[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AFXHZ5DHN628SE94BVT865":3,"skill-same:01M6AFXHZ5DHN628SE94BVT865":125},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":26,"publishedAt":46,"linkOnly":47,"markdownContent":48,"markdownBody":49,"frontMatter":50,"refName":66,"commitSha":67,"skillDirectory":68,"forksCount":69,"repositoryHtmlUrl":70,"repositoryHomepageUrl":71,"ownerHtmlUrl":72,"ownerBlogUrl":73,"ownerDescription":74,"updatedAt":75,"install":76,"resources":89},"01M6AFXHZ5DHN628SE94BVT865","performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass",null,"Bypasses SSL\u002FTLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and iOS applications to enable traffic interception during authorized security assessments. Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, NSURLSession, and third-party pinning library bypass techniques using Frida, Objection, and custom scripts. Activates for requests involving certificate pinning bypass, SSL pinning defeat, mobile TLS interception, or proxy-resistant app testing.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45],"performing mobile app certificate pinning bypass","ios","certificate-pinning","applications","t1059","t1078","tls","penetration-testing","frida","objection","testing","mobile-security","ssl","library","proxy","pr","cybersecurity","security","android","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\ndescription: 'Bypasses SSL\u002FTLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and\n  iOS applications to enable traffic interception during authorized security assessments.\n  Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, NSURLSession, and third-party pinning library bypass\n  techniques using Frida, Objection, and custom scripts. Activates for requests involving\n  certificate pinning bypass, SSL pinning defeat, mobile TLS interception, or proxy-resistant\n  app testing.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: mobile-security\nauthor: mahipal\ntags:\n- mobile-security\n- android\n- ios\n- certificate-pinning\n- frida\n- penetration-testing\nversion: 1.0.0\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- PR.AA-05\n- ID.RA-01\n- DE.CM-09\nmitre_attack:\n- T1059\n- T1056\n- T1036\n- T1078\n- T1027\n---\n# Performing Mobile App Certificate Pinning Bypass\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- Mobile app refuses connections through a proxy due to certificate pinning\n- Performing authorized security testing requiring HTTPS traffic interception\n- Assessing the strength and bypass difficulty of pinning implementations\n- Evaluating defense-in-depth of mobile app network security\n\n**Do not use** to bypass pinning on apps without explicit testing authorization.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Burp Suite configured as proxy with listener on all interfaces\n- Rooted Android device or jailbroken iOS device\n- Frida server running on target device\n- Objection installed (`pip install objection`)\n- Target app installed and reproducing the pinning behavior\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Identify Pinning Implementation\n\n**Android pinning methods to identify:**\n```\n1. Network Security Config (res\u002Fxml\u002Fnetwork_security_config.xml)\n   \u003Cpin-set> with certificate hash pins\n\n2. OkHttp CertificatePinner\n   CertificatePinner.Builder().add(\"api.target.com\", \"sha256\u002F...\")\n\n3. Custom TrustManager\n   X509TrustManager overrides in code\n\n4. Third-party libraries\n   - TrustKit\n   - Certificate Transparency checks\n```\n\n**iOS pinning methods:**\n```\n1. NSURLSession delegate (URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:)\n2. ATS (App Transport Security) with custom trust evaluation\n3. TrustKit framework\n4. Alamofire ServerTrustPolicy\n5. Custom SecTrust evaluation\n```\n\n### Step 2: Bypass with Objection (Quickest Approach)\n\n```bash\n# Android\nobjection --gadget com.target.app explore\nandroid sslpinning disable\n\n# iOS\nobjection --gadget com.target.app explore\nios sslpinning disable\n```\n\nObjection hooks common pinning implementations including OkHttp CertificatePinner, TrustManagerImpl, NSURLSession delegate methods, and SecTrust evaluation.