[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M6ADMWYCZ8BAS1G0DTYZ4WQ9":3,"skill-same:01M6ADMWYCZ8BAS1G0DTYZ4WQ9":117},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":26,"publishedAt":54,"linkOnly":55,"markdownContent":56,"markdownBody":57,"frontMatter":58,"refName":59,"commitSha":60,"skillDirectory":61,"forksCount":62,"repositoryHtmlUrl":63,"repositoryHomepageUrl":64,"ownerHtmlUrl":65,"ownerBlogUrl":66,"ownerDescription":67,"updatedAt":68,"install":69,"resources":82},"01M6ADMWYCZ8BAS1G0DTYZ4WQ9","github-actions-hardening",null,"Security hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss — untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like \"is this workflow safe?\", \"review my CI for security issues\", \"why is pull_request_target dangerous here?\", \"pin my actions\", or \"lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions\". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target \u002F workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV\u002FGITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.","github\u002Fawesome-copilot","github","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F9919?v=4","01M6AC83DS133TPXFSP1DHNCC6","GitHub","01M6AD3PBDYPK7NVFJNJ66Y8RS",41081,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002FSKILL.md",[18,23],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000011","运维与部署","SCENARIO","使用场景",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000023","Skill与智能体开发",[9,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53],"hardening","github actions hardening","github actions","actions","audit","new","when","interpolation","github actions workflow","runner","files","reviewer","model","ci","writing","threat model","pull","issues","permissions","code","run","secure","workflows","workflow","security","safe","review","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: github-actions-hardening\ndescription: Security hardening reviewer for GitHub Actions workflow files (.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F*.yml). Reasons about the Actions threat model that pattern matchers and general code linters miss — untrusted-input script injection, privileged triggers running fork code, mutable action references, and over-scoped tokens. Use this skill when asked to review, audit, harden, or secure a GitHub Actions workflow, when writing a new workflow, or for any request like \"is this workflow safe?\", \"review my CI for security issues\", \"why is pull_request_target dangerous here?\", \"pin my actions\", or \"lock down GITHUB_TOKEN permissions\". Covers script injection via ${{ }} interpolation, pull_request_target \u002F workflow_run privilege escalation, SHA-pinning of third-party actions, least-privilege permissions, GITHUB_ENV\u002FGITHUB_OUTPUT injection, secret exposure, OIDC over long-lived credentials, and self-hosted runner exposure on public repositories.\n---\n\n# GitHub Actions Hardening\n\nA focused security reviewer for GitHub Actions workflows. It reasons about the *Actions-specific*\nthreat model — where trust boundaries live in trigger types, token scopes, and string\ninterpolation — rather than the application-code vulnerabilities a general security scanner looks\nfor. Most workflow risks are invisible to language linters because the dangerous code is the YAML\nitself and the way GitHub expands `${{ }}` expressions into a shell before your script runs.\n\n## When to Use This Skill\n\nUse this skill when the request involves:\n\n* Reviewing, auditing, or hardening any file under `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F`\n* Authoring a new workflow and wanting it secure by default\n* A workflow that uses `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, or `issue_comment` triggers\n* Questions about `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions or the `permissions:` key\n* Pinning actions to commit SHAs vs tags vs branches\n* Handling untrusted input (issue titles, PR bodies, branch names, commit messages) in `run:` steps\n* OIDC \u002F cloud authentication from Actions, or secret handling in CI\n* Self-hosted runners on public repositories\n* Any request like \"is this workflow safe?\", \"secure my CI\", or \"review this GitHub Action\"\n\n## The Core Insight\n\nIn a workflow, **`${{ \u003Cexpr> }}` is expanded by the runner into the script *before* the shell\nexecutes it.