[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AFBF4GQ6M3KWB76CW8MDHE":3,"skill-same:01M6AFBF4GQ6M3KWB76CW8MDHE":106},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":65,"commitSha":66,"skillDirectory":67,"forksCount":68,"repositoryHtmlUrl":69,"repositoryHomepageUrl":70,"ownerHtmlUrl":71,"ownerBlogUrl":72,"ownerDescription":73,"updatedAt":74,"install":75,"resources":88},"01M6AFBF4GQ6M3KWB76CW8MDHE","implementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation",null,"Implement network segmentation based on the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) model, separating ICS networks into hierarchical security zones from Level 0 physical process through Level 5 enterprise and enforcing strict traffic control through IEC 62443-aligned DMZs between OT and IT domains. Use when designing ICS\u002FSCADA network zones or segmenting OT from IT networks.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"implementing purdue model network segmentation","segmentation","network","ics","dmz","purdue-model","networks","t1059","t1078","iec62443","scada","cybersecurity","ot-security","defense","network-segmentation","Enterprise","defense-in-depth","pr","architecture","implement","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: implementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation\ndescription: 'Implement network segmentation based on the Purdue Enterprise Reference\n  Architecture (PERA) model, separating ICS networks into hierarchical security\n  zones from Level 0 physical process through Level 5 enterprise and enforcing strict\n  traffic control through IEC 62443-aligned DMZs between OT and IT domains. Use when\n  designing ICS\u002FSCADA network zones or segmenting OT from IT networks.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: ot-ics-security\ntags:\n- ot-security\n- ics\n- purdue-model\n- network-segmentation\n- iec62443\n- defense-in-depth\n- dmz\n- scada\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- DE.CM-01\n- ID.AM-05\n- GV.OC-02\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078\n- T1190\n- T1059\n- T0816\n- T0836\n---\n\n# Implementing Purdue Model Network Segmentation\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When designing or retrofitting network architecture for an ICS\u002FSCADA environment\n- When implementing IEC 62443 zone and conduit requirements in a brownfield plant\n- When creating the IT\u002FOT DMZ (Level 3.5) to control data flow between enterprise and control networks\n- When remediating audit findings about flat OT networks or direct IT-to-OT connectivity\n- When segmenting a converged IT\u002FOT network after an acquisition or merger\n\n**Do not use** for micro-segmentation within a single Purdue level (see implementing-zone-conduit-model-for-ics), for cloud-native environments without traditional ICS networks, or for network segmentation in purely IT environments.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Complete OT asset inventory with Purdue level classification for each device\n- Network architecture diagram showing current topology, VLANs, and firewall placements\n- Industrial firewalls capable of deep packet inspection for OT protocols (Palo Alto, Fortinet, Cisco)\n- Understanding of required data flows between Purdue levels (historian replication, remote access, patch distribution)\n- Change management approval from plant operations for network modifications\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map Current Architecture to Purdue Levels\n\nClassify all network assets and data flows according to the Purdue Model hierarchy.\n\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\n\"\"\"Purdue Model Network Segmentation Planner.\n\nMaps existing OT\u002FIT network assets to Purdue Model levels and generates\nsegmentation recommendations including firewall rules and VLAN assignments.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport csv\nimport sys\nfrom collections import defaultdict\nfrom datetime import datetime\nfrom typing import Dict, List\n\n\nPURDUE_LEVELS = {\n    0: {\n        \"name\": \"Physical Process\",\n        \"description\": \"Sensors, actuators, field instruments\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Sensors\", \"Actuators\", \"Drives\", \"Motor starters\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"100-109\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HART\", \"Profibus\", \"Foundation Fieldbus\", \"IO-Link\"],\n    },\n    1: {\n        \"name\": \"Basic Control\",\n        \"description\": \"PLCs, RTUs, safety controllers\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"PLC\", \"RTU\", \"Safety Controller\", \"DCS Controller\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"110-119\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"EtherNet\u002FIP\", \"Profinet\", \"Modbus\u002FTCP\", \"S7comm\", \"OPC UA\"],\n    },\n    2: {\n        \"name\": \"Supervisory Control\",\n        \"description\": \"HMI, SCADA servers, engineering workstations\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"HMI\", \"SCADA Server\", \"Engineering Workstation\", \"Batch Server\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"120-129\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"OPC