[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AEK6C522Z13D355C72PTG0":3,"skill-same:01M6AEK6C522Z13D355C72PTG0":112},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":67,"commitSha":68,"skillDirectory":69,"forksCount":70,"repositoryHtmlUrl":71,"repositoryHomepageUrl":72,"ownerHtmlUrl":73,"ownerBlogUrl":74,"ownerDescription":75,"updatedAt":76,"install":77,"resources":90},"01M6AEK6C522Z13D355C72PTG0","detecting-wmi-persistence",null,"Detect WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE T1546.003) by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding creation, cross-referenced against root\\subscription namespace contents and Sysinternals Autoruns. Use when hunting WMI-based persistence, triaging a Sysmon alert on these event IDs, or during incident response and purple-team validation of WMI defenses.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",35990,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-wmi-persistence\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"detecting wmi persistence","persistence","threat-hunting","wmi","t1059","ids","purple-team","sysmon","T1059.001","analyzing","dfir","malicious","mitre-attack","server","monitoring","protocol","validation","windows","incident response","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: detecting-wmi-persistence\ndescription: Detect WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE T1546.003) by analyzing Sysmon\n  Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding\n  creation, cross-referenced against root\\subscription namespace contents and Sysinternals\n  Autoruns. Use when hunting WMI-based persistence, triaging a Sysmon alert on these event\n  IDs, or during incident response and purple-team validation of WMI defenses.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- wmi\n- persistence\n- sysmon\n- t1546.003\n- mitre-attack\n- windows\n- dfir\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1546.003\n- T1047\n- T1059.001\n---\n\n# Detecting WMI Persistence\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1546.003)\n- After detecting suspicious WMI activity in endpoint telemetry\n- During incident response to identify attacker persistence mechanisms\n- When Sysmon alerts trigger on Event IDs 19, 20, or 21\n- During purple team exercises testing WMI-based persistence\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon v6.1+ deployed with WMI event logging enabled (Event IDs 19, 20, 21)\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding configured\n- SIEM with Sysmon data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- PowerShell access for WMI enumeration on endpoints\n- Sysinternals Autoruns for manual WMI subscription review\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Collect Telemetry**: Parse Sysmon Event IDs 19 (WmiEventFilter), 20 (WmiEventConsumer), 21 (WmiEventConsumerToFilter).\n2. **Identify Suspicious Consumers**: Flag CommandLineEventConsumer and ActiveScriptEventConsumer types executing code.\n3. **Analyze Event Filters**: Examine WQL queries in EventFilters for process start triggers or timer-based execution.\n4. **Correlate Bindings**: Match FilterToConsumerBindings linking suspicious filters to consumers.\n5. **Check Persistence Locations**: Query WMI namespaces root\\subscription and root\\default for active subscriptions.\n6. **Validate Findings**: Cross-reference with known-good WMI subscriptions (SCCM, AV products).\n7. **Document and Remediate**: Remove malicious subscriptions and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Sysmon Event 19 | WmiEventFilter creation detected |\n| Sysmon Event 20 | WmiEventConsumer creation detected |\n| Sysmon Event 21 | WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding detected |\n| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |\n| CommandLineEventConsumer | Executes system commands when filter triggers |\n| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Runs VBScript\u002FJScript when filter triggers |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Windows event monitoring for WMI activity |\n| WMI Explorer | GUI tool for browsing WMI namespaces |\n| Autoruns | Sysinternals tool listing persistence mechanisms |\n| PowerShell Get-WMIObject | Enumerate WMI event subscriptions |\n| Splunk | SIEM analysis of Sysmon WMI events |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint WMI artifact collection |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1546.003\nHost: [Hostname]\nEvent Type: [EventFilter|EventConsumer|Binding]\nConsumer Type: [CommandLine|ActiveScript]\nWQL Query: [Filter query text]\nCommand: [Executed command or script]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Remove subscription, investigate lateral movement]\n```\n","# Detecting WMI Persistence\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1546.003)\n- After detecting suspicious WMI activity in endpoint telemetry\n- During incident response to identify attacker persistence mechanisms\n- When Sysmon alerts trigger on Event IDs 19, 20, or 21\n- During purple team exercises testing WMI-based persistence\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon v6.1+ deployed with WMI event logging enabled (Event IDs 19, 20, 21)\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding configured\n- SIEM with Sysmon data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- PowerShell access for WMI enumeration on endpoints\n- Sysinternals Autoruns for manual WMI subscription review\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Collect Telemetry**: Parse Sysmon Event IDs 19 (WmiEventFilter), 20 (WmiEventConsumer), 21 (WmiEventConsumerToFilter).\n2. **Identify Suspicious Consumers**: Flag CommandLineEventConsumer and ActiveScriptEventConsumer types executing code.\n3. **Analyze Event Filters**: Examine WQL queries in EventFilters for process start triggers or timer-based execution.