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and Prowler to enforce least-privilege data access controls.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fauditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":26,"taxonomyTypeDesc":27},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000033","数据分析师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44],"permissions","s3","auditing aws s3 bucket permissions","cli","security","cybersecurity","pr","audit","cloud","cloud-security","data","encryption","aws","bucket-permissions","data-protection","access-control","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions\ndescription: 'Systematically audit AWS S3 bucket permissions to identify publicly\n  accessible buckets, overly permissive ACLs, misconfigured bucket policies, and missing\n  encryption settings using AWS CLI, S3audit, and Prowler to enforce least-privilege\n  data access controls.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- cloud-security\n- aws\n- s3\n- bucket-permissions\n- data-protection\n- access-control\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- GV.SC-06\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1530\n- T1619\n- T1078.004\n- T1537\n- T1567.002\n---\n\n# Auditing AWS S3 Bucket Permissions\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting a security assessment of AWS environments to identify publicly exposed data\n- When onboarding a new AWS account and establishing a security baseline for storage resources\n- When responding to an alert about potential S3 data exposure from AWS Trusted Advisor or Security Hub\n- When compliance frameworks (SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA) require periodic review of data access controls\n- When a breach or credential compromise necessitates immediate review of all accessible S3 resources\n\n**Do not use** for auditing non-AWS object storage (use provider-specific tools), for real-time monitoring (use S3 Event Notifications with Lambda), or for auditing S3 access patterns (use S3 Access Analyzer or CloudTrail S3 data events).\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- AWS CLI v2 configured with credentials that have `s3:GetBucketPolicy`, `s3:GetBucketAcl`, `s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock`, `s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration`, and `s3:ListAllMyBuckets` permissions\n- Prowler installed (`pip install prowler`) for automated CIS benchmark checks\n- S3audit or similar enumeration tool for quick public bucket detection\n- Access to AWS Organizations if auditing across multiple accounts\n- Python 3.8+ with boto3 for custom audit scripts\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Enumerate All S3 Buckets and Account-Level Block Public Access\n\nCheck the account-level S3 Block Public Access settings first, then list all buckets with their regions.\n\n```bash\n# Check account-level S3 Block Public Access settings\naws s3control get-public-access-block \\\n  --account-id $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text) \\\n  --output json\n\n# List all buckets with creation dates\naws s3api list-buckets \\\n  --query 'Buckets[*].[Name,CreationDate]' \\\n  --output table\n\n# Get bucket regions for each bucket\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  region=$(aws s3api get-bucket-location --bucket \"$bucket\" --query 'LocationConstraint' --output text)\n  echo \"$bucket -> ${region:-us-east-1}\"\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 2: Check Each Bucket's Public Access Block and ACL Configuration\n\nIterate through all buckets to evaluate their individual public access blocks and ACL grants.\n\n```bash\n# Check per-bucket Block Public Access settings\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  echo \"=== $bucket ===\"\n  aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket \"$bucket\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo \"  No Block Public Access configured\"\n\n  # Check ACL for public grants\n  aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket \"$bucket\" \\\n    --query 'Grants[?Grantee.URI==`http:\u002F\u002Facs.amazonaws.com\u002Fgroups\u002Fglobal\u002FAllUsers` || Grantee.URI==`http:\u002F\u002Facs.amazonaws.com\u002Fgroups\u002Fglobal\u002FAuthenticatedUsers`]' \\\n    --output json\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Bucket Policies for Overly Permissive Access\n\nReview bucket policies for wildcard principals, missing conditions, and statements that allow broad access.