UA\", \"OPC DA\", \"Modbus\u002FTCP\", \"DNP3\", \"HTTPS\"],\n    },\n    3: {\n        \"name\": \"Site Operations\",\n        \"description\": \"Historian, MES, asset management\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Historian\", \"MES Server\", \"Asset Management\", \"Alarm Server\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"130-139\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"OPC UA\", \"SQL\", \"HTTPS\", \"MQTT\"],\n    },\n    3.5: {\n        \"name\": \"IT\u002FOT DMZ\",\n        \"description\": \"Demilitarized zone between IT and OT\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Jump Server\", \"Historian Mirror\", \"Patch Server\", \"AV Update Server\", \"Remote Access Gateway\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"150-159\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HTTPS\", \"RDP (to jump server only)\", \"SSH\", \"SQL (read replica)\"],\n    },\n    4: {\n        \"name\": \"Enterprise IT\",\n        \"description\": \"Enterprise applications, email, ERP\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"ERP Server\", \"Email Server\", \"Business Applications\", \"Active Directory\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"200-249\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HTTPS\", \"LDAPS\", \"SMTP\", \"SQL\"],\n    },\n    5: {\n        \"name\": \"Enterprise Network \u002F Internet\",\n        \"description\": \"External connections, cloud services, partner networks\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Internet Gateway\", \"VPN Concentrator\", \"Cloud Services\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"250-254\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HTTPS\", \"IPsec VPN\"],\n    },\n}\n\n\nclass PurdueSegmentationPlanner:\n    \"\"\"Plans Purdue Model network segmentation.\"\"\"\n\n    def __init__(self):\n        self.assets = []\n        self.data_flows = []\n        self.firewall_rules = []\n\n    def load_asset_inventory(self, filepath: str):\n        \"\"\"Load asset inventory from CSV.\"\"\"\n        with open(filepath, \"r\") as f:\n            self.assets = list(csv.DictReader(f))\n        print(f\"[*] Loaded {len(self.assets)} assets\")\n\n    def classify_assets(self):\n        \"\"\"Classify assets into Purdue levels based on type and function.\"\"\"\n        classification = defaultdict(list)\n        for asset in self.assets:\n            level = asset.get(\"purdue_level\", \"\")\n            try:\n                level = float(level)\n            except (ValueError, TypeError):\n                level = self._infer_purdue_level(asset)\n\n            classification[level].append(asset)\n            asset[\"assigned_level\"] = level\n\n        return classification\n\n    def _infer_purdue_level(self, asset: dict) -> float:\n        \"\"\"Infer Purdue level from device type if not explicitly assigned.\"\"\"\n        device_type = asset.get(\"type\", \"\").lower()\n        mapping = {\n            \"sensor\": 0, \"actuator\": 0, \"drive\": 0,\n            \"plc\": 1, \"rtu\": 1, \"safety\": 1, \"dcs\": 1,\n            \"hmi\": 2, \"scada\": 2, \"engineering\": 2,\n            \"historian\": 3, \"mes\": 3, \"alarm\": 3,\n            \"jump\": 3.5, \"patch\": 3.5, \"remote_access\": 3.5,\n            \"erp\": 4, \"email\": 4, \"directory\": 4,\n        }\n        for keyword, level in mapping.items():\n            if keyword in device_type:\n                return level\n        return -1\n\n    def generate_vlan_plan(self, classification: dict) -> list:\n        \"\"\"Generate VLAN assignment plan based on Purdue levels.\"\"\"\n        vlan_plan = []\n        for level, info in PURDUE_LEVELS.items():\n            assets_at_level = classification.get(level, [])\n            vlan_plan.append({\n                \"purdue_level\": level,\n                \"level_name\": info[\"name\"],\n                \"vlan_range\": info[\"vlan_range\"],\n                \"asset_count\": len(assets_at_level),\n                \"allowed_protocols\": info[\"allowed_protocols\"],\n            })\n        return vlan_plan\n\n    def generate_firewall_rules(self) -> list:\n        \"\"\"Generate inter-level firewall rules enforcing Purdue Model boundaries.\"\"\"\n        rules = [\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 1,\n                \"name\": \"Block direct IT-to-Level1\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_4_Enterprise\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_1_Control\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"No direct access from enterprise IT to basic control PLCs\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 2,\n                \"name\": \"Block direct IT-to-Level2\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_4_Enterprise\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"No direct access from enterprise IT to HMI\u002FSCADA\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 3,\n                \"name\": \"Allow DMZ-to-Historian-Replica\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_3_Operations\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"service\": \"SQL\u002F1433 (read replica