\n\n### Step 3: Bypass with Custom Frida Scripts\n\n**Android - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:**\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F android_ssl_bypass.js\nJava.perform(function() {\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass TrustManagerImpl\n    var TrustManagerImpl = Java.use(\"com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl\");\n    TrustManagerImpl.verifyChain.implementation = function(untrustedChain, trustAnchorChain,\n        host, clientAuth, ocspData, tlsSctData) {\n        console.log(\"[+] Bypassing TrustManagerImpl for: \" + host);\n        return untrustedChain;\n    };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass OkHttp3 CertificatePinner\n    try {\n        var CertificatePinner = Java.use(\"okhttp3.CertificatePinner\");\n        CertificatePinner.check.overload(\"java.lang.String\", \"java.util.List\").implementation =\n            function(hostname, peerCertificates) {\n                console.log(\"[+] Bypassing OkHttp3 pinning for: \" + hostname);\n                return;\n            };\n    } catch(e) {}\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass custom X509TrustManager\n    var X509TrustManager = Java.use(\"javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager\");\n    var TrustManager = Java.registerClass({\n        name: \"com.bypass.TrustManager\",\n        implements: [X509TrustManager],\n        methods: {\n            checkClientTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},\n            checkServerTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},\n            getAcceptedIssuers: function() { return []; }\n        }\n    });\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass SSLContext\n    var SSLContext = Java.use(\"javax.net.ssl.SSLContext\");\n    SSLContext.init.overload(\"[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;\",\n        \"[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;\", \"java.security.SecureRandom\").implementation =\n        function(km, tm, sr) {\n            console.log(\"[+] Replacing TrustManagers in SSLContext.init\");\n            this.init(km, [TrustManager.$new()], sr);\n        };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass NetworkSecurityConfig (Android 7+)\n    try {\n        var NetworkSecurityConfig = Java.use(\n            \"android.security.net.config.NetworkSecurityConfig\");\n        NetworkSecurityConfig.isCleartextTrafficPermitted.implementation = function() {\n            return true;\n        };\n    } catch(e) {}\n\n    console.log(\"[*] SSL pinning bypass loaded\");\n});\n```\n\n```bash\nfrida -U -f com.target.app -l android_ssl_bypass.js --no-pause\n```\n\n**iOS - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:**\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F ios_ssl_bypass.js\nif (ObjC.available) {\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass NSURLSession delegate\n    var resolver = new ApiResolver(\"objc\");\n    resolver.enumerateMatches(\n        \"-[* URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:completionHandler:]\", {\n        onMatch: function(match) {\n            Interceptor.attach(match.address, {\n                onEnter: function(args) {\n                    var completionHandler = new ObjC.Block(args[4]);\n                    var NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential = 0;\n                    var trust = new ObjC.Object(args[3])\n                        .protectionSpace().serverTrust();\n                    var credential = ObjC.classes.NSURLCredential\n                        .credentialForTrust_(trust);\n                    completionHandler.invoke(NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential,\n                        credential);\n                }\n            });\n        },\n        onComplete: function() {}\n    });\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass SecTrustEvaluate\n    var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module.findExportByName(\n        \"Security\", \"SecTrustEvaluateWithError\");\n    if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError) {\n        Interceptor.replace(SecTrustEvaluateWithError, new NativeCallback(\n            function(trust, error) {\n                return 1;  \u002F\u002F Always return true\n            }, \"bool\", [\"pointer\", \"pointer\"]\n        ));\n    }\n\n    console.log(\"[*] iOS SSL pinning bypass loaded\");\n}\n```\n\n### Step 4: Handle Advanced Pinning\n\nFor apps using advanced pinning (TrustKit, custom binary checks):\n\n```bash\n# Identify the specific pinning library\nfrida-trace -U -n TargetApp -m \"*[*Trust*]\" -m \"*[*Pin*]\" -m \"*[*SSL*]\" -m \"*[*Certificate*]\"\n\n# Hook the identified validation function\n# Custom Frida script targeting the specific implementation\n```\n\n### Step 5: Verify Bypass Success\n\nAfter applying the bypass:\n1. Configure device proxy to Burp Suite\n2. Open target app and navigate through authenticated flows\n3. Verify HTTPS traffic appears in Burp Suite HTTP History\n4. Check for any remaining pinned connections that are not captured\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Certificate Pinning** | Restricting accepted server certificates to a known set, preventing MITM via rogue CA certificates |\n| **Public Key Pinning** | Pinning the server's public key hash rather than the full certificate, surviving certificate rotation |\n| **Network Security Config** | Android XML configuration for declaring trust anchors, pins, and cleartext policy per-domain |\n| **TrustKit** | Open-source library