[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AFP85VYG402GB75SHZX82B":3,"skill-same:01M6AFP85VYG402GB75SHZX82B":126},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":26,"publishedAt":47,"linkOnly":48,"markdownContent":49,"markdownBody":50,"frontMatter":51,"refName":69,"commitSha":70,"skillDirectory":71,"forksCount":72,"repositoryHtmlUrl":73,"repositoryHomepageUrl":74,"ownerHtmlUrl":75,"ownerBlogUrl":76,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M6AFP85VYG402GB75SHZX82B","performing-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail",null,"Investigate AWS account compromise by querying CloudTrail with boto3's LookupEvents or AWS Athena SQL over S3-delivered logs, filtering on suspicious user agents, source IPs, and event names to reconstruct an attacker timeline. Use when tracing unauthorized API calls, S3 data exfiltration, IAM privilege escalation, or credential exposure, and building a forensic report of findings and remediation steps.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46],"performing cloud forensics with aws cloudtrail","cloud","forensics","cloudtrail","aws","exfiltration","t1078","t1003","boto3","ips","remediation","iam","data","suspicious","cloud-security","logs","tracing","sql","cybersecurity","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: performing-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail\ndescription: Investigate AWS account compromise by querying CloudTrail with boto3's LookupEvents\n  or AWS Athena SQL over S3-delivered logs, filtering on suspicious user agents, source IPs, and\n  event names to reconstruct an attacker timeline. Use when tracing unauthorized API calls, S3\n  data exfiltration, IAM privilege escalation, or credential exposure, and building a forensic\n  report of findings and remediation steps.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- cloud-security\n- aws\n- cloudtrail\n- forensics\n- incident-response\n- dfir\n- boto3\n- s3\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- GV.SC-06\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078.004\n- T1530\n- T1537\n- T1580\n- T1003\n---\n\n# Performing Cloud Forensics with AWS CloudTrail\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating suspected AWS account compromise\n- After detecting unauthorized API calls or credential exposure\n- During incident response involving cloud infrastructure\n- When analyzing S3 data exfiltration or IAM privilege escalation\n- For post-incident forensic timeline reconstruction\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- AWS account with CloudTrail enabled (management and data events)\n- IAM permissions for cloudtrail:LookupEvents, s3:GetObject, athena:StartQueryExecution\n- boto3 Python SDK installed\n- CloudTrail logs delivered to S3 with optional Athena table configured\n- AWS CLI configured with appropriate credentials\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Scope Investigation**: Identify timeframe, affected accounts, and compromised credentials.\n2. **Query CloudTrail**: Use boto3 lookup_events or Athena to retrieve relevant API events.\n3. **Filter by Indicators**: Search for suspicious user agents, source IPs, and event names.\n4. **Reconstruct Timeline**: Build chronological sequence of attacker actions from API calls.\n5. **Analyze Access Patterns**: Identify data access, IAM changes, and resource modifications.\n6. **Identify Persistence**: Check for new IAM users, access keys, roles, or Lambda functions.\n7. **Generate Report**: Produce forensic timeline with findings and remediation steps.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| LookupEvents | CloudTrail API to query management events (last 90 days) |\n| Athena Queries | SQL queries against CloudTrail logs in S3 for historical analysis |\n| User Agent Analysis | Identify tool signatures (AWS CLI, SDK, console, custom) |\n| AccessKeyId | Track activity by specific IAM access key |\n| EventName | AWS API action name (e.g., GetObject, CreateUser, AssumeRole) |\n| sourceIPAddress | Origin IP of API call for geolocation analysis |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| boto3 CloudTrail client | Programmatic CloudTrail event lookup |\n| AWS Athena | SQL-based analysis of CloudTrail S3 logs |\n| AWS CLI | Command-line CloudTrail queries |\n| jq | JSON processing for CloudTrail event parsing |\n| CloudTrail Lake | Advanced event data store with SQL query support |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nForensic Report: AWS-IR-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAccount: [AWS Account ID]\nTimeframe: [Start] to [End]\nCompromised Credentials: [Access Key IDs]\nSuspicious Events: [Count]\nSource IPs: [List of attacker IPs]\nActions Taken: [API calls by attacker]\nData Accessed: [S3 objects, secrets, etc.]\nPersistence Mechanisms: [New users, keys, roles]\n```\n","# Performing Cloud Forensics with AWS CloudTrail\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating suspected AWS account compromise\n- After detecting unauthorized API calls or credential exposure\n- During incident response involving cloud infrastructure\n- When analyzing S3 data exfiltration or IAM privilege escalation\n- For post-incident forensic timeline reconstruction\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- AWS account with CloudTrail enabled (management and data events)\n- IAM permissions for cloudtrail:LookupEvents, s3:GetObject, athena:StartQueryExecution\n- boto3 Python SDK installed\n- CloudTrail logs delivered to S3 with optional Athena table configured\n- AWS CLI configured with appropriate credentials\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Scope Investigation**: Identify timeframe, affected accounts, and compromised credentials.\n2. **Query CloudTrail**: Use boto3 lookup_events or Athena to retrieve relevant API events.\n3. **Filter by Indicators**: Search for suspicious user agents, source IPs, and event names.\n4. **Reconstruct Timeline**: Build chronological sequence of attacker actions from API calls.\n5. **Analyze Access Patterns**: Identify data access, IAM changes, and resource modifications.