\n\n```bash\n# Extract and analyze bucket policies\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  policy=$(aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket \"$bucket\" --output text 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  if [ -n \"$policy\" ]; then\n    echo \"=== $bucket policy ===\"\n    echo \"$policy\" | python3 -c \"\nimport json, sys\npolicy = json.load(sys.stdin)\nfor stmt in policy.get('Statement', []):\n    principal = stmt.get('Principal', {})\n    effect = stmt.get('Effect', '')\n    if principal == '*' or principal == {'AWS': '*'}:\n        print(f'  WARNING: {effect} with wildcard principal')\n        print(f'  Actions: {stmt.get(\\\"Action\\\", \\\"\\\")}')\n        print(f'  Condition: {stmt.get(\\\"Condition\\\", \\\"NONE\\\")}')\n\"\n  fi\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Encryption and Versioning Settings\n\nCheck that all buckets have server-side encryption enabled and versioning configured for data protection.\n\n```bash\n# Check encryption and versioning status for all buckets\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  echo \"=== $bucket ===\"\n\n  # Encryption configuration\n  aws s3api get-bucket-encryption --bucket \"$bucket\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    && echo \"  Encryption: ENABLED\" \\\n    || echo \"  Encryption: DISABLED\"\n\n  # Versioning status\n  aws s3api get-bucket-versioning --bucket \"$bucket\" \\\n    --query 'Status' --output text\n\n  # Logging status\n  aws s3api get-bucket-logging --bucket \"$bucket\" \\\n    --query 'LoggingEnabled' --output text 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 5: Run Prowler S3-Specific Checks\n\nExecute Prowler's S3-focused checks aligned with CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark.\n\n```bash\n# Run Prowler S3-specific checks\nprowler aws \\\n  --checks s3_bucket_public_access \\\n           s3_bucket_default_encryption \\\n           s3_bucket_policy_public_write_access \\\n           s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled \\\n           s3_bucket_versioning_enabled \\\n           s3_bucket_acl_prohibited \\\n  -M json-ocsf \\\n  -o .\u002Fprowler-s3-audit\u002F\n\n# View summary\nprowler aws --checks s3 -M csv -o .\u002Fprowler-s3-audit\u002F\n```\n\n### Step 6: Use IAM Access Analyzer for S3 Public and Cross-Account Findings\n\nLeverage IAM Access Analyzer to identify buckets shared externally or publicly.\n\n```bash\n# List Access Analyzer findings for S3\naws accessanalyzer list-findings \\\n  --analyzer-arn $(aws accessanalyzer list-analyzers --query 'analyzers[0].arn' --output text) \\\n  --filter '{\"resourceType\": {\"eq\": [\"AWS::S3::Bucket\"]}}' \\\n  --query 'findings[*].[resource,status,condition,principal]' \\\n  --output table\n\n# Create an analyzer if one does not exist\naws accessanalyzer create-analyzer \\\n  --analyzer-name s3-access-audit \\\n  --type ACCOUNT\n```\n\n### Step 7: Generate Audit Report and Remediate\n\nCompile findings into an actionable report and apply remediation for critical issues.\n\n```bash\n# Quick remediation: Enable Block Public Access on a bucket\naws s3api put-public-access-block \\\n  --bucket TARGET_BUCKET \\\n  --public-access-block-configuration \\\n  'BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true'\n\n# Enable default encryption with SSE-S3\naws s3api put-bucket-encryption \\\n  --bucket TARGET_BUCKET \\\n  --server-side-encryption-configuration \\\n  '{\"Rules\":[{\"ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault\":{\"SSEAlgorithm\":\"aws:kms\",\"KMSMasterKeyID\":\"alias\u002Faws\u002Fs3\"},\"BucketKeyEnabled\":true}]}'\n\n# Enable versioning\naws s3api put-bucket-versioning \\\n  --bucket TARGET_BUCKET \\\n  --versioning-configuration Status=Enabled\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| S3 Block Public Access | Account-level and bucket-level settings that override ACLs and policies to prevent public access regardless of individual resource configurations |\n| Bucket Policy | JSON-based resource policy attached to a bucket that defines who can access the bucket and what actions they can perform |\n| ACL (Access Control List) | Legacy S3 access control mechanism granting permissions to AWS accounts or predefined groups like AllUsers or AuthenticatedUsers |\n| IAM Access Analyzer | AWS service that analyzes resource policies to identify resources shared with external entities or the public |\n| Server-Side Encryption | Encryption applied by S3 at the object level using SSE-S3, SSE-KMS, or SSE-C before writing data to disk |\n| CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark | Security best practice standard from Center for Internet Security with specific controls for S3 bucket configuration |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **AWS CLI**: Primary interface for querying S3 bucket configurations, policies, ACLs, and encryption