[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEWATK5A7BRJT2CDQ60303":3,"skill-same:01M6AEWATK5A7BRJT2CDQ60303":128},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":69,"commitSha":70,"skillDirectory":71,"forksCount":72,"repositoryHtmlUrl":73,"repositoryHomepageUrl":74,"ownerHtmlUrl":75,"ownerBlogUrl":76,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M6AEWATK5A7BRJT2CDQ60303","hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows",null,"Systematically hunts for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints, covering registry Run\u002FRunOnce keys, services, startup folders, scheduled tasks, and WMI event subscriptions. Use when performing a broad persistence sweep during incident response or building SIEM detections that cover the full range of Windows persistence techniques (MITRE T1547).","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"persistence","hunting for persistence mechanisms in windows","windows","services","incident response","wmi","execution","detection","proactive-detection","startup","threat-hunting","mitre-attack","siem","cybersecurity","file","content","validation","registry","run","tasks","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows\ndescription: Systematically hunts for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows\n  endpoints, covering registry Run\u002FRunOnce keys, services, startup folders, scheduled\n  tasks, and WMI event subscriptions. Use when performing a broad persistence sweep\n  during incident response or building SIEM detections that cover the full range of\n  Windows persistence techniques (MITRE T1547).\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- mitre-attack\n- persistence\n- windows\n- registry\n- siem\n- proactive-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Content Format Conversion\n- File Content Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1547\n---\n\n# Hunting for Persistence Mechanisms in Windows\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During periodic proactive threat hunts for dormant backdoors\n- After an incident to identify all persistence mechanisms an attacker planted\n- When investigating unusual services, scheduled tasks, or startup entries\n- When threat intel reports describe new persistence techniques in the wild\n- During security posture assessments to identify unauthorized persistent software\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with Event IDs 12\u002F13\u002F14 (Registry), 19\u002F20\u002F21 (WMI), 1 (Process Creation)\n- Windows Security Event forwarding for 4697 (Service Install), 4698 (Scheduled Task)\n- EDR with registry and file monitoring capabilities\n- PowerShell script block logging enabled (Event ID 4104)\n- Autoruns or equivalent baseline of legitimate persistent entries\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate Known Persistence Locations**: Build a comprehensive list of Windows persistence points (Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI, startup folder, DLL search order, COM hijacks, AppInit DLLs, Image File Execution Options).\n2. **Collect Endpoint Data**: Use EDR, Sysmon, or Velociraptor to collect current persistence artifacts from endpoints across the environment.\n3. **Baseline Legitimate Persistence**: Compare collected data against known-good baselines (Autoruns snapshots, GPO-deployed entries, SCCM configurations).\n4. **Identify Anomalies**: Flag new, unsigned, or unknown entries in persistence locations that deviate from the baseline.\n5. **Investigate Suspicious Entries**: For each anomaly, examine the binary it points to, its digital signature, file hash, and creation timestamp.\n6. **Correlate with Process Activity**: Link persistence entries to process execution, network activity, and user login events.\n7. **Document and Remediate**: Record findings, remove malicious persistence, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys \u002F Startup Folder |\n| T1543.003 | Windows Service (Create or Modify) |\n| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task |\n| T1546.003 | WMI Event Subscription |\n| T1546.015 | Component Object Model (COM) Hijacking |\n| T1546.012 | Image File Execution Options Injection |\n| T1546.010 | AppInit DLLs |\n| T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLL |\n| T1547.005 | Security Support Provider |\n| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |\n| TA0003 | Persistence Tactic |\n| Autoruns | Sysinternals tool showing persistent entries |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysinternals Autoruns | Comprehensive persistence enumeration |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint-wide persistence artifact collection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | Real-time persistence monitoring |\n| Sysmon | Registry and WMI event monitoring |\n| OSQuery | SQL-based persistence queries |\n| RECmd | Registry Explorer for forensic analysis |\n| Splunk | SIEM correlation of persistence events |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Registry Run Key Backdoor**: Malware adds `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` entry pointing to payload in `%APPDATA%`.\n2. **WMI Event Subscription**: Adversary creates WMI consumer\u002Ffilter pair that executes PowerShell on system boot.\n3. **Malicious Service**: Attacker creates Windows service with `sc create` pointing to a backdoor binary.\n4. **COM Object Hijack**: Legitimate COM CLSID InprocServer32 path replaced with malicious DLL.\n5. **IFEO Debugger Injection**: Image File Execution Options key set with debugger pointing to implant for common utilities.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-PERSIST-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nPersistence Type: [Registry\u002FService\u002FTask\u002FWMI\u002FCOM\u002FOther]\nMITRE Technique: T1547.xxx \u002F T1543.xxx \u002F T1053.xxx\nLocation: [Full registry key \u002F service name \u002F task path]\nValue: [Binary path \u002F command line]\nHost(s): [Affected endpoints]\nSigned: [Yes\u002FNo]\nHash: [SHA256]\nCreation Time: [Timestamp]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nVerdict: [Malicious\u002FSuspicious\u002FBenign]\n```\n","# Hunting for Persistence Mechanisms in Windows\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During periodic proactive threat hunts for dormant backdoors\n- After an incident to identify all persistence mechanisms an attacker planted\n- When investigating unusual services, scheduled tasks, or startup entries\n- When threat intel reports describe new persistence techniques in the wild\n- During security posture assessments to identify unauthorized persistent software\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with Event IDs 12\u002F13\u002F14 (Registry), 19\u002F20\u002F21 (WMI), 1 (Process Creation)\n- Windows Security Event forwarding for 4697 (Service Install), 4698 (Scheduled Task)\n- EDR with registry and file monitoring capabilities\n- PowerShell script block logging enabled (Event ID 4104)\n- Autoruns or equivalent baseline of legitimate persistent entries\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enumerate Known Persistence Locations**: Build a comprehensive list of Windows persistence points (Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI, startup folder, DLL search order, COM hijacks, AppInit DLLs, Image File Execution Options).