push)\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Historian pushes data to DMZ replica for IT consumption\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 4,\n                \"name\": \"Allow IT-to-DMZ-JumpServer\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_4_Enterprise\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"service\": \"RDP\u002F3389, SSH\u002F22\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"IT users access OT via jump server in DMZ only\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 5,\n                \"name\": \"Allow DMZ-JumpServer-to-Level2\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"service\": \"RDP\u002F3389 (from jump server IP only)\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Jump server provides controlled access to HMI\u002FSCADA\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 6,\n                \"name\": \"Allow Level2-to-Level1\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_1_Control\",\n                \"service\": \"Modbus\u002F502, EtherNet-IP\u002F44818, S7comm\u002F102\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"HMI\u002FSCADA communicates with PLCs using industrial protocols\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 7,\n                \"name\": \"Block Level1-outbound-internet\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_1_Control\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_5_Internet\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"PLCs must never reach the internet directly\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 8,\n                \"name\": \"Allow patch distribution DMZ-to-Level2\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"service\": \"WSUS\u002F8530\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Patch server in DMZ distributes updates to supervisory systems\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 9,\n                \"name\": \"Default deny all inter-zone\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"ANY\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"ANY\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Default deny all traffic not explicitly permitted\",\n            },\n        ]\n        self.firewall_rules = rules\n        return rules\n\n    def print_segmentation_plan(self, classification: dict):\n        \"\"\"Print the complete segmentation plan.\"\"\"\n        print(f\"\\n{'='*70}\")\n        print(\"PURDUE MODEL NETWORK SEGMENTATION PLAN\")\n        print(f\"{'='*70}\")\n        print(f\"Generated: {datetime.now().isoformat()}\")\n\n        vlan_plan = self.generate_vlan_plan(classification)\n        print(f\"\\n--- VLAN ASSIGNMENT ---\")\n        for v in vlan_plan:\n            print(f\"\\n  {v['level_name']} (Purdue {v['purdue_level']})\")\n            print(f\"    VLAN Range: {v['vlan_range']}\")\n            print(f\"    Assets: {v['asset_count']}\")\n            print(f\"    Allowed Protocols: {', '.join(v['allowed_protocols'])}\")\n\n        print(f\"\\n--- INTER-ZONE FIREWALL RULES ---\")\n        rules = self.generate_firewall_rules()\n        for rule in rules:\n            action_symbol = \"+\" if rule[\"action\"] == \"ALLOW\" else \"X\"\n            print(f\"\\n  [{action_symbol}] Rule {rule['rule_id']}: {rule['name']}\")\n            print(f\"      {rule['source_zone']} -> {rule['dest_zone']}\")\n            print(f\"      Service: {rule['service']}\")\n            print(f\"      Reason: {rule['description']}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    planner = PurdueSegmentationPlanner()\n    if len(sys.argv) >= 2:\n        planner.load_asset_inventory(sys.argv[1])\n    classification = planner.classify_assets()\n    planner.print_segmentation_plan(classification)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Configure Industrial DMZ (Level 3.5)\n\nThe DMZ is the critical boundary between IT and OT. All data exchange must traverse it -- no direct connections are permitted.\n\n```yaml\n# Level 3.5 DMZ Architecture Configuration\n# All IT-OT data exchange flows through the DMZ\n\ndmz_architecture:\n  zone_name: \"IT_OT_DMZ\"\n  purdue_level: 3.5\n  vlan: 150\n\n  components:\n    historian_replica:\n      purpose: \"Read-only copy of OT historian data for IT\u002Fbusiness access\"\n      direction: \"OT pushes data TO DMZ (unidirectional)\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.10\"\n      services:\n        - port: 1433\n          protocol: \"SQL\"\n          direction: \"inbound from Level 3 historian only\"\n        - port: 443\n          protocol: \"HTTPS\"\n          direction: \"outbound to Level 4 for IT consumers\"\n\n    jump_server:\n      purpose: \"Controlled remote access point for OT maintenance\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.20\"\n      services:\n        - port: 3389\n          protocol: \"RDP\"\n          direction: \"inbound from Level 4 with MFA\"\n        - port: 3389\n          protocol: \"RDP\"\n          direction: \"outbound to Level 2 HMIs only\"\n      security_controls:\n        - \"Multi-factor authentication required\"\n        - \"Session recording enabled\"\n        - \"Maximum session duration: 4 hours\"\n        - \"Approval-based