performing-dynamic-analysis-with-any-run
Perform interactive dynamic malware analysis using the ANY.RUN cloud sandbox to detonate samples, observe real-time execution behavior, interact with malware prompts such as dialogs and CAPTCHAs, and capture process trees, network traffic, and system changes. Use when a suspicious file or URL needs live, interactive behavioral detonation in a cloud sandbox rather than static analysis alone.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- performing-dynamic-analysis-with-any-run
- tags
- [ "malware", "dynamic-analysis", "sandbox", "ANY.RUN", "interactive-analysis" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0.0
- nist_csf
- [ "DE.AE-02", "RS.AN-03", "ID.RA-01", "DE.CM-01" ]
- subdomain
- malware-analysis
- description
- Perform interactive dynamic malware analysis using the ANY.RUN cloud sandbox to detonate samples, observe real-time execution behavior, interact with malware prompts such as dialogs and CAPTCHAs, and capture process trees, network traffic, and system changes. Use when a suspicious file or URL needs live, interactive behavioral detonation in a cloud sandbox rather than static analysis alone.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1027", "T1055", "T1140", "T1497", "T1591" ]
- d3fend_techniques
- [ "File Metadata Consistency Validation", "Application Protocol Command Analysis", "Identifier Analysis", "Content Format Conversion", "Message Analysis" ]
02 资源文件 3
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md3.1 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py10.5 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Performing Dynamic Analysis with ANY.RUN
When to Use
- Interactive malware analysis is needed where the analyst must click dialogs, enter credentials, or navigate installer screens
- Rapid cloud-based sandbox analysis without maintaining local sandbox infrastructure
- Malware requires user interaction to proceed past anti-sandbox checks (document macros requiring "Enable Content")
- Sharing analysis results with team members via public or private task URLs
- Comparing behavior across different OS versions (Windows 7, 10, 11) available in ANY.RUN
Do not use for highly sensitive samples that cannot be uploaded to cloud services; use an on-premises sandbox like Cuckoo instead.
Prerequisites
- ANY.RUN account (free community tier or paid subscription at https://any.run)
- Modern web browser with WebSocket support for interactive session streaming
- Sample file ready for upload (max 100 MB for free tier, 256 MB for paid)
- Understanding of the sample type to select appropriate execution environment
- VPN or secure network for accessing ANY.RUN portal during analysis sessions
Workflow
Step 1: Configure Analysis Environment
Set up the ANY.RUN task with appropriate parameters:
ANY.RUN Task Configuration:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
OS Selection: Windows 10 x64 (recommended default)
Windows 7 x64 (for legacy malware)
Windows 11 x64 (for modern samples)
Execution Time: 60 seconds (default) / 120-300 for slow-acting malware
Network: Connected (captures real C2 traffic)
Residential Proxy (bypasses geo-blocking)
Privacy: Public (free tier) / Private (paid - not indexed)
MITM Proxy: Enable for HTTPS traffic decryption
Fake Net: Enable to simulate internet services if sample checks connectivity
API-based submission (paid tier):
# Submit file via ANY.RUN API
curl -X POST "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis" \
-H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \
-F "file=@suspect.exe" \
-F "env_os=windows" \
-F "env_version=10" \
-F "env_bitness=64" \
-F "opt_timeout=120" \
-F "opt_network_connect=true" \
-F "opt_privacy_type=bylink"
# Check task status
curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID" \
-H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" | jq '.data.status'
Step 2: Interact with Malware During Execution
Use the interactive session to trigger malware behavior:
Interactive Actions During Analysis:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Document Macros: Click "Enable Content" / "Enable Editing" when prompted
2. Installer Screens: Click through installation dialogs
3. UAC Prompts: Click "Yes" to allow elevation (observe privilege escalation)
4. Credential Harvests: Enter fake credentials to observe phishing behavior
5. Browser Redirects: Navigate to URLs if malware opens browser windows
6. File Dialogs: Select target files if malware presents file picker
7. Timeout Extension: Extend analysis time if malware has delayed execution
Step 3: Analyze Process Tree
Review the complete process execution chain:
Process Tree Analysis Points:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Parent-Child Relationships:
- WINWORD.EXE -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe (macro execution chain)
- explorer.exe -> suspect.exe -> svchost.exe (process injection)
Process Events to Note:
- Process creation with suspicious command-line arguments
- PowerShell with encoded commands (-enc / -encodedcommand)
- cmd.exe executing script files (.bat, .vbs, .js)
- Legitimate processes spawned from unusual parents
- Process termination (self-deletion behavior)
Step 4: Review Network Activity
Examine DNS, HTTP/HTTPS, and TCP/UDP connections:
ANY.RUN Network Panel Analysis:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
DNS Requests:
- Domain resolutions with threat intelligence tags
- Fast-flux or DGA domain patterns
- DNS over HTTPS (DoH) detection
HTTP/HTTPS Traffic (with MITM enabled):
- Full request/response bodies for HTTP
- Decrypted HTTPS traffic showing C2 commands
- Downloaded payloads and their content types
- POST data containing exfiltrated information
Connection Map:
