hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence
Detects T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, cross-referencing Autoruns entries, and running a Python watchdog script for real-time filesystem monitoring. Use when hunting for malware or implants that survive reboot via startup-folder placement, or when validating autoruns/EDR findings against known-good startup baselines.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence
- tags
- [ "threat-hunting", "T1547.001", "startup-folder", "persistence", "autoruns", "watchdog", "filesystem-monitoring" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "DE.CM-01", "DE.AE-02", "DE.AE-07", "ID.RA-05" ]
- subdomain
- threat-hunting
- description
- Detects T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, cross-referencing Autoruns entries, and running a Python watchdog script for real-time filesystem monitoring. Use when hunting for malware or implants that survive reboot via startup-folder placement, or when validating autoruns/EDR findings against known-good startup baselines.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1046", "T1057", "T1082", "T1083", "T1547" ]
- d3fend_techniques
- [ "Executable Denylisting", "Execution Isolation", "File Metadata Consistency Validation", "Content Format Conversion", "File Content Analysis" ]
02 资源文件 5
- 参考文档examples/example_usage.md1.9 KB
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md2.8 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py10.2 KB
- 脚本scripts/apk_analyzer.py7.4 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Hunting for Startup Folder Persistence
Overview
Attackers use Windows startup folders for persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder). Files placed in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup or C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup execute automatically at user logon. This skill scans startup directories for suspicious files, monitors for real-time changes using Python watchdog, and analyzes file metadata to detect persistence implants.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for startup folder persistence
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with
watchdog,pefile(optional for PE analysis) - Access to Windows startup folders (user and all-users)
- Windows Event Logs for Event ID 4663 correlation (optional)
Steps
- Enumerate all files in user and system startup directories
- Analyze file types, creation timestamps, and digital signatures
- Flag suspicious file extensions (.bat, .vbs, .ps1, .lnk, .exe)
- Check for recently created files (< 7 days) as potential implants
- Monitor startup folders in real-time using watchdog FileSystemEventHandler
- Correlate with known legitimate startup entries
- Generate threat hunting report with T1547.001 MITRE mapping
Expected Output
- JSON report listing all startup folder contents with risk scores, file metadata, and suspicious indicators
- Real-time monitoring alerts for new file creation in startup directories
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