** So a step like:\n\n```yaml\n- run: echo \"Title: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}\"\n```\n\nis not passing a variable — it is *pasting attacker-controlled text directly into your shell\ncommand*. An issue titled `\"; \u003Cattacker-command> #` is concatenated into the script and executed.\nThis single mechanism is the most common real-world Actions vulnerability, and models routinely\ngenerate it. Treat every\n`${{ }}` that contains data an outside contributor can influence as a code-injection sink.\n\n## Execution Workflow\n\nFollow these steps **in order** for every workflow reviewed.\n\n### Step 1 — Map the Triggers and Trust Level\n\nRead every `on:` trigger and classify the workflow's privilege:\n\n* `push`, `pull_request` (from same repo) → runs with the contributor's own trust\n* `pull_request` from a **fork** → runs with a **read-only** token, **no secrets** (safe by design)\n* `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, `issue_comment`, `issues` → run in the context of the\n  **base repository** with a **read\u002Fwrite token and full access to secrets**, but can be\n  **triggered by outside contributors**. These are the dangerous triggers.\n\nRead `references\u002Ftriggers-and-privilege.md` for the full trust matrix.\n\n### Step 2 — Hunt for Script Injection\n\nFor every `run:` block, every `script:` in `actions\u002Fgithub-script`, and every input to a custom\naction, list the `${{ }}` expressions and check whether any resolve to attacker-controllable data.\nHigh-risk contexts include:\n\n* `github.event.issue.title`, `github.event.issue.body`\n* `github.event.pull_request.title`, `github.event.pull_request.body`, `.head.ref`, `.head.label`\n* `github.event.comment.body`, `github.event.review.body`\n* `github.event.pages.*.page_name`, `github.event.commits.*.message`, `github.event.head_commit.*`\n* `github.head_ref` and any `github.event.*` field a fork author can set\n\nRead `references\u002Finjection.md` for the complete sink list and the safe-pattern fixes.\n\n### Step 3 — Check Privileged Triggers Don't Execute Untrusted Code\n\nIf a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` workflow checks out PR\u002Ffork code\n(`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}`) **and then runs it** (build, test, install\nscripts, `npm install` with lifecycle scripts, etc.), that is remote code execution against a\nprivileged token. Flag it as CRITICAL. The safe pattern is to split into two workflows: an\nunprivileged `pull_request` workflow that runs the untrusted code, and a privileged\n`workflow_run` workflow that only consumes its results.\n\n### Step 4 — Audit `permissions:`\n\n* If there is **no** `permissions:` block, the workflow inherits the repository default, which may\n  be read\u002Fwrite to everything. Flag it.\n* Recommend a top-level `permissions: {}` (deny-all) or `contents: read`, then grant the minimum\n  per job (e.g. `pull-requests: write` only on the job that comments).\n* Flag any `permissions: write-all` or broad `write` scopes that the steps don't actually need.\n\nRead `references\u002Fpermissions-and-tokens.md` for the per-scope guidance and OIDC setup.\n\n### Step 5 — Audit Action References (Supply Chain)\n\nFor every `uses:`:\n\n* **Third-party actions** (not `actions\u002F*` or `github\u002F*`) MUST be pinned to a full 40-character\n  commit SHA, not a tag or branch. Tags and branches are mutable; a compromised upstream action\n  can rewrite `v1` to malicious code that runs with your token and secrets.\n* First-party `actions\u002F*` are lower risk but SHA-pinning is still the hardened recommendation.\n* Flag `@main`, `@master`, or any branch reference as HIGH — that is \"latest\" and can change under\n  you at any time.\n* Note the human-readable version in a trailing comment: `uses: foo\u002Fbar@\u003Csha> # v2.1.0`.\n\nRead `references\u002Fsupply-chain.md` for pinning, Dependabot for actions, and artifact\u002Fcache risks.\n\n### Step 6 — Check Secret and Output Handling\n\n* No secrets echoed, printed, or written to logs; no `set -x` \u002F `bash -x` in steps that touch\n  secrets.\n* Secrets must not be passed to steps that run untrusted code or to untrusted third-party actions.\n* Untrusted multiline data written to `$GITHUB_ENV` or `$GITHUB_OUTPUT` can inject environment\n  variables or step outputs — use the random-delimiter heredoc form and never write raw user input.\n* `actions\u002Fcheckout` leaves a token on disk by default; set `persist-credentials: false` when the\n  job later runs untrusted code.