settings\n- **Prowler**: Open-source security tool with 50+ S3-specific checks aligned to CIS, PCI DSS, and HIPAA controls\n- **IAM Access Analyzer**: AWS-native service for continuous monitoring of resource policies that grant external access\n- **S3audit**: Lightweight tool for quick enumeration of public S3 buckets across an account\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud auditing tool that collects S3 configuration data and generates risk-scored HTML reports\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Identifying a Publicly Readable Bucket Containing Customer Data\n\n**Context**: A security engineer receives a Trusted Advisor alert about a publicly accessible S3 bucket. The bucket was created by a development team for a demo and was never locked down.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Run `aws s3api get-bucket-acl` and find a grant to `AllUsers` with `READ` permission\n2. Check `get-bucket-policy` and discover a policy with `Principal: \"*\"` and `s3:GetObject`\n3. Confirm Block Public Access is not enabled at the bucket or account level\n4. Enumerate bucket contents to assess data sensitivity\n5. Immediately enable Block Public Access on the bucket\n6. Review CloudTrail S3 data events to determine if unauthorized access occurred\n7. Report the finding with timeline, data inventory, and remediation confirmation\n\n**Pitfalls**: Enabling Block Public Access can break applications that intentionally serve content publicly (static websites). Always verify the bucket's intended use before applying restrictions. Check for CloudFront distributions or other services relying on the bucket's public access.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nS3 Bucket Permissions Audit Report\n=====================================\nAccount: 123456789012 (Production)\nDate: 2026-02-23\nAuditor: Security Engineering Team\nTotal Buckets: 47\n\nACCOUNT-LEVEL SETTINGS:\n  Block Public Access: ENABLED (all four settings)\n\nCRITICAL FINDINGS:\n[S3-001] Public Read Access via ACL\n  Bucket: marketing-assets-prod\n  Issue: AllUsers group granted READ permission via ACL\n  Risk: Any internet user can list and download bucket contents\n  Data Sensitivity: Contains customer-facing but non-sensitive marketing assets\n  Remediation: Remove AllUsers ACL grant, enable Block Public Access\n\n[S3-002] Wildcard Principal in Bucket Policy\n  Bucket: data-exchange-partner\n  Issue: Policy allows s3:GetObject with Principal \"*\" and no VPC\u002FIP condition\n  Risk: Intended for partner access but accessible to anyone with the bucket name\n  Remediation: Add aws:SourceVpce or aws:SourceIp condition to restrict access\n\nSUMMARY:\n  Buckets with public access:           3 \u002F 47\n  Buckets without encryption:           5 \u002F 47\n  Buckets without versioning:          12 \u002F 47\n  Buckets without access logging:      18 \u002F 47\n  Buckets with overly broad policies:   7 \u002F 47\n```\n","# Auditing AWS S3 Bucket Permissions\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting a security assessment of AWS environments to identify publicly exposed data\n- When onboarding a new AWS account and establishing a security baseline for storage resources\n- When responding to an alert about potential S3 data exposure from AWS Trusted Advisor or Security Hub\n- When compliance frameworks (SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA) require periodic review of data access controls\n- When a breach or credential compromise necessitates immediate review of all accessible S3 resources\n\n**Do not use** for auditing non-AWS object storage (use provider-specific tools), for real-time monitoring (use S3 Event Notifications with Lambda), or for auditing S3 access patterns (use S3 Access Analyzer or CloudTrail S3 data events).\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- AWS CLI v2 configured with credentials that have `s3:GetBucketPolicy`, `s3:GetBucketAcl`, `s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock`, `s3:GetEncryptionConfiguration`, and `s3:ListAllMyBuckets` permissions\n- Prowler installed (`pip install prowler`) for automated CIS benchmark checks\n- S3audit or similar enumeration tool for quick public bucket detection\n- Access to AWS Organizations if auditing across multiple accounts\n- Python 3.8+ with boto3 for custom audit scripts\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Enumerate All S3 Buckets and Account-Level Block Public Access\n\nCheck the account-level S3 Block Public Access settings first, then list all buckets with their regions.\n\n```bash\n# Check account-level S3 Block Public Access settings\naws s3control get-public-access-block \\\n  --account-id $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text) \\\n  --output json\n\n# List all buckets with creation dates\naws s3api list-buckets \\\n  --query 'Buckets[*].