    # Configure database connection\n    client.secrets.database.configure(\n        name=db_config[\"name\"],\n        plugin_name=\"postgresql-database-plugin\",\n        connection_url=f\"postgresql:\u002F\u002F{{{{username}}}}:{{{{password}}}}@\"\n                       f\"{db_config['host']}:{db_config['port']}\u002F{db_config['database']}\",\n        allowed_roles=[db_config[\"role_name\"]],\n        username=db_config[\"admin_user\"],\n        password=db_config[\"admin_password\"],\n    )\n\n    # Create a role for dynamic credentials\n    client.secrets.database.create_role(\n        name=db_config[\"role_name\"],\n        db_name=db_config[\"name\"],\n        creation_statements=[\n            \"CREATE ROLE \\\"{{name}}\\\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD '{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}';\",\n            f\"GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO \\\"{{{{name}}}}\\\";\"\n        ],\n        default_ttl=\"1h\",\n        max_ttl=\"24h\",\n    )\n\n    return {\"status\": \"configured\", \"role\": db_config[\"role_name\"]}\n```\n\n### Step 5: Post-Rotation Verification\n\nAfter every rotation, verify service continuity:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\n\ndef verify_service_health(service_endpoints, max_retries=3, delay=10):\n    \"\"\"Check that services are healthy after credential rotation.\"\"\"\n    results = []\n    for endpoint in service_endpoints:\n        for attempt in range(max_retries):\n            try:\n                response = requests.get(\n                    endpoint[\"health_url\"],\n                    timeout=10,\n                    headers=endpoint.get(\"headers\", {})\n                )\n                healthy = response.status_code == 200\n                results.append({\n                    \"service\": endpoint[\"name\"],\n                    \"status\": \"healthy\" if healthy else f\"unhealthy ({response.status_code})\",\n                    \"attempt\": attempt + 1,\n                })\n                if healthy:\n                    break\n            except requests.RequestException as e:\n                results.append({\n                    \"service\": endpoint[\"name\"],\n                    \"status\": f\"error: {str(e)}\",\n                    \"attempt\": attempt + 1,\n                })\n            if attempt \u003C max_retries - 1:\n                time.sleep(delay)\n\n    return results\n```\n\n## Validation Checklist\n\n- [ ] Complete inventory of service accounts with dependency mapping\n- [ ] gMSA implemented for all eligible Windows service accounts\n- [ ] Cloud access keys rotated via secrets manager (AWS, GCP, Azure)\n- [ ] Database credentials managed via dynamic secrets (Vault) or rotation policy\n- [ ] Rotation schedule defined (30-90 days depending on risk level)\n- [ ] Post-rotation health checks automated\n- [ ] Alerting configured for rotation failures\n- [ ] Old credentials revoked after grace period\n- [ ] Rotation events logged and auditable\n- [ ] Rollback procedure documented and tested\n\n## References\n\n- [Google Cloud Service Account Key Rotation](https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fiam\u002Fdocs\u002Fkey-rotation)\n- [AWS Secrets Manager Rotation](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fsecretsmanager\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Frotating-secrets.html)\n- [Microsoft gMSA Documentation](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fwindows-server\u002Fsecurity\u002Fgroup-managed-service-accounts\u002Fgroup-managed-service-accounts-overview)\n- [HashiCorp Vault Database Secrets Engine](https:\u002F\u002Fdeveloper.hashicorp.com\u002Fvault\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecrets\u002Fdatabases)\n","# Performing Service Account Credential Rotation\n\n## Overview\n\nService accounts are non-human identities used by applications, daemons, CI\u002FCD pipelines, and automated processes to authenticate to systems and APIs. These accounts often have elevated privileges and their credentials (passwords, API keys, certificates, tokens) are frequently long-lived and shared across teams, making them prime targets for attackers. Credential rotation is the systematic process of replacing these secrets on a scheduled basis, propagating new credentials to all dependent systems, and verifying service continuity after rotation.