[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6ADR5ZK29Z7AB22K9PAC63S":3,"skill-same:01M6ADR5ZK29Z7AB22K9PAC63S":107},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":62,"commitSha":63,"skillDirectory":64,"forksCount":65,"repositoryHtmlUrl":66,"repositoryHomepageUrl":67,"ownerHtmlUrl":68,"ownerBlogUrl":69,"ownerDescription":70,"updatedAt":71,"install":72,"resources":85},"01M6ADR5ZK29Z7AB22K9PAC63S","analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise",null,"Parse Office 365 Unified Audit Logs via Microsoft Graph API to detect email forwarding rule creation, inbox delegation, suspicious OAuth app grants, and other indicators of account compromise.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000005","邮件与沟通","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"analyzing office365 audit logs for compromise","audit","logs","analyzing","cloud-security","BEC","OAuth","inbox-rules","email-compromise","audit-logs","Microsoft-Graph","Office365","suspicious","email","office","delegation","inbox","pr","microsoft","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise\ndescription: Parse Office 365 Unified Audit Logs via Microsoft Graph API to detect\n  email forwarding rule creation, inbox delegation, suspicious OAuth app grants, and\n  other indicators of account compromise.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- Office365\n- Microsoft-Graph\n- audit-logs\n- email-compromise\n- inbox-rules\n- OAuth\n- BEC\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- GV.SC-06\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1114.002\n- T1098.002\n- T1556.006\n- T1078.004\n---\n\n# Analyzing Office 365 Audit Logs for Compromise\n\n## Overview\n\nBusiness Email Compromise (BEC) attacks often leave traces in Office 365 audit logs: suspicious inbox rule creation, email forwarding to external addresses, mailbox delegation changes, and unauthorized OAuth application consent grants. This skill uses the Microsoft Graph API to query the Unified Audit Log, enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes, detect forwarding configurations, and identify compromised account indicators.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing office365 audit logs for compromise\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Azure AD app registration with `AuditLog.Read.All`, `MailboxSettings.Read`, `Mail.Read` (application permissions)\n- Python 3.9+ with `msal`, `requests`\n- Client secret or certificate for authentication\n- Global Reader or Security Reader role\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Authenticate to Microsoft Graph using MSAL client credentials flow\n2. Query Unified Audit Log for suspicious operations (Set-Mailbox, New-InboxRule)\n3. Enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes and flag forwarding rules\n4. Detect mailbox delegation changes (Add-MailboxPermission)\n5. Identify OAuth consent grants to suspicious applications\n6. Check for suspicious sign-in patterns from audit logs\n7. Generate compromise indicator report with timeline\n\n## Expected Output\n\n- JSON report listing forwarding rules, delegation changes, OAuth grants, and suspicious audit events with risk scores\n- Timeline of compromise indicators with affected mailboxes\n","# Analyzing Office 365 Audit Logs for Compromise\n\n## Overview\n\nBusiness Email Compromise (BEC) attacks often leave traces in Office 365 audit logs: suspicious inbox rule creation, email forwarding to external addresses, mailbox delegation changes, and unauthorized OAuth application consent grants. This skill uses the Microsoft Graph API to query the Unified Audit Log, enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes, detect forwarding configurations, and identify compromised account indicators.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing office365 audit logs for compromise\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Azure AD app registration with `AuditLog.Read.All`, `MailboxSettings.Read`, `Mail.Read` (application permissions)\n- Python 3.9+ with `msal`, `requests`\n- Client secret or certificate for authentication\n- Global Reader or Security Reader role\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Authenticate to Microsoft Graph using MSAL client credentials flow\n2. Query Unified Audit Log for suspicious operations (Set-Mailbox, New-InboxRule)\n3. Enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes and flag forwarding rules\n4. Detect mailbox delegation changes (Add-MailboxPermission)\n5. Identify OAuth consent grants to suspicious applications\n6. Check for suspicious sign-in patterns from audit logs\n7. Generate compromise indicator report with timeline\n\n## Expected Output\n\n- JSON report listing forwarding rules, delegation changes, OAuth grants, and suspicious audit events with risk scores\n- Timeline of compromise indicators with affected mailboxes\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"author":50,"domain":43,"license":15,"version":51,"nist_csf":52,"subdomain":28,"description":7,"mitre_attack":57},[35,34,33,32,31,30,29],"mahipal","1.0",[53,54,55,56],"PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01",[58,59,60,61],"T1114.002","T1098.002","T1556.006","T1078.004","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fanalyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise",4414,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":73,"prompt":83,"zipAvailable":84},[74,77,80],{"tool":75,"command":76},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise",{"tool":78,"command":79},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise",{"tool":81,"command":82},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise\u002FSKILL.md",true,[86,91,97,101],{"path":87,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise\u002FLICENSE",{"path":92,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"package.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",838,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fnodetool-ai\u002Fnodetool\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fsandbox-packs\u002Fsandbox-fabric\u002Fpackage.json",{"path":98,"resourceType":93,"resourceTypeDesc":94,"sizeBytes":99,"sourceHtmlUrl":100},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",2823,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":102,"resourceType":103,"resourceTypeDesc":104,"sizeBytes":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",10029,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[108,136,160,188,213,240],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":117,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[114],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[118,119,120,121,122,43,123,124,41,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","security","incident response","identity","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":137,"name":138,"nameZh":6,"description":139,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":140,"categories":141,"keywords":143,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[142],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[144,132,145,146,122,147,43,41,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":161,"name":162,"nameZh":6,"description":163,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":164,"categories":165,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[166,169],{"categoryNo":167,"categoryName":168,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[154,171,172,173,174,43,175,176,148,177,178,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","incident-response","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":189,"name":190,"nameZh":6,"description":191,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":192,"categories":193,"keywords":195,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[194],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[196,197,198,43,199,200,26,201,202,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,151,210,211,212],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":214,"name":215,"nameZh":6,"description":216,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":217,"categories":218,"keywords":220,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[219],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[221,222,223,43,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239],"vulnerabilities","framework","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":241,"name":242,"nameZh":6,"description":243,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":244,"categories":245,"keywords":247,"publishedAt":44},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[246],{"categoryNo":115,"categoryName":116,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[122,248,43,249,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,183,257,184,258,259,260,261,262,263],"triaging security incident","siem","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]