detecting-mobile-malware-behavior
Detects and analyzes malicious behavior in mobile applications through behavioral analysis, permission abuse detection, network traffic monitoring, and dynamic instrumentation. Use when analyzing suspicious mobile applications for data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, credential stealing, SMS interception, or other malware indicators. Activates for requests involving mobile malware analysis, app behavior monitoring, trojan detection, or suspicious app investigation.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- detecting-mobile-malware-behavior
- tags
- [ "mobile-security", "android", "ios", "malware-analysis", "owasp-mobile", "penetration-testing" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0.0
- mitre_f3
- { "tactics": [ "positioning", "execution", "initial-access" ], "version": "1.1", "techniques": [ { "id": "T1453", "name": "Abuse Accessibility Features", "source": "attack", "tactic": "positioning" }, { "id": "F1003", "name": "Abuse SMS verification", "source": "f3", "tactic": "execution" }, { "id": "T1113", "name": "Screen Capture", "source": "attack", "tactic": "positioning" }, { "id": "T1219", "name": "Remote Access Tools", "source": "attack", "tactic": "positioning" }, { "id": "F1002.001", "name": "Abuse of Public-Facing API: Mobile API Abuse", "source": "f3", "tactic": "positioning" } ] }
- nist_csf
- [ "PR.PS-01", "PR.AA-05", "ID.RA-01", "DE.CM-09" ]
- subdomain
- mobile-security
- description
- Detects and analyzes malicious behavior in mobile applications through behavioral analysis, permission abuse detection, network traffic monitoring, and dynamic instrumentation. Use when analyzing suspicious mobile applications for data exfiltration, command-and-control communication, credential stealing, SMS interception, or other malware indicators. Activates for requests involving mobile malware analysis, app behavior monitoring, trojan detection, or suspicious app investigation.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1059", "T1056", "T1036", "T1078", "T1003" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 资产文件assets/template.md956 B
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md1.7 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md931 B
- 参考文档references/workflows.md1.0 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py6.1 KB
- 脚本scripts/process.py8.8 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Detecting Mobile Malware Behavior
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Analyzing suspicious mobile applications submitted by users or discovered during incident response
- Monitoring enterprise mobile fleet for malicious app indicators
- Performing malware triage on APK/IPA samples
- Investigating data exfiltration or unauthorized device access from mobile apps
Do not use this skill to create, enhance, or distribute malware. This skill is for defensive analysis only.
Prerequisites
- Isolated analysis environment (dedicated device or emulator, not connected to production networks)
- MobSF for automated static+dynamic analysis
- Frida/Objection for runtime behavior monitoring
- Wireshark/tcpdump for network traffic capture
- Android emulator (AVD) or Genymotion for safe execution
- VirusTotal API key for hash lookups
Workflow
Step 1: Static Indicator Analysis
# Hash the sample
sha256sum suspicious.apk
# Check VirusTotal
curl -s "https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3/files/<SHA256>" \
-H "x-apikey: <VT_API_KEY>" | jq '.data.attributes.last_analysis_stats'
# Extract permissions from AndroidManifest.xml
aapt dump permissions suspicious.apk
# High-risk permission combinations:
# READ_SMS + INTERNET = SMS stealer
# RECEIVE_SMS + SEND_SMS = SMS interceptor/banker trojan
# ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE + INTERNET = overlay attack capability
# CAMERA + RECORD_AUDIO + INTERNET = spyware
# DEVICE_ADMIN + INTERNET = ransomware capability
# READ_CONTACTS + INTERNET = contact exfiltration
Step 2: MobSF Automated Malware Scan
# Upload to MobSF
curl -F "file=@suspicious.apk" http://localhost:8000/api/v1/upload \
-H "Authorization: <API_KEY>"
# Review malware indicators in report:
# - Hardcoded C2 server addresses
# - Dynamic code loading (DexClassLoader)
# - Reflection-based API calls (to evade static analysis)
# - Encrypted/obfuscated payloads
# - Root detection (malware often checks for root)
# - Anti-emulator checks (malware evades sandbox)
Step 3: Network Behavior Monitoring
# Start packet capture on emulator
tcpdump -i any -w malware_traffic.pcap
# Or use mitmproxy for HTTP/HTTPS
mitmproxy --mode transparent