access workflow\"\n\n    patch_server:\n      purpose: \"Staging area for tested patches before OT deployment\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.30\"\n      services:\n        - port: 8530\n          protocol: \"WSUS\"\n          direction: \"pulls from Level 4 WSUS, pushes to Level 2-3\"\n\n    antivirus_relay:\n      purpose: \"AV signature distribution to OT endpoints\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.40\"\n      services:\n        - port: 443\n          protocol: \"HTTPS\"\n          direction: \"pulls definitions from Level 4, distributes to Level 2-3\"\n\n  firewall_rules:\n    north_firewall:  # Between DMZ and Level 4 Enterprise\n      - allow: \"Level 4 -> DMZ jump server:3389 (with MFA)\"\n      - allow: \"Level 4 -> DMZ historian replica:443 (read-only)\"\n      - allow: \"DMZ patch server -> Level 4 WSUS:8530 (pull only)\"\n      - deny: \"ALL other traffic\"\n\n    south_firewall:  # Between DMZ and Level 3 Operations\n      - allow: \"Level 3 historian -> DMZ replica:1433 (push direction)\"\n      - allow: \"DMZ jump server -> Level 2 HMI:3389 (session-limited)\"\n      - allow: \"DMZ patch server -> Level 2\u002F3:8530 (scheduled)\"\n      - deny: \"ALL other traffic\"\n\n    critical_rule: \"NO traffic passes through DMZ end-to-end. DMZ breaks all connections.\"\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Purdue Model (PERA) | Hierarchical reference architecture organizing industrial networks into levels 0-5 based on function and trust |\n| Level 3.5 DMZ | Demilitarized zone between IT (Level 4) and OT (Level 3), where all cross-boundary data exchange occurs |\n| Defense in Depth | Layered security approach requiring attackers to breach multiple boundaries to reach critical control systems |\n| Data Diode | Hardware-enforced unidirectional communication device ensuring data flows only from OT to IT, never reverse |\n| Zone | Logical grouping of assets sharing common security requirements as defined by IEC 62443 |\n| Conduit | Controlled communication path between zones with defined security policies |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Flat OT Network Remediation\n\n**Context**: An audit reveals that enterprise IT systems can directly communicate with PLCs on the control network. There is no DMZ and no firewall between IT and OT.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Perform full traffic analysis to identify all legitimate data flows crossing IT\u002FOT boundary\n2. Design DMZ architecture with historian replica, jump server, and patch staging\n3. Deploy industrial firewall between IT and DMZ (north firewall) and between DMZ and OT (south firewall)\n4. Migrate data flows one at a time: start with historian replication through DMZ\n5. Implement jump server for remote access, deprecating direct RDP to OT systems\n6. Block direct IT-to-OT traffic on the north firewall after all flows migrate through DMZ\n7. Validate with penetration test from IT network confirming no direct path to Level 1 controllers\n\n**Pitfalls**: Do not cut over all traffic simultaneously -- migrate flow by flow with rollback plans. Legacy OT systems may use protocols that cannot traverse firewalls doing DPI; test thoroughly in a lab first. Never deploy the DMZ during active production without an agreed maintenance window.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nPURDUE MODEL SEGMENTATION REPORT\n====================================\nAssessment Date: YYYY-MM-DD\nFacility: [Plant Name]\n\nCURRENT STATE:\n  Network Type: [Flat\u002FPartially segmented\u002FFully segmented]\n  IT-OT Boundary: [None\u002FFirewall\u002FDMZ with dual firewall]\n  Direct IT-to-PLC paths: [count]\n\nRECOMMENDED ARCHITECTURE:\n  Level 0-1: VLAN 110 (Control Network)\n  Level 2:   VLAN 120 (Supervisory Network)\n  Level 3:   VLAN 130 (Operations Network)\n  Level 3.5: VLAN 150 (IT\u002FOT DMZ)\n  Level 4-5: VLAN 200+ (Enterprise)\n\nDMZ COMPONENTS:\n  - Historian Replica Server\n  - Jump Server (MFA-enabled)\n  - Patch Staging Server\n  - AV Relay Server\n\nFIREWALL RULES: [count] rules generated\nMIGRATION STEPS: [count] phases planned\n```\n","# Implementing Purdue Model Network Segmentation\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When designing or retrofitting network architecture for an ICS\u002FSCADA environment\n- When implementing IEC 62443 zone and conduit requirements in a brownfield plant\n- When creating the IT\u002FOT DMZ (Level 3.5) to control data flow between enterprise and control networks\n- When remediating audit findings about flat OT networks or direct IT-to-OT connectivity\n- When segmenting a converged IT\u002FOT network after an acquisition or merger\n\n**Do not use** for micro-segmentation within a single Purdue level (see implementing-zone-conduit-model-for-ics), for cloud-native environments without traditional ICS networks, or for network segmentation in purely IT environments.