[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEWEC1QJ25VYBASMGMZY97":3,"skill-same:01M6AEWEC1QJ25VYBASMGMZY97":147},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":69,"commitSha":70,"skillDirectory":71,"forksCount":72,"repositoryHtmlUrl":73,"repositoryHomepageUrl":74,"ownerHtmlUrl":75,"ownerBlogUrl":76,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M6AEWEC1QJ25VYBASMGMZY97","hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions",null,"Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003) by monitoring the creation of WMI event filters, consumers, and filter-to-consumer bindings that trigger malicious code execution on system events. Use when investigating fileless, trigger-based persistence on Windows hosts or auditing WMI repository contents for malicious event subscriptions.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"hunting for persistence via wmi subscriptions","persistence","wmi","network","event-subscription","mitre-t1546-003","wmi-persistence","t1546.003","execution","endpoint-detection","endpoint","malicious","threat-hunting","repository","server","monitoring","protocol","code","windows","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\ndescription: Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003)\n  by monitoring the creation of WMI event filters, consumers, and filter-to-consumer\n  bindings that trigger malicious code execution on system events. Use when investigating\n  fileless, trigger-based persistence on Windows hosts or auditing WMI repository\n  contents for malicious event subscriptions.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- wmi-persistence\n- mitre-t1546-003\n- event-subscription\n- windows\n- endpoint-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1547\n---\n\n# Hunting for Persistence via WMI Subscriptions\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments\n- After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)\n- When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts\n- During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean\n- When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter\u002FConsumer\u002FBinding) enabled\n- Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\n- PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)\n- WMI repository access for enumeration\n- SIEM platform for event correlation\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions**: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.\n2. **Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19\u002F20\u002F21)**: Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.\n3. **Analyze Consumer Types**: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript\u002FJScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.\n4. **Check Event Filter Triggers**: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.\n5. **Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes**: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.\n6. **Correlate with MOF Compilation**: Detect `mofcomp.exe` usage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically.\n7. **Validate and Respond**: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |\n| __EventFilter | WMI class defining the trigger condition |\n| __EventConsumer | WMI class defining the action to perform |\n| __FilterToConsumerBinding | Links a filter to a consumer |\n| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript |\n| CommandLineEventConsumer | Consumer that executes command lines |\n| WmiPrvSe.exe | WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions |\n| MOF File | Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)\n| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, \"EventFilter\", EventCode=20, \"EventConsumer\", EventCode=21, \"FilterToConsumerBinding\")\n| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination Operation\n```\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog source=\"Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\u002FOperational\" EventCode=5861\n| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCause\n```\n\n### PowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions\n```powershell\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventFilter\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventConsumer\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding\n```\n\n### KQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"wmiprvse.exe\"\n| where FileName in~ (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n```yaml\ntitle: WMI Event Subscription Persistence\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: wmi_event\ndetection:\n    selection_consumer:\n        EventID: 20\n        Destination|contains:\n            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'\n            - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'\n    condition: selection_consumer\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.persistence\n    - attack.t1546.003\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **APT29 WMI Persistence**: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.\n2. **Turla WMI Backdoor**: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.\n3. **FIN8 WMI Timer**: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.\n4. **MOF-Based Installation**: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with `mofcomp.exe` to silently create persistent subscriptions.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSubscription Name: [Filter\u002FConsumer name]\nFilter Query: [WQL trigger condition]\nConsumer Type: [ActiveScript\u002FCommandLine]\nConsumer Action: [Script content or command]\nBinding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]\nCreated: [Timestamp]\nUser Context: [SYSTEM\u002FUser]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Hunting for Persistence via WMI Subscriptions\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments\n- After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)\n- When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts\n- During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean\n- When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter\u002FConsumer\u002FBinding) enabled\n- Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\n- PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)\n- WMI repository access for enumeration\n- SIEM platform for event correlation\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions**: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.\n2. **Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19\u002F20\u002F21)**: Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.\n3. **Analyze Consumer Types**: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript\u002FJScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.\n4. **Check Event Filter Triggers**: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.\n5. **Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes**: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.\n6. **Correlate with MOF Compilation**: Detect `mofcomp.exe` usage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically.