detecting-azure-storage-account-misconfigurations
Audit Azure Blob and ADLS storage accounts for public access exposure, weak or long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption at rest, disabled HTTPS-only traffic, and outdated TLS versions, using the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK to generate a risk-scored report. Use when assessing an Azure subscription's storage accounts for misconfiguration, building cloud security posture checks, or investigating a suspected data exposure via public blob access.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-08-31
- Stars
- ★ 3.6w
- Forks
- 4.4k
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- detecting-azure-storage-account-misconfigurations
- tags
- [ "Azure", "storage-accounts", "blob-storage", "ADLS", "SAS-tokens", "encryption", "public-access", "cloud-misconfiguration", "azure-mgmt-storage" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "PR.IR-01", "ID.AM-08", "GV.SC-06", "DE.CM-01" ]
- subdomain
- cloud-security
- description
- Audit Azure Blob and ADLS storage accounts for public access exposure, weak or long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption at rest, disabled HTTPS-only traffic, and outdated TLS versions, using the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK to generate a risk-scored report. Use when assessing an Azure subscription's storage accounts for misconfiguration, building cloud security posture checks, or investigating a suspected data exposure via public blob access.
- nist_ai_rmf
- [ "MEASURE-2.7", "MAP-5.1", "MANAGE-2.4" ]
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1530", "T1078.004", "T1619", "T1580" ]
- atlas_techniques
- [ "AML.T0070", "AML.T0066", "AML.T0082" ]
02 资源文件 3
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md3.3 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py8.8 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Detecting Azure Storage Account Misconfigurations
Overview
Azure Storage accounts are a frequent target for attackers due to misconfigured public access, long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption, and outdated TLS versions. This skill uses the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK with StorageManagementClient to enumerate all storage accounts in a subscription, inspect their security properties, list blob containers for public access settings, and generate a risk-scored audit report identifying critical misconfigurations.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure storage account misconfigurations
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with
azure-mgmt-storage,azure-identity - Azure service principal with Reader role on target subscription
- Environment variables: AZURE_CLIENT_ID, AZURE_TENANT_ID, AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET, AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID
Key Detection Areas
- Public blob access —
allow_blob_public_accessenabled on storage account or individual containers set to Blob/Container access level - HTTPS enforcement —
enable_https_traffic_onlydisabled, allowing unencrypted HTTP traffic - Minimum TLS version — accounts accepting TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 instead of minimum TLS 1.2
- Encryption at rest — storage service encryption not enabled or missing customer-managed keys
- Network rules — default action set to Allow instead of Deny, exposing storage to all networks
- SAS token risks — account-level SAS with overly broad permissions or excessive lifetime
Output
JSON report with per-account findings, severity ratings (Critical/High/Medium/Low), and remediation recommendations aligned with CIS Azure Benchmark controls.
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