[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AE2C05T1KQHQH25P34KAT3":3,"skill-same:01M6AE2C05T1KQHQH25P34KAT3":109},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":62,"commitSha":63,"skillDirectory":64,"forksCount":65,"repositoryHtmlUrl":66,"repositoryHomepageUrl":67,"ownerHtmlUrl":68,"ownerBlogUrl":69,"ownerDescription":70,"updatedAt":71,"install":72,"resources":85},"01M6AE2C05T1KQHQH25P34KAT3","conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30",null,"Conduct a defensible cybersecurity risk assessment using the NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 methodology: prepare scope and a risk model, identify threat sources and threat events, identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions, determine likelihood and impact, compute risk, and communicate results as a prioritized risk register. Use when an organization needs an actual risk *assessment* (not a maturity score), when a control framework (CSF, ISO 27001, RMF, SOC 2, PCI) requires a documented risk analysis as input, when leadership asks \"what are our top risks and how bad are they\", when assessing risk for a new system or major change, or when building a risk register from scratch. This is the methodology that feeds framework selection, ATO packages, and treatment decisions. Keywords: risk assessment, NIST 800-30, threat modeling, likelihood and impact, risk register, risk analysis, threat sources, vulnerabilities, risk determination, qualitative risk, risk matrix, residual risk, risk treatment.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"conducting cyber risk assessment with nist 800 30","risk assessment","assessment","NIST","compliance","nist-800-39","risk-register","threat-modeling","risk-management","feeds","methodology","soc","cybersecurity","packages","risk register","risk analysis","governance","prepare","change","vulnerabilities","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\ndescription: >-\n  Conduct a defensible cybersecurity risk assessment using the NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1\n  methodology: prepare scope and a risk model, identify threat sources and threat events,\n  identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions, determine likelihood and impact,\n  compute risk, and communicate results as a prioritized risk register. Use when an\n  organization needs an actual risk *assessment* (not a maturity score), when a control\n  framework (CSF, ISO 27001, RMF, SOC 2, PCI) requires a documented risk analysis as input,\n  when leadership asks \"what are our top risks and how bad are they\", when assessing risk\n  for a new system or major change, or when building a risk register from scratch. This is\n  the methodology that feeds framework selection, ATO packages, and treatment decisions.\n  Keywords: risk assessment, NIST 800-30, threat modeling, likelihood and impact, risk\n  register, risk analysis, threat sources, vulnerabilities, risk determination, qualitative\n  risk, risk matrix, residual risk, risk treatment.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: compliance-governance\ntags:\n- risk-assessment\n- nist-800-30\n- risk-management\n- threat-modeling\n- risk-register\n- governance\n- nist-800-39\n- compliance\nversion: \"1.0\"\nauthor: andrewibrah\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- GV.RM-01\n- ID.RA-01\n- ID.RA-03\n- ID.RA-04\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1566\n- T1078\n- T1190\n- T1486\n- T1021\n---\n\n# Conducting a Cyber Risk Assessment with NIST SP 800-30\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When the organization needs a real risk *assessment* — an analysis of specific threats, likelihoods, and impacts — rather than a maturity score against a framework. (Maturity tells you how mature your practices are; a risk assessment tells you what could hurt you and how badly.)\n- When another framework requires a documented risk analysis as a mandatory input: NIST CSF (ID.RA), ISO 27001 (Clause 6.1.2), NIST RMF \u002F 800-37 (the Prepare and Select steps), SOC 2 (CC3), PCI DSS, or HIPAA (§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)).\n- When standing up or significantly changing a system and you must understand its risk before authorization or go-live.\n- When leadership asks for the organization's top risks, ranked, with a rationale they can defend to a board or regulator.\n- When building or refreshing an enterprise risk register.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- An inventory of in-scope assets, systems, and the information types they handle (system boundary defined).\n- Access to threat intelligence (internal incident history, sector ISAC feeds, MITRE ATT&CK) to ground threat-event likelihood in observed behavior.\n- Vulnerability data (scan results, pen-test findings, configuration\u002Farchitecture review) for the in-scope systems.\n- Business context: which missions\u002Fprocesses the systems support, and what impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability would mean in business terms.