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve performing service account credential rotation\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Inventory of all service accounts across AD, cloud, and applications\n- Secrets management platform (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or CyberArk)\n- Service dependency mapping (which services use which credentials)\n- Change management process for rotation windows\n- Monitoring for service health post-rotation\n\n## Core Concepts\n\n### Service Account Types\n\n| Type | Platform | Credential | Rotation Method |\n|------|----------|-----------|-----------------|\n| Active Directory Service Account | Windows\u002FAD | Password | gMSA (automatic) or PAM-managed |\n| AWS IAM User | AWS | Access Key\u002FSecret Key | AWS Secrets Manager rotation Lambda |\n| GCP Service Account | GCP | JSON key file | Key rotation via IAM API |\n| Azure Service Principal | Azure | Client secret\u002Fcertificate | Key Vault + rotation policy |\n| Database Service Account | SQL\u002FOracle\u002FPostgres | Password | Vault dynamic secrets |\n| API Key | SaaS applications | API token | Application-specific API |\n\n### Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)\n\nWindows gMSAs provide automatic password management by Active Directory:\n- AD automatically rotates the password every 30 days\n- Password is 240 bytes, cryptographically random\n- Multiple servers can use the same gMSA simultaneously\n- No administrator knows or manages the password\n- Eliminates manual rotation for Windows services\n\n### Rotation Architecture\n\n```\nSecrets Manager \u002F Vault\n        │\n        ├── Rotation Trigger (schedule or on-demand)\n        │\n        ├── Generate new credential\n        │\n        ├── Update credential at source (AD, cloud IAM, database)\n        │\n        ├── Update credential in all consumers:\n        │   ├── Application configuration\n        │   ├── CI\u002FCD pipeline secrets\n        │   ├── Kubernetes secrets\n        │   └── Other dependent services\n        │\n        ├── Verify service health\n        │   ├── Health check endpoints\n        │   ├── Authentication test\n        │   └── Functional smoke test\n        │\n        └── Revoke old credential (after grace period)\n```\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Discover and Inventory Service Accounts\n\nEnumerate all service accounts and their dependencies:\n\n```powershell\n# Active Directory: Find all service accounts\nGet-ADServiceAccount -Filter * -Properties *\nGet-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne \"$null\"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName,PasswordLastSet,LastLogonDate\n\n# Find accounts with passwords older than 90 days\n$threshold = (Get-Date).AddDays(-90)\nGet-ADUser -Filter {PasswordLastSet -lt $threshold -and Enabled -eq $true} -Properties PasswordLastSet,ServicePrincipalName |\n    Where-Object {$_.ServicePrincipalName} |\n    Select-Object Name, PasswordLastSet, ServicePrincipalName\n```\n\n### Step 2: Implement gMSA for Windows Services\n\n```powershell\n# Create KDS Root Key (one-time, domain-wide)\nAdd-KdsRootKey -EffectiveImmediately\n\n# Create the gMSA account\nNew-ADServiceAccount -Name \"svc-webapp-gmsa\" `\n    -DNSHostName \"svc-webapp-gmsa.corp.example.com\" `\n    -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword \"WebServerGroup\" `\n    -KerberosEncryptionType AES128,AES256\n\n# Install on target server\nInstall-ADServiceAccount -Identity \"svc-webapp-gmsa\"\n\n# Test the account\nTest-ADServiceAccount -Identity \"svc-webapp-gmsa\"\n\n# Configure IIS Application Pool to use gMSA\n# Set identity to: CORP\\svc-webapp-gmsa$\n```\n\n### Step 3: AWS Access Key Rotation with Secrets Manager\n\n```python\nimport boto3\nimport json\n\ndef rotate_iam_access_key(secret_arn, iam_username):\n    \"\"\"Rotate an IAM user's access key via Secrets Manager.\"\"\"\n    iam = boto3.client(\"iam\")\n    sm = boto3.client(\"secretsmanager\")\n\n    # Create new access key\n    new_key = iam.create_access_key(UserName=iam_username)\n    new_access_key = new_key[\"AccessKey\"][\"AccessKeyId\"]\n    new_secret_key = new_key[\"AccessKey\"][\"SecretAccessKey\"]\n\n    # Store new credentials in Secrets Manager\n    sm.put_secret_value(\n        SecretId=secret_arn,\n        SecretString=json.dumps({\n            \"accessKeyId\": new_access_key,\n            \"secretAccessKey\": new_secret_key,\n            \"username\": iam_username,\n        })\n    )\n\n    # List old access keys and deactivate them\n    keys = iam.list_access_keys(UserName=iam_username)\n    for key in keys[\"AccessKeyMetadata\"]:\n        if key[\"AccessKeyId\"] != new_access_key and key[\"Status\"] == \"Active\":\n            iam.update_access_key(\n                UserName=iam_username,\n                AccessKeyId=key[\"AccessKeyId\"],\n                Status=\"Inactive\"\n            )\n\n    return {\"new_key_id\": new_access_key, \"old_keys_deactivated\": True}\n```\n\n### Step 4: Database Credential Rotation with Vault\n\n```python\nimport hvac\n\ndef configure_vault_database_rotation(vault_url, vault_token, db_config):\n    \"\"\"Configure HashiCorp Vault for automatic database credential rotation.