- Geographic visualization of C2 server locations
- Connection timeline showing beacon patterns
- Suricata alerts triggered on network traffic
Step 5: Examine IOCs and Threat Intelligence
Extract indicators and map to known threats:
ANY.RUN IOC Categories:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Files: Dropped files with hashes, YARA matches, VirusTotal results
Network: IPs, domains, URLs contacted during execution
Registry: Keys created/modified for persistence
Processes: Suspicious process names and command lines
Mutex: Named mutexes created (used for single-instance checking)
Signatures: Suricata rules triggered, behavioral signatures matched
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:
- ANY.RUN automatically maps observed behaviors to ATT&CK techniques
- Review the ATT&CK matrix tab for technique coverage
- Export ATT&CK Navigator layer for reporting
Step 6: Export Analysis Results
Download comprehensive reports and artifacts:
# Download report via API
curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID/report" \
-H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \
-o report.json
# Download PCAP
curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID/pcap" \
-H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \
-o capture.pcap
# Download dropped files
curl "https://api.any.run/v1/analysis/$TASK_ID/files" \
-H "Authorization: API-Key $ANYRUN_API_KEY" \
-o dropped_files.zip
# Available exports from ANY.RUN web interface:
# - HTML Report (shareable standalone page)
# - PCAP file (network traffic capture)
# - Process dump (memory dumps of processes)
# - Dropped files (all files created during execution)
# - MITRE ATT&CK Navigator JSON
# - IOC export (STIX/JSON/CSV format)
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Interactive Sandbox | Analysis environment allowing real-time analyst interaction with the executing sample, enabling triggering of user-dependent behaviors |
| MITM Proxy | Man-in-the-middle TLS interception in ANY.RUN that decrypts HTTPS traffic for visibility into encrypted C2 communications |
| Residential Proxy | ANY.RUN feature routing malware traffic through residential IP addresses to bypass geo-IP and datacenter-IP evasion checks |
| Suricata Alerts | Network IDS signatures triggered during execution, providing immediate identification of known malicious traffic patterns |
| Process Tree | Hierarchical visualization of parent-child process relationships showing the complete execution chain from initial sample to final payloads |
| Behavioral Tags | ANY.RUN classification labels automatically applied based on observed behavior (e.g., "trojan", "stealer", "ransomware") |
Tools & Systems
- ANY.RUN: Cloud-based interactive malware sandbox providing real-time execution monitoring, process trees, network capture, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping
- ANY.RUN API: REST API for programmatic sample submission, status checking, and report/artifact retrieval
- Suricata: Integrated network IDS within ANY.RUN providing signature-based detection of malicious network traffic
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator: Framework integration mapping observed malware behaviors to adversary techniques and tactics
- VirusTotal Integration: Automatic hash lookup of sample and dropped files against VirusTotal detection results
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Analyzing a Macro-Enabled Document Requiring User Interaction
Context: Phishing email contains a .docm file that requires clicking "Enable Content" to trigger the macro payload. Traditional non-interactive sandboxes fail to trigger the malicious behavior.
Approach:
- Upload .docm to ANY.RUN with Windows 10 environment and Microsoft Office installed
- When Word opens and displays the security banner, click "Enable Content" interactively
- Observe the macro execution in the process tree (Word -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe)
- Monitor network panel for PowerShell downloading second-stage payload
- If a UAC prompt appears, click "Yes" to allow the payload to observe full behavior chain
- Review Suricata alerts for known malware signatures on the downloaded payload
- Export IOCs (download URLs, dropped file hashes, C2 domains) for blocking
Pitfalls:
- Forgetting to enable MITM proxy, resulting in encrypted HTTPS traffic without visibility
- Using too short an execution timeout for malware with delayed execution or sleep timers
- Uploading to public analysis when the sample contains sensitive organizational data
- Not clicking through all prompts; some malware requires multiple user interactions to fully execute
Output Format
ANY.RUN ANALYSIS REPORT
=========================
Task URL: https://app.any.run/tasks/<task_id>
Sample: invoice_q3.docm
SHA-256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924...
Verdict: MALICIOUS (Score: 95/100)
Family: Emotet
Tags: [trojan, banker, spam, macro]
PROCESS TREE
WINWORD.EXE (PID: 2184)
└── cmd.exe (PID: 3456) "/c powershell -enc JABXAG..."
└── powershell.exe (PID: 4012)
└── rundll32.exe (PID: 4568) "C:\Users\...\payload.dll,Control_RunDLL"
NETWORK INDICATORS
DNS: update.emotet-c2[.]com -> 185.220.101.42
HTTPS: POST hxxps://185.220.101[.]42/wp-content/gate/ (C2 beacon)
HTTP: GET hxxp://compromised-site[.]com/invoice.dll (payload download)
SURICATA ALERTS
[1:2028401] ET MALWARE Emotet CnC Beacon
[1:2028402] ET MALWARE Win32/Emotet Activity
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1218.011 Rundll32 Execution
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
DROPPED FILES
payload.dll SHA-256: abc123... Detection: 48/72 (VirusTotal)
config.dat SHA-256: def456... (encrypted configuration)
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