\n- Agreement on the **risk model and scales** before scoring, so results are comparable and repeatable (see `references\u002Fstandards.md`).\n- Familiarity with the three-tier risk-management context from NIST SP 800-39 (organization, mission\u002Fbusiness process, information system).\n\n## Workflow\n\nNIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 defines four steps. Steps 1 and 4 bookend the assessment; Step 2 is the analytic core.\n\n### 1. Prepare for the assessment\nDefine and document:\n- **Purpose** (e.g., support an authorization decision, inform control selection, satisfy ISO 6.1.2).\n- **Scope** — organizational tier (Tier 1\u002F2\u002F3), systems, and time horizon.\n- **Assumptions and constraints** (e.g., assume an external adversarial threat with moderate capability).\n- **Information sources** — threat, vulnerability, and impact inputs.\n- **Risk model and analytic approach** — the factors (threat source, threat event, vulnerability, likelihood, impact) and the scales (qualitative Very Low–Very High, or semi-quantitative 0–10). Lock these now.\n\n### 2. Conduct the assessment\nWork through the analytic tasks in order. The 800-30 appendices provide the reference taxonomies (D–I).\n\n**2a. Identify threat sources (Appendix D).** Classify by type: **Adversarial** (individuals, groups, nation-states — characterize capability, intent, targeting), **Accidental** (user error), **Structural** (equipment\u002Fsoftware failure), **Environmental** (natural disasters, infrastructure outages).\n\n**2b. Identify threat events (Appendix E).** The specific actions a source could take (e.g., \"adversary exfiltrates credentials via phishing then moves laterally\"). Map adversarial events to MITRE ATT&CK techniques for traceability.\n\n**2c. Identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions (Appendix F).** Weaknesses (missing MFA, unpatched service) and conditions that make exploitation more or less likely (internet exposure, flat network, lack of segmentation).\n\n**2d. Determine likelihood (Appendix G).** Assess the likelihood that a threat event is *initiated* (adversarial) or *occurs* (non-adversarial), and the likelihood it results in adverse impact given the vulnerabilities. Combine into an overall likelihood on the agreed scale.\n\n**2e. Determine impact (Appendix H).** Magnitude of harm if the event succeeds — to operations, assets, individuals, other organizations, or the nation. Express against the agreed scale and in business terms.\n\n**2f. Determine risk (Appendix I).** Risk is a function of likelihood and impact. Plot each threat event on the risk matrix (e.g., likelihood × impact → Very Low … Very High). Record the risk level, the contributing factors, and uncertainty\u002Fassumptions.\n\n### 3. Communicate and share results\nProduce the **risk register** and an executive briefing. For each risk: the threat event, affected assets, likelihood, impact, risk level, key contributing vulnerabilities, and a recommended treatment. Rank by risk level so decision-makers see the top risks first.\n\n### 4. Maintain the assessment\nRisk is not static. Define a refresh cadence and the triggers that force re-assessment (new system, major architecture change, significant incident, new threat intel). Track risk-acceptance decisions and treatment progress over time.\n\n### 5. Drive treatment decisions\nHand the ranked register to risk owners. For each risk choose a treatment — **mitigate** (add\u002Fstrengthen controls), **transfer** (insurance, contractual), **avoid** (stop the activity), or **accept** (document residual risk with an authorizing signature). Re-score residual risk after planned controls to show the post-treatment position.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Definition |\n|---|---|\n| Threat source | The cause of a threat event: adversarial, accidental, structural, or environmental. |\n| Threat event | A specific action or occurrence that could cause harm (mapped to ATT&CK for adversarial cases). |\n| Vulnerability | A weakness that a threat event can exploit. |\n| Predisposing condition | A condition that increases or decreases the likelihood of adverse impact (e.g., internet exposure). |\n| Likelihood | The chance a threat event initiates\u002Foccurs *and* results in adverse impact. |\n| Impact | The magnitude of harm if the event succeeds. |\n| Risk | A function of likelihood and impact; the expected harm to the organization. |\n| Inherent vs residual risk | Risk before vs after planned\u002Fimplemented controls. |\n| Risk tolerance \u002F appetite | The level of risk leadership is willing to accept. |\n| Risk register | The prioritized record of risks, scores, owners, and treatments. |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1** — the methodology and Appendices D–I taxonomies (threat sources, events, vulnerabilities, likelihood, impact, risk).\n- **NIST SP 800-39** — enterprise risk-management context (three tiers).\n- **MITRE ATT&CK** — to enumerate and ground adversarial threat events in observed TTPs.