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Use when securing a Docker host's daemon to prevent privilege escalation, breakout, or lateral movement, or when auditing daemon settings against CIS requirements. Keywords: dockerd, daemon.json, userns-remap, no-new-privileges, icc, live-restore, TLS socket. Do not use for hardening images and per-container runtime flags - use hardening-docker-containers-for-production.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41],"hardening","hardening docker daemon configuration","docker","security","cybersecurity","pr","benchmark","authentication","container-security","cis-benchmark","containers","Production","escalation","tls","breakout","daemon-hardening","rootless","userns-remap","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hardening-docker-daemon-configuration\ndescription: >-\n  Hardens the Docker daemon (dockerd) through \u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fdaemon.json with user namespace\n  remapping, TLS client authentication, seccomp profiles, and CIS Docker Benchmark controls\n  such as icc, no-new-privileges, and live-restore. Use when securing a Docker host's daemon\n  to prevent privilege escalation, breakout, or lateral movement, or when auditing daemon\n  settings against CIS requirements. Keywords: dockerd, daemon.json, userns-remap,\n  no-new-privileges, icc, live-restore, TLS socket. Do not use for hardening images and\n  per-container runtime flags - use hardening-docker-containers-for-production.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: container-security\ntags:\n- docker\n- daemon-hardening\n- container-security\n- cis-benchmark\n- rootless\n- userns-remap\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1610\n- T1611\n- T1609\n- T1525\n- T1553\n---\n\n# Hardening Docker Daemon Configuration\n\n## Overview\n\nThe Docker daemon (`dockerd`) runs with root privileges and controls all container operations. Hardening its configuration through `\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fdaemon.json`, TLS certificates, user namespace remapping, and network restrictions is essential to prevent privilege escalation, lateral movement, and container breakout attacks.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying or configuring hardening docker daemon configuration capabilities in your environment\n- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements\n- When building or improving security architecture for this domain\n- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Docker Engine 24.0+ installed\n- Root or sudo access to the Docker host\n- OpenSSL for TLS certificate generation\n- Understanding of Linux namespaces and cgroups\n\n## Core Hardened daemon.json\n\n```json\n{\n  \"icc\": false,\n  \"userns-remap\": \"default\",\n  \"no-new-privileges\": true,\n  \"log-driver\": \"json-file\",\n  \"log-opts\": {\n    \"max-size\": \"10m\",\n    \"max-file\": \"5\"\n  },\n  \"storage-driver\": \"overlay2\",\n  \"live-restore\": true,\n  \"userland-proxy\": false,\n  \"default-ulimits\": {\n    \"nofile\": {\n      \"Name\": \"nofile\",\n      \"Hard\": 65536,\n      \"Soft\": 32768\n    },\n    \"nproc\": {\n      \"Name\": \"nproc\",\n      \"Hard\": 4096,\n      \"Soft\": 2048\n    }\n  },\n  \"seccomp-profile\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fseccomp\u002Fdefault.json\",\n  \"default-address-pools\": [\n    {\n      \"base\": \"172.17.0.0\u002F16\",\n      \"size\": 24\n    }\n  ],\n  \"iptables\": true,\n  \"ip-forward\": true,\n  \"ip-masq\": true,\n  \"experimental\": false,\n  \"metrics-addr\": \"127.0.0.1:9323\",\n  \"max-concurrent-downloads\": 3,\n  \"max-concurrent-uploads\": 5,\n  \"default-runtime\": \"runc\",\n  \"runtimes\": {\n    \"runsc\": {\n      \"path\": \"\u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Frunsc\",\n      \"runtimeArgs\": [\"--platform=ptrace\"]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Setting-by-Setting Explanation\n\n### Disable Inter-Container Communication (ICC)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"icc\": false\n}\n```\n\nPrevents containers on the default bridge network from communicating. Each container must use explicit `--link` or user-defined networks with published ports.\n\n### Enable User Namespace Remapping\n\n```json\n{\n  \"userns-remap\": \"default\"\n}\n```\n\nMaps container root (UID 0) to a high unprivileged UID on the host. This prevents a container breakout from gaining root on the host.\n\n```bash\n# Verify userns-remap is active\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Fsubuid\n# Output: dockremap:100000:65536\n\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Fsubgid\n# Output: dockremap:100000:65536\n\n# Verify container UID mapping\ndocker run --rm alpine id\n# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) -- but host UID is 100000+\n```\n\n### Disable New Privilege Escalation\n\n```json\n{\n  \"no-new-privileges\": true\n}\n```\n\nPrevents container processes from gaining additional privileges via setuid\u002Fsetgid binaries or capability escalation.