\n2. **Collect Endpoint Data**: Use EDR, Sysmon, or Velociraptor to collect current persistence artifacts from endpoints across the environment.\n3. **Baseline Legitimate Persistence**: Compare collected data against known-good baselines (Autoruns snapshots, GPO-deployed entries, SCCM configurations).\n4. **Identify Anomalies**: Flag new, unsigned, or unknown entries in persistence locations that deviate from the baseline.\n5. **Investigate Suspicious Entries**: For each anomaly, examine the binary it points to, its digital signature, file hash, and creation timestamp.\n6. **Correlate with Process Activity**: Link persistence entries to process execution, network activity, and user login events.\n7. **Document and Remediate**: Record findings, remove malicious persistence, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys \u002F Startup Folder |\n| T1543.003 | Windows Service (Create or Modify) |\n| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task |\n| T1546.003 | WMI Event Subscription |\n| T1546.015 | Component Object Model (COM) Hijacking |\n| T1546.012 | Image File Execution Options Injection |\n| T1546.010 | AppInit DLLs |\n| T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLL |\n| T1547.005 | Security Support Provider |\n| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |\n| TA0003 | Persistence Tactic |\n| Autoruns | Sysinternals tool showing persistent entries |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysinternals Autoruns | Comprehensive persistence enumeration |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint-wide persistence artifact collection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | Real-time persistence monitoring |\n| Sysmon | Registry and WMI event monitoring |\n| OSQuery | SQL-based persistence queries |\n| RECmd | Registry Explorer for forensic analysis |\n| Splunk | SIEM correlation of persistence events |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Registry Run Key Backdoor**: Malware adds `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` entry pointing to payload in `%APPDATA%`.\n2. **WMI Event Subscription**: Adversary creates WMI consumer\u002Ffilter pair that executes PowerShell on system boot.\n3. **Malicious Service**: Attacker creates Windows service with `sc create` pointing to a backdoor binary.\n4. **COM Object Hijack**: Legitimate COM CLSID InprocServer32 path replaced with malicious DLL.\n5. **IFEO Debugger Injection**: Image File Execution Options key set with debugger pointing to implant for common utilities.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-PERSIST-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nPersistence Type: [Registry\u002FService\u002FTask\u002FWMI\u002FCOM\u002FOther]\nMITRE Technique: T1547.xxx \u002F T1543.xxx \u002F T1053.xxx\nLocation: [Full registry key \u002F service name \u002F task path]\nValue: [Binary path \u002F command line]\nHost(s): [Affected endpoints]\nSigned: [Yes\u002FNo]\nHash: [SHA256]\nCreation Time: [Timestamp]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nVerdict: [Malicious\u002FSuspicious\u002FBenign]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":50,"domain":37,"license":15,"version":51,"nist_csf":52,"subdomain":34,"description":7,"mitre_attack":57,"d3fend_techniques":63},[34,35,24,26,41,36,32],"mahipal","1.0",[53,54,55,56],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[58,59,60,61,62],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1547",[64,65,66,67,68],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fhunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows",{"tool":85,"command":86},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows",{"tool":88,"command":89},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill 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artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[135],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[137,138,139,140,141,37,28,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":156,"name":157,"nameZh":6,"description":158,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":159,"categories":160,"keywords":162,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[161],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[163,151,164,165,141,166,37,143,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":180,"name":181,"nameZh":6,"description":182,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":183,"categories":184,"keywords":189,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[185,188],{"categoryNo":186,"categoryName":187,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[173,190,191,192,193,37,194,40,167,195,196,197,198,199,31,200,201,202,203,204],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":206,"name":207,"nameZh":6,"description":208,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":209,"categories":210,"keywords":212,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[211],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[26,213,214,37,41,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,170,226,227,228],"kape","triaging windows with kape","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":230,"name":231,"nameZh":6,"description":232,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":233,"categories":234,"keywords":236,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[235],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[237,238,239,37,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":257,"name":258,"nameZh":6,"description":259,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":260,"categories":261,"keywords":263,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[262],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[141,264,37,36,38,265,266,267,268,269,270,200,30,201,271,272,273,274,275,276],"triaging security incident","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]