\"\"\"\n    client = hvac.Client(url=vault_url, token=vault_token)\n\n    # Enable database secrets engine\n    client.sys.enable_secrets_engine(\n        backend_type=\"database\",\n        path=\"database\"\n    )\n\n    # Configure database connection\n    client.secrets.database.configure(\n        name=db_config[\"name\"],\n        plugin_name=\"postgresql-database-plugin\",\n        connection_url=f\"postgresql:\u002F\u002F{{{{username}}}}:{{{{password}}}}@\"\n                       f\"{db_config['host']}:{db_config['port']}\u002F{db_config['database']}\",\n        allowed_roles=[db_config[\"role_name\"]],\n        username=db_config[\"admin_user\"],\n        password=db_config[\"admin_password\"],\n    )\n\n    # Create a role for dynamic credentials\n    client.secrets.database.create_role(\n        name=db_config[\"role_name\"],\n        db_name=db_config[\"name\"],\n        creation_statements=[\n            \"CREATE ROLE \\\"{{name}}\\\" WITH LOGIN PASSWORD '{{password}}' VALID UNTIL '{{expiration}}';\",\n            f\"GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO \\\"{{{{name}}}}\\\";\"\n        ],\n        default_ttl=\"1h\",\n        max_ttl=\"24h\",\n    )\n\n    return {\"status\": \"configured\", \"role\": db_config[\"role_name\"]}\n```\n\n### Step 5: Post-Rotation Verification\n\nAfter every rotation, verify service continuity:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\n\ndef verify_service_health(service_endpoints, max_retries=3, delay=10):\n    \"\"\"Check that services are healthy after credential rotation.\"\"\"\n    results = []\n    for endpoint in service_endpoints:\n        for attempt in range(max_retries):\n            try:\n                response = requests.get(\n                    endpoint[\"health_url\"],\n                    timeout=10,\n                    headers=endpoint.get(\"headers\", {})\n                )\n                healthy = response.status_code == 200\n                results.append({\n                    \"service\": endpoint[\"name\"],\n                    \"status\": \"healthy\" if healthy else f\"unhealthy ({response.status_code})\",\n                    \"attempt\": attempt + 1,\n                })\n                if healthy:\n                    break\n            except requests.RequestException as e:\n                results.append({\n                    \"service\": endpoint[\"name\"],\n                    \"status\": f\"error: {str(e)}\",\n                    \"attempt\": attempt + 1,\n                })\n            if attempt \u003C max_retries - 1:\n                time.sleep(delay)\n\n    return results\n```\n\n## Validation Checklist\n\n- [ ] Complete inventory of service accounts with dependency mapping\n- [ ] gMSA implemented for all eligible Windows service accounts\n- [ ] Cloud access keys rotated via secrets manager (AWS, GCP, Azure)\n- [ ] Database credentials managed via dynamic secrets (Vault) or rotation policy\n- [ ] Rotation schedule defined (30-90 days depending on risk level)\n- [ ] Post-rotation health checks automated\n- [ ] Alerting configured for rotation failures\n- [ ] Old credentials revoked after grace period\n- [ ] Rotation events logged and auditable\n- [ ] Rollback procedure documented and tested\n\n## References\n\n- [Google Cloud Service Account Key Rotation](https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fiam\u002Fdocs\u002Fkey-rotation)\n- [AWS Secrets Manager Rotation](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fsecretsmanager\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Frotating-secrets.html)\n- [Microsoft gMSA Documentation](https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fwindows-server\u002Fsecurity\u002Fgroup-managed-service-accounts\u002Fgroup-managed-service-accounts-overview)\n- [HashiCorp Vault Database Secrets Engine](https:\u002F\u002Fdeveloper.hashicorp.com\u002Fvault\u002Fdocs\u002Fsecrets\u002Fdatabases)\n",{"name":5,"tags":56,"author":58,"domain":50,"license":15,"version":59,"mitre_f3":60,"nist_csf":83,"subdomain":88,"description":7,"mitre_attack":89},[45,37,38,57,49,36],"pam","mahipal","1.0",{"tactics":61,"version":64,"techniques":65},[41,62,63],"positioning","stealth","1.1",[66,70,73,77,80],{"id":67,"name":68,"source":69,"tactic":41},"F1006.001","Account Takeover: Exposed API Key","f3",{"id":71,"name":72,"source":69,"tactic":41},"F1006.002","Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential",{"id":74,"name":75,"source":76,"tactic":41},"T1110","Brute Force","attack",{"id":78,"name":79,"source":69,"tactic":62},"F1005","Account