implementing certificate pinning with reporting for both Android and iOS |\n| **HPKP Deprecation** | HTTP Public Key Pinning header was deprecated in browsers but concept persists in mobile apps |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Objection**: Pre-built pinning bypass for common libraries (OkHttp, NSURLSession, TrustKit)\n- **Frida**: Custom JavaScript hooks targeting specific pinning implementations\n- **apktool**: APK decompilation for identifying pinning in Network Security Config\n- **SSLUnpinning (Xposed)**: Xposed framework module for system-wide pinning bypass on Android\n- **ssl-kill-switch2**: iOS tweak for disabling SSL pinning system-wide on jailbroken devices\n\n## Common Pitfalls\n\n- **Certificate transparency**: Some apps check CT logs in addition to pinning. May need to bypass CT verification separately.\n- **Multi-layer pinning**: Apps may implement pinning at multiple levels (OkHttp + custom TrustManager). Bypass all layers.\n- **Binary-level pinning**: Some apps validate certificates in native C\u002FC++ code, which requires Interceptor.attach at native function addresses rather than Java\u002FObjC hooks.\n- **Dynamic pinning updates**: Apps using TrustKit or similar may fetch updated pins from a server. Monitor for pin rotation during testing.\n","# Performing Mobile App Certificate Pinning Bypass\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- Mobile app refuses connections through a proxy due to certificate pinning\n- Performing authorized security testing requiring HTTPS traffic interception\n- Assessing the strength and bypass difficulty of pinning implementations\n- Evaluating defense-in-depth of mobile app network security\n\n**Do not use** to bypass pinning on apps without explicit testing authorization.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Burp Suite configured as proxy with listener on all interfaces\n- Rooted Android device or jailbroken iOS device\n- Frida server running on target device\n- Objection installed (`pip install objection`)\n- Target app installed and reproducing the pinning behavior\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Identify Pinning Implementation\n\n**Android pinning methods to identify:**\n```\n1. Network Security Config (res\u002Fxml\u002Fnetwork_security_config.xml)\n   \u003Cpin-set> with certificate hash pins\n\n2. OkHttp CertificatePinner\n   CertificatePinner.Builder().add(\"api.target.com\", \"sha256\u002F...\")\n\n3. Custom TrustManager\n   X509TrustManager overrides in code\n\n4. Third-party libraries\n   - TrustKit\n   - Certificate Transparency checks\n```\n\n**iOS pinning methods:**\n```\n1. NSURLSession delegate (URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:)\n2. ATS (App Transport Security) with custom trust evaluation\n3. TrustKit framework\n4. Alamofire ServerTrustPolicy\n5. Custom SecTrust evaluation\n```\n\n### Step 2: Bypass with Objection (Quickest Approach)\n\n```bash\n# Android\nobjection --gadget com.target.app explore\nandroid sslpinning disable\n\n# iOS\nobjection --gadget com.target.app explore\nios sslpinning disable\n```\n\nObjection hooks common pinning implementations including OkHttp CertificatePinner, TrustManagerImpl, NSURLSession delegate methods, and SecTrust evaluation.\n\n### Step 3: Bypass with Custom Frida Scripts\n\n**Android - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:**\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F android_ssl_bypass.js\nJava.perform(function() {\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass TrustManagerImpl\n    var TrustManagerImpl = Java.use(\"com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl\");\n    TrustManagerImpl.verifyChain.implementation = function(untrustedChain, trustAnchorChain,\n        host, clientAuth, ocspData, tlsSctData) {\n        console.log(\"[+] Bypassing TrustManagerImpl for: \" + host);\n        return untrustedChain;\n    };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass OkHttp3 CertificatePinner\n    try {\n        var CertificatePinner = Java.use(\"okhttp3.CertificatePinner\");\n        CertificatePinner.check.overload(\"java.lang.String\", \"java.util.List\").implementation =\n            function(hostname, peerCertificates) {\n                console.log(\"[+] Bypassing OkHttp3 pinning for: \" + hostname);\n                return;\n            };\n    } catch(e) {}\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass custom X509TrustManager\n    var X509TrustManager = Java.use(\"javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager\");\n    var TrustManager = Java.registerClass({\n        name: \"com.bypass.TrustManager\",\n        implements: [X509TrustManager],\n        methods: {\n            checkClientTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},\n            checkServerTrusted: function(chain, authType) {},\n            getAcceptedIssuers: function() { return []; }\n        }\n    });\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass SSLContext\n    var SSLContext = Java.use(\"javax.net.ssl.SSLContext\");\n    SSLContext.init.overload(\"[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;\",\n        \"[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;\", \"java.security.SecureRandom\").implementation =\n        function(km, tm, sr) {\n            console.log(\"[+] Replacing TrustManagers in SSLContext.init\");\n            this.init(km, [TrustManager.