\n\n### Step 7 — Produce the Report\n\nOutput findings using the format in `references\u002Freport-format.md`: a severity summary table first,\nthen grouped findings with file, the exact offending YAML, the risk in plain English, and a\nconcrete before\u002Fafter fix. Never auto-apply changes — present them for review.\n\n## Severity Guide\n\n| Severity | Meaning | Example |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| ? CRITICAL | Token\u002Fsecret theft or RCE reachable by an outside contributor | `pull_request_target` checking out and running fork code; `${{ github.event.* }}` in a `run:` on a privileged trigger |\n| ? HIGH | Exploitable supply-chain or scope problem | Third-party action on a mutable tag\u002Fbranch; `write-all` permissions; injection sink on `issue_comment` |\n| ? MEDIUM | Risk under conditions or chaining | Missing `permissions:` block; secret reachable by a non-fork PR author |\n| ? LOW | Hardening gap, low direct risk | First-party action not SHA-pinned; `persist-credentials` left default on a non-privileged job |\n| ⚪ INFO | Observation, not a vulnerability | Version comment missing next to a pinned SHA |\n\n## Output Rules\n\n* **Always** show a findings summary table (counts by severity) first.\n* **Group by issue type**, not by file.\n* **Be exact** — quote the offending line and give the line location.\n* **Always** pair every CRITICAL\u002FHIGH with a concrete corrected YAML snippet.\n* **Never** claim a fork `pull_request` is dangerous just because it runs untrusted code — it has\n  no secrets and a read-only token. Reserve CRITICAL for the privileged triggers.\n* If the workflow is already hardened, say so and list what was checked.\n\n## Reference Files\n\nLoad these as needed:\n\n* `references\u002Ftriggers-and-privilege.md` — Trust matrix for every trigger, why `pull_request_target`\n  and `workflow_run` are privileged, and the two-workflow safe pattern.\n  + Search patterns: `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, `issue_comment`, `fork`, `secrets`, `read-only token`, `trust boundary`\n* `references\u002Finjection.md` — Full list of attacker-controllable `${{ }}` contexts and the\n  `env:`-variable safe pattern for each sink (`run`, `github-script`, action inputs).\n  + Search patterns: `script injection`, `github.event`, `head_ref`, `issue title`, `env`, `intermediate variable`, `actions\u002Fgithub-script`\n* `references\u002Fpermissions-and-tokens.md` — `GITHUB_TOKEN` scopes, least-privilege `permissions:`\n  recipes per job type, and OIDC for cloud auth instead of long-lived secrets.\n  + Search patterns: `permissions`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `write-all`, `contents: read`, `id-token`, `OIDC`, `least privilege`\n* `references\u002Fsupply-chain.md` — SHA-pinning third-party actions, Dependabot for `github-actions`,\n  artifact and cache poisoning across `workflow_run`, and self-hosted runner exposure.\n  + Search patterns: `SHA pin`, `uses`, `mutable tag`, `Dependabot`, `download-artifact`, `cache`, `self-hosted runner`\n* `references\u002Freport-format.md` — Output template: summary table, finding cards, and before\u002Fafter\n  remediation blocks.\n  + Search patterns: `report`, `format`, `finding`, `summary`, `remediation`, `before`, `after`\n","# GitHub Actions Hardening\n\nA focused security reviewer for GitHub Actions workflows. It reasons about the *Actions-specific*\nthreat model — where trust boundaries live in trigger types, token scopes, and string\ninterpolation — rather than the application-code vulnerabilities a general security scanner looks\nfor. Most workflow risks are invisible to language linters because the dangerous code is the YAML\nitself and the way GitHub expands `${{ }}` expressions into a shell before your script runs.\n\n## When to Use This Skill\n\nUse this skill when the request involves:\n\n* Reviewing, auditing, or hardening any file under `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F`\n* Authoring a new workflow and wanting it secure by default\n* A workflow that uses `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, or `issue_comment` triggers\n* Questions about `GITHUB_TOKEN` permissions or the `permissions:` key\n* Pinning actions to commit SHAs vs tags vs branches\n* Handling untrusted input (issue titles, PR bodies, branch names, commit messages) in `run:` steps\n* OIDC \u002F cloud authentication from Actions, or secret handling in CI\n* Self-hosted runners on public repositories\n* Any request like \"is this workflow safe?