implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign
Signs and verifies container image provenance with Sigstore Cosign, covering key-based and keyless OIDC signing (Fulcio, Rekor transparency log), SLSA attestations, and enforcing signature verification through Kubernetes admission control. Use when signing images for supply chain security, setting up keyless OIDC signing, attaching attestations, or enforcing a verified-images-only policy at admission. Keywords: Cosign, Sigstore, Fulcio, Rekor, keyless, attestation, cosign verify, admission policy. Do not use for in-toto layout-based pipeline attestation - use implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign
- tags
- [ "cosign", "sigstore", "image-signing", "supply-chain", "provenance", "keyless", "slsa" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "PR.PS-01", "PR.IR-01", "ID.AM-08", "DE.CM-01" ]
- subdomain
- container-security
- description
- Signs and verifies container image provenance with Sigstore Cosign, covering key-based and keyless OIDC signing (Fulcio, Rekor transparency log), SLSA attestations, and enforcing signature verification through Kubernetes admission control. Use when signing images for supply chain security, setting up keyless OIDC signing, attaching attestations, or enforcing a verified-images-only policy at admission. Keywords: Cosign, Sigstore, Fulcio, Rekor, keyless, attestation, cosign verify, admission policy. Do not use for in-toto layout-based pipeline attestation - use implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1610", "T1611", "T1609", "T1525", "T1195" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 资产文件assets/template.md1.3 KB
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md1.9 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md1.3 KB
- 参考文档references/workflows.md1.2 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py7.5 KB
- 脚本scripts/process.py6.0 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Implementing Image Provenance Verification with Cosign
Overview
Cosign is a Sigstore tool for signing, verifying, and attaching metadata to container images and OCI artifacts. It supports both key-based and keyless (OIDC) signing, integrates with Fulcio (certificate authority) and Rekor (transparency log), and enables supply chain security for container images.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing image provenance verification with cosign capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Cosign CLI installed
- Docker or Podman for building images
- OCI-compliant container registry (Docker Hub, GHCR, GCR, ECR)
- OIDC provider account (GitHub, Google, Microsoft) for keyless signing
Installing Cosign
# Install via Go
go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest
# Install via Homebrew
brew install cosign
# Install via script
curl -O -L "https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/latest/download/cosign-linux-amd64"
sudo mv cosign-linux-amd64 /usr/local/bin/cosign
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/cosign
# Verify installation
cosign version
Key-Based Signing
Generate Key Pair
# Generate cosign key pair (creates cosign.key and cosign.pub)
cosign generate-key-pair
# Generate key pair stored in KMS
cosign generate-key-pair --kms awskms:///alias/cosign-key
cosign generate-key-pair --kms gcpkms://projects/PROJECT/locations/LOCATION/keyRings/KEYRING/cryptoKeys/KEY
cosign generate-key-pair --kms hashivault://transit/keys/cosign
Sign Image with Key
# Sign an image
cosign sign --key cosign.key ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Sign with annotations
cosign sign --key cosign.key \
-a "build-id=12345" \
-a "git-sha=$(git rev-parse HEAD)" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
Verify Image with Key
# Verify signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify with annotation check
cosign verify --key cosign.pub \
-a "build-id=12345" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
Keyless Signing (OIDC)
Sign with Keyless (Interactive)
# Keyless sign - opens browser for OIDC auth
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# The signature, certificate, and Rekor entry are created automatically
Sign with Keyless (CI/CD - Non-Interactive)
# GitHub Actions (uses OIDC token automatically)
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--yes
# With explicit identity token
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--identity-token=$(cat /var/run/sigstore/cosign/oidc-token) \
--yes
Verify Keyless Signature
# Verify by email identity
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity=builder@example.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com
# Verify by GitHub Actions workflow
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity=https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/heads/main \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
# Verify with regex matching
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity-regexp=".*@example.com" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com
Attestations (SLSA Provenance)
Attach SBOM Attestation
# Generate SBOM
syft ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.cdx.json
# Attach SBOM as attestation
cosign attest --key cosign.key \
--type cyclonedx \
--predicate sbom.cdx.json \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify attestation
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub \
--type cyclonedx \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
Attach Vulnerability Scan Attestation
# Run scan and save results
grype ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 -o json > vuln-scan.json
# Attach scan results as attestation
cosign attest --key cosign.key \
--type vuln \
--predicate vuln-scan.json \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
SLSA Provenance Attestation
# Attach SLSA provenance
cosign attest --key cosign.key \
--type slsaprovenance \
--predicate provenance.json \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify SLSA provenance
cosign verify-attestation --key cosign.pub \
--type slsaprovenance \
ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0
CI/CD Integration
GitHub Actions
name: Sign and Publish
on:
push:
tags: ['v*']
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write # Required for keyless signing
jobs:
build-sign:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
- name: Login to GHCR
uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push
id: build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
with:
push: true
tags: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }}
- name: Sign image (keyless)
run: |
cosign sign --yes \
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
- name: Generate and attach SBOM
run: |
syft ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }} -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json
cosign attest --yes \
--type cyclonedx \
--predicate sbom.json \
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
Kubernetes Admission Enforcement
Policy Controller (Sigstore)
# Install policy-controller
helm repo add sigstore https://sigstore.github.io/helm-charts
helm install policy-controller sigstore/policy-controller \
--namespace cosign-system --create-namespace
# Enforce signed images in namespace
apiVersion: policy.sigstore.dev/v1beta1
kind: ClusterImagePolicy
metadata:
name: require-signed-images
spec:
images:
- glob: "ghcr.io/myorg/**"
authorities:
- keyless:
url: https://fulcio.sigstore.dev
identities:
- issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
subjectRegExp: "https://github.com/myorg/.*"
ctlog:
url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
Kyverno Integration
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: verify-image-signature
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
rules:
- name: verify-cosign-signature
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: ["Pod"]
verifyImages:
- imageReferences:
- "ghcr.io/myorg/*"
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "https://github.com/myorg/*"
issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
rekor:
url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
Transparency Log (Rekor)
# Search Rekor for image signatures
rekor-cli search --email builder@example.com
# Get specific entry
rekor-cli get --uuid <entry-uuid>
# Verify entry inclusion
cosign verify ghcr.io/myorg/myapp:v1.0.0 \
--certificate-identity=builder@example.com \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com
Best Practices
- Use keyless signing in CI/CD for automated pipelines
- Sign by digest not by tag for immutable references
- Attach SBOM attestations alongside signatures
- Enforce signatures at admission with policy-controller or Kyverno
- Use OIDC identity verification instead of just key verification
- Store keys in KMS (AWS KMS, GCP KMS, HashiCorp Vault) for key-based signing
- Verify the full chain: signature + certificate + Rekor inclusion
- Include build metadata as annotations on signatures
04 同仓库更多 Skills
verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore
Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI/CD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.
validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation
Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote/tpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware/kernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.
validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery
Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable/air-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.
triaging-windows-with-kape
Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment/triage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.
triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework
Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track/Track*/Attend/Act decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.
triaging-security-incident
Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM/EDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.