[Name,CreationDate]' \\\n  --output table\n\n# Get bucket regions for each bucket\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  region=$(aws s3api get-bucket-location --bucket \"$bucket\" --query 'LocationConstraint' --output text)\n  echo \"$bucket -> ${region:-us-east-1}\"\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 2: Check Each Bucket's Public Access Block and ACL Configuration\n\nIterate through all buckets to evaluate their individual public access blocks and ACL grants.\n\n```bash\n# Check per-bucket Block Public Access settings\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  echo \"=== $bucket ===\"\n  aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket \"$bucket\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo \"  No Block Public Access configured\"\n\n  # Check ACL for public grants\n  aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket \"$bucket\" \\\n    --query 'Grants[?Grantee.URI==`http:\u002F\u002Facs.amazonaws.com\u002Fgroups\u002Fglobal\u002FAllUsers` || Grantee.URI==`http:\u002F\u002Facs.amazonaws.com\u002Fgroups\u002Fglobal\u002FAuthenticatedUsers`]' \\\n    --output json\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Bucket Policies for Overly Permissive Access\n\nReview bucket policies for wildcard principals, missing conditions, and statements that allow broad access.\n\n```bash\n# Extract and analyze bucket policies\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  policy=$(aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket \"$bucket\" --output text 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull)\n  if [ -n \"$policy\" ]; then\n    echo \"=== $bucket policy ===\"\n    echo \"$policy\" | python3 -c \"\nimport json, sys\npolicy = json.load(sys.stdin)\nfor stmt in policy.get('Statement', []):\n    principal = stmt.get('Principal', {})\n    effect = stmt.get('Effect', '')\n    if principal == '*' or principal == {'AWS': '*'}:\n        print(f'  WARNING: {effect} with wildcard principal')\n        print(f'  Actions: {stmt.get(\\\"Action\\\", \\\"\\\")}')\n        print(f'  Condition: {stmt.get(\\\"Condition\\\", \\\"NONE\\\")}')\n\"\n  fi\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 4: Verify Encryption and Versioning Settings\n\nCheck that all buckets have server-side encryption enabled and versioning configured for data protection.\n\n```bash\n# Check encryption and versioning status for all buckets\nfor bucket in $(aws s3api list-buckets --query 'Buckets[*].Name' --output text); do\n  echo \"=== $bucket ===\"\n\n  # Encryption configuration\n  aws s3api get-bucket-encryption --bucket \"$bucket\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull \\\n    && echo \"  Encryption: ENABLED\" \\\n    || echo \"  Encryption: DISABLED\"\n\n  # Versioning status\n  aws s3api get-bucket-versioning --bucket \"$bucket\" \\\n    --query 'Status' --output text\n\n  # Logging status\n  aws s3api get-bucket-logging --bucket \"$bucket\" \\\n    --query 'LoggingEnabled' --output text 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone\n```\n\n### Step 5: Run Prowler S3-Specific Checks\n\nExecute Prowler's S3-focused checks aligned with CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark.\n\n```bash\n# Run Prowler S3-specific checks\nprowler aws \\\n  --checks s3_bucket_public_access \\\n           s3_bucket_default_encryption \\\n           s3_bucket_policy_public_write_access \\\n           s3_bucket_server_access_logging_enabled \\\n           s3_bucket_versioning_enabled \\\n           s3_bucket_acl_prohibited \\\n  -M json-ocsf \\\n  -o .\u002Fprowler-s3-audit\u002F\n\n# View summary\nprowler aws --checks s3 -M csv -o .\u002Fprowler-s3-audit\u002F\n```\n\n### Step 6: Use IAM Access Analyzer for S3 Public and Cross-Account Findings\n\nLeverage IAM Access Analyzer to identify buckets shared externally or publicly.\n\n```bash\n# List Access Analyzer findings for S3\naws accessanalyzer list-findings \\\n  --analyzer-arn $(aws accessanalyzer list-analyzers --query 'analyzers[0].arn' --output text) \\\n  --filter '{\"resourceType\": {\"eq\": [\"AWS::S3::Bucket\"]}}' \\\n  --query 'findings[*].[resource,status,condition,principal]' \\\n  --output table\n\n# Create an analyzer if one does not exist\naws accessanalyzer create-analyzer \\\n  --analyzer-name s3-access-audit \\\n  --type ACCOUNT\n```\n\n### Step 7: Generate Audit Report and Remediate\n\nCompile findings into an actionable report and apply remediation for critical issues.