\n\n### Enable Live Restore\n\n```json\n{\n  \"live-restore\": true\n}\n```\n\nKeeps containers running during daemon downtime, enabling daemon upgrades without container restart.\n\n### Disable Userland Proxy\n\n```json\n{\n  \"userland-proxy\": false\n}\n```\n\nUses iptables rules instead of docker-proxy for port forwarding, reducing attack surface and improving performance.\n\n## TLS Configuration for Remote Docker API\n\n### Generate CA and Server Certificates\n\n```bash\n# Create CA\nopenssl genrsa -aes256 -out ca-key.pem 4096\nopenssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key ca-key.pem -sha256 -out ca.pem \\\n  -subj \"\u002FCN=Docker CA\"\n\n# Create server key and CSR\nopenssl genrsa -out server-key.pem 4096\nopenssl req -subj \"\u002FCN=docker-host\" -sha256 -new -key server-key.pem -out server.csr\n\n# Create extfile with SANs\necho \"subjectAltName = DNS:docker-host,IP:10.0.0.5,IP:127.0.0.1\" > extfile.cnf\necho \"extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth\" >> extfile.cnf\n\n# Sign server certificate\nopenssl x509 -req -days 365 -sha256 -in server.csr -CA ca.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \\\n  -CAcreateserial -out server-cert.pem -extfile extfile.cnf\n\n# Create client key and certificate\nopenssl genrsa -out key.pem 4096\nopenssl req -subj \"\u002FCN=client\" -new -key key.pem -out client.csr\necho \"extendedKeyUsage = clientAuth\" > extfile-client.cnf\nopenssl x509 -req -days 365 -sha256 -in client.csr -CA ca.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \\\n  -CAcreateserial -out cert.pem -extfile extfile-client.cnf\n\n# Set permissions\nchmod 0400 ca-key.pem key.pem server-key.pem\nchmod 0444 ca.pem server-cert.pem cert.pem\n\n# Move to Docker TLS directory\nsudo mkdir -p \u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\nsudo cp ca.pem server-cert.pem server-key.pem \u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002F\n```\n\n### Configure daemon.json for TLS\n\n```json\n{\n  \"tls\": true,\n  \"tlsverify\": true,\n  \"tlscacert\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002Fca.pem\",\n  \"tlscert\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002Fserver-cert.pem\",\n  \"tlskey\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002Fserver-key.pem\",\n  \"hosts\": [\"unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\", \"tcp:\u002F\u002F0.0.0.0:2376\"]\n}\n```\n\n### Client Connection\n\n```bash\ndocker --tlsverify \\\n  --tlscacert=ca.pem \\\n  --tlscert=cert.pem \\\n  --tlskey=key.pem \\\n  -H=tcp:\u002F\u002Fdocker-host:2376 version\n```\n\n## Docker Socket Protection\n\n```bash\n# Restrict socket ownership\nsudo chown root:docker \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\nsudo chmod 660 \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n\n# Audit Docker socket access\nsudo auditctl -w \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock -k docker-socket\n\n# Never mount Docker socket into containers\n# BAD: docker run -v \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock:\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock ...\n```\n\n## Rootless Docker\n\n```bash\n# Install rootless Docker\ncurl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Fget.docker.com\u002Frootless | sh\n\n# Configure environment\nexport PATH=$HOME\u002Fbin:$PATH\nexport DOCKER_HOST=unix:\u002F\u002F$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR\u002Fdocker.sock\n\n# Start rootless daemon\nsystemctl --user start docker\nsystemctl --user enable docker\n\n# Verify rootless mode\ndocker info | grep -i rootless\n# Rootless: true\n```\n\n## Content Trust (Image Signing)\n\n```bash\n# Enable Docker Content Trust\nexport DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1\n\n# Pull only signed images\ndocker pull library\u002Falpine:3.18\n# Will fail if image is not signed\n\n# Sign and push image\ndocker trust sign myregistry\u002Fmyapp:1.0\n```\n\n## Seccomp Profile\n\n```bash\n# View default seccomp profile\ndocker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'\n\n# Use custom seccomp profile\ndocker run --security-opt seccomp=\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fseccomp\u002Fcustom.json alpine\n\n# Verify seccomp is enabled\ndocker inspect --format='{{.HostConfig.SecurityOpt}}' container_name\n```\n\n## AppArmor Profile\n\n```bash\n# Check AppArmor status\nsudo aa-status\n\n# Use custom AppArmor profile\ndocker run --security-opt apparmor=docker-custom alpine\n\n# Load custom profile\nsudo apparmor_parser -r \u002Fetc\u002Fapparmor.d\u002Fdocker-custom\n```\n\n## Verification Commands\n\n```bash\n# Check daemon configuration\ndocker info\n\n# Verify userns-remap\ndocker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'\n\n# Check ICC setting\ndocker network inspect bridge --format '{{.Options}}'\n\n# Audit with Docker Bench\ndocker run --rm --net host --pid host \\\n  -v \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock:\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock \\\n  -v \u002Fetc:\u002Fetc:ro \\\n  docker\u002Fdocker-bench-security\n```\n\n## Best Practices\n\n1. **Never expose Docker daemon without TLS** - Always use `--tlsverify` for remote access\n2. **Enable user namespace remapping** - Map container root to unprivileged host UID\n3. **Disable ICC** - Prevent default bridge network container-to-container communication\n4. **Use rootless mode** - Run Docker daemon as non-root where possible\n5. **Enable content trust** - Only pull signed images\n6. **Configure log rotation** - Prevent log files from filling disk\n7. **Use seccomp profiles** - Restrict syscalls available to containers\n8. **Audit Docker socket** - Monitor access to \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n9. **Run Docker Bench regularly** - Automate CIS benchmark checks\n10. **Keep Docker updated** - Apply security patches promptly\n","# Hardening Docker Daemon Configuration\n\n## Overview\n\nThe Docker daemon (`dockerd`) runs with root privileges and controls all container operations. Hardening its configuration through `\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fdaemon.json`, TLS certificates, user namespace remapping, and network restrictions is essential to prevent privilege escalation, lateral movement, and container breakout attacks.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying or configuring hardening docker daemon configuration capabilities in your environment\n- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements\n- When building or improving security architecture for this domain\n- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Docker Engine 24.0+ installed\n- Root or sudo access to the Docker host\n- OpenSSL for TLS certificate generation\n- Understanding of Linux namespaces and cgroups\n\n## Core Hardened daemon.json\n\n```json\n{\n  \"icc\": false,\n  \"userns-remap\": \"default\",\n  \"no-new-privileges\": true,\n  \"log-driver\": \"json-file\",\n  \"log-opts\": {\n    \"max-size\": \"10m\",\n    \"max-file\": \"5\"\n  },\n  \"storage-driver\": \"overlay2\",\n  \"live-restore\": true,\n  \"userland-proxy\": false,\n  \"default-ulimits\": {\n    \"nofile\": {\n      \"Name\": \"nofile\",\n      \"Hard\": 65536,\n      \"Soft\": 32768\n    },\n    \"nproc\": {\n      \"Name\": \"nproc\",\n      \"Hard\": 4096,\n      \"Soft\": 2048\n    }\n  },\n  \"seccomp-profile\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fseccomp\u002Fdefault.json\",\n  \"default-address-pools\": [\n    {\n      \"base\": \"172.17.0.0\u002F16\",\n      \"size\": 24\n    }\n  ],\n  \"iptables\": true,\n  \"ip-forward\": true,\n  \"ip-masq\": true,\n  \"experimental\": false,\n  \"metrics-addr\": \"127.0.0.1:9323\",\n  \"max-concurrent-downloads\": 3,\n  \"max-concurrent-uploads\": 5,\n  \"default-runtime\": \"runc\",\n  \"runtimes\": {\n    \"runsc\": {\n      \"path\": \"\u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin\u002Frunsc\",\n      \"runtimeArgs\": [\"--platform=ptrace\"]\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Setting-by-Setting Explanation\n\n### Disable Inter-Container Communication (ICC)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"icc\": false\n}\n```\n\nPrevents containers on the default bridge network from communicating. Each container must use explicit `--link` or user-defined networks with published ports.\n\n### Enable User Namespace Remapping\n\n```json\n{\n  \"userns-remap\": \"default\"\n}\n```\n\nMaps container root (UID 0) to a high unprivileged UID on the host. This prevents a container breakout from gaining root on the host.\n\n```bash\n# Verify userns-remap is active\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Fsubuid\n# Output: dockremap:100000:65536\n\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Fsubgid\n# Output: dockremap:100000:65536\n\n# Verify container UID mapping\ndocker run --rm alpine id\n# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) -- but host UID is 100000+\n```\n\n### Disable New Privilege Escalation\n\n```json\n{\n  \"no-new-privileges\": true\n}\n```\n\nPrevents container processes from gaining additional privileges via setuid\u002Fsetgid binaries or capability escalation.\n\n### Enable Live Restore\n\n```json\n{\n  \"live-restore\": true\n}\n```\n\nKeeps containers running during daemon downtime, enabling daemon upgrades without container restart.\n\n### Disable Userland Proxy\n\n```json\n{\n  \"userland-proxy\": false\n}\n```\n\nUses iptables rules instead of docker-proxy for port forwarding, reducing attack surface and improving performance.\n\n## TLS Configuration for Remote Docker API\n\n### Generate CA and Server Certificates\n\n```bash\n# Create CA\nopenssl genrsa -aes256 -out ca-key.pem 4096\nopenssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key ca-key.pem -sha256 -out ca.pem \\\n  -subj \"\u002FCN=Docker CA\"\n\n# Create server key and CSR\nopenssl genrsa -out server-key.pem 4096\nopenssl req -subj \"\u002FCN=docker-host\" -sha256 -new -key server-key.pem -out server.csr\n\n# Create extfile with SANs\necho \"subjectAltName = DNS:docker-host,IP:10.0.0.5,IP:127.0.0.1\" > extfile.cnf\necho \"extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth\" >> extfile.cnf\n\n# Sign server certificate\nopenssl x509 -req -days 365 -sha256 -in server.csr -CA ca.