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Use when establishing artifact integrity checks against supply-chain tampering, proving authenticity to customers, building zero-trust pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts, or meeting SLSA Level 2+ provenance requirements.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-code-signing-for-artifacts\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":26,"taxonomyTypeDesc":27},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48],"artifacts","implementing code signing for artifacts","code","implementing code","pr","integrity checks","deployment","secure","packages","cybersecurity","containers","ZeRO","zero-trust","t1059","t1195","cicd","code-signing","sigstore","secure-sdlc","devsecops","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts\ndescription: 'Implements code signing for build artifacts (binaries, packages, containers)\n  using GPG, Sigstore, and platform-specific signing tools, establishing trust chains\n  and verifying signatures in deployment pipelines. Use when establishing artifact\n  integrity checks against supply-chain tampering, proving authenticity to customers,\n  building zero-trust pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts, or meeting SLSA Level\n  2+ provenance requirements.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: devsecops\ntags:\n- devsecops\n- cicd\n- code-signing\n- supply-chain\n- sigstore\n- secure-sdlc\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- GV.SC-07\n- ID.IM-04\n- PR.PS-04\nmitre_attack:\n- T1195\n- T1554\n- T1059.004\n- T1610\n- T1611\n---\n\n# Implementing Code Signing for Artifacts\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When establishing artifact integrity verification to prevent supply chain tampering\n- When compliance requires cryptographic proof that build artifacts are authentic and unmodified\n- When distributing software to customers who need to verify publisher identity\n- When implementing zero-trust deployment pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts\n- When meeting SLSA Level 2+ requirements for provenance and integrity\n\n**Do not use** for encrypting artifacts (signing provides integrity, not confidentiality), for container image signing specifically (use cosign), or for source code authentication (use commit signing).\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- GPG key pair for traditional signing or Sigstore account for keyless signing\n- Code signing certificate from a Certificate Authority for public distribution\n- CI\u002FCD pipeline with access to signing keys or identity provider\n- Verification infrastructure in deployment pipelines\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Generate and Manage Signing Keys\n\n```bash\n# Generate GPG key for artifact signing\ngpg --full-generate-key --batch \u003C\u003CEOF\nKey-Type: eddsa\nKey-Curve: ed25519\nSubkey-Type: eddsa\nSubkey-Curve: ed25519\nName-Real: CI Build System\nName-Email: ci-signing@company.com\nExpire-Date: 1y\n%no-protection\nEOF\n\n# Export public key for distribution\ngpg --armor --export ci-signing@company.com > signing-key.pub\n\n# Export private key for CI\u002FCD (store in secrets manager)\ngpg --armor --export-secret-keys ci-signing@company.com > signing-key.priv\n```\n\n### Step 2: Sign Build Artifacts in CI\u002FCD\n\n```yaml\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fbuild-sign.yml\nname: Build and Sign\n\non:\n  push:\n    tags: ['v*']\n\njobs:\n  build-sign:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    permissions:\n      contents: write\n      id-token: write  # For Sigstore keyless signing\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n\n      - name: Build artifacts\n        run: |\n          make build\n          sha256sum dist\u002F* > dist\u002Fchecksums.sha256\n\n      - name: Import GPG Key\n        run: |\n          echo \"${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}\" | gpg --batch --import\n          gpg --list-secret-keys\n\n      - name: Sign artifacts\n        run: |\n          for file in dist\u002F*; do\n            gpg --detach-sign --armor --local-user ci-signing@company.com \"$file\"\n          done\n\n      - name: Install cosign for keyless signing\n        uses: sigstore\u002Fcosign-installer@v3\n\n      - name: Keyless sign with Sigstore\n        run: |\n          for file in dist\u002F*.tar.gz; do\n            cosign sign-blob \"$file\" \\\n              --output-signature \"${file}.sig\" \\\n              --output-certificate \"${file}.cert\" \\\n              --yes\n          done\n\n      - name: Create Release with signed artifacts\n        uses: softprops\u002Faction-gh-release@v2\n        with:\n          files: |\n            dist\u002F*\n            dist\u002F*.asc\n            dist\u002F*.sig\n            dist\u002F*.cert\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify Signatures in Deployment Pipeline\n\n```bash\n# Verify GPG signature\ngpg --import signing-key.pub\ngpg --verify artifact.tar.gz.asc artifact.tar.gz\n\n# Verify Sigstore keyless signature\ncosign verify-blob artifact.tar.gz \\\n  --signature artifact.tar.gz.sig \\\n  --certificate artifact.tar.gz.cert \\\n  --certificate-identity ci-signing@company.com \\\n  --certificate-oidc-issuer https:\u002F\u002Ftoken.actions.githubusercontent.com\n\n# Verify checksums\nsha256sum --check checksums.sha256\n```\n\n### Step 4: Sign npm Packages with Provenance\n\n```json\n{\n  \"scripts\": {\n    \"prepublishOnly\": \"npm run build && npm run test\"\n  },\n  \"publishConfig\": {\n    \"provenance\": true\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n# Publish npm package with provenance attestation\nnpm publish --provenance\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Code Signing | Cryptographic process of signing software artifacts to verify publisher identity and artifact integrity |\n| Detached Signature | Signature stored in a separate file from the artifact, allowing independent distribution |\n| Keyless Signing | Sigstore's approach using short-lived certificates tied to OIDC identities instead of long-lived keys |\n| Provenance | Metadata describing how, where, and by whom an artifact was built |\n| Transparency Log | Append-only log (Rekor) that records all signing events for public auditability |\n| Trust Chain | Hierarchical chain from root CA to signing certificate establishing trust in the signer's identity |\n| SLSA | Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts — framework defining levels of supply chain security |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **GPG\u002FPGP**: Traditional asymmetric cryptography tool for signing and verifying artifacts\n- **Sigstore (cosign)**: Modern keyless signing infrastructure using OIDC identity and transparency logs\n- **Rekor**: Sigstore's transparency log recording all signing events immutably\n- **Fulcio**: Sigstore's certificate authority issuing short-lived certificates bound to OIDC identities\n- **notation**: Microsoft's artifact signing tool for OCI registries (Project Notary v2)\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Establishing Signed Release Pipeline\n\n**Context**: An open-source project needs to sign release artifacts so users can verify authenticity and detect tampering.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Use Sigstore keyless signing in GitHub Actions (no key management overhead)\n2. Sign all release binaries with `cosign sign-blob` using OIDC identity\n3. Generate and sign checksums file for bulk verification\n4. Upload signatures, certificates, and checksums alongside release artifacts\n5. Document verification instructions in the project README\n6. Add verification step to the Homebrew formula or apt repository\n\n**Pitfalls**: GPG key compromise requires revoking and re-signing all artifacts. Sigstore keyless signing avoids this by using ephemeral keys. Long-lived signing keys in CI\u002FCD secrets are a supply chain risk if the CI system is compromised.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nArtifact Signing Report\n========================\nPipeline: Build and Sign v2.3.0\nDate: 2026-02-23\nSigning Method: Sigstore Keyless + GPG\n\nSIGNED ARTIFACTS:\n  app-v2.3.0-linux-amd64.tar.gz\n    GPG:      PASS (ci-signing@company.com, EdDSA\u002FEd25519)\n    Sigstore: PASS (Rekor entry: 24658135, Fulcio cert issued)\n    SHA256:   a1b2c3d4...\n\n  app-v2.3.0-darwin-arm64.tar.gz\n    GPG:      PASS\n    Sigstore: PASS (Rekor entry: 24658136)\n    SHA256:   e5f6g7h8...\n\n  checksums.sha256\n    GPG:      PASS (detached signature)\n\nTRANSPARENCY LOG:\n  Entries recorded: 3\n  Log index range: 24658135-24658137\n  Verification: https:\u002F\u002Fsearch.sigstore.dev\n```\n","# Implementing Code Signing for Artifacts\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When establishing artifact integrity verification to prevent supply chain tampering\n- When compliance requires cryptographic proof that build artifacts are authentic and unmodified\n- When distributing software to customers who need to verify publisher identity\n- When implementing zero-trust deployment pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts\n- When meeting SLSA Level 2+ requirements for provenance and integrity\n\n**Do not use** for encrypting artifacts (signing provides integrity, not confidentiality), for container image signing specifically (use cosign), or for source code authentication (use commit signing).