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Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction, and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis, Linux audit log investigation, ausearch queries, aureport summaries, or host-based intrusion detection on Linux.","mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","mukul975","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42860185?v=4","01M6ADEQR8T5M4EEG6C67BQCWF","Mahipal","01M6ADJPMYWG1E5GM1FWBE3128",36078,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40],"logs","analyzing linux audit logs for intrusion","audit","linux","cybersecurity","siem","framework","security","integration","suspicious","forensics","auditd","ausearch","aureport","linux-security","intrusion-detection","HIDS","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: analyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion\ndescription: 'Uses the Linux Audit framework (auditd) with ausearch and aureport utilities\n  to detect intrusion attempts, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious\n  system activity. Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction,\n  and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis,\n  Linux audit log investigation, ausearch queries, aureport summaries, or host-based\n  intrusion detection on Linux.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: incident-response\ntags:\n- auditd\n- ausearch\n- aureport\n- linux-security\n- intrusion-detection\n- HIDS\n- forensics\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- RS.MA-01\n- RS.MA-02\n- RS.AN-03\n- RC.RP-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1059.004\n- T1070\n- T1548.003\n- T1543.002\n---\n\n# Analyzing Linux Audit Logs for Intrusion\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Investigating suspected unauthorized access or privilege escalation on Linux hosts\n- Hunting for evidence of exploitation, backdoor installation, or persistence mechanisms\n- Auditing compliance with security baselines (CIS, STIG, PCI-DSS) that require system call monitoring\n- Reconstructing a timeline of attacker actions during incident response\n- Detecting file tampering on critical system files such as `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd`, `\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow`, or SSH keys\n\n**Do not use** for network-level intrusion detection; use Suricata or Zeek for network traffic analysis. Auditd operates at the kernel level on individual hosts.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux system with `auditd` package installed and the audit daemon running (`systemctl status auditd`)\n- Root or sudo access to configure audit rules and query logs\n- Audit rules deployed via `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002F*.rules` or loaded with `auditctl`\n- Recommended: Neo23x0\u002Fauditd ruleset from GitHub for comprehensive baseline coverage\n- Familiarity with Linux syscalls (`execve`, `open`, `connect`, `ptrace`, etc.)\n- Log storage with sufficient retention (default location: `\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Faudit\u002Faudit.log`)\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Verify Audit Daemon Status and Configuration\n\nConfirm the audit system is running and check the current rule set:\n\n```bash\n# Check auditd service status\nsystemctl status auditd\n\n# Show current audit rules loaded in the kernel\nauditctl -l\n\n# Show audit daemon configuration\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Fauditd.conf | grep -E \"log_file|max_log_file|num_logs|space_left_action\"\n\n# Check if the audit backlog is being exceeded (dropped events)\nauditctl -s\n```\n\nIf the backlog limit is being reached, increase it:\n\n```bash\nauditctl -b 8192\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Intrusion-Focused Audit Rules\n\nAdd rules that target common intrusion indicators. Place these in `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002Fintrusion.rules`:\n\n```bash\n# Monitor credential files for unauthorized reads or modifications\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd -p wa -k credential_access\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow -p rwa -k credential_access\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fgshadow -p rwa -k credential_access\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fsudoers -p wa -k privilege_escalation\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fsudoers.d\u002F -p wa -k privilege_escalation\n\n# Monitor SSH configuration and authorized keys\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fssh\u002Fsshd_config -p wa -k sshd_config_change\n-w \u002Froot\u002F.ssh\u002Fauthorized_keys -p wa -k ssh_key_tampering\n\n# Monitor user and group management commands\n-w \u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fuseradd -p x -k user_management\n-w \u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fusermod -p x -k user_management\n-w \u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fgroupadd -p x -k user_management\n\n# Detect process injection via ptrace\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -k process_injection\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -k process_injection\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -k process_injection\n\n# Monitor execution of programs from unusual directories\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=\u002Ftmp -k exec_from_tmp\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=\u002Fdev\u002Fshm -k exec_from_shm\n\n# Detect kernel module loading (rootkit installation)\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S finit_module -k kernel_module_load\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -k kernel_module_remove\n-w \u002Fsbin\u002Finsmod -p x -k kernel_module_tool\n-w \u002Fsbin\u002Fmodprobe -p x -k kernel_module_tool\n\n# Monitor network socket creation for reverse shells\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=2 -k network_socket_created\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -F a0=2 -k network_connection\n\n# Detect cron job modifications (persistence)\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fcrontab -p wa -k cron_persistence\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\u002F -p wa -k cron_persistence\n-w \u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Fcron\u002F -p wa -k cron_persistence\n\n# Monitor log deletion or tampering\n-w \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002F -p wa -k log_tampering\n```\n\nReload rules after editing:\n\n```bash\naugenrules --load\nauditctl -l | wc -l   # Confirm rule count\n```\n\n### Step 3: Search for Intrusion Indicators with ausearch\n\nUse `ausearch` to query the audit log for specific events:\n\n```bash\n# Search for all failed login attempts in the last 24 hours\nausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no -ts recent\n\n# Search for commands executed by a specific user\nausearch -ua 1001 -m EXECVE -ts today\n\n# Search for all file access events on \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\nausearch -f \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow -ts this-week\n\n# Search for privilege escalation via sudo\nausearch -m USER_CMD -ts today\n\n# Search for kernel module loading events\nausearch -k kernel_module_load -ts this-month\n\n# Search for processes executed from \u002Ftmp (common attack staging)\nausearch -k exec_from_tmp -ts this-week\n\n# Search for SSH key modifications\nausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts this-month\n\n# Search for a specific event by audit event ID\nausearch -a 12345\n\n# Search events in a specific time range\nausearch -ts 03\u002F15\u002F2026 08:00:00 -te 03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00\n\n# Interpret syscall numbers and format output readably\nausearch -k credential_access -i -ts today\n```\n\n### Step 4: Generate Summary Reports with aureport\n\nUse `aureport` to produce aggregate summaries for triage:\n\n```bash\n# Summary of all authentication events\naureport -au -ts this-week --summary\n\n# Report of all failed events (login, access, etc.)\naureport --failed --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of executable runs\naureport -x --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of all anomaly events (segfaults, promiscuous mode, etc.)\naureport --anomaly -ts this-week\n\n# Report of file access events\naureport -f --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of all events by key (maps to your custom rule keys)\naureport -k --summary -ts this-month\n\n# Report of all system calls\naureport -s --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of events grouped by user\naureport -u --summary -ts this-week\n\n# Detailed time-based event report for timeline building\naureport -ts 03\u002F15\u002F2026 08:00:00 -te 03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00 --summary\n```\n\n### Step 5: Reconstruct the Attack Timeline\n\nCombine ausearch queries to build a chronological narrative:\n\n```bash\n# Step 5a: Identify the initial access timestamp\nausearch -m USER_LOGIN -ua 0 --success yes -ts this-week -i | head -50\n\n# Step 5b: Trace what the attacker did after gaining access\n# Get all events from the compromised account within the incident window\nausearch -ua \u003CUID> -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -te \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00\" -i \\\n  | aureport -f -i\n\n# Step 5c: Extract all commands executed during the incident window\nausearch -m EXECVE -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -te \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00\" -i\n\n# Step 5d: Check for persistence mechanisms installed\nausearch -k cron_persistence -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -i\nausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -i\n\n# Step 5e: Check for lateral movement (outbound connections)\nausearch -k network_connection -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -i\n```\n\n### Step 6: Forward Audit Logs to SIEM\n\nConfigure `audisp-remote` or `auditbeat` to ship logs to a central SIEM for correlation:\n\n```bash\n# Option A: Using audisp-remote plugin\n# Edit \u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Fplugins.d\u002Fau-remote.conf\nactive = yes\ndirection = out\npath = \u002Fsbin\u002Faudisp-remote\ntype = always\n\n# Configure remote target in \u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Faudisp-remote.conf\nremote_server = siem.internal.corp\nport = 6514\ntransport = tcp\n\n# Option B: Using Elastic Auditbeat\n# Install auditbeat and configure \u002Fetc\u002Fauditbeat\u002Fauditbeat.yml\n# Auditbeat reads directly from the kernel audit framework\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **auditd** | The Linux Audit daemon that receives audit events from the kernel and writes them to `\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Faudit\u002Faudit.log` |\n| **auditctl** | Command-line utility to control the audit system: add\u002Fremove rules, check status, set backlog size |\n| **ausearch** | Query tool that searches audit logs by message type, user, file, key, time range, or event ID |\n| **aureport** | Reporting tool that generates aggregate summaries of audit events for triage and compliance |\n| **audit rule key (-k)** | A user-defined label attached to an audit rule, enabling fast filtering of related events with ausearch and aureport |\n| **syscall auditing** | Kernel-level monitoring of system calls (execve, open, connect, ptrace) that captures process and file activity |\n| **augenrules** | Utility that merges all files in `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002F` into `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Faudit.rules` and loads them into the kernel |\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] auditd is running and rules are loaded (`auditctl -l` returns expected rule count)\n- [ ] No audit backlog overflow (`auditctl -s` shows `backlog: 0` or low value, lost: 0)\n- [ ] ausearch returns events for each custom key (`ausearch -k \u003Ckey> -ts today` returns results)\n- [ ] aureport generates non-empty summaries for authentication, executable, and file events\n- [ ] Timeline reconstruction produces a coherent chronological sequence of attacker actions\n- [ ] Critical file watches trigger alerts on test modifications (`touch \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow` generates an event)\n- [ ] Logs are forwarding to central SIEM (verify with a test event and confirm receipt)\n- [ ] Audit rules persist across reboot (rules in `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002F`, not only via `auditctl`)\n","# Analyzing Linux Audit Logs for Intrusion\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Investigating suspected unauthorized access or privilege escalation on Linux hosts\n- Hunting for evidence of exploitation, backdoor installation, or persistence mechanisms\n- Auditing compliance with security baselines (CIS, STIG, PCI-DSS) that require system call monitoring\n- Reconstructing a timeline of attacker actions during incident response\n- Detecting file tampering on critical system files such as `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd`, `\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow`, or SSH keys\n\n**Do not use** for network-level intrusion detection; use Suricata or Zeek for network traffic analysis. Auditd operates at the kernel level on individual hosts.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux system with `auditd` package installed and the audit daemon running (`systemctl status auditd`)\n- Root or sudo access to configure audit rules and query logs\n- Audit rules deployed via `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002F*.rules` or loaded with `auditctl`\n- Recommended: Neo23x0\u002Fauditd ruleset from GitHub for comprehensive baseline coverage\n- Familiarity with Linux syscalls (`execve`, `open`, `connect`, `ptrace`, etc.)\n- Log storage with sufficient retention (default location: `\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Faudit\u002Faudit.log`)\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Verify Audit Daemon Status and Configuration\n\nConfirm the audit system is running and check the current rule set:\n\n```bash\n# Check auditd service status\nsystemctl status auditd\n\n# Show current audit rules loaded in the kernel\nauditctl -l\n\n# Show audit daemon configuration\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Fauditd.conf | grep -E \"log_file|max_log_file|num_logs|space_left_action\"\n\n# Check if the audit backlog is being exceeded (dropped events)\nauditctl -s\n```\n\nIf the backlog limit is being reached, increase it:\n\n```bash\nauditctl -b 8192\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Intrusion-Focused Audit Rules\n\nAdd rules that target common intrusion indicators. Place these in `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002Fintrusion.rules`:\n\n```bash\n# Monitor credential files for unauthorized reads or modifications\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd -p wa -k credential_access\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow -p rwa -k credential_access\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fgshadow -p rwa -k credential_access\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fsudoers -p wa -k privilege_escalation\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fsudoers.d\u002F -p wa -k privilege_escalation\n\n# Monitor SSH configuration and authorized keys\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fssh\u002Fsshd_config -p wa -k sshd_config_change\n-w \u002Froot\u002F.ssh\u002Fauthorized_keys -p wa -k ssh_key_tampering\n\n# Monitor