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \\\n  -CAcreateserial -out server-cert.pem -extfile extfile.cnf\n\n# Create client key and certificate\nopenssl genrsa -out key.pem 4096\nopenssl req -subj \"\u002FCN=client\" -new -key key.pem -out client.csr\necho \"extendedKeyUsage = clientAuth\" > extfile-client.cnf\nopenssl x509 -req -days 365 -sha256 -in client.csr -CA ca.pem -CAkey ca-key.pem \\\n  -CAcreateserial -out cert.pem -extfile extfile-client.cnf\n\n# Set permissions\nchmod 0400 ca-key.pem key.pem server-key.pem\nchmod 0444 ca.pem server-cert.pem cert.pem\n\n# Move to Docker TLS directory\nsudo mkdir -p \u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\nsudo cp ca.pem server-cert.pem server-key.pem \u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002F\n```\n\n### Configure daemon.json for TLS\n\n```json\n{\n  \"tls\": true,\n  \"tlsverify\": true,\n  \"tlscacert\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002Fca.pem\",\n  \"tlscert\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002Fserver-cert.pem\",\n  \"tlskey\": \"\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Ftls\u002Fserver-key.pem\",\n  \"hosts\": [\"unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\", \"tcp:\u002F\u002F0.0.0.0:2376\"]\n}\n```\n\n### Client Connection\n\n```bash\ndocker --tlsverify \\\n  --tlscacert=ca.pem \\\n  --tlscert=cert.pem \\\n  --tlskey=key.pem \\\n  -H=tcp:\u002F\u002Fdocker-host:2376 version\n```\n\n## Docker Socket Protection\n\n```bash\n# Restrict socket ownership\nsudo chown root:docker \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\nsudo chmod 660 \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n\n# Audit Docker socket access\nsudo auditctl -w \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock -k docker-socket\n\n# Never mount Docker socket into containers\n# BAD: docker run -v \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock:\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock ...\n```\n\n## Rootless Docker\n\n```bash\n# Install rootless Docker\ncurl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Fget.docker.com\u002Frootless | sh\n\n# Configure environment\nexport PATH=$HOME\u002Fbin:$PATH\nexport DOCKER_HOST=unix:\u002F\u002F$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR\u002Fdocker.sock\n\n# Start rootless daemon\nsystemctl --user start docker\nsystemctl --user enable docker\n\n# Verify rootless mode\ndocker info | grep -i rootless\n# Rootless: true\n```\n\n## Content Trust (Image Signing)\n\n```bash\n# Enable Docker Content Trust\nexport DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1\n\n# Pull only signed images\ndocker pull library\u002Falpine:3.18\n# Will fail if image is not signed\n\n# Sign and push image\ndocker trust sign myregistry\u002Fmyapp:1.0\n```\n\n## Seccomp Profile\n\n```bash\n# View default seccomp profile\ndocker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'\n\n# Use custom seccomp profile\ndocker run --security-opt seccomp=\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fseccomp\u002Fcustom.json alpine\n\n# Verify seccomp is enabled\ndocker inspect --format='{{.HostConfig.SecurityOpt}}' container_name\n```\n\n## AppArmor Profile\n\n```bash\n# Check AppArmor status\nsudo aa-status\n\n# Use custom AppArmor profile\ndocker run --security-opt apparmor=docker-custom alpine\n\n# Load custom profile\nsudo apparmor_parser -r \u002Fetc\u002Fapparmor.d\u002Fdocker-custom\n```\n\n## Verification Commands\n\n```bash\n# Check daemon configuration\ndocker info\n\n# Verify userns-remap\ndocker info --format '{{.SecurityOptions}}'\n\n# Check ICC setting\ndocker network inspect bridge --format '{{.Options}}'\n\n# Audit with Docker Bench\ndocker run --rm --net host --pid host \\\n  -v \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock:\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock \\\n  -v \u002Fetc:\u002Fetc:ro \\\n  docker\u002Fdocker-bench-security\n```\n\n## Best Practices\n\n1. **Never expose Docker daemon without TLS** - Always use `--tlsverify` for remote access\n2. **Enable user namespace remapping** - Map container root to unprivileged host UID\n3. **Disable ICC** - Prevent default bridge network container-to-container communication\n4. **Use rootless mode** - Run Docker daemon as non-root where possible\n5. **Enable content trust** - Only pull signed images\n6. **Configure log rotation** - Prevent log files from filling disk\n7. **Use seccomp profiles** - Restrict syscalls available to containers\n8. **Audit Docker socket** - Monitor access to \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n9. **Run Docker Bench regularly** - Automate CIS benchmark checks\n10. **Keep Docker updated** - Apply security patches