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Complete OT asset inventory with Purdue level classification for each device\n- Network architecture diagram showing current topology, VLANs, and firewall placements\n- Industrial firewalls capable of deep packet inspection for OT protocols (Palo Alto, Fortinet, Cisco)\n- Understanding of required data flows between Purdue levels (historian replication, remote access, patch distribution)\n- Change management approval from plant operations for network modifications\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map Current Architecture to Purdue Levels\n\nClassify all network assets and data flows according to the Purdue Model hierarchy.\n\n```python\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv python3\n\"\"\"Purdue Model Network Segmentation Planner.\n\nMaps existing OT\u002FIT network assets to Purdue Model levels and generates\nsegmentation recommendations including firewall rules and VLAN assignments.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport csv\nimport sys\nfrom collections import defaultdict\nfrom datetime import datetime\nfrom typing import Dict, List\n\n\nPURDUE_LEVELS = {\n    0: {\n        \"name\": \"Physical Process\",\n        \"description\": \"Sensors, actuators, field instruments\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Sensors\", \"Actuators\", \"Drives\", \"Motor starters\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"100-109\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HART\", \"Profibus\", \"Foundation Fieldbus\", \"IO-Link\"],\n    },\n    1: {\n        \"name\": \"Basic Control\",\n        \"description\": \"PLCs, RTUs, safety controllers\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"PLC\", \"RTU\", \"Safety Controller\", \"DCS Controller\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"110-119\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"EtherNet\u002FIP\", \"Profinet\", \"Modbus\u002FTCP\", \"S7comm\", \"OPC UA\"],\n    },\n    2: {\n        \"name\": \"Supervisory Control\",\n        \"description\": \"HMI, SCADA servers, engineering workstations\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"HMI\", \"SCADA Server\", \"Engineering Workstation\", \"Batch Server\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"120-129\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"OPC UA\", \"OPC DA\", \"Modbus\u002FTCP\", \"DNP3\", \"HTTPS\"],\n    },\n    3: {\n        \"name\": \"Site Operations\",\n        \"description\": \"Historian, MES, asset management\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Historian\", \"MES Server\", \"Asset Management\", \"Alarm Server\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"130-139\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"OPC UA\", \"SQL\", \"HTTPS\", \"MQTT\"],\n    },\n    3.5: {\n        \"name\": \"IT\u002FOT DMZ\",\n        \"description\": \"Demilitarized zone between IT and OT\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Jump Server\", \"Historian Mirror\", \"Patch Server\", \"AV Update Server\", \"Remote Access Gateway\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"150-159\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HTTPS\", \"RDP (to jump server only)\", \"SSH\", \"SQL (read replica)\"],\n    },\n    4: {\n        \"name\": \"Enterprise IT\",\n        \"description\": \"Enterprise applications, email, ERP\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"ERP Server\", \"Email Server\", \"Business Applications\", \"Active Directory\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"200-249\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HTTPS\", \"LDAPS\", \"SMTP\", \"SQL\"],\n    },\n    5: {\n        \"name\": \"Enterprise Network \u002F Internet\",\n        \"description\": \"External connections, cloud services, partner networks\",\n        \"typical_devices\": [\"Internet Gateway\", \"VPN Concentrator\", \"Cloud Services\"],\n        \"vlan_range\": \"250-254\",\n        \"allowed_protocols\": [\"HTTPS\", \"IPsec VPN\"],\n    },\n}\n\n\nclass PurdueSegmentationPlanner:\n    \"\"\"Plans Purdue Model network segmentation.\"\"\"\n\n    def __init__(self):\n        self.assets = []\n        self.data_flows = []\n        self.firewall_rules = []\n\n    def load_asset_inventory(self, filepath: str):\n        \"\"\"Load asset inventory from CSV.\"\"\"\n        with open(filepath, \"r\") as f:\n            self.assets = list(csv.DictReader(f))\n        print(f\"[*] Loaded {len(self.assets)} assets\")\n\n    def classify_assets(self):\n        \"\"\"Classify assets into Purdue levels based on type and function.\"\"\"\n        classification = defaultdict(list)\n        for asset in self.assets:\n            level = asset.get(\"purdue_level\", \"\")\n            try:\n                level = float(level)\n            except (ValueError, TypeError):\n                level = self._infer_purdue_level(asset)\n\n            classification[level].append(asset)\n            asset[\"assigned_level\"] = level\n\n        return classification\n\n    def _infer_purdue_level(self, asset: dict) -> float:\n        \"\"\"Infer Purdue level from device type if not explicitly assigned.