\n- **Vulnerability scanners \u002F pen-test reports** — empirical vulnerability input.\n- **Threat intel sources** — sector ISACs, vendor feeds, internal incident history for likelihood grounding.\n- **GRC \u002F risk-register tooling** — spreadsheet, or platforms such as ServiceNow GRC, Archer, OneTrust, to store and track the register.\n- **FAIR** (optional) — a quantitative model if leadership wants risk expressed in dollar ranges rather than qualitative bands.\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **CSF\u002FISO\u002FSOC 2 needs a risk analysis.** Run 800-30 to produce the documented assessment those frameworks require as input, then map results to their control sets.\n- **New system before go-live.** Assess threat events against the system's architecture and feed the result into the authorization (RMF Select\u002FAuthorize) decision.\n- **Board wants the top risks.** Deliver a ranked register with impacts in business terms and clear treatment recommendations.\n- **Post-incident.** Re-assess the affected systems; the incident updates likelihood evidence and may surface new threat events.\n- **Annual refresh.** Re-score against current threat intel and control changes; show movement in residual risk year over year.\n\n## Output Format\n\nProduce a **Risk Assessment Report** using `assets\u002Ftemplate.md`, containing:\n\n1. **Purpose, scope, and tier** — what was assessed and why.\n2. **Assumptions, constraints, and risk model** — the factors and scales used (so results are reproducible).\n3. **Threat sources** — by type, with adversarial characterization.\n4. **Threat events** — each with affected assets and ATT&CK mapping where adversarial.\n5. **Vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions** — tied to threat events.\n6. **Risk register** — table: ID, threat event, asset, likelihood, impact, **risk level**, contributing vulnerabilities, recommended treatment, owner, residual risk.\n7. **Top risks summary** — ranked, in business terms, for leadership.\n8. **Maintenance plan** — refresh cadence and re-assessment triggers.\n\nUse `scripts\u002Fprocess.py` to score the register from a risk-input JSON (likelihood × impact → risk level on a configurable matrix), rank risks, and emit the register table.\n","# Conducting a Cyber Risk Assessment with NIST SP 800-30\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When the organization needs a real risk *assessment* — an analysis of specific threats, likelihoods, and impacts — rather than a maturity score against a framework. (Maturity tells you how mature your practices are; a risk assessment tells you what could hurt you and how badly.)\n- When another framework requires a documented risk analysis as a mandatory input: NIST CSF (ID.RA), ISO 27001 (Clause 6.1.2), NIST RMF \u002F 800-37 (the Prepare and Select steps), SOC 2 (CC3), PCI DSS, or HIPAA (§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)).\n- When standing up or significantly changing a system and you must understand its risk before authorization or go-live.\n- When leadership asks for the organization's top risks, ranked, with a rationale they can defend to a board or regulator.\n- When building or refreshing an enterprise risk register.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- An inventory of in-scope assets, systems, and the information types they handle (system boundary defined).\n- Access to threat intelligence (internal incident history, sector ISAC feeds, MITRE ATT&CK) to ground threat-event likelihood in observed behavior.\n- Vulnerability data (scan results, pen-test findings, configuration\u002Farchitecture review) for the in-scope systems.\n- Business context: which missions\u002Fprocesses the systems support, and what impact to confidentiality, integrity, or availability would mean in business terms.\n- Agreement on the **risk model and scales** before scoring, so results are comparable and repeatable (see `references\u002Fstandards.md`).\n- Familiarity with the three-tier risk-management context from NIST SP 800-39 (organization, mission\u002Fbusiness process, information system).\n\n## Workflow\n\nNIST SP 800-30 Rev 1 defines four steps. Steps 1 and 4 bookend the assessment; Step 2 is the analytic core.\n\n### 1. Prepare for the assessment\nDefine and document:\n- **Purpose** (e.g., support an authorization decision, inform control selection, satisfy ISO 6.1.2).\n- **Scope** — organizational tier (Tier 1\u002F2\u002F3), systems, and time horizon.\n- **Assumptions and constraints** (e.g., assume an external adversarial threat with moderate capability).\n- **Information sources** — threat, vulnerability, and impact inputs.\n- **Risk model and analytic approach** — the factors (threat source, threat event, vulnerability, likelihood, impact) and the scales (qualitative Very Low–Very High, or semi-quantitative 0–10). Lock these now.\n\n### 2. Conduct the assessment\nWork through the analytic tasks in order. The 800-30 appendices provide the reference taxonomies (D–I).