\n\n```bash\n# Quick remediation: Enable Block Public Access on a bucket\naws s3api put-public-access-block \\\n  --bucket TARGET_BUCKET \\\n  --public-access-block-configuration \\\n  'BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true'\n\n# Enable default encryption with SSE-S3\naws s3api put-bucket-encryption \\\n  --bucket TARGET_BUCKET \\\n  --server-side-encryption-configuration \\\n  '{\"Rules\":[{\"ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault\":{\"SSEAlgorithm\":\"aws:kms\",\"KMSMasterKeyID\":\"alias\u002Faws\u002Fs3\"},\"BucketKeyEnabled\":true}]}'\n\n# Enable versioning\naws s3api put-bucket-versioning \\\n  --bucket TARGET_BUCKET \\\n  --versioning-configuration Status=Enabled\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| S3 Block Public Access | Account-level and bucket-level settings that override ACLs and policies to prevent public access regardless of individual resource configurations |\n| Bucket Policy | JSON-based resource policy attached to a bucket that defines who can access the bucket and what actions they can perform |\n| ACL (Access Control List) | Legacy S3 access control mechanism granting permissions to AWS accounts or predefined groups like AllUsers or AuthenticatedUsers |\n| IAM Access Analyzer | AWS service that analyzes resource policies to identify resources shared with external entities or the public |\n| Server-Side Encryption | Encryption applied by S3 at the object level using SSE-S3, SSE-KMS, or SSE-C before writing data to disk |\n| CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark | Security best practice standard from Center for Internet Security with specific controls for S3 bucket configuration |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **AWS CLI**: Primary interface for querying S3 bucket configurations, policies, ACLs, and encryption settings\n- **Prowler**: Open-source security tool with 50+ S3-specific checks aligned to CIS, PCI DSS, and HIPAA controls\n- **IAM Access Analyzer**: AWS-native service for continuous monitoring of resource policies that grant external access\n- **S3audit**: Lightweight tool for quick enumeration of public S3 buckets across an account\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud auditing tool that collects S3 configuration data and generates risk-scored HTML reports\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Identifying a Publicly Readable Bucket Containing Customer Data\n\n**Context**: A security engineer receives a Trusted Advisor alert about a publicly accessible S3 bucket. The bucket was created by a development team for a demo and was never locked down.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Run `aws s3api get-bucket-acl` and find a grant to `AllUsers` with `READ` permission\n2. Check `get-bucket-policy` and discover a policy with `Principal: \"*\"` and `s3:GetObject`\n3. Confirm Block Public Access is not enabled at the bucket or account level\n4. Enumerate bucket contents to assess data sensitivity\n5. Immediately enable Block Public Access on the bucket\n6. Review CloudTrail S3 data events to determine if unauthorized access occurred\n7. Report the finding with timeline, data inventory, and remediation confirmation\n\n**Pitfalls**: Enabling Block Public Access can break applications that intentionally serve content publicly (static websites). Always verify the bucket's intended use before applying restrictions. Check for CloudFront distributions or other services relying on the bucket's public access.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nS3 Bucket Permissions Audit Report\n=====================================\nAccount: 123456789012 (Production)\nDate: 2026-02-23\nAuditor: Security Engineering Team\nTotal Buckets: 47\n\nACCOUNT-LEVEL SETTINGS:\n  Block Public Access: ENABLED (all four settings)\n\nCRITICAL FINDINGS:\n[S3-001] Public Read Access via ACL\n  Bucket: marketing-assets-prod\n  Issue: AllUsers group granted READ permission via ACL\n  Risk: Any internet user can list and download bucket contents\n  Data Sensitivity: Contains customer-facing but non-sensitive marketing assets\n  Remediation: Remove AllUsers ACL grant, enable Block Public Access\n\n[S3-002] Wildcard Principal in Bucket Policy\n  Bucket: data-exchange-partner\n  Issue: Policy allows s3:GetObject with Principal \"*\" and no VPC\u002FIP condition\n  Risk: Intended for partner access but accessible to anyone with the bucket name\n  Remediation: Add aws:SourceVpce or aws:SourceIp condition to restrict access\n\nSUMMARY:\n  Buckets with public access:           3 \u002F 47\n  Buckets without encryption:           5 \u002F 47\n  Buckets without versioning:          12 \u002F 47\n  Buckets without access logging:      18 \u002F 47\n  Buckets with overly broad policies:   7 \u002F 47\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":50,"author":51,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":52,"nist_csf":53,"subdomain":38,"description":58,"mitre_attack":59},[38,41,30,42,43,44],"mahipal","1.0",[54,55,56,57],"PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01","Systematically audit AWS S3 bucket permissions to identify publicly accessible buckets, overly permissive ACLs, misconfigured bucket policies, and missing encryption settings using AWS CLI, S3audit, and Prowler to enforce least-privilege data access controls.