$new()], sr);\n        };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass NetworkSecurityConfig (Android 7+)\n    try {\n        var NetworkSecurityConfig = Java.use(\n            \"android.security.net.config.NetworkSecurityConfig\");\n        NetworkSecurityConfig.isCleartextTrafficPermitted.implementation = function() {\n            return true;\n        };\n    } catch(e) {}\n\n    console.log(\"[*] SSL pinning bypass loaded\");\n});\n```\n\n```bash\nfrida -U -f com.target.app -l android_ssl_bypass.js --no-pause\n```\n\n**iOS - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:**\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F ios_ssl_bypass.js\nif (ObjC.available) {\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass NSURLSession delegate\n    var resolver = new ApiResolver(\"objc\");\n    resolver.enumerateMatches(\n        \"-[* URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:completionHandler:]\", {\n        onMatch: function(match) {\n            Interceptor.attach(match.address, {\n                onEnter: function(args) {\n                    var completionHandler = new ObjC.Block(args[4]);\n                    var NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential = 0;\n                    var trust = new ObjC.Object(args[3])\n                        .protectionSpace().serverTrust();\n                    var credential = ObjC.classes.NSURLCredential\n                        .credentialForTrust_(trust);\n                    completionHandler.invoke(NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential,\n                        credential);\n                }\n            });\n        },\n        onComplete: function() {}\n    });\n\n    \u002F\u002F Bypass SecTrustEvaluate\n    var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module.findExportByName(\n        \"Security\", \"SecTrustEvaluateWithError\");\n    if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError) {\n        Interceptor.replace(SecTrustEvaluateWithError, new NativeCallback(\n            function(trust, error) {\n                return 1;  \u002F\u002F Always return true\n            }, \"bool\", [\"pointer\", \"pointer\"]\n        ));\n    }\n\n    console.log(\"[*] iOS SSL pinning bypass loaded\");\n}\n```\n\n### Step 4: Handle Advanced Pinning\n\nFor apps using advanced pinning (TrustKit, custom binary checks):\n\n```bash\n# Identify the specific pinning library\nfrida-trace -U -n TargetApp -m \"*[*Trust*]\" -m \"*[*Pin*]\" -m \"*[*SSL*]\" -m \"*[*Certificate*]\"\n\n# Hook the identified validation function\n# Custom Frida script targeting the specific implementation\n```\n\n### Step 5: Verify Bypass Success\n\nAfter applying the bypass:\n1. Configure device proxy to Burp Suite\n2. Open target app and navigate through authenticated flows\n3. Verify HTTPS traffic appears in Burp Suite HTTP History\n4. Check for any remaining pinned connections that are not captured\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Certificate Pinning** | Restricting accepted server certificates to a known set, preventing MITM via rogue CA certificates |\n| **Public Key Pinning** | Pinning the server's public key hash rather than the full certificate, surviving certificate rotation |\n| **Network Security Config** | Android XML configuration for declaring trust anchors, pins, and cleartext policy per-domain |\n| **TrustKit** | Open-source library implementing certificate pinning with reporting for both Android and iOS |\n| **HPKP Deprecation** | HTTP Public Key Pinning header was deprecated in browsers but concept persists in mobile apps |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Objection**: Pre-built pinning bypass for common libraries (OkHttp, NSURLSession, TrustKit)\n- **Frida**: Custom JavaScript hooks targeting specific pinning implementations\n- **apktool**: APK decompilation for identifying pinning in Network Security Config\n- **SSLUnpinning (Xposed)**: Xposed framework module for system-wide pinning bypass on Android\n- **ssl-kill-switch2**: iOS tweak for disabling SSL pinning system-wide on jailbroken devices\n\n## Common Pitfalls\n\n- **Certificate transparency**: Some apps check CT logs in addition to pinning. May need to bypass CT verification separately.\n- **Multi-layer pinning**: Apps may implement pinning at multiple levels (OkHttp + custom TrustManager). Bypass all layers.