[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AFBXBD5SEXKXQJ7XBPNE87":3,"skill-same:01M6AFBXBD5SEXKXQJ7XBPNE87":121},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":62,"commitSha":63,"skillDirectory":64,"forksCount":65,"repositoryHtmlUrl":66,"repositoryHomepageUrl":67,"ownerHtmlUrl":68,"ownerBlogUrl":69,"ownerDescription":70,"updatedAt":71,"install":72,"resources":85},"01M6AFBXBD5SEXKXQJ7XBPNE87","implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes",null,"Hardens Kubernetes RBAC by designing least-privilege Roles and ClusterRoles, auditing RoleBindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, separating service accounts, and integrating an external OIDC identity provider. Use when tightening cluster access control, removing excessive ClusterRoleBindings, or hardening service-account permissions against escalation and lateral movement. Keywords: RBAC, Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, least privilege, service account, OIDC, cluster-admin. Do not use for discovering existing escalation paths - use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"implementing rbac hardening for kubernetes","rbac","hardening","kubernetes","access-control","oidc","escalation","least-privilege","service-account","service-accounts","iam","security-hardening","container-security","privilege-escalation","admin","permissions","pr","identity","cybersecurity","security","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\ndescription: >-\n  Hardens Kubernetes RBAC by designing least-privilege Roles and ClusterRoles, auditing\n  RoleBindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, separating service accounts, and integrating\n  an external OIDC identity provider. Use when tightening cluster access control, removing\n  excessive ClusterRoleBindings, or hardening service-account permissions against escalation\n  and lateral movement. Keywords: RBAC, Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, least privilege,\n  service account, OIDC, cluster-admin. Do not use for discovering existing escalation paths -\n  use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: container-security\ntags:\n- kubernetes\n- rbac\n- access-control\n- least-privilege\n- security-hardening\n- iam\n- oidc\n- service-accounts\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1610\n- T1611\n- T1609\n- T1525\n---\n\n# Implementing RBAC Hardening for Kubernetes\n\n## Overview\n\nKubernetes RBAC regulates access to cluster resources based on roles assigned to users, groups, and service accounts. Default configurations often grant excessive permissions, and without active hardening, RBAC becomes a primary attack vector for privilege escalation, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. Hardening requires implementing least-privilege principles, eliminating unnecessary ClusterRole bindings, separating service accounts, integrating external identity providers, and continuous auditing.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying or configuring implementing rbac hardening for kubernetes capabilities in your environment\n- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements\n- When building or improving security architecture for this domain\n- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster v1.24+ with RBAC enabled (default since v1.6)\n- kubectl access with cluster-admin for initial audit\n- External identity provider (OIDC) for user authentication\n- Audit logging enabled on the API server\n\n## Core Hardening Principles\n\n### 1. Eliminate cluster-admin Sprawl\n\nAudit and remove unnecessary cluster-admin bindings:\n\n```bash\n# List all cluster-admin bindings\nkubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.roleRef.name == \"cluster-admin\") |\n  \"\\(.metadata.name) -> \\(.subjects[]? | \"\\(.kind)\u002F\\(.name) (\\(.namespace \u002F\u002F \"cluster\"))\")\"\n'\n```\n\n### 2. Namespace-Scoped Roles Over ClusterRoles\n\nUse Role and RoleBinding instead of ClusterRole and ClusterRoleBinding:\n\n```yaml\n# Good: Namespace-scoped role\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: Role\nmetadata:\n  namespace: application\n  name: app-developer\nrules:\n  - apiGroups: [\"apps\"]\n    resources: [\"deployments\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\", \"create\", \"update\", \"patch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n    resources: [\"pods\", \"pods\u002Flog\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n    resources: [\"configmaps\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\"]\n---\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: RoleBinding\nmetadata:\n  namespace: application\n  name: app-developer-binding\nsubjects:\n  - kind: Group\n    name: dev-team\n    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\nroleRef:\n  kind: Role\n  name: app-developer\n  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\n```\n\n### 3. Dedicated Service Accounts Per Workload\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: v1\nkind: ServiceAccount\nmetadata:\n  name: payment-processor\n  namespace: payments\nautomountServiceAccountToken: false  # Disable auto-mount\n---\napiVersion: apps\u002Fv1\nkind: Deployment\nmetadata:\n  name: payment-processor\n  namespace: payments\nspec:\n  template:\n    spec:\n      serviceAccountName: payment-processor\n      automountServiceAccountToken: true  # Only mount when explicitly needed\n      containers:\n        - name: processor\n          image: payments\u002Fprocessor:v2.1@sha256:abc...