user and group management commands\n-w \u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fuseradd -p x -k user_management\n-w \u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fusermod -p x -k user_management\n-w \u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fgroupadd -p x -k user_management\n\n# Detect process injection via ptrace\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -k process_injection\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -k process_injection\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -k process_injection\n\n# Monitor execution of programs from unusual directories\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=\u002Ftmp -k exec_from_tmp\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=\u002Fdev\u002Fshm -k exec_from_shm\n\n# Detect kernel module loading (rootkit installation)\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S finit_module -k kernel_module_load\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -k kernel_module_remove\n-w \u002Fsbin\u002Finsmod -p x -k kernel_module_tool\n-w \u002Fsbin\u002Fmodprobe -p x -k kernel_module_tool\n\n# Monitor network socket creation for reverse shells\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=2 -k network_socket_created\n-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -F a0=2 -k network_connection\n\n# Detect cron job modifications (persistence)\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fcrontab -p wa -k cron_persistence\n-w \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\u002F -p wa -k cron_persistence\n-w \u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Fcron\u002F -p wa -k cron_persistence\n\n# Monitor log deletion or tampering\n-w \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002F -p wa -k log_tampering\n```\n\nReload rules after editing:\n\n```bash\naugenrules --load\nauditctl -l | wc -l   # Confirm rule count\n```\n\n### Step 3: Search for Intrusion Indicators with ausearch\n\nUse `ausearch` to query the audit log for specific events:\n\n```bash\n# Search for all failed login attempts in the last 24 hours\nausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no -ts recent\n\n# Search for commands executed by a specific user\nausearch -ua 1001 -m EXECVE -ts today\n\n# Search for all file access events on \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\nausearch -f \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow -ts this-week\n\n# Search for privilege escalation via sudo\nausearch -m USER_CMD -ts today\n\n# Search for kernel module loading events\nausearch -k kernel_module_load -ts this-month\n\n# Search for processes executed from \u002Ftmp (common attack staging)\nausearch -k exec_from_tmp -ts this-week\n\n# Search for SSH key modifications\nausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts this-month\n\n# Search for a specific event by audit event ID\nausearch -a 12345\n\n# Search events in a specific time range\nausearch -ts 03\u002F15\u002F2026 08:00:00 -te 03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00\n\n# Interpret syscall numbers and format output readably\nausearch -k credential_access -i -ts today\n```\n\n### Step 4: Generate Summary Reports with aureport\n\nUse `aureport` to produce aggregate summaries for triage:\n\n```bash\n# Summary of all authentication events\naureport -au -ts this-week --summary\n\n# Report of all failed events (login, access, etc.)\naureport --failed --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of executable runs\naureport -x --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of all anomaly events (segfaults, promiscuous mode, etc.)\naureport --anomaly -ts this-week\n\n# Report of file access events\naureport -f --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of all events by key (maps to your custom rule keys)\naureport -k --summary -ts this-month\n\n# Report of all system calls\naureport -s --summary -ts today\n\n# Report of events grouped by user\naureport -u --summary -ts this-week\n\n# Detailed time-based event report for timeline building\naureport -ts 03\u002F15\u002F2026 08:00:00 -te 03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00 --summary\n```\n\n### Step 5: Reconstruct the Attack Timeline\n\nCombine ausearch queries to build a chronological narrative:\n\n```bash\n# Step 5a: Identify the initial access timestamp\nausearch -m USER_LOGIN -ua 0 --success yes -ts this-week -i | head -50\n\n# Step 5b: Trace what the attacker did after gaining access\n# Get all events from the compromised account within the incident window\nausearch -ua \u003CUID> -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -te \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00\" -i \\\n  | aureport -f -i\n\n# Step 5c: Extract all commands executed during the incident window\nausearch -m EXECVE -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -te \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 18:00:00\" -i\n\n# Step 5d: Check for persistence mechanisms installed\nausearch -k cron_persistence -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -i\nausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -i\n\n# Step 5e: Check for lateral movement (outbound connections)\nausearch -k network_connection -ts \"03\u002F15\u002F2026 