\", \"secure my CI\", or \"review this GitHub Action\"\n\n## The Core Insight\n\nIn a workflow, **`${{ \u003Cexpr> }}` is expanded by the runner into the script *before* the shell\nexecutes it.** So a step like:\n\n```yaml\n- run: echo \"Title: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}\"\n```\n\nis not passing a variable — it is *pasting attacker-controlled text directly into your shell\ncommand*. An issue titled `\"; \u003Cattacker-command> #` is concatenated into the script and executed.\nThis single mechanism is the most common real-world Actions vulnerability, and models routinely\ngenerate it. Treat every\n`${{ }}` that contains data an outside contributor can influence as a code-injection sink.\n\n## Execution Workflow\n\nFollow these steps **in order** for every workflow reviewed.\n\n### Step 1 — Map the Triggers and Trust Level\n\nRead every `on:` trigger and classify the workflow's privilege:\n\n* `push`, `pull_request` (from same repo) → runs with the contributor's own trust\n* `pull_request` from a **fork** → runs with a **read-only** token, **no secrets** (safe by design)\n* `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, `issue_comment`, `issues` → run in the context of the\n  **base repository** with a **read\u002Fwrite token and full access to secrets**, but can be\n  **triggered by outside contributors**. These are the dangerous triggers.\n\nRead `references\u002Ftriggers-and-privilege.md` for the full trust matrix.\n\n### Step 2 — Hunt for Script Injection\n\nFor every `run:` block, every `script:` in `actions\u002Fgithub-script`, and every input to a custom\naction, list the `${{ }}` expressions and check whether any resolve to attacker-controllable data.\nHigh-risk contexts include:\n\n* `github.event.issue.title`, `github.event.issue.body`\n* `github.event.pull_request.title`, `github.event.pull_request.body`, `.head.ref`, `.head.label`\n* `github.event.comment.body`, `github.event.review.body`\n* `github.event.pages.*.page_name`, `github.event.commits.*.message`, `github.event.head_commit.*`\n* `github.head_ref` and any `github.event.*` field a fork author can set\n\nRead `references\u002Finjection.md` for the complete sink list and the safe-pattern fixes.\n\n### Step 3 — Check Privileged Triggers Don't Execute Untrusted Code\n\nIf a `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run` workflow checks out PR\u002Ffork code\n(`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}`) **and then runs it** (build, test, install\nscripts, `npm install` with lifecycle scripts, etc.), that is remote code execution against a\nprivileged token. Flag it as CRITICAL. The safe pattern is to split into two workflows: an\nunprivileged `pull_request` workflow that runs the untrusted code, and a privileged\n`workflow_run` workflow that only consumes its results.\n\n### Step 4 — Audit `permissions:`\n\n* If there is **no** `permissions:` block, the workflow inherits the repository default, which may\n  be read\u002Fwrite to everything. Flag it.\n* Recommend a top-level `permissions: {}` (deny-all) or `contents: read`, then grant the minimum\n  per job (e.g. `pull-requests: write` only on the job that comments).\n* Flag any `permissions: write-all` or broad `write` scopes that the steps don't actually need.\n\nRead `references\u002Fpermissions-and-tokens.md` for the per-scope guidance and OIDC setup.\n\n### Step 5 — Audit Action References (Supply Chain)\n\nFor every `uses:`:\n\n* **Third-party actions** (not `actions\u002F*` or `github\u002F*`) MUST be pinned to a full 40-character\n  commit SHA, not a tag or branch. Tags and branches are mutable; a compromised upstream action\n  can rewrite `v1` to malicious code that runs with your token and secrets.\n* First-party `actions\u002F*` are lower risk but SHA-pinning is still the hardened recommendation.\n* Flag `@main`, `@master`, or any branch reference as HIGH — that is \"latest\" and can change under\n  you at any time.\n* Note the human-readable version in a trailing comment: `uses: foo\u002Fbar@\u003Csha> # v2.1.0`.\n\nRead `references\u002Fsupply-chain.md` for pinning, Dependabot for actions, and artifact\u002Fcache risks.\n\n### Step 6 — Check Secret and Output Handling\n\n* No secrets echoed, printed, or written to logs; no `set -x` \u002F `bash -x` in steps that touch\n  secrets.\n* Secrets must not be passed to steps that run untrusted code or to untrusted third-party actions.\n* Untrusted multiline data written to `$GITHUB_ENV` or `$GITHUB_OUTPUT` can inject environment\n  variables or step outputs — use the random-delimiter heredoc form and never write raw user input.