\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- GPG key pair for traditional signing or Sigstore account for keyless signing\n- Code signing certificate from a Certificate Authority for public distribution\n- CI\u002FCD pipeline with access to signing keys or identity provider\n- Verification infrastructure in deployment pipelines\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Generate and Manage Signing Keys\n\n```bash\n# Generate GPG key for artifact signing\ngpg --full-generate-key --batch \u003C\u003CEOF\nKey-Type: eddsa\nKey-Curve: ed25519\nSubkey-Type: eddsa\nSubkey-Curve: ed25519\nName-Real: CI Build System\nName-Email: ci-signing@company.com\nExpire-Date: 1y\n%no-protection\nEOF\n\n# Export public key for distribution\ngpg --armor --export ci-signing@company.com > signing-key.pub\n\n# Export private key for CI\u002FCD (store in secrets manager)\ngpg --armor --export-secret-keys ci-signing@company.com > signing-key.priv\n```\n\n### Step 2: Sign Build Artifacts in CI\u002FCD\n\n```yaml\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fbuild-sign.yml\nname: Build and Sign\n\non:\n  push:\n    tags: ['v*']\n\njobs:\n  build-sign:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    permissions:\n      contents: write\n      id-token: write  # For Sigstore keyless signing\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n\n      - name: Build artifacts\n        run: |\n          make build\n          sha256sum dist\u002F* > dist\u002Fchecksums.sha256\n\n      - name: Import GPG Key\n        run: |\n          echo \"${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}\" | gpg --batch --import\n          gpg --list-secret-keys\n\n      - name: Sign artifacts\n        run: |\n          for file in dist\u002F*; do\n            gpg --detach-sign --armor --local-user ci-signing@company.com \"$file\"\n          done\n\n      - name: Install cosign for keyless signing\n        uses: sigstore\u002Fcosign-installer@v3\n\n      - name: Keyless sign with Sigstore\n        run: |\n          for file in dist\u002F*.tar.gz; do\n            cosign sign-blob \"$file\" \\\n              --output-signature \"${file}.sig\" \\\n              --output-certificate \"${file}.cert\" \\\n              --yes\n          done\n\n      - name: Create Release with signed artifacts\n        uses: softprops\u002Faction-gh-release@v2\n        with:\n          files: |\n            dist\u002F*\n            dist\u002F*.asc\n            dist\u002F*.sig\n            dist\u002F*.cert\n```\n\n### Step 3: Verify Signatures in Deployment Pipeline\n\n```bash\n# Verify GPG signature\ngpg --import signing-key.pub\ngpg --verify artifact.tar.gz.asc artifact.tar.gz\n\n# Verify Sigstore keyless signature\ncosign verify-blob artifact.tar.gz \\\n  --signature artifact.tar.gz.sig \\\n  --certificate artifact.tar.gz.cert \\\n  --certificate-identity ci-signing@company.com \\\n  --certificate-oidc-issuer https:\u002F\u002Ftoken.actions.githubusercontent.com\n\n# Verify checksums\nsha256sum --check checksums.sha256\n```\n\n### Step 4: Sign npm Packages with Provenance\n\n```json\n{\n  \"scripts\": {\n    \"prepublishOnly\": \"npm run build && npm run test\"\n  },\n  \"publishConfig\": {\n    \"provenance\": true\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n# Publish npm package with provenance attestation\nnpm publish --provenance\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Code Signing | Cryptographic process of signing software artifacts to verify publisher identity and artifact integrity |\n| Detached Signature | Signature stored in a separate file from the artifact, allowing independent distribution |\n| Keyless Signing | Sigstore's approach using short-lived certificates tied to OIDC identities instead of long-lived keys |\n| Provenance | Metadata describing how, where, and by whom an artifact was built |\n| Transparency Log | Append-only log (Rekor) that records all signing events for public auditability |\n| Trust Chain | Hierarchical chain from root CA to signing certificate establishing trust in the signer's identity |\n| SLSA | Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts — framework defining levels of supply chain security |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **GPG\u002FPGP**: Traditional asymmetric cryptography tool for signing and verifying artifacts\n- **Sigstore (cosign)**: Modern keyless signing infrastructure using OIDC identity and transparency logs\n- **Rekor**: Sigstore's transparency log recording all signing events immutably\n- **Fulcio**: Sigstore's certificate authority issuing short-lived certificates bound to OIDC identities\n- **notation**: Microsoft's artifact signing tool for OCI registries (Project Notary v2)\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Establishing Signed Release Pipeline\n\n**Context**: An open-source project needs to sign release artifacts so users can verify authenticity and detect tampering.