\"\"\"\n        device_type = asset.get(\"type\", \"\").lower()\n        mapping = {\n            \"sensor\": 0, \"actuator\": 0, \"drive\": 0,\n            \"plc\": 1, \"rtu\": 1, \"safety\": 1, \"dcs\": 1,\n            \"hmi\": 2, \"scada\": 2, \"engineering\": 2,\n            \"historian\": 3, \"mes\": 3, \"alarm\": 3,\n            \"jump\": 3.5, \"patch\": 3.5, \"remote_access\": 3.5,\n            \"erp\": 4, \"email\": 4, \"directory\": 4,\n        }\n        for keyword, level in mapping.items():\n            if keyword in device_type:\n                return level\n        return -1\n\n    def generate_vlan_plan(self, classification: dict) -> list:\n        \"\"\"Generate VLAN assignment plan based on Purdue levels.\"\"\"\n        vlan_plan = []\n        for level, info in PURDUE_LEVELS.items():\n            assets_at_level = classification.get(level, [])\n            vlan_plan.append({\n                \"purdue_level\": level,\n                \"level_name\": info[\"name\"],\n                \"vlan_range\": info[\"vlan_range\"],\n                \"asset_count\": len(assets_at_level),\n                \"allowed_protocols\": info[\"allowed_protocols\"],\n            })\n        return vlan_plan\n\n    def generate_firewall_rules(self) -> list:\n        \"\"\"Generate inter-level firewall rules enforcing Purdue Model boundaries.\"\"\"\n        rules = [\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 1,\n                \"name\": \"Block direct IT-to-Level1\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_4_Enterprise\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_1_Control\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"No direct access from enterprise IT to basic control PLCs\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 2,\n                \"name\": \"Block direct IT-to-Level2\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_4_Enterprise\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"No direct access from enterprise IT to HMI\u002FSCADA\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 3,\n                \"name\": \"Allow DMZ-to-Historian-Replica\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_3_Operations\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"service\": \"SQL\u002F1433 (read replica push)\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Historian pushes data to DMZ replica for IT consumption\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 4,\n                \"name\": \"Allow IT-to-DMZ-JumpServer\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_4_Enterprise\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"service\": \"RDP\u002F3389, SSH\u002F22\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"IT users access OT via jump server in DMZ only\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 5,\n                \"name\": \"Allow DMZ-JumpServer-to-Level2\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"service\": \"RDP\u002F3389 (from jump server IP only)\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Jump server provides controlled access to HMI\u002FSCADA\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 6,\n                \"name\": \"Allow Level2-to-Level1\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_1_Control\",\n                \"service\": \"Modbus\u002F502, EtherNet-IP\u002F44818, S7comm\u002F102\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"HMI\u002FSCADA communicates with PLCs using industrial protocols\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 7,\n                \"name\": \"Block Level1-outbound-internet\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_1_Control\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_5_Internet\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"PLCs must never reach the internet directly\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 8,\n                \"name\": \"Allow patch distribution DMZ-to-Level2\",\n                \"action\": \"ALLOW\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"Level_35_DMZ\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"Level_2_Supervisory\",\n                \"service\": \"WSUS\u002F8530\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Patch server in DMZ distributes updates to supervisory systems\",\n            },\n            {\n                \"rule_id\": 9,\n                \"name\": \"Default deny all inter-zone\",\n                \"action\": \"DENY\",\n                \"source_zone\": \"ANY\",\n                \"dest_zone\": \"ANY\",\n                \"service\": \"ANY\",\n                \"log\": True,\n                \"description\": \"Default deny all traffic not explicitly permitted\",\n            },\n        ]\n        self.firewall_rules = rules\n        return rules\n\n    def print_segmentation_plan(self, classification: dict):\n        \"\"\"Print the complete segmentation plan.