14:00:00\" -i\n```\n\n### Step 6: Forward Audit Logs to SIEM\n\nConfigure `audisp-remote` or `auditbeat` to ship logs to a central SIEM for correlation:\n\n```bash\n# Option A: Using audisp-remote plugin\n# Edit \u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Fplugins.d\u002Fau-remote.conf\nactive = yes\ndirection = out\npath = \u002Fsbin\u002Faudisp-remote\ntype = always\n\n# Configure remote target in \u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Faudisp-remote.conf\nremote_server = siem.internal.corp\nport = 6514\ntransport = tcp\n\n# Option B: Using Elastic Auditbeat\n# Install auditbeat and configure \u002Fetc\u002Fauditbeat\u002Fauditbeat.yml\n# Auditbeat reads directly from the kernel audit framework\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **auditd** | The Linux Audit daemon that receives audit events from the kernel and writes them to `\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Faudit\u002Faudit.log` |\n| **auditctl** | Command-line utility to control the audit system: add\u002Fremove rules, check status, set backlog size |\n| **ausearch** | Query tool that searches audit logs by message type, user, file, key, time range, or event ID |\n| **aureport** | Reporting tool that generates aggregate summaries of audit events for triage and compliance |\n| **audit rule key (-k)** | A user-defined label attached to an audit rule, enabling fast filtering of related events with ausearch and aureport |\n| **syscall auditing** | Kernel-level monitoring of system calls (execve, open, connect, ptrace) that captures process and file activity |\n| **augenrules** | Utility that merges all files in `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002F` into `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Faudit.rules` and loads them into the kernel |\n\n## Verification\n\n- [ ] auditd is running and rules are loaded (`auditctl -l` returns expected rule count)\n- [ ] No audit backlog overflow (`auditctl -s` shows `backlog: 0` or low value, lost: 0)\n- [ ] ausearch returns events for each custom key (`ausearch -k \u003Ckey> -ts today` returns results)\n- [ ] aureport generates non-empty summaries for authentication, executable, and file events\n- [ ] Timeline reconstruction produces a coherent chronological sequence of attacker actions\n- [ ] Critical file watches trigger alerts on test modifications (`touch \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow` generates an event)\n- [ ] Logs are forwarding to central SIEM (verify with a test event and confirm receipt)\n- [ ] Audit rules persist across reboot (rules in `\u002Fetc\u002Faudit\u002Frules.d\u002F`, not only via `auditctl`)\n",{"name":5,"tags":46,"author":47,"domain":28,"license":15,"version":48,"nist_csf":49,"subdomain":54,"description":55,"mitre_attack":56},[35,36,37,38,39,40,34],"mahipal","1.0.0",[50,51,52,53],"RS.MA-01","RS.MA-02","RS.AN-03","RC.RP-01","incident-response","Uses the Linux Audit framework (auditd) with ausearch and aureport utilities to detect intrusion attempts, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious system activity. Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction, and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis, Linux audit log investigation, ausearch queries, aureport summaries, or host-based intrusion detection on Linux.\n",[57,58,59,60],"T1059.004","T1070","T1548.003","T1543.002","main","54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57","skills\u002Fanalyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion",4414,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","https:\u002F\u002Fmahipal.engineer\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975","Mahipal.engineer","🔐 Cybersecurity | 💻 Dev | 📷 Street Photographer\r\n🎓 MSc | 📚 Research & AI Security","2026-08-31 12:32:44",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":72,"prompt":82,"zipAvailable":83},[73,76,79],{"tool":74,"command":75},"npx","npx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion",{"tool":77,"command":78},"bunx","bunx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion",{"tool":80,"command":81},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add mukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion\u002FSKILL.md",true,[85,90,96],{"path":86,"resourceType":86,"resourceTypeDesc":87,"sizeBytes":88,"sourceHtmlUrl":89},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion\u002FLICENSE",{"path":91,"resourceType":92,"resourceTypeDesc":93,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1911,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":97,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":100,"sourceHtmlUrl":101},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",8103,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[103,129,153,180,205,231],{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":41},"01M6AGDM3HJXTKXX15ZZ0ZVCJ3","verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore","Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI\u002FCD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fverifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore\u002FSKILL.md",[109],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[111,112,113,114,31,28,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128],"sigstore","provenance","slsa","verifying