[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEXQAKCYXCNEY5AZEVZACG":3,"skill-same:01M6AEXQAKCYXCNEY5AZEVZACG":107},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":66,"commitSha":67,"skillDirectory":68,"forksCount":69,"repositoryHtmlUrl":70,"repositoryHomepageUrl":71,"ownerHtmlUrl":72,"ownerBlogUrl":73,"ownerDescription":74,"updatedAt":75,"install":76,"resources":89},"01M6AEXQAKCYXCNEY5AZEVZACG","hunting-for-unusual-service-installations",null,"Detects suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event log Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and flagging indicators of persistence mechanisms via Sysmon\u002FEDR telemetry. Use when hunting for new-service persistence after a suspected compromise, when Event ID 7045 fires for an unfamiliar service, or during incident response to enumerate service-based persistence on Windows hosts.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-unusual-service-installations\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"hunting for unusual service installations","sysmon","Windows-services","Event-7045","service-installation","T1543.003","indicators","edr","ATT&CK","hardening","suspicious","analyzing","threat-hunting","services","database","permissions","telemetry","windows","incident response","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-unusual-service-installations\ndescription: Detects suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event log Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and flagging indicators of persistence mechanisms via Sysmon\u002FEDR telemetry. Use when hunting for new-service persistence after a suspected compromise, when Event ID 7045 fires for an unfamiliar service, or during incident response to enumerate service-based persistence on Windows hosts.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- T1543.003\n- service-installation\n- persistence\n- Event-7045\n- Sysmon\n- Windows-services\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Platform Hardening\n- System Configuration Permissions\n- Restore Object\n- Restore Database\n- Asset Inventory\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1547\n---\n\n# Hunting for Unusual Service Installations\n\n## Overview\n\nAttackers frequently install malicious Windows services for persistence and privilege escalation (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003 — Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service). Event ID 7045 in the System event log records every new service installation. This skill parses .evtx log files to extract service installation events, flags suspicious binary paths (temp directories, PowerShell, cmd.exe, encoded commands), and correlates with known attack patterns.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for unusual service installations\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml`\n- Windows System event log (.evtx) files\n- Access to live System event log (optional, for real-time monitoring)\n- Sysmon logs for enhanced process tracking (optional)\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Parse System.evtx for Event ID 7045 (new service installed)\n2. Extract service name, binary path, service type, and account\n3. Flag services with suspicious binary paths (temp dirs, encoded commands)\n4. Detect PowerShell-based service creation patterns\n5. Identify services running as LocalSystem with unusual paths\n6. Cross-reference with known legitimate service baselines\n7. Generate threat hunting report with MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003 mapping\n\n## Expected Output\n\n- JSON report listing all new service installations with risk scores, suspicious indicators, and remediation recommendations\n- Timeline of service installation events with binary path analysis\n","# Hunting for Unusual Service Installations\n\n## Overview\n\nAttackers frequently install malicious Windows services for persistence and privilege escalation (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003 — Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service). Event ID 7045 in the System event log records every new service installation. This skill parses .evtx log files to extract service installation events, flags suspicious binary paths (temp directories, PowerShell, cmd.exe, encoded commands), and correlates with known attack patterns.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for unusual service installations\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml`\n- Windows System event log (.evtx) files\n- Access to live System event log (optional, for real-time monitoring)\n- Sysmon logs for enhanced process tracking (optional)\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Parse System.evtx for Event ID 7045 (new service installed)\n2. Extract service name, binary path, service type, and account\n3. Flag services with suspicious binary paths (temp dirs, encoded commands)\n4. Detect PowerShell-based service creation patterns\n5. Identify services running as LocalSystem with unusual paths\n6. Cross-reference with known legitimate service baselines\n7. Generate threat hunting report with MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003 mapping\n\n## Expected Output\n\n- JSON report listing all new service installations with risk scores, suspicious indicators, and remediation recommendations\n- Timeline of service installation events with binary path analysis\n",{"name":5,"tags":44,"author":47,"domain":38,"license":15,"version":48,"nist_csf":49,"subdomain":31,"description":7,"mitre_attack":54,"d3fend_techniques":60},[31,24,23,45,22,46,21],"persistence","Sysmon","mahipal","1.0",[50,51,52,53],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[55,56,57,58,59],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547",[61,62,63,64,65],"Platform Hardening","System Configuration Permissions","Restore Object","Restore Database","Asset Inventory","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fhunting-for-unusual-service-installations",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":77,"prompt":87,"zipAvailable":88},[78,81,84],{"tool":79,"command":80},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-unusual-service-installations",{"tool":82,"command":83},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-unusual-service-installations",{"tool":85,"command":86},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-unusual-service-installations","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-unusual-service-installations\u002FSKILL.md",true,[90,95,101],{"path":91,"resourceType":91,"resourceTypeDesc":92,"sizeBytes":93,"sourceHtmlUrl":94},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-unusual-service-installations\u002FLICENSE",{"path":96,"resourceType":97,"resourceTypeDesc":98,"sizeBytes":99,"sourceHtmlUrl":100},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2639,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-unusual-service-installations\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":102,"resourceType":103,"resourceTypeDesc":104,"sizeBytes":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7779,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-unusual-service-installations\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[108,138,162,190,215,242],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":119,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[114],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[120,121,122,123,124,38,37,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":139,"name":140,"nameZh":6,"description":141,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":142,"categories":143,"keywords":145,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[144],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},[146,134,147,148,124,149,38,126,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":163,"name":164,"nameZh":6,"description":165,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":166,"categories":167,"keywords":172,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[168,171],{"categoryNo":169,"categoryName":170,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},[156,173,174,175,176,38,177,178,150,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":191,"name":192,"nameZh":6,"description":193,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":194,"categories":195,"keywords":197,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[196],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},[36,198,199,38,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,211,153,212,213,214],"kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":216,"name":217,"nameZh":6,"description":218,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":219,"categories":220,"keywords":222,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[221],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},[223,224,225,38,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":243,"name":244,"nameZh":6,"description":245,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":246,"categories":247,"keywords":249,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[248],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":117,"taxonomyTypeDesc":118},[124,250,38,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,26,185,258,186,259,260,261,262,263,264],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]