\n",[60,61,62,63,64],"T1530","T1619","T1078.004","T1537","T1567.002","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fauditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions",4414,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":76,"prompt":86,"zipAvailable":87},[77,80,83],{"tool":78,"command":79},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions",{"tool":81,"command":82},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions",{"tool":84,"command":85},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fauditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions\u002FSKILL.md",true,[89,94,100,104,110],{"path":90,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":92,"sourceHtmlUrl":93},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fauditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions\u002FLICENSE",{"path":95,"resourceType":96,"resourceTypeDesc":97,"sizeBytes":98,"sourceHtmlUrl":99},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2394,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fauditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":101,"resourceType":96,"resourceTypeDesc":97,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"references\u002Fassess-results.md",2649,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNVIDIA\u002FModel-Optimizer\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fmodelopt\u002Fskills\u002Fcompare-results\u002Freferences\u002Fassess-results.md",{"path":105,"resourceType":106,"resourceTypeDesc":107,"sizeBytes":108,"sourceHtmlUrl":109},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6686,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fauditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":111,"resourceType":96,"resourceTypeDesc":97,"sizeBytes":112,"sourceHtmlUrl":113},"tests\u002Fevals.json",3019,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNVIDIA\u002FModel-Optimizer\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fplugins\u002Fmodelopt\u002Fskills\u002Fcompare-results\u002Ftests\u002Fevals.json",[115,140,164,192,217,244],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":45},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[121],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[123,124,125,126,33,34,127,128,35,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":141,"name":142,"nameZh":6,"description":143,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":144,"categories":145,"keywords":147,"publishedAt":45},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[146],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[148,136,149,150,33,151,34,35,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":174,"publishedAt":45},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[170,173],{"categoryNo":171,"categoryName":172,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[158,175,176,177,178,34,179,180,152,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":193,"name":194,"nameZh":6,"description":195,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":196,"categories":197,"keywords":199,"publishedAt":45},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[198],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[200,201,202,34,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,39,210,211,212,213,155,214,215,216],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","logs","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":218,"name":219,"nameZh":6,"description":220,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":221,"categories":222,"keywords":224,"publishedAt":45},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[223],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[225,226,227,34,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":245,"name":246,"nameZh":6,"description":247,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":248,"categories":249,"keywords":251,"publishedAt":45},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[250],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[33,252,34,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,260,187,261,188,262,263,264,265,266,267],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]