\n6. **Identify Persistence**: Check for new IAM users, access keys, roles, or Lambda functions.\n7. **Generate Report**: Produce forensic timeline with findings and remediation steps.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| LookupEvents | CloudTrail API to query management events (last 90 days) |\n| Athena Queries | SQL queries against CloudTrail logs in S3 for historical analysis |\n| User Agent Analysis | Identify tool signatures (AWS CLI, SDK, console, custom) |\n| AccessKeyId | Track activity by specific IAM access key |\n| EventName | AWS API action name (e.g., GetObject, CreateUser, AssumeRole) |\n| sourceIPAddress | Origin IP of API call for geolocation analysis |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| boto3 CloudTrail client | Programmatic CloudTrail event lookup |\n| AWS Athena | SQL-based analysis of CloudTrail S3 logs |\n| AWS CLI | Command-line CloudTrail queries |\n| jq | JSON processing for CloudTrail event parsing |\n| CloudTrail Lake | Advanced event data store with SQL query support |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nForensic Report: AWS-IR-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAccount: [AWS Account ID]\nTimeframe: [Start] to [End]\nCompromised Credentials: [Access Key IDs]\nSuspicious Events: [Count]\nSource IPs: [List of attacker IPs]\nActions Taken: [API calls by attacker]\nData Accessed: [S3 objects, secrets, etc.]\nPersistence Mechanisms: [New users, keys, roles]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":52,"author":56,"domain":45,"license":15,"version":57,"nist_csf":58,"subdomain":41,"description":7,"mitre_attack":63},[41,31,30,29,53,54,35,55],"incident-response","dfir","s3","mahipal","1.0",[59,60,61,62],"PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01",[64,65,66,67,68],"T1078.004","T1530","T1537","T1580","T1003","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fperforming-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail",{"tool":85,"command":86},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail",{"tool":88,"command":89},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail\u002FSKILL.md",true,[93,98,104,108,112,116,120],{"path":94,"resourceType":94,"resourceTypeDesc":95,"sizeBytes":96,"sourceHtmlUrl":97},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail\u002FLICENSE",{"path":99,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"references\u002Fanimations.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",5355,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fvideo\u002Fmanim\u002Freferences\u002Fanimations.md",{"path":105,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",3244,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":109,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"references\u002Flatex.md",4660,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fvideo\u002Fmanim\u002Freferences\u002Flatex.md",{"path":113,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":114,"sourceHtmlUrl":115},"references\u002Fmobjects.md",3838,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fvideo\u002Fmanim\u002Freferences\u002Fmobjects.md",{"path":117,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":118,"sourceHtmlUrl":119},"references\u002Fscenes.md",2802,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fvideo\u002Fmanim\u002Freferences\u002Fscenes.md",{"path":121,"resourceType":122,"resourceTypeDesc":123,"sizeBytes":124,"sourceHtmlUrl":125},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",8840,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-cloud-forensics-with-aws-cloudtrail\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[127,153,177,203,226,252],{"skillNo":128,"name":129,"nameZh":6,"description":130,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":131,"categories":132,"keywords":134,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[133],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[135,136,137,138,46,45,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":154,"name":155,"nameZh":6,"description":156,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":157,"categories":158,"keywords":160,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[159],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[161,149,162,163,46,164,45,141,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":178,"name":179,"nameZh":6,"description":180,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":181,"categories":182,"keywords":187,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[183,186],{"categoryNo":184,"categoryName":185,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[171,188,189,190,191,45,192,193,165,194,195,53,196,197,198,33,199,200,201,202],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":204,"name":205,"nameZh":6,"description":206,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":207,"categories":208,"keywords":210,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[209],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[211,212,213,45,214,215,42,216,54,217,218,39,219,220,221,222,168,223,224,225],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","windows-forensics","mft","mftecmd","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":227,"name":228,"nameZh":6,"description":229,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":230,"categories":231,"keywords":233,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[232],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[234,235,236,45,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,37,246,247,248,249,250,251],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":253,"name":254,"nameZh":6,"description":255,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":256,"categories":257,"keywords":259,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[258],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[46,260,45,261,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,33,269,199,270,271,272,273,274,275],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]