\n* `actions\u002Fcheckout` leaves a token on disk by default; set `persist-credentials: false` when the\n  job later runs untrusted code.\n\n### Step 7 — Produce the Report\n\nOutput findings using the format in `references\u002Freport-format.md`: a severity summary table first,\nthen grouped findings with file, the exact offending YAML, the risk in plain English, and a\nconcrete before\u002Fafter fix. Never auto-apply changes — present them for review.\n\n## Severity Guide\n\n| Severity | Meaning | Example |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| ? CRITICAL | Token\u002Fsecret theft or RCE reachable by an outside contributor | `pull_request_target` checking out and running fork code; `${{ github.event.* }}` in a `run:` on a privileged trigger |\n| ? HIGH | Exploitable supply-chain or scope problem | Third-party action on a mutable tag\u002Fbranch; `write-all` permissions; injection sink on `issue_comment` |\n| ? MEDIUM | Risk under conditions or chaining | Missing `permissions:` block; secret reachable by a non-fork PR author |\n| ? LOW | Hardening gap, low direct risk | First-party action not SHA-pinned; `persist-credentials` left default on a non-privileged job |\n| ⚪ INFO | Observation, not a vulnerability | Version comment missing next to a pinned SHA |\n\n## Output Rules\n\n* **Always** show a findings summary table (counts by severity) first.\n* **Group by issue type**, not by file.\n* **Be exact** — quote the offending line and give the line location.\n* **Always** pair every CRITICAL\u002FHIGH with a concrete corrected YAML snippet.\n* **Never** claim a fork `pull_request` is dangerous just because it runs untrusted code — it has\n  no secrets and a read-only token. Reserve CRITICAL for the privileged triggers.\n* If the workflow is already hardened, say so and list what was checked.\n\n## Reference Files\n\nLoad these as needed:\n\n* `references\u002Ftriggers-and-privilege.md` — Trust matrix for every trigger, why `pull_request_target`\n  and `workflow_run` are privileged, and the two-workflow safe pattern.\n  + Search patterns: `pull_request_target`, `workflow_run`, `issue_comment`, `fork`, `secrets`, `read-only token`, `trust boundary`\n* `references\u002Finjection.md` — Full list of attacker-controllable `${{ }}` contexts and the\n  `env:`-variable safe pattern for each sink (`run`, `github-script`, action inputs).\n  + Search patterns: `script injection`, `github.event`, `head_ref`, `issue title`, `env`, `intermediate variable`, `actions\u002Fgithub-script`\n* `references\u002Fpermissions-and-tokens.md` — `GITHUB_TOKEN` scopes, least-privilege `permissions:`\n  recipes per job type, and OIDC for cloud auth instead of long-lived secrets.\n  + Search patterns: `permissions`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `write-all`, `contents: read`, `id-token`, `OIDC`, `least privilege`\n* `references\u002Fsupply-chain.md` — SHA-pinning third-party actions, Dependabot for `github-actions`,\n  artifact and cache poisoning across `workflow_run`, and self-hosted runner exposure.\n  + Search patterns: `SHA pin`, `uses`, `mutable tag`, `Dependabot`, `download-artifact`, `cache`, `self-hosted runner`\n* `references\u002Freport-format.md` — Output template: summary table, finding cards, and before\u002Fafter\n  remediation blocks.\n  + Search patterns: `report`, `format`, `finding`, `summary`, `remediation`, `before`, `after`\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","5269f7ea2d6c3a9bfda5ed878b6726cf509121fd","skills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening",5344,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot","https:\u002F\u002Fawesome-copilot.github.com\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fabout","How people build software.","2026-11-13 02:05:36",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":70,"prompt":80,"zipAvailable":81},[71,74,77],{"tool":72,"command":73},"npx","npx skills add github\u002Fawesome-copilot --skill github-actions-hardening",{"tool":75,"command":76},"bunx","bunx skills add github\u002Fawesome-copilot --skill github-actions-hardening",{"tool":78,"command":79},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add github\u002Fawesome-copilot --skill github-actions-hardening","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002FSKILL.md",true,[83,89,93,97,101,105,109,113],{"path":84,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":87,"sourceHtmlUrl":88},"agents\u002Fopenai.