\n7. **Validate and Respond**: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |\n| __EventFilter | WMI class defining the trigger condition |\n| __EventConsumer | WMI class defining the action to perform |\n| __FilterToConsumerBinding | Links a filter to a consumer |\n| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript |\n| CommandLineEventConsumer | Consumer that executes command lines |\n| WmiPrvSe.exe | WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions |\n| MOF File | Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)\n| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, \"EventFilter\", EventCode=20, \"EventConsumer\", EventCode=21, \"FilterToConsumerBinding\")\n| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination Operation\n```\n\n### Splunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog source=\"Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity\u002FOperational\" EventCode=5861\n| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCause\n```\n\n### PowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions\n```powershell\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventFilter\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __EventConsumer\nGet-WmiObject -Namespace root\\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding\n```\n\n### KQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"wmiprvse.exe\"\n| where FileName in~ (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"wscript.exe\", \"cscript.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n```yaml\ntitle: WMI Event Subscription Persistence\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: wmi_event\ndetection:\n    selection_consumer:\n        EventID: 20\n        Destination|contains:\n            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'\n            - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'\n    condition: selection_consumer\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.persistence\n    - attack.t1546.003\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **APT29 WMI Persistence**: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.\n2. **Turla WMI Backdoor**: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.\n3. **FIN8 WMI Timer**: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.\n4. **MOF-Based Installation**: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with `mofcomp.exe` to silently create persistent subscriptions.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSubscription Name: [Filter\u002FConsumer name]\nFilter Query: [WQL trigger condition]\nConsumer Type: [ActiveScript\u002FCommandLine]\nConsumer Action: [Script content or command]\nBinding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]\nCreated: [Timestamp]\nUser Context: [SYSTEM\u002FUser]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":50,"domain":43,"license":15,"version":51,"nist_csf":52,"subdomain":36,"description":7,"mitre_attack":57,"d3fend_techniques":63},[36,30,29,28,42,33],"mahipal","1.0",[53,54,55,56],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[58,59,60,61,62],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547",[64,65,66,67,68],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform Monitoring","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions",{"tool":85,"command":86},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions",{"tool":88,"command":89},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002FSKILL.md",true,[93,99,105,110,116,120,124,128,132,136,140,143],{"path":94,"resourceType":95,"resourceTypeDesc":96,"sizeBytes":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",1016,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":100,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":103,"sourceHtmlUrl":104},"bin\u002Fcallpath.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5449,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcallpath\u002Fbin\u002Fcallpath.py",{"path":106,"resourceType":106,"resourceTypeDesc":107,"sizeBytes":108,"sourceHtmlUrl":109},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002FLICENSE",{"path":111,"resourceType":112,"resourceTypeDesc":113,"sizeBytes":114,"sourceHtmlUrl":115},"profiles\u002F_template\u002Fprofile.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",283,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcallpath\u002Fprofiles\u002F_template\u002Fprofile.yaml",{"path":117,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":118,"sourceHtmlUrl":119},"profiles\u002F_template\u002Frun.sh",727,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcallpath\u002Fprofiles\u002F_template\u002Frun.sh",{"path":121,"resourceType":112,"resourceTypeDesc":113,"sizeBytes":122,"sourceHtmlUrl":123},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",1928,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":125,"resourceType":112,"resourceTypeDesc":113,"sizeBytes":126,"sourceHtmlUrl":127},"references\u002Fstandards.md",2619,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":129,"resourceType":112,"resourceTypeDesc":113,"sizeBytes":130,"sourceHtmlUrl":131},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3145,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":133,"resourceType":112,"resourceTypeDesc":113,"sizeBytes":134,"sourceHtmlUrl":135},"schema\u002Ftrace-model.md",1623,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcallpath\u002Fschema\u002Ftrace-model.md",{"path":137,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":138,"sourceHtmlUrl":139},"scripts\u002Fagent.py",6446,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":141,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":103,"sourceHtmlUrl":142},"scripts\u002Fcallpath.sh","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcallpath\u002Fscripts\u002Fcallpath.sh",{"path":144,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":145,"sourceHtmlUrl":146},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",6866,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[148,174,198,226,251,278],{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[154],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[156,157,158,159,160,43,161,162,163,41,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","pr","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":175,"name":176,"nameZh":6,"description":177,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":178,"categories":179,"keywords":181,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[180],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[182,170,183,184,160,185,43,163,186,187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":199,"name":200,"nameZh":6,"description":201,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":202,"categories":203,"keywords":208,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[204,207],{"categoryNo":205,"categoryName":206,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[192,209,210,211,212,43,213,214,186,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":227,"name":228,"nameZh":6,"description":229,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":230,"categories":231,"keywords":233,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[232],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[42,234,235,43,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,189,248,249,250],"kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":252,"name":253,"nameZh":6,"description":254,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":255,"categories":256,"keywords":258,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[257],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[259,260,261,43,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,269,270,271,272,273,274,275,276,277],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":279,"name":280,"nameZh":6,"description":281,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":282,"categories":283,"keywords":285,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[284],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[160,286,43,287,288,289,290,291,292,293,294,221,32,222,295,296,297,298,299,300],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]