\n```\n\n### 4. Restrict Dangerous Permissions\n\nBlock permissions that enable privilege escalation:\n\n```yaml\n# Dangerous verbs\u002Fresources to restrict:\n# - secrets: get, list, watch (exposes all secrets in namespace)\n# - pods\u002Fexec: create (enables command execution in pods)\n# - pods: create with privileged securityContext\n# - serviceaccounts\u002Ftoken: create (generates new tokens)\n# - clusterroles\u002Fclusterrolebindings: create, update (self-escalation)\n# - nodes\u002Fproxy: create (bypasses API server authorization)\n\n# Safe read-only role example\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: ClusterRole\nmetadata:\n  name: security-viewer\nrules:\n  - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n    resources: [\"pods\", \"services\", \"namespaces\", \"nodes\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"apps\"]\n    resources: [\"deployments\", \"daemonsets\", \"statefulsets\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"networking.k8s.io\"]\n    resources: [\"networkpolicies\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n```\n\n### 5. OIDC Integration for User Authentication\n\n```yaml\n# API server flags for OIDC integration\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: kube-apiserver\nspec:\n  containers:\n    - name: kube-apiserver\n      command:\n        - kube-apiserver\n        - --oidc-issuer-url=https:\u002F\u002Fidp.company.com\n        - --oidc-client-id=kubernetes\n        - --oidc-username-claim=email\n        - --oidc-groups-claim=groups\n        - --oidc-ca-file=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Foidc-ca.crt\n```\n\n## RBAC Audit Process\n\n### Step 1: Enumerate All Bindings\n\n```bash\n# All ClusterRoleBindings with subjects\nkubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] | select(.subjects != null) |\n  .subjects[] as $s |\n  \"\\(.metadata.name) | \\(.roleRef.name) | \\($s.kind)\u002F\\($s.name)\"\n' | sort | column -t -s '|'\n\n# All RoleBindings across namespaces\nkubectl get rolebindings --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] | select(.subjects != null) |\n  .subjects[] as $s |\n  \"\\(.metadata.namespace) | \\(.metadata.name) | \\(.roleRef.name) | \\($s.kind)\u002F\\($s.name)\"\n' | sort | column -t -s '|'\n```\n\n### Step 2: Identify Overprivileged Service Accounts\n\n```bash\n# Find service accounts with cluster-admin or admin roles\nkubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.roleRef.name == \"cluster-admin\" or .roleRef.name == \"admin\") |\n  select(.subjects[]?.kind == \"ServiceAccount\") |\n  \"\\(.subjects[] | select(.kind == \"ServiceAccount\") | \"\\(.namespace)\u002F\\(.name)\")\"\n'\n```\n\n### Step 3: Check Default Service Account Usage\n\n```bash\n# Find pods using the default service account\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.spec.serviceAccountName == \"default\" or .spec.serviceAccountName == null) |\n  \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name)\"\n'\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Token Auto-Mount\n\n```bash\n# Find pods with auto-mounted service account tokens\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.spec.automountServiceAccountToken != false) |\n  \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name) sa=\\(.spec.serviceAccountName \u002F\u002F \"default\")\"\n'\n```\n\n## Tooling\n\n### rbac-lookup\n\n```bash\n# Install rbac-lookup\nkubectl krew install rbac-lookup\n\n# View RBAC for a specific user\nkubectl rbac-lookup developer@company.com\n\n# View all RBAC bindings wide format\nkubectl rbac-lookup --kind user -o wide\n```\n\n### rakkess (Review Access)\n\n```bash\n# Install rakkess\nkubectl krew install access-matrix\n\n# Show access matrix for current user\nkubectl access-matrix\n\n# Show access for a specific service account\nkubectl access-matrix --sa payments:payment-processor\n```\n\n## References\n\n- [Kubernetes RBAC Documentation](https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fdocs\u002Freference\u002Faccess-authn-authz\u002Frbac\u002F)\n- [CIS Kubernetes Benchmark - RBAC Controls](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisecurity.org\u002Fbenchmark\u002Fkubernetes)\n- [Kubernetes Security Hardening Guide 2025](https:\u002F\u002Fsealos.io\u002Fblog\u002Fa-practical-guide-to-kubernetes-security-hardening-your-cluster-in-2025\u002F)\n- [OWASP Kubernetes Security Cheat Sheet](https:\u002F\u002Fcheatsheetseries.owasp.org\u002Fcheatsheets\u002FKubernetes_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n","# Implementing RBAC Hardening for Kubernetes\n\n## Overview\n\nKubernetes RBAC regulates access to cluster resources based on roles assigned to users, groups, and service accounts. Default configurations often grant excessive permissions, and without active hardening, RBAC becomes a primary attack vector for privilege escalation, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. Hardening requires implementing least-privilege principles, eliminating unnecessary ClusterRole bindings, separating service accounts, integrating external identity providers, and continuous auditing.