Manipulation",{"id":81,"name":82,"source":69,"tactic":63},"F1023","Device Fingerprint Spoofing",[84,85,86,87],"PR.AA-01","PR.AA-02","PR.AA-05","PR.AA-06","identity-access-management",[90,74,91,92,93],"T1078","T1556","T1098","T1003","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":105,"prompt":115,"zipAvailable":116},[106,109,112],{"tool":107,"command":108},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-service-account-credential-rotation",{"tool":110,"command":111},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-service-account-credential-rotation",{"tool":113,"command":114},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-service-account-credential-rotation","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002FSKILL.md",true,[118,124,129,135,139,143,149],{"path":119,"resourceType":120,"resourceTypeDesc":121,"sizeBytes":122,"sourceHtmlUrl":123},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",1087,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":125,"resourceType":125,"resourceTypeDesc":126,"sizeBytes":127,"sourceHtmlUrl":128},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002FLICENSE",{"path":130,"resourceType":131,"resourceTypeDesc":132,"sizeBytes":133,"sourceHtmlUrl":134},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2376,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":136,"resourceType":131,"resourceTypeDesc":132,"sizeBytes":137,"sourceHtmlUrl":138},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1964,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":140,"resourceType":131,"resourceTypeDesc":132,"sizeBytes":141,"sourceHtmlUrl":142},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3586,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":144,"resourceType":145,"resourceTypeDesc":146,"sizeBytes":147,"sourceHtmlUrl":148},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7042,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":150,"resourceType":145,"resourceTypeDesc":146,"sizeBytes":151,"sourceHtmlUrl":152},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",9976,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-service-account-credential-rotation\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[154,179,202,229,255,280],{"skillNo":155,"name":156,"nameZh":6,"description":157,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":158,"categories":159,"keywords":161,"publishedAt":51},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[160],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[162,163,164,165,166,50,167,48,47,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":180,"name":181,"nameZh":6,"description":182,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":183,"categories":184,"keywords":186,"publishedAt":51},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[185],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[187,175,188,189,166,190,50,47,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,34,198,199,200,201],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":203,"name":204,"nameZh":6,"description":205,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":206,"categories":207,"keywords":212,"publishedAt":51},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[208,211],{"categoryNo":209,"categoryName":210,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[197,213,214,215,216,50,217,218,191,219,220,221,222,223,224,43,225,226,227,228],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":230,"name":231,"nameZh":6,"description":232,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":233,"categories":234,"keywords":236,"publishedAt":51},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[235],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[237,238,239,50,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,194,252,253,254],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":256,"name":257,"nameZh":6,"description":258,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":259,"categories":260,"keywords":262,"publishedAt":51},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[261],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[263,264,265,50,266,267,268,269,270,271,272,273,274,275,33,276,35,277,278,279],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","vulnerability","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":281,"name":282,"nameZh":6,"description":283,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":284,"categories":285,"keywords":287,"publishedAt":51},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[286],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[166,288,50,289,290,291,292,293,294,295,296,43,297,225,298,299,300,301,302,303],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]