\n4. **Correlate Bindings**: Match FilterToConsumerBindings linking suspicious filters to consumers.\n5. **Check Persistence Locations**: Query WMI namespaces root\\subscription and root\\default for active subscriptions.\n6. **Validate Findings**: Cross-reference with known-good WMI subscriptions (SCCM, AV products).\n7. **Document and Remediate**: Remove malicious subscriptions and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Sysmon Event 19 | WmiEventFilter creation detected |\n| Sysmon Event 20 | WmiEventConsumer creation detected |\n| Sysmon Event 21 | WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding detected |\n| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |\n| CommandLineEventConsumer | Executes system commands when filter triggers |\n| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Runs VBScript\u002FJScript when filter triggers |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Windows event monitoring for WMI activity |\n| WMI Explorer | GUI tool for browsing WMI namespaces |\n| Autoruns | Sysinternals tool listing persistence mechanisms |\n| PowerShell Get-WMIObject | Enumerate WMI event subscriptions |\n| Splunk | SIEM analysis of Sysmon WMI events |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint WMI artifact collection |\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1546.003\nHost: [Hostname]\nEvent Type: [EventFilter|EventConsumer|Binding]\nConsumer Type: [CommandLine|ActiveScript]\nWQL Query: [Filter query text]\nCommand: [Executed command or script]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Remove subscription, investigate lateral movement]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":51,"domain":43,"license":15,"version":52,"nist_csf":53,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":58,"d3fend_techniques":61},[26,27,25,31,50,36,41,34],"t1546.003","mahipal","1.0",[54,55,56,57],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[59,60,32],"T1546.003","T1047",[62,63,64,65,66],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform Monitoring","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fdetecting-wmi-persistence",4395,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":78,"prompt":88,"zipAvailable":89},[79,82,85],{"tool":80,"command":81},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-wmi-persistence",{"tool":83,"command":84},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-wmi-persistence",{"tool":86,"command":87},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill detecting-wmi-persistence","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-wmi-persistence\u002FSKILL.md",true,[91,97,102,106],{"path":92,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"config.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",18,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftwaldin\u002Fdotfiles\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fagents\u002Fskills\u002Fagent-browser\u002Fconfig.json",{"path":98,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":100,"sourceHtmlUrl":101},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-wmi-persistence\u002FLICENSE",{"path":103,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":104,"sourceHtmlUrl":105},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",2985,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-wmi-persistence\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":107,"resourceType":108,"resourceTypeDesc":109,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",8867,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-wmi-persistence\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[113,139,163,190,214,241],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":117,"categories":118,"keywords":120,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[119],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[121,122,123,124,125,43,42,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":140,"name":141,"nameZh":6,"description":142,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":143,"categories":144,"keywords":146,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[145],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[147,135,148,149,125,150,43,127,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":164,"name":165,"nameZh":6,"description":166,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":167,"categories":168,"keywords":173,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[169,172],{"categoryNo":170,"categoryName":171,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[157,174,175,176,177,43,178,40,151,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":191,"name":192,"nameZh":6,"description":193,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":194,"categories":195,"keywords":197,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[196],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[41,198,199,43,200,201,202,203,34,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,154,211,212,213],"kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":215,"name":216,"nameZh":6,"description":217,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":218,"categories":219,"keywords":221,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[220],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[222,223,224,43,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":242,"name":243,"nameZh":6,"description":244,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":245,"categories":246,"keywords":248,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[247],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[125,249,43,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,185,258,186,259,260,261,262,263,264],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]