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying or configuring implementing rbac hardening for kubernetes capabilities in your environment\n- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements\n- When building or improving security architecture for this domain\n- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster v1.24+ with RBAC enabled (default since v1.6)\n- kubectl access with cluster-admin for initial audit\n- External identity provider (OIDC) for user authentication\n- Audit logging enabled on the API server\n\n## Core Hardening Principles\n\n### 1. Eliminate cluster-admin Sprawl\n\nAudit and remove unnecessary cluster-admin bindings:\n\n```bash\n# List all cluster-admin bindings\nkubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.roleRef.name == \"cluster-admin\") |\n  \"\\(.metadata.name) -> \\(.subjects[]? | \"\\(.kind)\u002F\\(.name) (\\(.namespace \u002F\u002F \"cluster\"))\")\"\n'\n```\n\n### 2. Namespace-Scoped Roles Over ClusterRoles\n\nUse Role and RoleBinding instead of ClusterRole and ClusterRoleBinding:\n\n```yaml\n# Good: Namespace-scoped role\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: Role\nmetadata:\n  namespace: application\n  name: app-developer\nrules:\n  - apiGroups: [\"apps\"]\n    resources: [\"deployments\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\", \"create\", \"update\", \"patch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n    resources: [\"pods\", \"pods\u002Flog\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n    resources: [\"configmaps\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\"]\n---\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: RoleBinding\nmetadata:\n  namespace: application\n  name: app-developer-binding\nsubjects:\n  - kind: Group\n    name: dev-team\n    apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\nroleRef:\n  kind: Role\n  name: app-developer\n  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\n```\n\n### 3. Dedicated Service Accounts Per Workload\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: v1\nkind: ServiceAccount\nmetadata:\n  name: payment-processor\n  namespace: payments\nautomountServiceAccountToken: false  # Disable auto-mount\n---\napiVersion: apps\u002Fv1\nkind: Deployment\nmetadata:\n  name: payment-processor\n  namespace: payments\nspec:\n  template:\n    spec:\n      serviceAccountName: payment-processor\n      automountServiceAccountToken: true  # Only mount when explicitly needed\n      containers:\n        - name: processor\n          image: payments\u002Fprocessor:v2.1@sha256:abc...\n```\n\n### 4. Restrict Dangerous Permissions\n\nBlock permissions that enable privilege escalation:\n\n```yaml\n# Dangerous verbs\u002Fresources to restrict:\n# - secrets: get, list, watch (exposes all secrets in namespace)\n# - pods\u002Fexec: create (enables command execution in pods)\n# - pods: create with privileged securityContext\n# - serviceaccounts\u002Ftoken: create (generates new tokens)\n# - clusterroles\u002Fclusterrolebindings: create, update (self-escalation)\n# - nodes\u002Fproxy: create (bypasses API server authorization)\n\n# Safe read-only role example\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\u002Fv1\nkind: ClusterRole\nmetadata:\n  name: security-viewer\nrules:\n  - apiGroups: [\"\"]\n    resources: [\"pods\", \"services\", \"namespaces\", \"nodes\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"apps\"]\n    resources: [\"deployments\", \"daemonsets\", \"statefulsets\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n  - apiGroups: [\"networking.k8s.io\"]\n    resources: [\"networkpolicies\"]\n    verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]\n```\n\n### 5. OIDC Integration for User Authentication\n\n```yaml\n# API server flags for OIDC integration\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n  name: kube-apiserver\nspec:\n  containers:\n    - name: kube-apiserver\n      command:\n        - kube-apiserver\n        - --oidc-issuer-url=https:\u002F\u002Fidp.company.com\n        - --oidc-client-id=kubernetes\n        - --oidc-username-claim=email\n        - --oidc-groups-claim=groups\n        - --oidc-ca-file=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Foidc-ca.crt\n```\n\n## RBAC Audit Process\n\n### Step 1: Enumerate All Bindings\n\n```bash\n# All ClusterRoleBindings with subjects\nkubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] | select(.subjects != null) |\n  .subjects[] as $s |\n  \"\\(.metadata.name) | \\(.roleRef.name) | \\($s.kind)\u002F\\($s.name)\"\n' | sort | column -t -s '|'\n\n# All RoleBindings across namespaces\nkubectl get rolebindings --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] | select(.subjects != null) |\n  .subjects[] as $s |\n  \"\\(.metadata.namespace) | \\(.metadata.name) | \\(.roleRef.name) | \\($s.kind)\u002F\\($s.name)\"\n' | sort | column -t -s '|'\n```\n\n### Step 2: Identify Overprivileged Service Accounts\n\n```bash\n# Find service accounts with cluster-admin or admin roles\nkubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.roleRef.name == \"cluster-admin\" or .roleRef.name == \"admin\") |\n  select(.subjects[]?.kind == \"ServiceAccount\") |\n  \"\\(.subjects[] | select(.kind == \"ServiceAccount\") | \"\\(.namespace)\u002F\\(.name)\")\"\n'\n```\n\n### Step 3: Check Default Service Account Usage\n\n```bash\n# Find pods using the default service account\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.spec.serviceAccountName == \"default\" or .spec.serviceAccountName == null) |\n  \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name)\"\n'\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Token Auto-Mount\n\n```bash\n# Find pods with auto-mounted service account tokens\nkubectl get pods --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '\n  .items[] |\n  select(.spec.automountServiceAccountToken != false) |\n  \"\\(.metadata.namespace)\u002F\\(.metadata.name) sa=\\(.spec.serviceAccountName \u002F\u002F \"default\")\"\n'\n```\n\n## Tooling\n\n### rbac-lookup\n\n```bash\n# Install rbac-lookup\nkubectl krew install rbac-lookup\n\n# View RBAC for a specific user\nkubectl rbac-lookup developer@company.com\n\n# View all RBAC bindings wide format\nkubectl rbac-lookup --kind user -o wide\n```\n\n### rakkess (Review Access)\n\n```bash\n# Install rakkess\nkubectl krew install access-matrix\n\n# Show access matrix for current user\nkubectl access-matrix\n\n# Show access for a specific service account\nkubectl access-matrix --sa payments:payment-processor\n```\n\n## References\n\n- [Kubernetes RBAC Documentation](https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fdocs\u002Freference\u002Faccess-authn-authz\u002Frbac\u002F)\n- [CIS Kubernetes Benchmark - RBAC Controls](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisecurity.org\u002Fbenchmark\u002Fkubernetes)\n- [Kubernetes Security Hardening Guide 2025](https:\u002F\u002Fsealos.io\u002Fblog\u002Fa-practical-guide-to-kubernetes-security-hardening-your-cluster-in-2025\u002F)\n- [OWASP Kubernetes Security Cheat Sheet](https:\u002F\u002Fcheatsheetseries.owasp.org\u002Fcheatsheets\u002FKubernetes_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":50,"domain":42,"license":15,"version":51,"nist_csf":52,"subdomain":36,"description":7,"mitre_attack":57},[27,25,28,31,35,34,29,33],"mahipal","1.0",[53,54,55,56],"PR.PS-01","PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","DE.CM-01",[58,59,60,61],"T1610","T1611","T1609","T1525","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":73,"prompt":83,"zipAvailable":84},[74,77,80],{"tool":75,"command":76},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes",{"tool":78,"command":79},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes",{"tool":81,"command":82},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002FSKILL.md",true,[86,92,97,103,107,111,117],{"path":87,"resourceType":88,"resourceTypeDesc":89,"sizeBytes":90,"sourceHtmlUrl":91},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",741,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":93,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002FLICENSE",{"path":98,"resourceType":99,"resourceTypeDesc":100,"sizeBytes":101,"sourceHtmlUrl":102},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",6262,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":104,"resourceType":99,"resourceTypeDesc":100,"sizeBytes":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106},"references\u002Fstandards.md",766,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":108,"resourceType":99,"resourceTypeDesc":100,"sizeBytes":109,"sourceHtmlUrl":110},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",708,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":112,"resourceType":113,"resourceTypeDesc":114,"sizeBytes":115,"sourceHtmlUrl":116},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",9923,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":118,"resourceType":113,"resourceTypeDesc":114,"sizeBytes":119,"sourceHtmlUrl":120},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",7020,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[122,148,172,200,226,253],{"skillNo":123,"name":124,"nameZh":6,"description":125,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":126,"categories":127,"keywords":131,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[128],{"categoryNo":129,"categoryName":130,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[132,133,134,135,43,42,136,41,40,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[154],{"categoryNo":129,"categoryName":130,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[156,144,157,158,43,159,42,40,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":173,"name":174,"nameZh":6,"description":175,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":176,"categories":177,"keywords":182,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[178,181],{"categoryNo":179,"categoryName":180,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":129,"categoryName":130,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[166,183,184,185,186,42,187,188,160,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":201,"name":202,"nameZh":6,"description":203,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":204,"categories":205,"keywords":207,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[206],{"categoryNo":129,"categoryName":130,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[208,209,210,42,211,212,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,163,223,224,225],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":227,"name":228,"nameZh":6,"description":229,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":230,"categories":231,"keywords":233,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[232],{"categoryNo":129,"categoryName":130,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[234,235,236,42,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":254,"name":255,"nameZh":6,"description":256,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":257,"categories":258,"keywords":260,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[259],{"categoryNo":129,"categoryName":130,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[43,261,42,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,269,195,270,196,271,272,273,274,275,276],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]