# Monitor for:
# - DNS lookups to suspicious/newly registered domains
# - Connections to known C2 infrastructure
# - Data exfiltration patterns (large POST requests)
# - Beaconing behavior (regular interval connections)
# - Non-standard ports and protocols
# - Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) patterns
Step 4: Runtime Behavior Monitoring with Frida
// monitor_malware.js - Comprehensive behavior monitoring
Java.perform(function() {
// Monitor SMS access
var SmsManager = Java.use("android.telephony.SmsManager");
SmsManager.sendTextMessage.overload("java.lang.String", "java.lang.String",
"java.lang.String", "android.app.PendingIntent", "android.app.PendingIntent")
.implementation = function(dest, sc, text, sent, delivery) {
console.log("[SMS] Sending to: " + dest + " Text: " + text);
// Allow or block based on analysis needs
return this.sendTextMessage(dest, sc, text, sent, delivery);
};
// Monitor file operations
var FileOutputStream = Java.use("java.io.FileOutputStream");
FileOutputStream.$init.overload("java.lang.String").implementation = function(path) {
console.log("[FILE-WRITE] " + path);
return this.$init(path);
};
// Monitor network connections
var URL = Java.use("java.net.URL");
URL.openConnection.overload().implementation = function() {
console.log("[NET] " + this.toString());
return this.openConnection();
};
// Monitor dynamic code loading
var DexClassLoader = Java.use("dalvik.system.DexClassLoader");
DexClassLoader.$init.implementation = function(dexPath, optDir, libPath, parent) {
console.log("[DEX-LOAD] Loading: " + dexPath);
return this.$init(dexPath, optDir, libPath, parent);
};
// Monitor command execution
var Runtime = Java.use("java.lang.Runtime");
Runtime.exec.overload("java.lang.String").implementation = function(cmd) {
console.log("[EXEC] " + cmd);
return this.exec(cmd);
};
// Monitor camera/audio access
var Camera = Java.use("android.hardware.Camera");
Camera.open.overload("int").implementation = function(id) {
console.log("[CAMERA] Camera opened: " + id);
return this.open(id);
};
// Monitor content provider access (contacts, call log)
var ContentResolver = Java.use("android.content.ContentResolver");
ContentResolver.query.overload("android.net.Uri", "[Ljava.lang.String;",
"java.lang.String", "[Ljava.lang.String;", "java.lang.String")
.implementation = function(uri, proj, sel, selArgs, sort) {
console.log("[QUERY] " + uri.toString());
return this.query(uri, proj, sel, selArgs, sort);
};
console.log("[*] Malware behavior monitor active");
});
Step 5: Classify Malware Type
Based on observed behaviors, classify the sample:
| Behavior Pattern | Malware Type |
|---|---|
| SMS interception + C2 communication | Banking Trojan |
| Camera/mic access + data upload | Spyware/Stalkerware |
| File encryption + ransom note display | Mobile Ransomware |
| Ad injection + click fraud traffic | Adware |
| Root exploit + persistence | Rootkit |
| Contact harvesting + SMS spam | Worm/SMS Spammer |
| Overlay attacks + credential capture | Credential Stealer |
| Crypto mining network activity | Cryptojacker |
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Dynamic Code Loading | Loading executable code at runtime from external sources, commonly used by malware to evade static analysis |
| C2 Beacon | Regular network check-in from malware to command-and-control server, identifiable by periodic timing patterns |
| DGA | Domain Generation Algorithm creating pseudo-random domain names for resilient C2 infrastructure |
| Overlay Attack | Drawing fake UI over legitimate apps to capture credentials, requiring SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission |
| Anti-Emulator | Techniques malware uses to detect sandbox/emulator environments and suppress malicious behavior |
Tools & Systems
- MobSF: Automated static and dynamic analysis for initial malware triage
- VirusTotal: Multi-engine malware scanning and hash reputation lookup
- Frida: Runtime behavior monitoring through method hooking
- Wireshark: Network traffic analysis for C2 communication patterns
- Cuckoo Sandbox / CuckooDroid: Automated malware analysis sandbox for Android samples
Common Pitfalls
- Anti-analysis evasion: Sophisticated malware detects emulators, debuggers, and Frida. Use hardware devices and stealthy Frida configurations for accurate analysis.
- Time-delayed payloads: Some malware activates only after a delay or specific trigger. Monitor for extended periods and simulate various conditions.
- Encrypted C2: Malware using encrypted communications requires TLS interception or memory inspection to observe payload content.
- Multi-stage payloads: Initial APK may be benign; malicious payload downloads later. Monitor for dynamic code loading and file downloads.
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