\n\n**2a. Identify threat sources (Appendix D).** Classify by type: **Adversarial** (individuals, groups, nation-states — characterize capability, intent, targeting), **Accidental** (user error), **Structural** (equipment\u002Fsoftware failure), **Environmental** (natural disasters, infrastructure outages).\n\n**2b. Identify threat events (Appendix E).** The specific actions a source could take (e.g., \"adversary exfiltrates credentials via phishing then moves laterally\"). Map adversarial events to MITRE ATT&CK techniques for traceability.\n\n**2c. Identify vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions (Appendix F).** Weaknesses (missing MFA, unpatched service) and conditions that make exploitation more or less likely (internet exposure, flat network, lack of segmentation).\n\n**2d. Determine likelihood (Appendix G).** Assess the likelihood that a threat event is *initiated* (adversarial) or *occurs* (non-adversarial), and the likelihood it results in adverse impact given the vulnerabilities. Combine into an overall likelihood on the agreed scale.\n\n**2e. Determine impact (Appendix H).** Magnitude of harm if the event succeeds — to operations, assets, individuals, other organizations, or the nation. Express against the agreed scale and in business terms.\n\n**2f. Determine risk (Appendix I).** Risk is a function of likelihood and impact. Plot each threat event on the risk matrix (e.g., likelihood × impact → Very Low … Very High). Record the risk level, the contributing factors, and uncertainty\u002Fassumptions.\n\n### 3. Communicate and share results\nProduce the **risk register** and an executive briefing. For each risk: the threat event, affected assets, likelihood, impact, risk level, key contributing vulnerabilities, and a recommended treatment. Rank by risk level so decision-makers see the top risks first.\n\n### 4. Maintain the assessment\nRisk is not static. Define a refresh cadence and the triggers that force re-assessment (new system, major architecture change, significant incident, new threat intel). Track risk-acceptance decisions and treatment progress over time.\n\n### 5. Drive treatment decisions\nHand the ranked register to risk owners. For each risk choose a treatment — **mitigate** (add\u002Fstrengthen controls), **transfer** (insurance, contractual), **avoid** (stop the activity), or **accept** (document residual risk with an authorizing signature). Re-score residual risk after planned controls to show the post-treatment position.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Definition |\n|---|---|\n| Threat source | The cause of a threat event: adversarial, accidental, structural, or environmental. |\n| Threat event | A specific action or occurrence that could cause harm (mapped to ATT&CK for adversarial cases). |\n| Vulnerability | A weakness that a threat event can exploit. |\n| Predisposing condition | A condition that increases or decreases the likelihood of adverse impact (e.g., internet exposure). |\n| Likelihood | The chance a threat event initiates\u002Foccurs *and* results in adverse impact. |\n| Impact | The magnitude of harm if the event succeeds. |\n| Risk | A function of likelihood and impact; the expected harm to the organization. |\n| Inherent vs residual risk | Risk before vs after planned\u002Fimplemented controls. |\n| Risk tolerance \u002F appetite | The level of risk leadership is willing to accept. |\n| Risk register | The prioritized record of risks, scores, owners, and treatments. |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **NIST SP 800-30 Rev 1** — the methodology and Appendices D–I taxonomies (threat sources, events, vulnerabilities, likelihood, impact, risk).\n- **NIST SP 800-39** — enterprise risk-management context (three tiers).\n- **MITRE ATT&CK** — to enumerate and ground adversarial threat events in observed TTPs.\n- **Vulnerability scanners \u002F pen-test reports** — empirical vulnerability input.\n- **Threat intel sources** — sector ISACs, vendor feeds, internal incident history for likelihood grounding.\n- **GRC \u002F risk-register tooling** — spreadsheet, or platforms such as ServiceNow GRC, Archer, OneTrust, to store and track the register.\n- **FAIR** (optional) — a quantitative model if leadership wants risk expressed in dollar ranges rather than qualitative bands.\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **CSF\u002FISO\u002FSOC 2 needs a risk analysis.** Run 800-30 to produce the documented assessment those frameworks require as input, then map results to their control sets.\n- **New system before go-live.** Assess threat events against the system's architecture and feed the result into the authorization (RMF Select\u002FAuthorize) decision.\n- **Board wants the top risks.** Deliver a ranked register with impacts in business terms and clear treatment recommendations.\n- **Post-incident.** Re-assess the affected systems; the incident updates likelihood evidence and may surface new threat events.\n- **Annual refresh.** Re-score against current threat intel and control changes; show movement in residual risk year over year.