[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEV9CKB6353GR945H465ZZ":3,"skill-same:01M6AEV9CKB6353GR945H465ZZ":114},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":69,"commitSha":70,"skillDirectory":71,"forksCount":72,"repositoryHtmlUrl":73,"repositoryHomepageUrl":74,"ownerHtmlUrl":75,"ownerBlogUrl":76,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M6AEV9CKB6353GR945H465ZZ","hunting-for-dcsync-attacks",null,"Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 (AccessMask 0x100) for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All requests issued by non-domain-controller accounts. Use when hunting for DCSync credential theft, after detecting Mimikatz-class tooling, or during incident response and purple-team exercises involving Active Directory replication abuse.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36146,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"hunting for dcsync attacks","dcsync","threat-hunting","t1003.006","domain-controller","ATT&CK","controller","purple-team","analyzing","dfir","directory","mimikatz","active-directory","credential-access","server","monitoring","protocol","windows","incident response","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-dcsync-attacks\ndescription: Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 (AccessMask 0x100) for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All requests issued by non-domain-controller accounts. Use when hunting for DCSync credential theft, after detecting Mimikatz-class tooling, or during incident response and purple-team exercises involving Active Directory replication abuse.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- dcsync\n- active-directory\n- credential-access\n- t1003.006\n- mimikatz\n- windows\n- dfir\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1003\n---\n\n# Hunting for DCSync Attacks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)\n- After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment\n- During incident response involving Active Directory compromise\n- When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests\n- During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled (Event ID 4662)\n- Audit Directory Service Access enabled via Group Policy\n- Domain Computers SACL configured on Domain Object for machine account detection\n- SIEM with Windows event data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller accounts and replication partners\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enable Auditing**: Ensure Audit Directory Service Access is enabled on domain controllers.\n2. **Collect Events**: Gather Windows Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 (Control Access).\n3. **Filter Replication GUIDs**: Search for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.\n4. **Identify Non-DC Sources**: Flag events where SubjectUserName is not a domain controller machine account.\n5. **Correlate with Network**: Cross-reference source IPs against known DC addresses.\n6. **Validate Findings**: Exclude legitimate replication tools (Azure AD Connect, SCCM).\n7. **Respond**: Disable compromised accounts, reset krbtgt, investigate lateral movement.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| DCSync | Technique abusing AD replication protocol to extract password hashes |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory Service Access audit event |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| AccessMask 0x100 | Control Access right indicating extended rights verification |\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Windows Event Viewer | Direct event log analysis |\n| Splunk | SIEM correlation of Event 4662 |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules for DCSync patterns |\n| Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync | Attack tool used to perform DCSync |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| BloodHound | Identify accounts with replication rights |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1003.006\nDomain Controller: [DC hostname]\nSubject Account: [Account performing replication]\nSource IP: [Non-DC IP address]\nGUID Accessed: [Replication GUID]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Disable account, reset krbtgt, investigate]\n```\n","# Hunting for DCSync Attacks\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for DCSync credential theft (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006)\n- After detecting Mimikatz or similar tools in the environment\n- During incident response involving Active Directory compromise\n- When monitoring for unauthorized domain replication requests\n- During purple team exercises testing AD attack detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled (Event ID 4662)\n- Audit Directory Service Access enabled via Group Policy\n- Domain Computers SACL configured on Domain Object for machine account detection\n- SIEM with Windows event data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller accounts and replication partners\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Enable Auditing**: Ensure Audit Directory Service Access is enabled on domain controllers.\n2. **Collect Events**: Gather Windows Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 (Control Access).\n3. **Filter Replication GUIDs**: Search for DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.\n4. **Identify Non-DC Sources**: Flag events where SubjectUserName is not a domain controller machine account.\n5. **Correlate with Network**: Cross-reference source IPs against known DC addresses.\n6. **Validate Findings**: Exclude legitimate replication tools (Azure AD Connect, SCCM).\n7. **Respond**: Disable compromised accounts, reset krbtgt, investigate lateral movement.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| DCSync | Technique abusing AD replication protocol to extract password hashes |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory Service Access audit event |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | GUID 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 |\n| AccessMask 0x100 | Control Access right indicating extended rights verification |\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Windows Event Viewer | Direct event log analysis |\n| Splunk | SIEM correlation of Event 4662 |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules for DCSync patterns |\n| Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync | Attack tool used to perform DCSync |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| BloodHound | Identify accounts with replication rights |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1003.006\nDomain Controller: [DC hostname]\nSubject Account: [Account performing replication]\nSource IP: [Non-DC IP address]\nGUID Accessed: [Replication GUID]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Disable account, reset krbtgt, investigate]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":50,"domain":43,"license":15,"version":51,"nist_csf":52,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":57,"d3fend_techniques":63},[26,25,36,37,27,35,41,33],"mahipal","1.0",[53,54,55,56],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[58,59,60,61,62],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1003",[64,65,66,67,68],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform Monitoring","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks",4425,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-dcsync-attacks",{"tool":85,"command":86},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-dcsync-attacks",{"tool":88,"command":89},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hunting-for-dcsync-attacks","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002FSKILL.md",true,[93,98,104,108],{"path":94,"resourceType":94,"resourceTypeDesc":95,"sizeBytes":96,"sourceHtmlUrl":97},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002FLICENSE",{"path":99,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",3464,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":105,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"references\u002Fpost-release-checklist.md",3016,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOpenHands\u002Fsoftware-agent-sdk\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsdk-release\u002Freferences\u002Fpost-release-checklist.md",{"path":109,"resourceType":110,"resourceTypeDesc":111,"sizeBytes":112,"sourceHtmlUrl":113},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",9941,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-dcsync-attacks\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[115,141,165,193,217,244],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[121],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[123,124,125,126,127,43,42,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,140],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":148,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[147],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[149,137,150,151,127,152,43,129,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":166,"name":167,"nameZh":6,"description":168,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":169,"categories":170,"keywords":175,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[171,174],{"categoryNo":172,"categoryName":173,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[159,176,177,178,179,43,180,181,153,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191,192],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":194,"name":195,"nameZh":6,"description":196,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":197,"categories":198,"keywords":200,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[199],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[41,201,202,43,203,204,205,206,33,207,208,209,210,211,212,213,156,214,215,216],"kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":218,"name":219,"nameZh":6,"description":220,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":221,"categories":222,"keywords":224,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[223],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[225,226,227,43,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":245,"name":246,"nameZh":6,"description":247,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":248,"categories":249,"keywords":251,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[250],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[127,252,43,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,260,188,261,189,262,263,264,265,266,267],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]