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",87,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHasarAli\u002Fdotfiles\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdot-agents\u002Fskills\u002Ftdd\u002Fagents\u002Fopenai.yaml",{"path":90,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":91,"sourceHtmlUrl":92},"mocking.md",1481,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHasarAli\u002Fdotfiles\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdot-agents\u002Fskills\u002Ftdd\u002Fmocking.md",{"path":94,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"references\u002Finjection.md",3035,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002Freferences\u002Finjection.md",{"path":98,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":99,"sourceHtmlUrl":100},"references\u002Fpermissions-and-tokens.md",2743,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002Freferences\u002Fpermissions-and-tokens.md",{"path":102,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":103,"sourceHtmlUrl":104},"references\u002Freport-format.md",1920,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002Freferences\u002Freport-format.md",{"path":106,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":107,"sourceHtmlUrl":108},"references\u002Fsupply-chain.md",2938,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002Freferences\u002Fsupply-chain.md",{"path":110,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":111,"sourceHtmlUrl":112},"references\u002Ftriggers-and-privilege.md",3397,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions-hardening\u002Freferences\u002Ftriggers-and-privilege.md",{"path":114,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":115,"sourceHtmlUrl":116},"tests.md",2214,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHasarAli\u002Fdotfiles\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fdot-agents\u002Fskills\u002Ftdd\u002Ftests.md",[118,146,173,201,235,252],{"skillNo":119,"name":120,"nameZh":6,"description":121,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":122,"categories":123,"keywords":128,"publishedAt":54},"01M70KXZNX9ES38N2A8M58ZZMZ","supabase-rls-policies","Write, review, and test Supabase Row Level Security (RLS) policies so that one user cannot read or change another user's rows. Use when creating or changing tables, policies, views, or security definer functions in a Supabase project, when reviewing a migration that touches RLS, or when asked to prove user isolation with pgTAP tests that sign in as two users.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsupabase-rls-policies\u002FSKILL.md",[124,127],{"categoryNo":125,"categoryName":126,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[129,130,131,132,133,33,53,134,135,136,51,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145],"supabase","rls","supabase rls","supabase rls policies","project","change","read","write","isolation","tables","as","tests","prove","use","users","functions","with",{"skillNo":147,"name":148,"nameZh":6,"description":149,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":150,"categories":151,"keywords":153,"publishedAt":54},"01M70KWA5YWXDV6V8DZ19E3T2Y","skill-distribution-audit","Audit a skill collection before release or investigate installer omissions, archived\u002Ftemplate leakage, duplicate identities, and manifest drift. Reconcile the intended public source set, distribution manifest, and actual discovery output for a specified consumer version. Includes a deterministic set-comparison helper.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fskill-distribution-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[152],{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[154,155,31,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172],"distribution","skill distribution audit","SET","deterministic","installer","for","discovery","comparison","helper","manifest","version","collection","drift","output","investigate","duplicate","template","release","reconcile",{"skillNo":174,"name":175,"nameZh":6,"description":176,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":177,"sourceHtmlUrl":178,"categories":179,"keywords":185,"publishedAt":54},"01M70KCJPFVW7PPQ49CC5R8JGK","logicapps-custom-code-net10-migration","Migrate Azure Logic Apps Standard local-function custom-code projects from .NET 8 to .NET 10. Use for legacy Logic Apps custom-code workspace upgrades, project\u002Fpackage configuration, custom-worker settings, publication, and integrated VS Code debugging. Not for ordinary .NET applications, standalone Azure Functions, Consumption workflows, or cloud deployment.