implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico
Installs Calico as the cluster CNI and writes standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy under it, covering default-deny baselines, policy ordering and precedence, service-account-based selectors, and verifying that policy is genuinely being enforced. Use when adopting Calico as the enforcement CNI, establishing a default-deny baseline, or debugging why a NetworkPolicy is not taking effect under Calico. Keywords: Calico CNI, NetworkPolicy, default deny, policy order, Felix, service account selector. Do not use for Calico-only CRDs such as GlobalNetworkPolicy or DNS egress - use implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico; for CNI-agnostic policy use implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico
- tags
- [ "calico", "kubernetes", "network-policy", "network-segmentation", "zero-trust", "cni" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "PR.PS-01", "PR.IR-01", "ID.AM-08", "DE.CM-01" ]
- subdomain
- container-security
- description
- Installs Calico as the cluster CNI and writes standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy under it, covering default-deny baselines, policy ordering and precedence, service-account-based selectors, and verifying that policy is genuinely being enforced. Use when adopting Calico as the enforcement CNI, establishing a default-deny baseline, or debugging why a NetworkPolicy is not taking effect under Calico. Keywords: Calico CNI, NetworkPolicy, default deny, policy order, Felix, service account selector. Do not use for Calico-only CRDs such as GlobalNetworkPolicy or DNS egress - use implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico; for CNI-agnostic policy use implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1610", "T1611", "T1609", "T1525" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 资产文件assets/template.md1.9 KB
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md1.4 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md2.6 KB
- 参考文档references/workflows.md4.5 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py7.7 KB
- 脚本scripts/process.py7.7 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Implementing Kubernetes Network Policy with Calico
Overview
Calico is an open-source CNI plugin that provides fine-grained network policy enforcement for Kubernetes clusters. It implements the full Kubernetes NetworkPolicy API and extends it with Calico-specific GlobalNetworkPolicy, supporting policy ordering, deny rules, and service-account-based selectors.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing kubernetes network policy with calico capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Kubernetes cluster (v1.24+)
- Calico CNI installed (v3.26+)
kubectlandcalicoctlCLI tools- Cluster admin RBAC permissions
Installing Calico
Operator-based Installation (Recommended)
# Install the Tigera operator
kubectl create -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectcalico/calico/v3.27.0/manifests/tigera-operator.yaml
# Install Calico custom resources
kubectl create -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectcalico/calico/v3.27.0/manifests/custom-resources.yaml
# Verify installation
kubectl get pods -n calico-system
watch kubectl get pods -n calico-system
# Install calicoctl
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectcalico/calico/v3.27.0/manifests/calicoctl.yaml
Verify Calico is Running
# Check Calico pods
kubectl get pods -n calico-system
# Check Calico node status
kubectl exec -n calico-system calicoctl -- calicoctl node status
# Check IP pools
kubectl exec -n calico-system calicoctl -- calicoctl get ippool -o wide
Kubernetes NetworkPolicy
Default Deny All Traffic
# deny-all-ingress.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-ingress
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
---
# deny-all-egress.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-egress
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
Allow Specific Pod-to-Pod Communication
# allow-frontend-to-backend.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-frontend-to-backend
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: backend
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: frontend
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
Allow DNS Egress
# allow-dns-egress.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-dns-egress
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector: {}
ports:
- protocol: UDP
port: 53
- protocol: TCP
port: 53
Namespace Isolation
# allow-same-namespace.yaml
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-same-namespace
namespace: production
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector: {}
Calico-Specific Policies
GlobalNetworkPolicy (Cluster-Wide)
# global-deny-external.yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: GlobalNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-external-ingress
spec:
order: 100
selector: "projectcalico.org/namespace != 'ingress-nginx'"
types:
- Ingress
ingress:
- action: Deny
source:
nets:
- 0.0.0.0/0
destination: {}
Calico NetworkPolicy with Deny Rules
# calico-deny-policy.yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-database-from-frontend
namespace: production
spec:
order: 10
selector: app == 'database'
types:
- Ingress
ingress:
- action: Deny
source:
selector: app == 'frontend'
- action: Allow
source:
selector: app == 'backend'
destination:
ports:
- 5432
Service Account Based Policy
# sa-based-policy.yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: allow-by-service-account
namespace: production
spec:
selector: app == 'api'
ingress:
- action: Allow
source:
serviceAccounts:
names:
- frontend-sa
- monitoring-sa
egress:
- action: Allow
destination:
serviceAccounts:
names:
- database-sa
Host Endpoint Protection
# host-endpoint-policy.yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: GlobalNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: restrict-host-ssh
spec:
order: 10
selector: "has(kubernetes.io/hostname)"
applyOnForward: false
types:
- Ingress
ingress:
- action: Allow
protocol: TCP
source:
nets:
- 10.0.0.0/8
destination:
ports:
- 22
- action: Deny
protocol: TCP
destination:
ports:
- 22
Calico Policy Tiers
# security-tier.yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: Tier
metadata:
name: security
spec:
order: 100
---
# platform-tier.yaml
apiVersion: projectcalico.org/v3
kind: Tier
metadata:
name: platform
spec:
order: 200
Monitoring and Troubleshooting
# List all network policies
kubectl get networkpolicy --all-namespaces
# List Calico-specific policies
kubectl exec -n calico-system calicoctl -- calicoctl get networkpolicy --all-namespaces -o wide
kubectl exec -n calico-system calicoctl -- calicoctl get globalnetworkpolicy -o wide
# Check policy evaluation for a specific endpoint
kubectl exec -n calico-system calicoctl -- calicoctl get workloadendpoint -n production -o yaml
# View Calico logs
kubectl logs -n calico-system -l k8s-app=calico-node --tail=100
# Test connectivity
kubectl exec -n production frontend-pod -- wget -qO- --timeout=2 http://backend-svc:8080/health
Best Practices
- Start with default deny - Apply deny-all policies to every namespace, then allow specific traffic
- Use labels consistently - Define a labeling standard for app, tier, environment
- Order policies - Use Calico policy ordering (
orderfield) to control evaluation precedence - Allow DNS first - Always create DNS egress rules before applying egress deny policies
- Use GlobalNetworkPolicy for cluster-wide security baselines
- Test policies in staging - Validate network connectivity after applying policies
- Monitor denied traffic - Enable Calico flow logs for visibility into blocked connections
- Use tiers - Organize policies into security, platform, and application tiers
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