\"\"\"\n        print(f\"\\n{'='*70}\")\n        print(\"PURDUE MODEL NETWORK SEGMENTATION PLAN\")\n        print(f\"{'='*70}\")\n        print(f\"Generated: {datetime.now().isoformat()}\")\n\n        vlan_plan = self.generate_vlan_plan(classification)\n        print(f\"\\n--- VLAN ASSIGNMENT ---\")\n        for v in vlan_plan:\n            print(f\"\\n  {v['level_name']} (Purdue {v['purdue_level']})\")\n            print(f\"    VLAN Range: {v['vlan_range']}\")\n            print(f\"    Assets: {v['asset_count']}\")\n            print(f\"    Allowed Protocols: {', '.join(v['allowed_protocols'])}\")\n\n        print(f\"\\n--- INTER-ZONE FIREWALL RULES ---\")\n        rules = self.generate_firewall_rules()\n        for rule in rules:\n            action_symbol = \"+\" if rule[\"action\"] == \"ALLOW\" else \"X\"\n            print(f\"\\n  [{action_symbol}] Rule {rule['rule_id']}: {rule['name']}\")\n            print(f\"      {rule['source_zone']} -> {rule['dest_zone']}\")\n            print(f\"      Service: {rule['service']}\")\n            print(f\"      Reason: {rule['description']}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    planner = PurdueSegmentationPlanner()\n    if len(sys.argv) >= 2:\n        planner.load_asset_inventory(sys.argv[1])\n    classification = planner.classify_assets()\n    planner.print_segmentation_plan(classification)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Configure Industrial DMZ (Level 3.5)\n\nThe DMZ is the critical boundary between IT and OT. All data exchange must traverse it -- no direct connections are permitted.\n\n```yaml\n# Level 3.5 DMZ Architecture Configuration\n# All IT-OT data exchange flows through the DMZ\n\ndmz_architecture:\n  zone_name: \"IT_OT_DMZ\"\n  purdue_level: 3.5\n  vlan: 150\n\n  components:\n    historian_replica:\n      purpose: \"Read-only copy of OT historian data for IT\u002Fbusiness access\"\n      direction: \"OT pushes data TO DMZ (unidirectional)\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.10\"\n      services:\n        - port: 1433\n          protocol: \"SQL\"\n          direction: \"inbound from Level 3 historian only\"\n        - port: 443\n          protocol: \"HTTPS\"\n          direction: \"outbound to Level 4 for IT consumers\"\n\n    jump_server:\n      purpose: \"Controlled remote access point for OT maintenance\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.20\"\n      services:\n        - port: 3389\n          protocol: \"RDP\"\n          direction: \"inbound from Level 4 with MFA\"\n        - port: 3389\n          protocol: \"RDP\"\n          direction: \"outbound to Level 2 HMIs only\"\n      security_controls:\n        - \"Multi-factor authentication required\"\n        - \"Session recording enabled\"\n        - \"Maximum session duration: 4 hours\"\n        - \"Approval-based access workflow\"\n\n    patch_server:\n      purpose: \"Staging area for tested patches before OT deployment\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.30\"\n      services:\n        - port: 8530\n          protocol: \"WSUS\"\n          direction: \"pulls from Level 4 WSUS, pushes to Level 2-3\"\n\n    antivirus_relay:\n      purpose: \"AV signature distribution to OT endpoints\"\n      ip: \"10.10.150.40\"\n      services:\n        - port: 443\n          protocol: \"HTTPS\"\n          direction: \"pulls definitions from Level 4, distributes to Level 2-3\"\n\n  firewall_rules:\n    north_firewall:  # Between DMZ and Level 4 Enterprise\n      - allow: \"Level 4 -> DMZ jump server:3389 (with MFA)\"\n      - allow: \"Level 4 -> DMZ historian replica:443 (read-only)\"\n      - allow: \"DMZ patch server -> Level 4 WSUS:8530 (pull only)\"\n      - deny: \"ALL other traffic\"\n\n    south_firewall:  # Between DMZ and Level 3 Operations\n      - allow: \"Level 3 historian -> DMZ replica:1433 (push direction)\"\n      - allow: \"DMZ jump server -> Level 2 HMI:3389 (session-limited)\"\n      - allow: \"DMZ patch server -> Level 2\u002F3:8530 (scheduled)\"\n      - deny: \"ALL other traffic\"\n\n    critical_rule: \"NO traffic passes through DMZ end-to-end. DMZ breaks all connections.\"\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Purdue Model (PERA) | Hierarchical reference architecture organizing industrial networks into levels 0-5 based on function and trust |\n| Level 3.5 DMZ | Demilitarized zone between IT (Level 4) and OT (Level 3), where all cross-boundary data exchange occurs |\n| Defense in Depth | Layered security approach requiring attackers to breach multiple boundaries to reach critical control systems |\n| Data Diode | Hardware-enforced unidirectional communication device ensuring data flows only from OT to IT, never reverse |\n| Zone | Logical grouping of assets sharing common security requirements as defined by IEC 62443 |\n| Conduit | Controlled communication path between zones with defined security policies |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Flat OT Network Remediation\n\n**Context**: An audit reveals that enterprise IT systems can directly communicate with PLCs on the control network. There is no DMZ and no firewall between IT and OT.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Perform full traffic analysis to identify all legitimate data flows crossing IT\u002FOT boundary\n2. Design DMZ architecture with historian replica, jump server, and patch staging\n3. Deploy industrial firewall between IT and DMZ (north firewall) and between DMZ and OT (south firewall)\n4. Migrate data flows one at a time: start with historian replication through DMZ\n5. Implement jump server for remote access, deprecating direct RDP to OT systems\n6. Block direct IT-to-OT traffic on the north firewall after all flows migrate through DMZ\n7. Validate with penetration test from IT network confirming no direct path to Level 1 controllers\n\n**Pitfalls**: Do not cut over all traffic simultaneously -- migrate flow by flow with rollback plans. Legacy OT systems may use protocols that cannot traverse firewalls doing DPI; test thoroughly in a lab first. Never deploy the DMZ during active production without an agreed maintenance window.