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Flogicapps-custom-code-net10-migration\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Flogicapps-custom-code-net10-migration\u002FSKILL.md",[180],{"categoryNo":181,"categoryName":182,"taxonomyType":183,"taxonomyTypeDesc":184},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000030","开发工程师","PROFESSION","适用职业",[186,46,187,188,189,190,159,133,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,142,198,199,200,49],"custom","logicapps custom code net10 migration","migration","projects","standalone","deployment","applications","local","azure","worker","upgrades","package","apps","Legacy","debugging",{"skillNo":202,"name":203,"nameZh":6,"description":204,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":205,"sourceHtmlUrl":206,"categories":207,"keywords":212,"publishedAt":54},"01M6AEBN37RQMXJ3298PEY7PG1","winmd-api-search","Find and explore Windows desktop APIs. Use when building features that need platform capabilities — camera, file access, notifications, UI controls, AI\u002FML, sensors, networking, etc. Discovers the right API for a task and retrieves full type details (methods, properties, events, enumeration values).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwinmd-api-search\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwinmd-api-search\u002FSKILL.md",[208,211],{"categoryNo":209,"categoryName":210,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000010","后端与接口",{"categoryNo":181,"categoryName":182,"taxonomyType":183,"taxonomyTypeDesc":184},[213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,33,228,229,230,231,232,159,233,234],"winmd api search","search","api","windows","desktop","file access","enumeration","ui","ml","file","networking","capabilities","notifications","explore","access","features","full","camera","events","platform","methods","controls",{"skillNo":236,"name":237,"nameZh":6,"description":238,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":239,"licenseFileUrl":240,"sourceHtmlUrl":241,"categories":242,"keywords":248,"publishedAt":54},"01M6AE571R3SC1ZGE202B3NB5S","resemble-detect","Deepfake detection and media safety — detect AI-generated audio, images, video, and text, trace synthesis sources, apply watermarks, verify speaker identity, and analyze media intelligence using Resemble AI","Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresemble-detect\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresemble-detect\u002FSKILL.md",[243,244,247],{"categoryNo":209,"categoryName":210,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},{"categoryNo":245,"categoryName":246,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000016","图像与多媒体",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[249,156,222,250,251],"resemble detect","https","identity",{"skillNo":253,"name":254,"nameZh":6,"description":255,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":239,"licenseFileUrl":256,"sourceHtmlUrl":257,"categories":258,"keywords":263,"publishedAt":54},"01M6AE30BSK2HCY4TQQ22Z8JRD","quality-playbook","Run a complete quality engineering audit on any codebase. Derives behavioral requirements from the code, generates spec-traced functional tests, runs a three-pass code review with regression tests, executes a multi-model spec audit (Council of Three), and produces a consolidated bug report with TDD-verified patches. Finds the 35% of real defects that structural code review alone cannot catch. Works with any language. Trigger on 'quality playbook', 'spec audit', 'Council of Three', 'fitness-to-purpose', or 'coverage theater'.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fquality-playbook\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgithub\u002Fawesome-copilot\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fquality-playbook\u002FSKILL.md",[259,262],{"categoryNo":260,"categoryName":261,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000007","代码审查",{"categoryNo":24,"categoryName":25,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},[264,265,266,267,46,53,9,31,268,47,250,269,270,271,272,273,274,275,276,277,278,279,140,280,39,281,282],"playbook","quality playbook","quality","code review","tdd","report","spec","bug report","council","engineering","functional","spec audit","bug","verified","multi-model","three","coverage","regression","structural"]