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Use Sigstore keyless signing in GitHub Actions (no key management overhead)\n2. Sign all release binaries with `cosign sign-blob` using OIDC identity\n3. Generate and sign checksums file for bulk verification\n4. Upload signatures, certificates, and checksums alongside release artifacts\n5. Document verification instructions in the project README\n6. Add verification step to the Homebrew formula or apt repository\n\n**Pitfalls**: GPG key compromise requires revoking and re-signing all artifacts. Sigstore keyless signing avoids this by using ephemeral keys. Long-lived signing keys in CI\u002FCD secrets are a supply chain risk if the CI system is compromised.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nArtifact Signing Report\n========================\nPipeline: Build and Sign v2.3.0\nDate: 2026-02-23\nSigning Method: Sigstore Keyless + GPG\n\nSIGNED ARTIFACTS:\n  app-v2.3.0-linux-amd64.tar.gz\n    GPG:      PASS (ci-signing@company.com, EdDSA\u002FEd25519)\n    Sigstore: PASS (Rekor entry: 24658135, Fulcio cert issued)\n    SHA256:   a1b2c3d4...\n\n  app-v2.3.0-darwin-arm64.tar.gz\n    GPG:      PASS\n    Sigstore: PASS (Rekor entry: 24658136)\n    SHA256:   e5f6g7h8...\n\n  checksums.sha256\n    GPG:      PASS (detached signature)\n\nTRANSPARENCY LOG:\n  Entries recorded: 3\n  Log index range: 24658135-24658137\n  Verification: https:\u002F\u002Fsearch.sigstore.dev\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":54,"author":56,"domain":38,"license":15,"version":57,"nist_csf":58,"subdomain":48,"description":63,"mitre_attack":64},[48,44,45,55,46,47],"supply-chain","mahipal","1.0.0",[59,60,61,62],"PR.PS-01","GV.SC-07","ID.IM-04","PR.PS-04","Implements code signing for build artifacts (binaries, packages, containers) using GPG, Sigstore, and platform-specific signing tools, establishing trust chains and verifying signatures in deployment pipelines. 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artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[160],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[46,162,163,164,165,38,166,167,33,31,29,168,55,169,170,43,171,45,172,173],"provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","ci","pipeline","supply-chain-security","attestation","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":175,"name":176,"nameZh":6,"description":177,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":178,"categories":179,"keywords":181,"publishedAt":49},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[180],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[182,171,183,184,165,185,38,33,186,40,187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":198,"name":199,"nameZh":6,"description":200,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":201,"categories":202,"keywords":207,"publishedAt":49},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[203,206],{"categoryNo":204,"categoryName":205,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[191,208,209,210,211,38,212,213,186,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":226,"name":227,"nameZh":6,"description":228,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":229,"categories":230,"keywords":232,"publishedAt":49},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[231],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[233,234,235,38,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,188,248,249,250],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":252,"name":253,"nameZh":6,"description":254,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":255,"categories":256,"keywords":258,"publishedAt":49},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[257],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[259,260,261,38,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,269,270,271,272,273,274,275,276,277],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":279,"name":280,"nameZh":6,"description":281,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":282,"categories":283,"keywords":285,"publishedAt":49},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[284],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[165,286,38,287,288,289,290,291,292,293,294,220,295,221,296,297,298,299,300,301],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]