promptly\n",{"name":5,"tags":47,"author":48,"domain":28,"license":15,"version":49,"nist_csf":50,"subdomain":32,"description":7,"mitre_attack":55},[26,39,32,33,40,41],"mahipal","1.0",[51,52,53,54],"PR.PS-01","PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","DE.CM-01",[56,57,58,59,60],"T1610","T1611","T1609","T1525","T1553","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":72,"prompt":82,"zipAvailable":83},[73,76,79],{"tool":74,"command":75},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill hardening-docker-daemon-configuration",{"tool":77,"command":78},"bunx","bunx 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hardening-docker-daemon-configuration","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002FSKILL.md",true,[85,91,96,102,106,110,114,118,124],{"path":86,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",1750,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":92,"resourceType":92,"resourceTypeDesc":93,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002FLICENSE",{"path":97,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":100,"sourceHtmlUrl":101},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1957,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":103,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":104,"sourceHtmlUrl":105},"references\u002Faside-repl-api-gotchas.md",6983,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Faside-browser-default\u002Freferences\u002Faside-repl-api-gotchas.md",{"path":107,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":108,"sourceHtmlUrl":109},"references\u002Foauth-capture-and-drive.md",1443,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjleechanorg\u002Fjleechan-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Faside-browser-default\u002Freferences\u002Foauth-capture-and-drive.md",{"path":111,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":112,"sourceHtmlUrl":113},"references\u002Fstandards.md",2431,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":115,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":116,"sourceHtmlUrl":117},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",2710,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":119,"resourceType":120,"resourceTypeDesc":121,"sizeBytes":122,"sourceHtmlUrl":123},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",4804,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":125,"resourceType":120,"resourceTypeDesc":121,"sizeBytes":126,"sourceHtmlUrl":127},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",8583,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fhardening-docker-daemon-configuration\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[129,156,180,208,234,261],{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":138,"publishedAt":42},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[135],{"categoryNo":136,"categoryName":137,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[139,140,141,142,27,28,143,144,29,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":157,"name":158,"nameZh":6,"description":159,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":160,"categories":161,"keywords":163,"publishedAt":42},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[162],{"categoryNo":136,"categoryName":137,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[164,152,165,166,27,167,28,29,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":181,"name":182,"nameZh":6,"description":183,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":184,"categories":185,"keywords":190,"publishedAt":42},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[186,189],{"categoryNo":187,"categoryName":188,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":136,"categoryName":137,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[174,191,192,193,194,28,195,196,168,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":209,"name":210,"nameZh":6,"description":211,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":212,"categories":213,"keywords":215,"publishedAt":42},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[214],{"categoryNo":136,"categoryName":137,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[216,217,218,28,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,171,231,232,233],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":235,"name":236,"nameZh":6,"description":237,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":238,"categories":239,"keywords":241,"publishedAt":42},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[240],{"categoryNo":136,"categoryName":137,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[242,243,244,28,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,260],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":262,"name":263,"nameZh":6,"description":264,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":265,"categories":266,"keywords":268,"publishedAt":42},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[267],{"categoryNo":136,"categoryName":137,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[27,269,28,270,271,272,273,274,275,276,277,203,278,204,279,280,281,282,283,284],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]