\n- **Binary-level pinning**: Some apps validate certificates in native C\u002FC++ code, which requires Interceptor.attach at native function addresses rather than Java\u002FObjC hooks.\n- **Dynamic pinning updates**: Apps using TrustKit or similar may fetch updated pins from a server. Monitor for pin rotation during testing.\n",{"name":5,"tags":51,"author":52,"domain":43,"license":15,"version":53,"nist_csf":54,"subdomain":38,"description":59,"mitre_attack":60},[38,45,28,29,35,34],"mahipal","1.0.0",[55,56,57,58],"PR.PS-01","PR.AA-05","ID.RA-01","DE.CM-09","Bypasses SSL\u002FTLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and iOS applications to enable traffic interception during authorized security assessments. Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, NSURLSession, and third-party pinning library bypass techniques using Frida, Objection, and custom scripts. Activates for requests involving certificate pinning bypass, SSL pinning defeat, mobile TLS interception, or proxy-resistant app testing.\n",[61,62,63,64,65],"T1059","T1056","T1036","T1078","T1027","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":77,"prompt":87,"zipAvailable":88},[78,81,84],{"tool":79,"command":80},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass",{"tool":82,"command":83},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass",{"tool":85,"command":86},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002FSKILL.md",true,[90,96,101,107,111,115,121],{"path":91,"resourceType":92,"resourceTypeDesc":93,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",560,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":97,"resourceType":97,"resourceTypeDesc":98,"sizeBytes":99,"sourceHtmlUrl":100},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002FLICENSE",{"path":102,"resourceType":103,"resourceTypeDesc":104,"sizeBytes":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1506,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":108,"resourceType":103,"resourceTypeDesc":104,"sizeBytes":109,"sourceHtmlUrl":110},"references\u002Fstandards.md",760,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":112,"resourceType":103,"resourceTypeDesc":104,"sizeBytes":113,"sourceHtmlUrl":114},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",1554,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":116,"resourceType":117,"resourceTypeDesc":118,"sizeBytes":119,"sourceHtmlUrl":120},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6878,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":122,"resourceType":117,"resourceTypeDesc":118,"sizeBytes":123,"sourceHtmlUrl":124},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",5421,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[126,151,175,199,225,252],{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":133,"publishedAt":46},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[132],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[134,135,136,137,44,43,138,139,42,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":152,"name":153,"nameZh":6,"description":154,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":155,"categories":156,"keywords":158,"publishedAt":46},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[157],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[159,147,160,161,44,162,43,42,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":176,"name":177,"nameZh":6,"description":178,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":179,"categories":180,"keywords":183,"publishedAt":46},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[181,182],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[169,184,185,186,37,43,187,188,163,189,190,191,192,193,194,32,195,196,197,198],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":200,"name":201,"nameZh":6,"description":202,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":203,"categories":204,"keywords":206,"publishedAt":46},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[205],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[207,208,209,43,210,211,212,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,166,222,223,224],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":226,"name":227,"nameZh":6,"description":228,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":229,"categories":230,"keywords":232,"publishedAt":46},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[231],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[233,234,235,43,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":253,"name":254,"nameZh":6,"description":255,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":256,"categories":257,"keywords":259,"publishedAt":46},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[258],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[44,260,43,261,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,32,269,195,270,271,272,273,274,275],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]