\n\n## Output Format\n\nProduce a **Risk Assessment Report** using `assets\u002Ftemplate.md`, containing:\n\n1. **Purpose, scope, and tier** — what was assessed and why.\n2. **Assumptions, constraints, and risk model** — the factors and scales used (so results are reproducible).\n3. **Threat sources** — by type, with adversarial characterization.\n4. **Threat events** — each with affected assets and ATT&CK mapping where adversarial.\n5. **Vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions** — tied to threat events.\n6. **Risk register** — table: ID, threat event, asset, likelihood, impact, **risk level**, contributing vulnerabilities, recommended treatment, owner, residual risk.\n7. **Top risks summary** — ranked, in business terms, for leadership.\n8. **Maintenance plan** — refresh cadence and re-assessment triggers.\n\nUse `scripts\u002Fprocess.py` to score the register from a risk-input JSON (likelihood × impact → risk level on a configurable matrix), rank risks, and emit the register table.\n",{"name":5,"tags":44,"author":47,"domain":31,"license":15,"version":48,"nist_csf":49,"subdomain":55,"description":7,"mitre_attack":56},[45,46,27,26,25,35,24,23],"risk-assessment","nist-800-30","andrewibrah","1.0",[50,51,52,53,54],"GV.RM-01","ID.RA-01","ID.RA-03","ID.RA-04","ID.RA-05","compliance-governance",[57,58,59,60,61],"T1566","T1078","T1190","T1486","T1021","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30",4414,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":73,"prompt":83,"zipAvailable":84},[74,77,80],{"tool":75,"command":76},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30",{"tool":78,"command":79},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30",{"tool":81,"command":82},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\u002FSKILL.md",true,[86,92,97,103],{"path":87,"resourceType":88,"resourceTypeDesc":89,"sizeBytes":90,"sourceHtmlUrl":91},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",4972,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":93,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\u002FLICENSE",{"path":98,"resourceType":99,"resourceTypeDesc":100,"sizeBytes":101,"sourceHtmlUrl":102},"references\u002Fstandards.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",3834,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":104,"resourceType":105,"resourceTypeDesc":106,"sizeBytes":107,"sourceHtmlUrl":108},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7964,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fconducting-cyber-risk-assessment-with-nist-800-30\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[110,141,165,192,218,243],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[116],{"categoryNo":117,"categoryName":118,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[122,123,124,125,126,31,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,140],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":148,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[147],{"categoryNo":117,"categoryName":118,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},[149,137,150,151,126,152,31,129,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":166,"name":167,"nameZh":6,"description":168,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":169,"categories":170,"keywords":175,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[171,174],{"categoryNo":172,"categoryName":173,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":117,"categoryName":118,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},[159,176,177,178,179,31,180,181,153,23,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":193,"name":194,"nameZh":6,"description":195,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":196,"categories":197,"keywords":199,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[198],{"categoryNo":117,"categoryName":118,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},[200,201,202,31,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,211,212,213,214,156,215,216,217],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":219,"name":220,"nameZh":6,"description":221,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":222,"categories":223,"keywords":225,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[224],{"categoryNo":117,"categoryName":118,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},[38,226,227,31,228,229,230,231,27,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242],"framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":244,"name":245,"nameZh":6,"description":246,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":247,"categories":248,"keywords":250,"publishedAt":39},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[249],{"categoryNo":117,"categoryName":118,"taxonomyType":119,"taxonomyTypeDesc":120},[126,251,31,252,253,254,30,255,22,256,257,187,258,188,259,260,261,262,263,264],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","NIST-800-61","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]