AGENT SKILL

detecting-wmi-persistence

Detect WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE T1546.003) by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding creation, cross-referenced against root\subscription namespace contents and Sysinternals Autoruns. Use when hunting WMI-based persistence, triaging a Sysmon alert on these event IDs, or during incident response and purple-team validation of WMI defenses.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-08-31
Stars
★ 3.6w
Forks
4.4k

01 前言 Front Matter

name
detecting-wmi-persistence
tags
[ "threat-hunting", "wmi", "persistence", "sysmon", "t1546.003", "mitre-attack", "windows", "dfir" ]
author
mahipal
domain
cybersecurity
license
Apache-2.0
version
1.0
nist_csf
[ "DE.CM-01", "DE.AE-02", "DE.AE-07", "ID.RA-05" ]
subdomain
threat-hunting
description
Detect WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE T1546.003) by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding creation, cross-referenced against root\subscription namespace contents and Sysinternals Autoruns. Use when hunting WMI-based persistence, triaging a Sysmon alert on these event IDs, or during incident response and purple-team validation of WMI defenses.
mitre_attack
[ "T1546.003", "T1047", "T1059.001" ]
d3fend_techniques
[ "Application Protocol Command Analysis", "Network Isolation", "Network Traffic Analysis", "Client-server Payload Profiling", "Platform Monitoring" ]

02 资源文件 4

03 SKILL.md 正文

Detecting WMI Persistence

When to Use

  • When hunting for WMI event subscription persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1546.003)
  • After detecting suspicious WMI activity in endpoint telemetry
  • During incident response to identify attacker persistence mechanisms
  • When Sysmon alerts trigger on Event IDs 19, 20, or 21
  • During purple team exercises testing WMI-based persistence

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon v6.1+ deployed with WMI event logging enabled (Event IDs 19, 20, 21)
  • Windows Security Event Log forwarding configured
  • SIEM with Sysmon data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
  • PowerShell access for WMI enumeration on endpoints
  • Sysinternals Autoruns for manual WMI subscription review

Workflow

  1. Collect Telemetry: Parse Sysmon Event IDs 19 (WmiEventFilter), 20 (WmiEventConsumer), 21 (WmiEventConsumerToFilter).
  2. Identify Suspicious Consumers: Flag CommandLineEventConsumer and ActiveScriptEventConsumer types executing code.
  3. Analyze Event Filters: Examine WQL queries in EventFilters for process start triggers or timer-based execution.
  4. Correlate Bindings: Match FilterToConsumerBindings linking suspicious filters to consumers.
  5. Check Persistence Locations: Query WMI namespaces root\subscription and root\default for active subscriptions.
  6. Validate Findings: Cross-reference with known-good WMI subscriptions (SCCM, AV products).
  7. Document and Remediate: Remove malicious subscriptions and update detection rules.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
Sysmon Event 19 WmiEventFilter creation detected
Sysmon Event 20 WmiEventConsumer creation detected
Sysmon Event 21 WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding detected
T1546.003 Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription
CommandLineEventConsumer Executes system commands when filter triggers
ActiveScriptEventConsumer Runs VBScript/JScript when filter triggers

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Sysmon Windows event monitoring for WMI activity
WMI Explorer GUI tool for browsing WMI namespaces
Autoruns Sysinternals tool listing persistence mechanisms
PowerShell Get-WMIObject Enumerate WMI event subscriptions
Splunk SIEM analysis of Sysmon WMI events
Velociraptor Endpoint WMI artifact collection

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1546.003
Host: [Hostname]
Event Type: [EventFilter|EventConsumer|Binding]
Consumer Type: [CommandLine|ActiveScript]
WQL Query: [Filter query text]
Command: [Executed command or script]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Remove subscription, investigate lateral movement]

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