build provenance with slsa sigstore","incident response","identity","pr","code","artifacts","ci","supply-chain","pipeline","supply-chain-security","t1195","attestation","code-signing","cosign","keyless",{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":136,"publishedAt":41},"01M6AGDGBPWYVZ2F11GFKJ4HZ9","validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation","Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote\u002Ftpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware\u002Fkernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation\u002FSKILL.md",[135],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[137,125,138,139,31,140,28,117,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152],"boot","TPM","validating tpm measured boot attestation","policy","verification","ZeRO","firmware","Tools","measured-boot","PCR","integrity","secrets","remote-attestation","tpm2-tools","integrity-verification","trusted-computing",{"skillNo":154,"name":155,"nameZh":6,"description":156,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":157,"categories":158,"keywords":163,"publishedAt":41},"01M6AGDCW0Y4FXZ3362GT1941M","validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery","Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable\u002Fair-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvalidating-backup-integrity-for-recovery\u002FSKILL.md",[159,162],{"categoryNo":160,"categoryName":161,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[147,164,165,166,167,28,168,169,141,170,171,54,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179],"backup","recovery","validating backup integrity for recovery","testing","infrastructure","validation","compliance","hash-verification","ransomware","cryptocurrency","detection","t1078","t1490","immutable","disaster-recovery","restore-testing",{"skillNo":181,"name":182,"nameZh":6,"description":183,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":184,"categories":185,"keywords":187,"publishedAt":41},"01M6AGD9GBG2KZ336AE763J3WH","triaging-windows-with-kape","Runs KAPE (Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor) to collect targeted forensic artifacts (registry hives, $MFT, event logs, prefetch, browser data) via Targets and parse them with Modules wrapping Eric Zimmerman's EZ Tools (PECmd, MFTECmd, RECmd). Use during early incident containment\u002Ftriage when full disk imaging is impractical but a defensible, parseable Windows artifact set is needed quickly, including at-scale remote collection.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-windows-with-kape\u002FSKILL.md",[186],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[188,189,190,28,191,192,24,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,144,202,203,204],"windows","kape","triaging windows with kape","registry","browser","windows-forensics","dfir","mft","mftecmd","data","prefetch","eric-zimmerman","digital-forensics","SET","collection","pecmd","artifact-collection",{"skillNo":206,"name":207,"nameZh":6,"description":208,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":209,"categories":210,"keywords":212,"publishedAt":41},"01M6AGD5PW5J4EVZM958WD74ZQ","triaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework","Triages and prioritizes vulnerabilities with CISA's Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) decision tree, weighing exploitation status (via the CISA KEV catalog and FIRST EPSS API), technical impact, automatability, and mission prevalence to output Track\u002FTrack*\u002FAttend\u002FAct decisions. Use when prioritizing vulnerability scan results (OpenVAS, Nessus, Qualys) for remediation planning beyond raw CVSS scores.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-vulnerabilities-with-ssvc-framework\u002FSKILL.md",[211],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[213,30,214,28,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230],"vulnerabilities","triaging vulnerabilities with ssvc framework","status","planning","CISA","vulnerability-management","risk-management","nessus","qualys","openvas","cvss","remediation","risk","vulnerability","api","prioritization","ssvc","decision-tree",{"skillNo":232,"name":233,"nameZh":6,"description":234,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":235,"categories":236,"keywords":238,"publishedAt":41},"01M6AGD24TTQQM4CXG69E3B9TJ","triaging-security-incident","Performs initial triage of security incidents using the NIST SP 800-61r3 and SANS PICERL frameworks, classifying incident type, assigning priority by business impact, and routing to the appropriate response team. Use when a SIEM\u002FEDR alert needs human classification, concurrent alerts must be prioritized, or a user report or threat-intel IOC match requires initial incident categorization.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Ftriaging-security-incident\u002FSKILL.md",[237],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[31,239,28,29,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,175,247,176,248,249,250,251,252,253],"triaging security incident","file","ioc","soc","NIST-800-61","NIST","severity","edr","execution","analysis","classification","severity-classification","incident-triage","SANS-PICERL","SOC-operations"]