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nPURDUE MODEL SEGMENTATION REPORT\n====================================\nAssessment Date: YYYY-MM-DD\nFacility: [Plant Name]\n\nCURRENT STATE:\n  Network Type: [Flat\u002FPartially segmented\u002FFully segmented]\n  IT-OT Boundary: [None\u002FFirewall\u002FDMZ with dual firewall]\n  Direct IT-to-PLC paths: [count]\n\nRECOMMENDED ARCHITECTURE:\n  Level 0-1: VLAN 110 (Control Network)\n  Level 2:   VLAN 120 (Supervisory Network)\n  Level 3:   VLAN 130 (Operations Network)\n  Level 3.5: VLAN 150 (IT\u002FOT DMZ)\n  Level 4-5: VLAN 200+ (Enterprise)\n\nDMZ COMPONENTS:\n  - Historian Replica Server\n  - Jump Server (MFA-enabled)\n  - Patch Staging Server\n  - AV Relay Server\n\nFIREWALL RULES: [count] rules generated\nMIGRATION STEPS: [count] phases planned\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":50,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":51,"nist_csf":52,"subdomain":57,"description":58,"mitre_attack":59},[36,27,29,38,33,40,28,34],"mahipal","1.0",[53,54,55,56],"PR.IR-01","DE.CM-01","ID.AM-05","GV.OC-02","ot-ics-security","Implement network segmentation based on the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) model, separating ICS networks into hierarchical security zones from Level 0 physical process through Level 5 enterprise and enforcing strict traffic control through IEC 62443-aligned DMZs between OT and IT domains. Use when designing ICS\u002FSCADA network zones or segmenting OT from IT networks.\n",[60,61,62,63,64],"T1078","T1190","T1059","T0816","T0836","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fimplementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":76,"prompt":86,"zipAvailable":87},[77,80,83],{"tool":78,"command":79},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation",{"tool":81,"command":82},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation",{"tool":84,"command":85},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill implementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation\u002FSKILL.md",true,[89,94,100],{"path":90,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":92,"sourceHtmlUrl":93},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation\u002FLICENSE",{"path":95,"resourceType":96,"resourceTypeDesc":97,"sizeBytes":98,"sourceHtmlUrl":99},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",5646,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":101,"resourceType":102,"resourceTypeDesc":103,"sizeBytes":104,"sourceHtmlUrl":105},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7709,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-purdue-model-network-segmentation\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[107,133,157,184,210,237],{"skillNo":108,"name":109,"nameZh":6,"description":110,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":111,"categories":112,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[113],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[115,116,117,118,119,35,120,121,41,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":134,"name":135,"nameZh":6,"description":136,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":137,"categories":138,"keywords":140,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[139],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[141,129,142,143,119,144,35,41,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":158,"name":159,"nameZh":6,"description":160,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":161,"categories":162,"keywords":167,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[163,166],{"categoryNo":164,"categoryName":165,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[151,168,169,170,171,35,172,173,145,174,175,176,177,178,179,32,180,181,182,183],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":185,"name":186,"nameZh":6,"description":187,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":188,"categories":189,"keywords":191,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[190],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[192,193,194,35,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,148,207,208,209],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":211,"name":212,"nameZh":6,"description":213,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":214,"categories":215,"keywords":217,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[216],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[218,219,220,35,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":238,"name":239,"nameZh":6,"description":240,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":241,"categories":242,"keywords":244,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[243],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[119,245,35,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,32,254,180,255,256,257,258,259,260],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]